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ABSTRACT 
Andrew Lawrence George 
Conservation Democracy: Ecology, Public Participation, & United States  
National Forest Management under the Healthy Forest Initiative  
(Under the direction of J. Robbie Cox) 
 
 
National forest management in the United States has traditionally included public 
participation in agency decision-making. Under the Bush Administration’s 2002 Healthy 
Forest Initiative, the rules governing citizen involvement were substantially modified.  A 
consequence of this was that the U.S. Forest Service was able to propose more 
commercial forestry in U.S. National Forests with less public oversight and 
environmental review previously mandated by the National Environmental Policy Act.  
This combined with other policy changes allowing use in sensitive areas with 
“extraordinary circumstances” that were previously off-limits to commercial activity.  
This North Carolina case study explores the effects of the Healthy Forest Initiative on 
citizen participation and environmental management in the Pisgah, Nantahala, Croatan, 
and Uwharrie National Forests. 
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CHAPTER ONE: DEMOCRATIC THEORY, CONSERVATION, & 
UNITED STATES NATIONAL FORESTS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Although there is consensus among most scholars regarding the legitimacy of 
democratic governance in United States National Forest management, there is less 
agreement over which democratic theory most adequately describes the actual 
structure or process of public participation involved in a specific decision.  There is even 
less known about the environmental outcomes from those decisions.  In the spirit of the 
Carolina motto, Lux Libertas, this dissertation attempts to shed light on these important 
topics.   
Unlike the centuries-old experiment with democratic rule, direct citizen 
involvement in resource management decisions emerged in the environmental era of 
the 1970’s.  Today, democratic theory provides an opportunity to explore the 
relationships between decision-making processes and their environmental 
consequences.   Through an interdisciplinary approach, this dissertation develops an 
understanding of the process embodied in the Bush Administration’s Healthy Forest 
Initiative.   
2 
This dissertation focuses on four democratic theories (elite, pluralist, 
deliberative, and agonistic) discussed in the policy and conservation literature that 
address U.S. Forest Service decision-making and environmental management.   
Presently, these include schools of thought about the rule of the demos (the common 
people) in modern Western liberal democracies: Elite democratic theory (Locke 1690; 
Madison 1723), Aggregative Pluralism (Dahl & Lindblom 1953, 1956), Deliberative 
Democracy (Rawls 1971; Habermas 1970, 1975), and Agonistic Pluralism (Mouffe 1999, 
2000).  Each theory corresponds with distinctly different operational management 
processes for public participation and U.S. National Forests (National Forests), including 
traditional resource management (Pinchot 1949), interest group representation (Lowi 
1965; Stewart 1975), collaborative management (Gray 1989; Wondolleck 1988, 1998; 
Leach et al. 2002) and direct, dissent-based conservation (Peterson et al. 2005; Cox 
2007).   
Traditional “elite” democratic theory advocates limits on citizen participation, to 
elections.  After a vote, according to this view, governance is rightly controlled by 
professionals who make technical decisions to ensure economic and political stability.  
Under the elite model, citizen involvement ends after elections install social elites who 
are entrusted with the control over governance (Schumpeter 1947, Mouffe 1999).   The 
other three more recent theories emerge from a separately defined category of 
“classical participation,” which calls for active citizen involvement in governance, or the 
“maximum public participation in all facets of political life” (Steelman 1996:1).  Under 
the ancient Greek or Jeffersonian understanding, classic participatory democracy 
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includes both instrumental and substantive benefits of involvement for the individual 
and the public.  This dissertation uses elite, pluralist, deliberative, and agonistic theory 
to analyze federal land decision-making in the United States and document ecological 
consequences of that management. 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
 Formally stated, this dissertation explores “Which democratic theory most 
accurately describes the Bush Administration’s Healthy Forest Initiative decision-making 
process, and how did the prevailing process affect forest management in North 
Carolina’s national forests?”   Given the four competing democratic theories and their 
value for understanding conflict-ridden environmental management, this dissertation is 
designed to explore which democratic theory most adequately explains the decision-
making processes and public participation characteristics under the Healthy Forest 
Initiative.  Furthermore, this study attempts to quantify how the prevailing decision-
making process affected forest management in U.S. National Forests using case study 
analysis from North Carolina’s Croatan, Nantahala, Pisgah, and Uwharrie National 
Forests.  
 
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 
Elite Democracy – Traditional Administrative Management  
There is much debate in the conservation and resource management literature 
on the question of which democratic theory most adequately explains the proper role of 
public participation in decision-making for land management.  Traditional resource 
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management literature weighs heavily toward the elite theory (Allen & Gould 1986; 
Twight & Lyden 1989).  This political philosophy was first introduced, broadly, in the 
United States by James Madison, during the country’s founding; it was later enshrined in 
the late 19th century by Gifford Pinchot and Progressives, who called for strict 
technocratic professional expertise to guide the formation of public lands.  Although the 
traditional elite structure came under challenge during the “participation explosion” of 
the 1960’s (Almond and Verba 1963:3), this democratic theory recently experienced 
resurgence under the George W. Bush Administration (Manring 2004; Teich et al. 2004; 
McCarthy 2005; Vaughn & Cortner 2005). 
Aggregative Pluralism – Interest Group Representation  
During the 1960’s, the elite model was eclipsed, in the literature, by aggregative 
pluralism as the dominant democratic structure for conservation and management 
(Schumpeter 1947; Dahl & Lindblom 1953, 1956, 1965).   This form of participation 
emphasizes interest group representation in a political arena.  Like elite democracy, the 
originators of aggregative pluralism reject the legitimacy of participation by individual 
citizens.  Under this democratic model, special interest groups compete with each other 
in a politically accountable forum without interference from individual members of the 
general public. 
Deliberative Democracy – Collaborative Management  
 Today, aggregative pluralism has come under criticism from proponents of 
emergent participatory theories emphasizing active participation by individual citizens 
and stakeholders who are perceived to be increasingly alienated by insular and conflict-
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ridden forms of interest group representation.  One of these contending theories is 
deliberative democracy (Rawls 1970, Habermas 1975).  This theory, embraced by 
proponents of collaborative management (Gray 1989, Wondolleck 1996, 1999), is 
defined by the adherence to consensus-models, free discourse, and rationality to 
achieve ethical agreements (Calhoun 1992; Benhabib 1996; Chambers 1996; Dryzek 
2000).   
 As a departure from interest group negotiations, deliberative theorists approach 
management decisions with “fair conditions” for debate.   According to deliberative 
theorists, these conditions include Habermas’ ”ideal speech situation” (1975) and 
Rawls’s “public reason” (1970) as an antidote to the conventional contentious decision-
making.  Presently, the resource management literature contains a collective wave of 
interest in collaborative decision-making, especially with regard to its application to 
environmental conflicts, yet empirical research on the environmental outcomes from 
collaboration is significantly lacking (Koontz & Thomas 2006). 
Agonistic Pluralism – Dissent-Based Conservation   
 The fourth and most recent decision-making structure described in the 
democratic and conservation literature is Agonism (Laclau & Mouffe 1985; Connolly 
1991; Honig 1993) or Agonistic Pluralism (Mouffe 2000).  These theorists address the 
role of conflict and direct participation, including forms of dissent-based conservation 
(Petersen MN et al. 2005, 2006, 2007; Cox 2007; Petersen T et al. 2007).  Like 
deliberative democracy, agonism emphasizes direct participation and the ascendancy of 
individual citizens in agency decision-making.  However, agonism’s distinctive central 
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contribution is the attention to the inevitability of conflict, (Arendt 1971; Connolly 1991; 
Honig 1993; Mouffe 1999, 2000).  These “ineradicable antagonisms” in Western liberal-
democratic societies are perceived as barriers to consensus- based deliberation or 
interest group compromise (Mouffe 2000).  Instead, dissent-expectant agonistic 
theorists accept the intractability of conflict in environmental decisions and calls for 
direct confrontation over scientific claims.  These conflicts require individuals to 
“challenge assumptions, debate scientific claims, identify areas of disagreement, and 
critically examine participants’ reasoning” (Peterson MN et al. 2006:576) through direct 
contest or argumentation. The purpose of this atmosphere of contest and challenge is 
perceived to be the most effective way to arrive at the most democratically healthy 
outcome. 
  Political theorists explain the tension between competing uses and demands as 
an inherent conflict within Western liberal-democratic governments.  This innate 
tension divides popular sovereignty of the majority and the liberty of private interests 
and individuals.  Given the nature of conflict in environmental management, agonistic 
democratic theorists and dissent-based conservationists call for navigating inherent 
tension between private interests and popular sovereignty by acknowledging this 
“democratic paradox” (Cox 2007; Peterson MN et al. 2007).  Agonism and “dissent-
based conservation” (Peterson MN et al. 2006:576) help develop an understanding of 
controversy surrounding “multiple-use” management for U.S. National Forests by 
acknowledging intractable aspects of conflict in resource management debates(Twight 
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& Lyden 1989, Coggins 1999; Moote and MaClaran 1997; Peterson MN et al. 2005, 2006, 
2007; Peterson T et al. 2006).   
 Since the founding of the U.S. Forest Service, public and private interests have 
wielded political and economic power, aiming to influence control over decision-making 
(see Chapter Four).  Much controversy surrounds the agency, which began in 1881 as 
the Bureau of Forestry and evolved into the modern U.S. Forest Service (Forest Service) 
under the U.S. Department of Agriculture.  Currently, the agency manages 155 national 
forests, 20 national grasslands, and 222 research and experimental forests on 192 
million acres of public land.  Today, the clash over competing and incompatible 
multiples uses of U.S. National Forests provides rich material for an exploration of 
conflict over environmental decision-making.  
FOREST MANAGEMENT 
 Policy-makers began experimenting with participatory democratic processes the 
“environmental era” beginning in the late 1960’s (Andrews 1999), after several high-
profile environmental controversies captured public attention.  These include the 
discovery of aminotriazole—a potent carcinogenic herbicide— in shipments of 
cranberries in 1959 (Dunlap 1981; Lear 1997); deformities found in newborn children 
from the drug thalidomide used by pregnant mothers (Dunlap 1981); radioactive 
Strontium-90 in the teeth of infants (Dunlap 1981:102), and findings in Rachel Carson’s 
Silent Spring (1962) addressing carcinogenic and deleterious affects of industrial 
chemical pollution on wildlife and humans.  These and other high profile environmental 
issues created a public backlash that moved the U.S. Congress to pass, and President 
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Nixon to sign the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 (Pub. L. 91-190, 42 U.S.C. 
4321-4347, January 1, 1970, as amended by Pub. L. 94-52, July 3, 1975, Pub. L. 94-83, 
August 9, 1975, and Pub. L. 97-258, § 4(b), Sept. 13, 1982) (NEPA).  NEPA was the 
nation’s first statutory law guaranteeing environmental analysis and public participation 
for major federal actions.  Today, NEPA’s procedural requirements are intended to guide 
Forest Service management (see Appendix A & B). 
During this time, many federal agencies came under increased scrutiny, including 
the Army Corps of Engineers (Maass 1950), the Bureau of Land Management (Foss 
1960), the Soil Conservation Service (Morgan 1965), and the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(Selznick 1949).  Although the Forest Service originally claimed exemption from NEPA, 
public outcry over federal land policy culminated with pivotal political and legal events 
highlighting controversial Forest Service commercial logging practices.   
Until the 1960’s, the Forest Service was known as a corps of professional 
foresters forged during the Progressive era, which emphasized expertise-based, 
technocratic decision-making (Steelman 1996).  However, with the publications of The 
Bolle Report (1970) and The Church Guidelines (1971), as well as the federal district 
court ruling on Izaak Walton League v. Butz (522 F.2d 945 4th Circuit, 1975), a 
groundswell of opposition was directed toward the agency and its adherence to the 
traditional “elite” administrative model (Sax 1971, 1975; Stewart 1975; Jones and Taylor 
1995; Hirt 1994, Andrews 1999; Steelman 1999, Hays 2007).    
More specifically, the public reacted to Forest Service monoculture plantation 
farming and industrial clearcutting in national forests, which were forms of commercial 
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forestry the agency embraced since the post-World War II housing boom (Hirt 1995).  
The Bolle Report criticized the Forest Service’s commercial forestry management in 
Montana’s Bitterroot National Forest, including logging on steep-slopes, terracing, and 
plantation tree-farming (Bolle 1970).  The Church Guidelines, named for Senator Frank 
Church (1971), recommended the end of clearcut logging in “highly scenic land, land 
with fragile soils, land with low reforestation potential, and land where reforestation or 
environmentally acceptable harvesting would be uneconomical" (Wilkinson 1992:142).   
The third pivotal event was Izaak Walton League v. Butz (552 F.2d 945, 4th Cir. 
1975) (Monongahela), a significant Fourth Circuit District Court decision—like the Bolle 
(1970) and Church (1971) publications—challenging fundamental assumptions about the 
traditional elite decision-making structure for Forest Service management of national 
forests.  The Monongahela ruling enjoined the agency from logging in the Monongahela 
National Forest and throughout the Fourth Circuit, which included all the national 
forests in West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina.   
Public Participation 
As a judicial check to elite decision-making, the Monongahela decision created a 
political vacuum that the U.S. Congress filled in 1976 by passing the National Forest 
Management Act (NFMA) (16 U.S.C. §1604(6)(3)(E)-(F)).  Congress rewrote federal law 
to balance competing demands for conservation and resource extraction, which meant 
striking a compromise that created the first opportunities for citizens to actively 
participate in Forest Service planning and management  (Fortenbery & Harris 1983; 
Parent 1992; Andrews 1999).  Although the Forest Service considered itself exempt from 
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NEPA’s statutory protections, the passage of NFMA established—for the first time—the 
legally guaranteed requirement for citizen involvement in long-term planning and 
forest-wide management in national forests (Hirt 1994; Andrews 1999).   
Although NFMA established the right of citizen participation in the creation and 
revision of forest-wide plans, the public was not formally involved in the 
implementation of those plans at the site-specific, project-level until 1992 when the U.S. 
Congress passed the National Forest Decision-making and Appeals Reform Act (ARA) 
(Pub. L. No. 102-381, § 322, 106 Stat. 1419 (1992) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1612)).  This 
new law codified the right of citizens to be notified, comment, and permitted to file 
administrative appeals challenging particular project-level decisions.  Although the 
agency had an objection process since its founding in 1905, the formal administrative 
appeals process was not guaranteed until 1989, when U.S. Senators, provoked by a 1989 
Forest Service proposal to eliminate the appeals process, passed the only statutory 
protections specifically guaranteeing these kinds of challenges to federal agency 
decisions (Coulombe 2004). 
Most conservation scholars agree that statutory requirements for public 
participation have opened Forest Service decision-making to more ecological, non-
consumptive considerations (Baldwin 1992; Kessler et al. 1992; Jones & Mohai 1995; 
Jones & Taylor 1995), facilitated direct exchange with decision makers (Moote and 
McClaran 1997), and promoted accountability by federal agencies (Kaufman 1960; 
Coggins 1999; Manring 2004).  Forest-wide policies requiring citizen involvement in 
agency decision-making have contributed to moving “the Forest Service toward the 
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adoption of the ecosystem-based policy of sustainable forest management that now 
better reflects public values and scientific opinion” (Manring 2004:70), which leads to 
“more ecologically sensitive and socially acceptable project designs” (Teich et al.: 
2004:15).  Other authors have asserted that citizen oversight and participation have 
compelled “the Forest Service to comply with environmental laws and regulations” 
(Manring 2004:62) and adhere to environmental laws more closely (Baldwin 1992:2).  
Today, there is almost universal agreement among both conservation and 
resource management scholars that citizen participation (through group representation 
and independent participation of individuals) has transformed the Forest Service over 
the past 40-years.  There is little empirical research, however, documenting the role of 
this public input for site-specific project-level decisions (Mohai 1987; Teich et al. 2004).  
Among the notable exceptions is an independent study of public participation at the 
project level (although not addressing ecological outcomes) conducted by Teich, 
Vaughn, & Cortner (2004), who demonstrated that the comment and appeals process is 
most commonly used by unaffiliated private citizens and public conservation 
organizations (2004:16). These traditionally underrepresented groups (Stewart 1975; 
Twight & Lyden 1989; Jones and Mohai; 1995; Steelman 1999; Overdevest 2000) filed 
comments and appeals to challenge resource extraction projects more than any project-
type (Teich et al. 2004:17).  Therefore, the citizen comment and administrative appeal 
process provides opportunities for underrepresented individuals and groups to directly 
participate in national forest management at the site-specific project level. 
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Healthy Forest Initiative 
 On August 22, 2002, President George W. Bush announced changes to established 
policies for public participation and environmental analysis in national forest decision-
making to address perceived management gridlock that was producing unhealthy forest 
conditions ripe for large wildfires and insect outbreaks.    This regulatory package, called 
the ““Healthy Forests: An Initiative for Wildfire Prevention and Stronger Communities,” 
commonly known as the Healthy Forests Initiative” (White House 2002) was proposed 
as a way to address an alleged “analysis paralysis” and “process predicament,” 
(Bosworth 2002) by removing the ARA’s notice, comment (36 C.F.R. § 215.4(a)), and 
administrative appeals process (36 C.F.R. § 215.12(f)) for expedited management 
projects.  This restriction on public participation, commonly known as the “Appeals 
Rule,” also included a long list of other policy changes (described in Chapter Six).   
 The HFI relied on a special class or permit system, called “Categorical Exclusion” 
(CE), for project-level management actions that are exempted from NEPA’s conventional 
Environmental Assessment (EA) or Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) process.  
Federal regulations define categorical exclusions as "a category of actions which do not 
individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment" (40 
CFR 1508.4).   In addition to the existing CE’s used by the Forest Service, the HFI Appeals 
Rule also applied to five new classes of CE’s for “Hazardous Fuels Reduction” (CE 10), 
“Post-fire Rehabilitation” (CE 11), “Limited” commercial logging (CE 12), “Salvage” 
logging for weather-related disturbance (CE 13), and “Sanitation” logging related to 
insect outbreaks (CE 14).  The Forest Service’s use of CE’s is highly controversial 
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(Moriarty 2004, Vaughan 2006; GAO 2007, Sutley 2010).  
 The HFI regulation changes modified the spatial and temporal scales of public 
participation in federal lands planning (Manring 2004) by reducing the days for 
comment, eliminating environmental analysis, and, in some cases, requiring face-to-face 
collaborative management or deliberation.  Specifically, the HFI eliminated the 
longstanding guarantee for public participation in forest-wide planning (NFMA, 36 CFR 
217), as well as the requirement for notice, comment, and administrative appeal for 
project-level decisions (ARA, 36 CFR 215).  In some cases, existing public participation 
processes were replaced with “cooperative conservation” (Bush 2004) planning 
processes that rely on collaborative management procedures (CE 10; Stewardship 
Contracts). 
 In 2005, the U.S. 9th Circuit of Appeals ruled in favor of environmental plaintiffs 
(CIV F-03-6386 JKS, 2005) (Earth Island v Ruthenbeck) and invalidated several 
components of the HFI regulations, including portions of the Appeals Rule.  On March 3, 
2009, the U.S. Supreme Court threw out the 9th Circuit judgment on a 5-4 decision based 
on a technicality (standing) and reinstated the HFI (Summers V. Earth Island Institute 
(No. 07-463) 490 F. 3d 687)).  Following the U.S. Supreme Court ruling, the Forest 
Service reinstated the HFI public participation regulations in July of 2009.  On December 
19, 2009, the case has been resubmitted in federal court once again. 
 The current study seeks to take advantage of fluctuations in regulatory regimes 
that create the conditions for a rare natural experiment in which public participation 
requirements were suspended for approximately three years before federal courts 
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invalided the policy.  Nationwide, the Forest Service used these new regulations to 
exempt over 72 percent of the project-level decisions between 2003 and 2005 (GAO 
2007).  This study explores the specific management projects (n=67), as well as the 
public participation in those decisions, to gain a better understanding of the decision-
making and ecological consequences of the HFI. 
 
SELECTION OF NORTH CAROLINA’S CROATAN, NANTAHALA, PISGAH AND 
UWHARRIE NATIONAL FORESTS  
 The Healthy Forest Initiative’s emphasis on CE projects requires a research 
design that addresses the implementation of site-specific participation and 
environmental outcomes.  According to the GAO (2007), from 2003-2005 the Forest 
Service proposed 633 CE projects covering 1,600 acres in the Southeastern U.S. (Region 
8), which represents the largest number of projects and total acreage when compared 
to any other Forest Service region in the country.  Of all the CE’s issued nationwide from 
2003 through 2005, for example, the GAO found Region 8 accounted for over 29 percent 
of the vegetation management CE projects conducted nationally.  The GAO also showed 
the number of CE’s proposed from 2003 through 2005 in North Carolina (n=32) was well 
above the national average (20).    
North Carolina’s 1,251,710 million acres of national forests also contain the most 
representative sample of geographic and demographic variation among the four forests 
covering the Southern Appalachian Blue Ridge Mountains, the Piedmont, and the 
Coastal region.  No other state in the region contains forest types from each of the 
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available Blue-Ridge, Piedmont, and Mid-Atlantic Coastal eco-regions.   The state also 
has highly-populated cities within a few hours driving distance of each forest, including 
the Pisgah National Forest, which is ranks second behind the Angeles National Forest in 
California as the most heavily visited national forest in the country. 
Figure 1.  North Carolina National Forests Adapted from the US Forest 
Service. 
 
 
 
Within the Blue Ridge Eco-region, the Nantahala and Pisgah cover 1,041,451 
acres.   The Pisgah National Forests (510,119 acres), was sold by the Vanderbilt family in 
1916 as part of the first tract of land purchased under the Weeks Act (see Chapter Four). 
Today, the forest is divided into the Appalachian, Pisgah, and Grandfather Ranger 
Districts.  The Nantahala National Forest, created in 1920 as part of the Weeks Act in 
western North Carolina, is the largest federal forest (531,338 acres) in the state.  Until 
2006, the Nantahala National Forest was divided into the Highlands, Tusquitee, Cheoah, 
and Wayah Ranger Districts.  After the consolidation, the new Nantahala District was 
formed when the Forest Service merged the Highlands Ranger District in Macon, 
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Jackson, and Transylvania counties with the Wayah Ranger District adjacent to the 
Cherokee Indian Reservation in Macon, Swain, and Jackson counties.    
Although these national forests were substantially logged at the beginning of the 
20th century (Hays 1959), a May 2000 a report on “Old-Growth Forest Communities in 
the Nantahala-Pisgah National Forest,” compiled by Rob Messick, documented 77,000 
acres of old growth forests in the Pisgah and Nantahala National Forests (Davis 1996).  
Additionally, a report entitled “The Southern Appalachian Assessment” (1996) 
documented 32 inventoried roadless areas totaling 152,378 acres in the national 
forests.   “Twenty-one of these roadless areas include a total of 28,506 acres of old 
growth. Thus, 37% of the delineated Nantahala-Pisgah old growth lies with inventoried 
roadless areas” (Davis 1996).   
Established in 1936, the Croatan National Forest occupies 159,886 acres in North 
Carolina’s Mid-Atlantic Coastal Plain (Griffith et al. 2002).  Given that the forest is 
smaller than most districts found in the national forests in the Blue Ridge Eco-region, 
the Croatan has only one ranger district by the same name.  In an area was once 
dominated by longleaf pine savanna, the forest has become a patchwork of pine-
plantations and second-generation longleaf stands (Frost 2000).  Previous logging and 
fire-suppression activities have replaced the native systems with tightly managed crops 
of loblolly pine, although scattered longleaf pine and pond pine forests remain (Frost 
2000). 
The 50,373-acre Uwharrie National Forest (Uwharrie) was first purchased by the 
federal government in 1931, and was officially proclaimed national forest land in 1961.  
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The Uwharrie is in Montgomery, Randolph, and Davidson Counties in the Carolina Slate 
Belt of the Piedmont eco-region (Griffith et al. 2002).  Although it is the smallest federal 
forest in state, it contains Uwharrie Mountains, which geologists consider some of the 
oldest mountains in North America, created from an ancient chain of volcanoes.  This 
forest is substantially managed for commercial forestry, off-road vehicle use, biking, and 
hunting.   
National Forests in North Carolina also have unique histories with respect to 
controversial Forest Service management, including an appeal over the 1987 Forest 
Planning process (Syden 1998), the 1997 Bluff Mountain controversy in Hot Springs 
North Carolina (Syden 1997), a 1999 forest-wide moratorium on logging in the 
Nantahala National Forest after the discovery of undocumented endangered Indiana 
Bats (Bagby 1999), and the 1999 Sierra Club v Martin case (48 ERC 1251, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 
20,569) which shut down logging projects in national forests in North Carolina and 
throughout the Southeast.   
This history of conflict over national forest management in North Carolina 
provides an explanation for the uncommonly large number of public comments (n=171) 
for the projects identified for this research (see Chapter Seven).  This is surprising given 
that CE projects are relatively obscure and are only allowed under NEPA if they “do not 
individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the quality of the human 
environment” (40 CFR1508.4).   This experience with public involvement makes North 
Carolina a worthy case study.   
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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES & CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 To answer these timely questions, this dissertation focuses on the public 
participation and forest management practices affiliated with the Healthy Forest 
Initiative for national forests in North Carolina from 2003 through 2008.  This study 
intends to inform the debate over democratic decision-making theories (elite, 
pluralistic, collaborative, and agonistic) by addressing their application to project-level, 
site-specific management.  This study also employs interdisciplinary methodologies to 
explain how the prevailing democratic process affected the management of species 
composition and ecological systems within the national forests.    
To evaluate the prevailing decision-making processes present in national forest 
management in North Carolina, characteristics of different democratic theories were 
identified in the literature (see Chapter Two).   Based on a design adapted from 
Steelman’s study (1996), which used two categories (elite and participatory), the current 
study used characteristics displayed in Table 1 to provide a framework for evaluating 
whether elite, pluralistic, deliberative, or agonistic democratic theories most adequately 
explained the processes for 67 HFI projects issued in North Carolina.  Finally, additional 
evidence from statistical modeling was used to identify patterns in the data to further 
explain the democratic processes and forest management present in the Healthy Forest 
Initiative. 
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Table 1 .  Characteristics Of Elite, Pluralist, Deliberative, And Agonistic Democratic 
Theories * 
 ELITE PLURALISTIC DELIBERATIVE AGONISTIC 
ROLE OF THE 
PUBLIC 
Limited/Passive Represented 
by interest 
groups 
Represented by 
stakeholders 
Active Citizens 
LOCUS OF 
POWER 
Vested in Elite Vested in 
interest groups 
Stakeholder 
Collaboration 
Vested in 
Individuals 
VALUE OF 
DEMOCRACY 
Instrumental; as 
a means 
Instrumental Intrinsic Intrinsic 
VIEW OF 
FOREST 
SERVICE 
Idealistic. 
Trusting and 
competent 
Moderates the 
Political Arena 
Devolved Skeptical 
PRIMARY 
CONCERN 
Efficiency and 
stability 
Political 
Accountability 
Conflict 
resolution 
Growth of 
Individual 
LOCUS OF 
PARTICIPATION 
Voting, ratifying 
leadership 
Interest group 
negotiations 
Consensus 
driven Local 
deliberation 
Local 
participation, 
Dissent-based 
negotiation, 
argumentation 
VIEW OF THE 
PUBLIC 
Disinterested 
Skeptical, 
Malleable, 
Apathetic, 
Uneducated 
Disinterested 
Skeptical, 
Malleable, 
Apathetic 
 
Legitimate, 
Knowledgeable 
Legitimate, 
Knowledgeable, 
Diverse, Active 
*  Adapted from Steelman (1996) 
 
The process and participant characteristics were evaluated using categories 
outlined in the conceptual framework from Chapter Three and analyzed in Chapter 
Seven (Figure 2).  These characteristics were evaluated to determine whether the 
presence of elite, pluralistic, deliberative, or agonistic theories were confirmed.   
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Following the analysis of democratic traits, this dissertation includes a discussion 
of forest management authorized under the Healthy Forest Initiative in North Carolina.  
These environmental outcomes were evaluated using policy and project characteristics 
explained in Chapter Eight to identify the prevailing forest management approach.  
Figure Two outlines the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter Three and analyzed 
in Chapter Eight. 
 
Figure 2.  Conceptual Framework for Research Design: Decision-Making Process. 
Decision-making process   = f  (Process Characteristics  +  Participant Characteristics) 
Decision-Making Process  Process Characteristics Participant Characteristics 
Elite 
Aggregative Pluralistic 
Deliberative Democracy 
Agonistic 
 
Scoping Comments 
HFI Appeals Rule 
Collaboration 
 
Who participated 
What they said 
How they said it 
Figure 3.  Conceptual Framework for Research Design:  Forest Management. 
  
Forest Management = f  (Policy Characteristics + Project Characteristics) 
 
Forest Management Policy Characteristics Project Characteristics 
Commodity forestry 
Ecological forestry 
 
Extraordinary Circumstances 
Categorical Exclusions 
 
Where project occurred 
What occurred 
When project occurred 
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OVERVIEW OF DATA COLLECTION AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
Records research and archival analysis were used to identify all individual 
project-level management actions in North Carolina beginning in 2003 with the 
promulgation of the Healthy Forest Initiative.  This included discovery and analysis of 
public and internal Forest Service and General Accounting Office (GAO) publications and 
databases with the names and locations of all CE projects in North Carolina.  These 
projects became the units of analysis for this study.   
When this dissertation was initiated, no central database of these projects 
existed; the only way to identify CE management actions was a non-standardized 
schedule of proposed actions (SOPA) published quarterly on the Forest Service’s 
website.  Although many of the projects announced on the SOPA were inaccurate, 
incomplete, and poorly identified, this information provided enough data to produce a 
rough list of the projects in North Carolina.  This list was then verified using data from a 
2007 GAO study of all Forest Service projects nationally from 2003-2005.  On March 25, 
2009, the GAO released their data collection instrument and spreadsheets to the author 
for the purposes of this dissertation. 
 During the summer of 2009, the Forest Service Region 8 Headquarters in 
Atlanta, GA acknowledged that the agency had developed an internal database called 
the Planning, Appeals and Litigation (PAL) tracking system.  On June 19, employees from 
the Forest Service Supervisors Office in Asheville, North Carolina, released a digital 
report of PAL of all projects of interest in the Croatan, Pisgah, Nantahala, and Uwharrie 
National Forests beginning in 2003.   
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After a July 6 2009, Freedom of Information Act (PL 89-554, 80 Stat. 383) (FOIA); 
request was filed by the author to obtain copies of the individual project files listed in 
the PAL report, the Forest Service Region 8 Headquarters in Atlanta approved the FOIA 
and determined that the research adequately met the criteria for a fee waiver.  On 
October 2, 2009, the Supervisors Office began releasing copies of the individual project 
files listed in the FOIA, which included all public comments (n=171), environmental 
surveys, and internal Forest Service correspondence.  On December 1, 2009, the final 
project file was received from the Forest Service.  Each project file contained a Decision 
Memo explaining the District Ranger’s decision, a Biological Evaluation documenting 
potential extraordinary circumstances, public comments about the projects, and other 
records. 
A content analysis of the comments documented in the project files was 
conducted to determine the process and participant characteristics for each project.  
Policy and project characteristics were identified using the Decision Memos and 
Biological Evaluations (required for each CE project) to determine the nature of the 
individual projects with respect to the size, location, and composition of rare species 
occurring, or potentially occurring, in each project.  These documents allowed for the 
classification of the forest management characteristics of individual projects.  Archival 
data included Forest Service project announcements published in local papers and other 
records and transcripts, used to corroborate findings from the records research and 
content analysis.  
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This dissertation attempts to bridge the democratic theory, conservation, and 
resource management literatures using an interdisciplinary (Klein 1990) or 
transdisciplinary (Jantsch 1970) approach, incorporating both social and natural science 
methodologies to better explain how citizen participation and processes affect 
environmental outcomes of site-specific management.  Because conflict over national 
forest decision-making has been present since the creation of federal public land, the 
problem-centered, social/natural science orientation dimensions of this study are most 
appropriately explored through interdisciplinary approaches to address similar 
questions arising from different fields of study.  Moreover, this study uses a 
“transdisciplinary” approach to move beyond “free” or “basic” research towards a “field 
induced,” problem-centered study (Klein 1990), which allows for the research to inform 
applied, timely questions that are inaccessible through the traditional discipline silos.  In 
short, this approach intends to broaden the scope of the research question beyond the 
traditional scholarship (Jantsch 1970).   
STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 This dissertation’s next chapter includes a review of the resource management, 
conservation, and public policy literatures to explore the dimensions of the debate over 
democratic theory and national forest management.  Chapter Three provides a 
discussion of the methodologies for this study, including records research, content 
analysis, and archival data analysis.   Chapter Four provides the context for the case 
study by addressing history of conservation, with an emphasis on commercial forestry, 
ecological forestry, and conservation biology.  Chapter Five provides a history of federal 
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land management, public participation, and environmental law in the U.S.   Chapter Six 
provides context for, and characteristics of the Healthy Forest Initiative, as well as the 
legal challenges invalidating portions of this Bush Administration policy change.   
Chapter Seven provides an analysis of public participation in North Carolina’s CE 
projects, with an emphasis on processes and participants.   Chapter Eight addresses the 
forest management and environmental outcomes of decisions addressed in Chapter 
Seven.  Chapter Nine concludes by providing an interdisciplinary lens to synthesize the 
analysis and provide potential policy recommendations arising from this study.  
 
SUMMARY 
 Debates over democratic decision-making and ecology have emerged in several 
literatures.  Four unique democratic theories—elite, pluralist, collaborative, and 
agonistic— address compelling questions for U.S. National Forest conservation conflicts 
that are identified and examined in this dissertation.  The research questions for this 
study were:  What decision-making structure dominated forest management activities 
in North Carolina under the Healthy Forest Initiative, and how did the prevailing 
decision-making process affect conservation for site-specific projects?  Sixty-seven 
categorical exclusion projects in the Croatan, Nantahala, Pisgah and Uwharrie National 
Forests were identified and analyzed according to the process, participant, policy, and 
project characteristics for each site-specific proposal.   
  
CHAPTER TWO: DEMOCRATIC THEORY, ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT, & U.S.  NATIONAL FORESTS 
 
 
These conflicts not only call for the highest order of skill, but involve decisions so 
weighty in their consequence, and so needful of permanence and correlation, that 
only the highest authority should make them. 
Leopold, 1948 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The word ‘democracy’ originates from the Greek demokratia and first emerged 
in the English language during the sixteenth century after it was translated from the 
French word democratie (Held 2006).  The root words demos (people) and kratia (rule) 
refer to a form of government emerging in the fifth century BC that was distinct from 
aristocracies or monarchies and run by a new economically and militarily independent 
group of free adult males of strictly Athenian decent (Held 2006).  Specifically, these 
citizens participated in “giving judgment and holding office” (Aristotle in Held 2006:167).  
Today, the debate focusing on the utility of different democratic theories (elite, 
pluralistic, collaborative, and agonistic) provides for a rich exploration of the 
contemporary application of this longstanding experiment with the rule of the people 
(see Table 2).   
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Table 2.  Overview of the Democratic Theories and Corresponding 
Management Approaches Identified in this chapter. 
Theory Operational Management   
Democratic Elitism Traditional Resource Management 
Aggregative Pluralism Interest Group Representation 
Deliberative Democracy Collaborative Management 
Agonistic Democracy Dissent-Based Conservation 
 
 This chapter addresses competing democratic theories in the conservation, 
resource, and policy literature, each of which attempt to explain how public 
participation in agency decision-making affects Forest Service management of U.S. 
National Forests.  These theories include traditional democratic elitism, interest-group 
pluralism, and emergent participatory theories, including deliberative democracy (Rawls 
1971, 2005; Habermas 1975, 1978, 1981, 2001, 2005) and agonism (Arendt 1958; 
Connolly 1971, 1991; Mouffe 1985, 1999, 2000, 2005; Honig 1993, 2001).  These authors 
have inspired substantial debate in different literatures, including resource 
management (Wondolleck 1988, 1996, 1999, 2000; USDA 2002; Mortimer 2003; Leach 
2005a, 2005b), conservation (McCloskey 1999, 2000, 2001; Coggins 2001; Peterson MN 
et al. 2005, 2006, 2007; Peterson T et al. 2006; Cox 2006, 2007), and public policy 
(Dryzek 1990, 2004, 2006, 2007; Tuler & Webler 1999; Webler &Tuler 2000, 2006; Smith 
& McDonough 2001, Poncelet 2001, Kapoor 2002, Parkins & Mitchell 2005).   
 These theories directly relate to ongoing debates about federal land 
management (Kessler et al. 1992, Jones & Mohai 1995; Jones & Taylor 1995; Baldwin 
1997, Moote and McClaran 1997, Coggins 1999; Beierle 2000, 2001; Steelman 2001, 
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Manring 2005; Peterson MN et al. 2005, 2006, 2007; Peterson T et al. 2006, Parkins & 
Mitchell 2005).  This chapter describes the democratic theories present in the different 
literatures to guide an analysis of the Healthy Forest Initiative (HFI) and the subsequent 
effects for public participation in national forest management.  Chapter Seven and Eight 
provide an analysis of the affects of HFI rule changes on public participation and 
conservation in national forests in North Carolina. 
ELITE DEMOCRATIC THEORY 
 Except for office-holders and elected representatives, the ancient Greeks would 
have found few contemporaries in the United States of a ‘democratic citizenry.’  Instead, 
democratic elitism, the dominant political theory until the 1960’s, vests all decision-
making power, except voting, in the hands of elected and appointed decision-makers.  
In this structure, the role of the individual citizen is “thin” (Barber 1984).   Democratic 
elitism theory holds a skeptical view about the ability of the public to contribute 
meaningfully to decisions that should, they assert, instead be left in the hands of 
political representatives.  Democratic elitism calls for only the most restricted role of the 
individual in active governance. 
Skepticism about an active citizenry, says Held (1987), dates back to the early 
Christian faith in a higher source of authority and wisdom, which eventually eclipsed the 
role of the philosopher king.   “In sharp contrast to the Greek view that the polis was the 
embodiment of political good, the Christian worldview insisted that the good lay in 
submission to God’s will” (Held 1987:37).  During the 17th century, social contract 
theorists and political individualists provided support for the perceived role of the 
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citizen under forms of democracy consistent with the elite model of democracy.  
Thomas Hobbes proposed an idea of the society ordered by a social contract that 
accounts for individual rights of independent citizens who agreed to allow sovereign 
powers to protect them from the brutality and chaos in the state of nature.  Hobbes 
called for citizens to “give up” the right to govern themselves in exchange for “peace 
and defense” (1651).   Later, John Locke later tried to improve Hobbes’ social contract 
by developing an understanding of ‘natural rights,’ where citizens entrusted 
governments with the authority to guarantee one’s rights to life, liberty, and property, 
unless the sovereign became tyrannical and triggered the legitimate power of the 
masses to revolt (1690).     
Modern elite theory in America has an intellectual lineage dating back to James 
Madison, whose contribution before and during the Constitutional Convention and in 
the Federalists Papers (1788) profoundly shapes our understanding of democracy.  
(Steelman 1996)  Like the European social contract theorists, Madison wrestled with 
paradoxical relationship between full equality of citizens and the unchecked power (i.e. 
“tyranny”) of the “popular majority.”  Concerned about threats to a wealthy and 
powerful minority (Dahl 1956), Madison argued “the accumulation of all powers, 
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, 
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny” (Federalist No. 40).  The 
majority would be restricted by the protections under the Constitution that prevented 
it, according to Madison, from otherwise sacrificing the public good and the rights of a 
concentrated minority interest group (Steelman 1996).   
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In his “Observations” paper and the Federalist No. 49, Madison called for 
external checks to restrain the popular majority and provide safeguards in case electoral 
process could not prevent “all powers” from accumulating into the same hands (1788).  
These measures evolved into the network of constitutional checks and balances, 
including the presidential veto power, the filibuster, a bicameral Congress, Presidential 
nomination and Senatorial confirmation of appointments, judicial review, Senatorial 
‘curtsey’, and “almost every organizational technique that promises to provide a check 
on any indefinable group of political leaders” (Dahl 1956:15).  According to Madison, 
without these checks, the will of the majority would lead to instability, injustice, and 
confusion (1788).  
Traditional Resource Management 
The Industrial Revolution reinforced the legitimacy of elite democratic 
governance by providing a justification for excluding the general public in favor of 
technocratic “experts” unqualified to steer the country through the modernization of 
the late 19th century.  The Progressive theory of governance, rising after a wave of 
populism and political turmoil at the beginning of the 20th century, adopted the 
philosophy closely following the elite model.  According to the Progressives, professional 
managers and scientific experts--- not “uneducated masses”--- would steer agencies 
toward a level of efficiency providing “the greatest good to the greatest number for the 
longest time” (Pinchot 1910).  Progressives created government agencies (e.g. the U.S.  
Forest Service) endowed with a “gospel of efficiency” (Hays 1959) and scientific 
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expertise they believed would allow apolitical administrators to dispassionately secure 
the broad public interest (Andrews 1999).  (See Chapter Four). 
By the 1950’s, elite democratic theory dominated political and bureaucratic 
management in the United States.   Some justified this dominance with support from 
empirical studies showing elite decision-makers were more supportive of democratic 
rights than average citizens.  Stouffer (1955), for example, found the general public was 
relatively intolerant and unsupportive of individual rights and freedoms, which 
contrasted with influential elites who were found to be less repressive, more committed 
to democratic principles, and fairer in applying those principles (discussed below).   
According to democratic elite theories, decision-makers were the “carriers of the 
democratic creed" (Prothro and Grigg 1960) and the "guardians of democracy" (Sullivan 
and Barnum, 1987).  These findings supported elite theorists’ claims about the 
presumed wisdom of restricting citizen participation in governance.  In addition to 
Stouffer's central finding in his influential 1955 study, Key (1961), McClosky (1964), 
Nunn, Crockett, and Williams (1978), McClosky and Brill (1983), Sullivan and Barnum 
(1987), and others produced studies addressing this central thesis.   Democratic elitism 
theory argued that decision-makers were the purveyors of democratic values who 
provided a check against the potential tyranny of the majority. 
In 1967, Bachrach published an influential critical analysis of “Democratic 
elitism,” which he criticized as an attempt to “legitimate elite power and the 
minimization of citizen participation” (1988:18) and defective on normative and 
empirical grounds.    Although his paper was originally rejected throughout his field 
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(only one journal reviewed his paper before rejecting it), Bachrach’s main argument was 
eventually supported by many in his field.  Leading political scientists, like Dahl and 
Lindblom for example, originally defended elite democratic theory but later called for 
radically restructuring power in the United States to promote more direct forms of 
democracy and individual dignity (Bachrach 1988). 
Environmental Era 
 These criticisms of the elite model coincided with the rise of the “environmental 
era” (Andrews 1999:13) beginning in the late 1960’s in the United States. The limits of 
the traditional elite model created a vacuum filled by participatory forms of democracy -
-- at least for organized interest groups.  Several high-profile environmental 
controversies trigger a substantial backlash against the traditional elite model and the 
tendency for “agencies and their administrators … to act on behalf of particular personal 
and political views of the public interest, which were neither scientific or consensual” 
(Andrews 1999:219).  Above-ground nuclear weapons testing during the 1950’s, for 
example, caused alarm after radioactive Strontium-90 was found in the teeth of 
deformed infants, despite assurances from scientists and agency administrators about 
the safety of nuclear testing in the atmosphere (Andrews 1999).  Fallout from these 
tests spread the isotope strontium 90 across the globe, where it was absorbed by grass 
and then transferred up the food chain into the bones and teeth of nursing infants 
whose mothers consumed cow milk contaminated with the radioactive particle.  
(Dunlap 1981:102)   “Suddenly, the authoritative reassurances of government scientists 
were proven false,” (Andrews 1999:212).   
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 Another high profile controversy erupted in November 1959, seventeen days 
before Thanksgiving, after a potent carcinogenic herbicide, aminotriazole, was found in 
shipments of cranberries from Oregon and Washington.  This discovery raised doubts 
about the Food and Drug Administration’s ability to regulate the use of toxic chemicals 
for farming (Dunlap 1981; Lear 1997).   Aminotriazole was used by farmers who 
improperly applied the toxic herbicide beyond safe levels to boost yields and profits, in 
violation of clear regulations governing their use (Bosso 1987:96).   The National Cancer 
Institute’s warnings about the dangers of the cranberries triggered a massive public 
scare that lead the Secretary of the Food and Drug Administration to impound millions 
of pounds of berries and urge consumers to stop eating them.  This public reaction was 
later described as “the first shot… for the nascent environmental movement… in a 
campaign to raise public fears about cancer from synthetic chemicals in food and water” 
(Wildavsky 1995 in Andrews 1999:214). 
 If the cranberry scare of 1959 raised the first doubts about to traditional elite 
model for environmental management, the findings about dangerous industrial 
chemicals in Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) would strike the most damaging blow 
to established faith in technocratic administrators.  Born in 1907, Carson began her 
career with early literary success as a wildlife and naturalist writer, whose first book in 
1951, Sea Around Us, won the national book award after remaining on the New York 
Times best-seller list for a record 86 weeks.  As one of the first female professionals at 
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, she began following reports of problems 
with the “wonder-pesticide” DDT introduced in the wake of WWII.  Farmers began using 
33 
“as much as two pounds of the poison per acre on crops like cotton, and its effects were 
showing up throughout the food chain, especially in birds” (McKibben 2008:365).   
 Silent Spring was published in 1962 after being serialized in The New Yorker, in 
which Carson famously wrote how “some evil spell had settled on the community: 
mysterious maladies swept the flocks of chickens; the cattle and sheep sickened and 
died.  Everywhere was a shadow of death.”  In her chapter, “Nature Fights Back,” Carson 
described how chemicals destroyed the natural ability of healthy ecosystems to keep 
pests in check, and killed the good and bad insects while leaving the most resistant, 
genetic selected super-pests.  Carson warned the loss of environmental resistance 
would unleash large outbreaks of disease spreading and crop destroying insects.   
This fear about silencing spring also produced an “ecocentric” or ecologically 
conscientious perspective, which was concerned with the threats from toxic chemicals 
to not just birds and fish but also humans. Carson’s work trigged a massive media 
campaign against her by the chemical industry’s Monsanto and Dow companies who 
criticized her as a “hysterical” “little old lady in tennis shoes” with no scientific expertise 
or evidence (Murphy 2005:106, 145).   When these attacks failed, the elite traditional 
decision-making model continued to lose legitimacy, and “the idea had been firmly 
planted that perhaps modernity was not as problem-free as we might have imagined.  
From that notion sprang most of what has followed for environmentalism” (McKibben 
2007:365).   
These and other high profile environmental crises created a public backlash that 
moved the U.S.  Congress to pass, and President Nixon to sign, the National 
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Environmental Policy Act of 1970 (Pub. L. 91-190, 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347, January 1, 1970, 
as amended by Pub. L. 94-52, July 3, 1975, Pub. L. 94-83, August 9, 1975, and Pub. L. 97-
258, § 4(b), Sept. 13, 1982) (NEPA), the nation’s first statutory law guaranteeing 
environmental analysis and public involvement for major federal actions (see Chapter 
Five and Six).  The elite democratic model was being eclipsed by more participatory 
processes. 
Over the next few decades, aggregative pluralism (discussed below) would 
slowly replace the traditional elite administrative framework to become the dominate 
democratic model in most Western liberal democracies.  Like democratic elitism, 
however, aggregative pluralism also rejected active participation by individual citizens.   
In fact, with a resurgence of democratic elitism during the 2000’s (Vaughn & Cortner 
2005), more participatory forms of democratic decision-making never completely 
replaced the elite model of democracy.  Under the Bush Administration, for example, 
longstanding guarantees for public participation in decision-making were eliminated 
(Huber 2005; McCarthy 2005; Vaughn & Cortner 2005) administrators were appointed 
who hostile to the mission of the regulating agencies they oversaw (Kennedy 2004), and 
democratically established regulations were rolled back to benefit client interests 
(McCarthy 2005) (see Chapter Six).   
AGGREGATIVE PLURALISM  
 In the 1960’s, aggregative pluralism emerged as the dominant political theory, 
and it presently serves as the conventional theoretical model of Western liberal-
democracies throughout the world (Mouffe 1999, 2000).   As problems emerged in the 
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traditional elite model of democracy theory, aggregative pluralism (Schumpeter 1947; 
Dahl & Lindblom 1961; Cohen 1992) or interest group pluralism (Lowi 1965, Stewart 
1975) was described as a decision-making that focused on political accountability to 
democratically order diversified interest groups and centers of power.   
Democratic participation was limited, in this view, to the struggle between 
diverse, competing interest groups to reduce conflict and support political stability 
through bargaining and compromise.  The public could “influence the political system 
through the articulation of interests that are aggregated by political parties and 
legislatures and brought to bear on political decision-making” (Cohen & Arato 1992:19).   
This required a political structure with cross cutting interests, overlapping group 
membership, and social mobility to guard against the permanent domination by any one 
group (Cohen & Arato 1992).   “In the pluralist view, therefore, the overall public 
interest lay not in delegating discretionary authority to administrative elites, but in 
making them more politically accountable” (Andrews 1999:219).   
Based on Schumpeter’s democratic theory (1942) and Dahl and Lindblom’s 
"polyarchy" or "pluralist democracy” (1953, 1956, 1961), aggregative pluralism theorizes 
interest group representation as a mechanism to provide stability and efficiency.  These 
theorists believed an ordered society was unattainable under either the traditional elite 
administrative models or more participatory forms of democracy.   Instead, Dahl and 
Lindblom argued political competition among organized groups of citizens was best 
means of assuring responsive public policy (1953, p. 283).    
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Like elite theory, however, pluralists believed citizens should be restricted from 
directly participating (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee 1954: 312; Dahl 1956), and should 
instead, as Schumpeter famously described, be relegated to “institutional arrangements 
for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by 
means of a competitive struggle for the peoples’ vote” (1950: 269).  Pluralist theory 
emphasizes the aggregation of preferences that are negotiated by interest groups and 
representatives, and it limits citizen participation to either accepting or rejecting leaders 
through a competitive electoral process.   Crystallized in his seminal 1942 work, 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter argued that groups or leaders—not 
individual citizens—best represented the general public interest by negotiating policy in 
open debate and elections.   
Democracy, according to aggregative pluralists, is a process by which political 
representatives form constellations of interests that influence decision-making and 
compete for policy outcomes.  This method mirrors the elite approach that strictly limits 
citizen participation to competition in elections, and instead relies on competition 
between interest groups and leaders to arrive at political compromises.  Citizen 
involvement under the pluralist model was limited to social clubs, church, volunteerism, 
and family to “deflect from political participation or activism on the part of the citizens” 
(Cohen & Arato 1992:19).  Similar to studies perceived as validating democratic elitism 
theory (Stouffer 1955), pluralists pointed to empirical research in which voting patterns 
validated pluralist claims about individual participants as disinterested and inactive 
(Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee 1954; Almond and Verba 1963; Milbrath and Goeld 
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1965), which required interest groups to counter-balance the longstanding dominance 
by powerful industries in agency decision-making.   
Interest Group Representation 
Under this new pluralistic model, competing powerful administrative elites were 
joined by interest groups in a form of decision-making where political parties appealed 
to a large diversity of groups to gain traction for politically accountable outcomes.  
Pluralists believed this would lead to a convergence of political coalitions around more 
moderate, stable polices while accommodating divergent interests.  “These included the 
traditional industrial and resource extraction interests, but also, interestingly, 
environmental protection activists who believed that only statutory mandates were 
strong enough to force agencies to stand up to powerful industrials” (Andrews 
1999:219). 
 Powers traditionally held by technocratic agency experts were shared with 
interest groups who negotiated and bargained on behalf of the public or private 
interests to produce political compromises and balanced decision-making.   As Stewart 
wrote in his seminal paper on the “reformation of American administrative law,” public 
interest groups “espouse the position of important, widely shared (and hence ‘public’) 
interests that assertedly have not heretofore received adequate representation in the 
process of agency decision.   Such representation is wholly consonant with the pluralist 
vision of the collective welfare implicit in the expansion of the traditional model” 
(1970:1764).  Ostheimer (1977:14) also identified the pluralistic emphasis as “a 
restoration of the political balance in our democracy,” which attempted to correct the 
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overrepresentation of client and regulated interests by opening several opportunities 
for organized public interest groups.     
Stewart identified this transformation of the traditional administrative process 
as a correction of the longstanding overrepresentation of private or client interests in 
agency decision-making.   “If bias is attributable to imbalance in representation within 
the agency decision-making process, however, a seemingly more reliable antidote 
would be to provide more effective representation for unorganized ‘public’ interests” 
(Stewart 1975:1715).   There is also criticism in the conservation literature about the 
tendency for commercial groups to benefit most by the Forest Service decisions 
(Bultena and John 1972; Robbins 1985; Clary 1986; Twight and Lyden 1990).    
In A Lumberjacks and Legislators (1982) and American Forestry (1985), for 
example, historian William G. Robbins documented a longstanding “highly congenial 
relationship between the Forest Service and the commercial interests consuming 
national forest outputs.”  And in Timber and the Forest Service, former Forest Service 
historian David Clary documented a strong timber production bias based on the 
agency’s historical goal of maximum commercial logging, and concludes that at "the 
wood chopper's voice will remain important, but someday it just might cease to be the 
dominant one in the Forest Service" (1986:199).  In short, the Forest Service has 
traditionally favored resource extraction at the exclusion of ecological forestry (Hirt 
1994; Hays 2007).     
Recently, interest group pluralism has come under criticism as a democratic 
model for its failure to correct the overrepresentation of client-interests in agency 
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decision-making (Olson 1965; Parent 1992, Abel & Stephan 2000).  Critics argue the 
pluralist model fails to incorporate individual citizens in agency decision-making to 
address imbalances in political and economic power (Schattsschneider 1952; McConnell 
1966; Lindblom 1988).  Pluralism displaces the legitimate right of independent citizens 
from participating in a “strong democracy” (Barber 1995; Steelman 1999; Abel & 
Stephen 2000) and fails to promote more democratic decision-making (Rawls 1971; 
Habermas 1975; Mouffe 2000).  Critics believe persistent inequalities exist in favor of 
private interest groups, which dominated agency decision-making processes before the 
environmental era (Sax 1970, Stewart 1975, Hirt 1995, Abel & Stephen 2000).  This is 
especially true for the Forest Service, which has consistently focused on commodity 
forestry since the 1940’s (Dana & Fairfax 1980; Twight 1983, Hays 2007).    
Critics of aggregative pluralism point to its tendency to discourage popular 
participation, alienate citizens from mainstream political processes, and generate 
excessively aggressive and destructive forms of expression (Rawls 1971, Habermas 1975, 
Mouffe 2000; Ackerman 2002).   John Rawls, for example, saw the aggregative view as 
the source of disaffection with democratic institutions, arguing in A Theory of Justice 
(1971) that the dominance of interest group representation was producing a crisis of 
legitimacy affecting liberal democracies.  Jürgen Habermas believed the aggregation of 
individual preferences, such as adding votes or referenda, was only sufficient for 
representing “mere agreement" instead of "rational consensus” (1990).   The next 
section addresses more direct democratic models (deliberative democracy and agonistic 
pluralism), which emerge from a long tradition of participatory democracy and are 
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presently involved in a debate in the literature over the most appropriate understanding 
of citizen in government decision-making. 
PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 
 While it is widely accepted that public participation counterbalances the 
overrepresentation of client and private interests in federal agency administrative 
decision-making, there is far less agreement about which democratic theory is most 
appropriate for understanding individual citizen input.  Although “democracy is today a 
near-universal validating principle for political systems” (Dryzek 2005), the literature is 
deeply divided over which democratic theories describe the most adequate process for 
citizen participation in agency decision-making.   This section addresses citizen 
involvement through an analysis of participatory democratic theory and two variants, 
deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism, which aim to improve conventional 
decision-making processes by including individual citizens.  
 Deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism are two relatively new models 
for public participation advanced in the policy and conservation literature by different 
democratic theorists with alternative explanations of the affect of individual citizens on 
agency decision-making.   The central focus on individuals, however, is not new.  More 
direct, radical, grassroots, or participatory processes have been rooted in democracy 
since its birth in Athens, where citizens directly deliberated over decisions for the polis.   
“What we see today is therefore the revival of an old theme, not the sudden emergence 
of a new one” (Mouffe 2000).    
41 
 Demokratia of Ancient Greece granted independent groups of free adult 
Athenian males the power to participate in “giving judgment and holding office” 
(Aristotle in Held 2006:167).  In The Politics, Aristotle writes the quality of reason, 
speech, and ethics are universal among citizens and governments should include them 
to allow individuals to realize their inherent capacities.   Although Plato and Aristotle 
argued against the inclusion of unskilled debaters without the same natural talent as 
political philosophers, they believed the opening of the polis would transform and 
develop newly independent, active citizens (Sheldon 1988).   Free and open discourse 
was extended beyond the walls of the general assembly to the marketplace, or agora 
(Cox 2006), which directly contributed to the actualization of the individual citizens’ 
unique human capacity for rational thought.   
 Taking these developmental qualities further, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, an 
eighteenth century philosopher and inspiration behind the French Revolution, believed 
democratic participation would lead toward higher education, better psychological 
wellbeing, and ultimately, greater individual and collective freedom (Dent 1990).  
Rousseau argued that individual personalities in a social contract would be bound to the 
“moral and collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly contains 
votes, and receiving from this act its unity, its common identity, its life and its will” 
(Rousseau 1762: book 1, section 6).   A contemporary of Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau 
incorporated participatory theory into the leading social contract philosophy of his time, 
calling for the active involvement of individuals in governance to strengthen the 
community as a whole.  Unlike elite democratic models, Rousseau considered individual 
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participation a primary building block of the social contract.   In defining “general will,” 
Rousseau argued “each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the 
supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each 
member as an indivisible part of the whole”  (Rousseau 1762: book 1, section 6 ).  Under 
this structure, the general will, like the term “public” or “public interest,” describes the 
collective good or popular sovereignty in the classic understanding of demokratia.  
 Although Native American societies included several indigenous forms of 
democratic models (Johansen 1996), the transfer of European participatory democracy 
to the United States is attributed to Thomas Jefferson who, inspired by Rousseau, 
envisioned an agrarian society where individual farmers and others would directly 
participate in governance.  Jefferson rejected a Lockean-style form of constitutional rule 
in favor of a form of popular sovereignty where individual citizens were involved in 
problem solving.   “He did not like removing the burden of solving public disputes from 
the people, and assigning it to various constitutional mechanisms” (Theobald 1997:81).   
 During this time in the U.S., some forms of democracy advanced according to its 
literal translation; the rule of the people not abrogated to legislative bodies or other 
forms of government.   Jefferson denied a request to join the Constitution Convention in 
Philadelphia, and he was critical of the meetings’ final document, which he only 
supported with the condition that the Bill of Rights included provisions for the 
protection of the individual citizen.  “For now we must emphasize that Jefferson was a 
civic republican and the Constitution created in Philadelphia was a modern liberal 
document. There should be little wonder that Jefferson opposed it” (Theobold 1997:81).   
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From his office in France, where he was serving as the ambassador in 1787, Jefferson 
penned a letter to one of the primary Constitution authors, James Madison, and 
expressed his unfriendly attitude toward more “energetic” forms of government, which 
he considered “always oppressive.”  
 In contrast to elite forms, popular sovereignty was a process where individuals 
became better educated citizens who understood their stake in the collective.   In his 
letter to Madison, Jefferson argued against restrictions of individual citizen 
participation, arguing “peace is best preserved by giving energy to the government or 
information to the people.  This last is the most certain and the most legitimate engine 
of government… *Citizens+ are the only sure reliance for the preservation of our liberty” 
(1787).  Educating the public was synonymous with good governance, providing a 
safeguard against what Jefferson feared was an illegitimate limitation of the individual 
citizen’s political role.  Instead of active participants in decision-making, democratic 
elites believed “citizens were economic beings in the ﬁrst place… In fact, when Hamilton 
created his national bank, modeled after the Bank of England created a century earlier, 
he used the epithet ‘mind your business’ on national coins—a phrase later changed to 
‘In God We Trust’” (Theobold 1999).  Contempt for citizen involvement among elites 
was equally matched by more open, participatory democratic approaches.  
 Today, direct citizen participation is the subject of countless pages in the policy 
and environmental literature.  Renn, Webler, and Widemann, for example, defined 
citizen participation as “forums for exchange that are organized for the purpose of 
facilitating communication between government, citizens, stakeholders and interest 
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groups, and businesses regarding a specific decision or problem“ (1993).  Abel and 
Stephan define direct democracy as including “the full and independent participation of 
individuals in setting policy” (2000:617) which, in contrast to the pluralist interest group 
model, includes citizen involvement in community political processes that influence 
decision-making (Laird 1933).    
 Much of the conservation literature has been dedicated to questions about  
individual participation as local, including collaborative management (deliberation) and 
dissent-based conservation (agonistic pluralism), which both elevate the role of citizen 
participation in issues of direct concern to their community.  Furthermore, individual 
participation is understood as process where, as Abel and Stephan argue, “citizens are 
concerned with local problems and may become involved in any program (federal, state, 
or local) that has direct impacts on their neighborhoods and families” (2000:617).  
Participation theorists have pointed to place-based (Escobar 2004), community-based 
(McCarthy 2005), or grassroots (Coglianese 1999) where people are directly affected by 
emerging issues, about which they are most likely to understand.  Going further, poet 
and naturalist Gary Snyder identified local participation at the watershed level, “the first 
and last nation whose boundaries, though subtly shifting, are unarguable" (1993:82). 
Given the limits of both the traditional elite and the dominant aggregative 
pluralistic theories, proponents of these new alternative theories have called for more 
adequate explanations of individual citizen involvement (Gray 1989 Mouffe 1999; 
Peterson et al. 2005; Cox 2007).  Deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism, 
described below, are useful for gaining a better understanding of the processes involved 
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in federal agency decision-making.  Paying attention to these emergent democratic 
theories can inform management when collectively held environmental interests are at 
stake.   
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY  
 To address these competing theories and their corresponding conservation 
outcomes, this section addresses deliberative democratic theory and the operational 
“collaborative management” (Gray 1989, Wondolleck & Yaffee 2000), “cooperative 
conservation” (Bush 2004), and other trends in federal agency decision-making that are 
designed to adhere to “rational” (Habermas 1975), consensus-based models.  
Deliberative democracy is best understood by illustrating two main variants proposed by 
John Rawls (1970) and Jürgen Habermas (1975, 1978, 1990, 1996, 2001, 2003, 2004, 
2005).  These authors define deliberative democracy by its adherence to free discourse 
and rational, consensus-driven decision-making that theoretically promotes ethical 
agreements in the public interest (Calhoun 1992; Benhabib 1996; Chambers 1996; 
Bohman and Rehg 1997; Dryzek 2000.)   
 As a departure from interest group negotiations, deliberative democrats wish to 
arrive at decisions based on democratic procedures and “fair conditions” that also 
include the free participation of independent citizens.  “Different deliberative theorists 
give somewhat different accounts of what these fair conditions are, the principal 
versions being those of Habermas’s ‘ideal speech situation’ and Rawls’s idea of ‘public 
reason’” (Crowder 2006:6).   
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 Deliberative democrats believe conditions supporting fair debate and 
transparent decisions provide an opportunity for individual citizens to rationally engage 
the process without causing instability and confusion.  According to deliberative 
democratic theorists, individual rights are protected by the liberal democratic state 
when citizens are informed by a logical, “universalist-rationalist” approach (Petersen 
2007) and can engage in agency decisions logically and unselfishly.  This approach 
“shares with enlightenment science the aim of establishing universal truths independent 
of context…. *and+ assumes that every nation will accept liberal democracy once its 
citizens become rational” (Petersen et al. 2007:83).  This faith in independent citizens 
and the trajectory of liberal democracies is contrasts starkly with the distrust harbored 
by elite and pluralists democratic theories.   
 The first wave of deliberative democratic theory was initiated by John Rawls in 
1971, whose work emerged in reaction to the dominance of the pluralistic interest-
group model.  In his book, A Theory of Justice, Rawls accepts “the fact of pluralism” 
while rejecting the dominance of the conventional aggregative administrative model, 
believing decision-making should be instead based on a form of “moral” consensus 
deeper than “mere agreement on procedures.”  Rawls and his followers (Cohen 1989) 
developed a theory of deliberative democracy emphasizing principles of justice reached 
through the “original position,” in which citizens set aside the particularities of positions 
and recognize “justice as fairness” in administrative decision-making.  The combination 
of these basic liberal principles with “constitutional essentials,” according to Rawls, 
provides a framework for “free public reason” (Rawls 1993:5).    
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 Similar to democratic elitism theory, Rawls principles of liberal justice protect 
the individual or minority (private) interests from the will of popular sovereignty.  He 
called for establishing a process for distinguishing ‘the good’ from ‘the right’ agreement 
(1971: 446-449) to serves as a bulwark against irrationality and instability.  Deliberative 
democracy secures these conditions, according to Rawls, because it creates fair 
conditions guaranteeing the “exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable” 
(Rawls 1993:217).   
 The key difference from both the elite and pluralist models, however, is that in 
the deliberative process individual citizens join administrators and interest group 
representatives as equal stakeholders in decision-making.  Under the deliberative 
model, democracy is also considered a fragile process that requires a political culture of 
informed and rational citizens to cautiously guide administrative decision-making (Ivie 
2004).   
 Jürgen Habermas' writings on deliberative democracy contribute to the 
literature by adding another thread relating to the “public sphere” as a unique 
discursive space where citizens participate through dialogue and debate (Habermas 
1964, 1975, 1978, 2004, 2005).  Habermas specifically calls for open and inclusive public 
decision-making processes to foster consensus about agency actions free of coercion.  
Although Rawls and Habermas’ theories are similar in their critique of the aggregative 
model of democratic theory, the former is concerned more with the liberty of the 
individual and the exchange of rational ideas, while the later calls for public space for 
free and open debate to allow for a deliberative turn in democratic decision-making.   
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 Habermas and other deliberative scholars (Benhabib 1996) advance a form of 
deliberative democracy in which “citizens behave as a public body *and+ confer in an 
unrestricted fashion—that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and 
association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions—about matters of 
general interest’’ (Habermas 1964:136).  This view of deliberation requires a strict 
proceduralist approach where participants directly address the merits of different 
alternatives and the rules of the debate.  In this administrative model, citizen 
participation occurs through deliberation based on “the force of the better argument” 
to inform agency decision-making (Habermas 1990:123). 
 Benhabib (1996) clarified these procedures by emphasizing the norms of 
“equality and symmetry” among participants who debate and question the assigned 
topics and rules for decision-making.   “It is a necessary condition for attaining 
legitimacy and rationality with regard to collective decision making processes in a polity, 
that the institutions of this polity are so arranged that what is considered in the 
common interest of all results from processes of collective deliberation conducted 
rationally and fairly among free and equal individuals” (Benhabib 1996:69).  This process 
gains legitimacy through a democratic institution’s free and open debate, which equally 
benefits all involved and produces a sense of impartiality.    
 Unlike norms of the elite democracy and interest group pluralism, individual 
citizens are encouraged by deliberative democrats to participate in processes that 
traditionally privileged powerful interests (Twight & Lyden 1989; Steelman 1996; Abel & 
Stephan 2000).  The deliberative emphasis on individual representation broadens the 
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conception of public participation beyond the interest group framework and is 
concerned with an administrative process in which individual citizens are involved in 
‘‘debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinion’’ 
(Chambers 2003:309).    
 Habermas’ model of deliberative democracy develops an alternate 
understanding of the “public sphere,” in which individual citizens influence agency 
decision-making through public debate and open communication.  “Communicative 
power is exercised in the manner of a siege.  It influences the premises of judgment and 
decision making in the political system without intending to conquer the system itself” 
(Habermas 1996:486).  Habermas’ deliberative theory endorses diffuse ‘subjectless 
communication’ in the public sphere, where “critical publicity,” the moral force of 
judgments, reached by rational consensus, prevails.  Public opinion, by virtue of the 
communicative power, influences decisions through elections that ultimately legitimize 
administrative power and legislation (Dryzek 2006).  
Collaborative Management 
 Deliberative democracy has emerged as a significant trend in the conservation 
and resource literature behind the emergence of collaborative management (Graham 
1986; Renn et al. 1995; Beierle 1999; Ackerman & Fishkin 2000; Gastil 2000; Fishkin 
2003, 2005; Gastil & Levine 2005; Ryfe 2005).  New models based on deliberative 
democratic theory include collaborative management (Gray 1989), community based 
environmental management (Kenney), ecosystem management (Grumbine 1994; 
Cortner and Moote 1999), collaborative conservation (Brick et al. 2001), community 
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based initiatives (Brunner et al. 2002), grassroots environmental management (Weber 
2003), partnering (Leach et a. 2002) and cooperative conservation (Bush 2004).  
According to proponents, federal lands decision-making should depart from the 
conventional pluralistic forms of citizen involvement and embrace more deliberative 
forms of participation (Wondolleck 1996, 1999).   
 The earliest and most frequently cited description of collaborative management 
in the resource literature was described by Barbara Gray (1989:5) in Collaborating: 
Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems.  Gray called for “a process of joint 
decision-making among key stakeholders of a problem domain about the future of that 
domain.”  Although Gray’s early work was primarily concerned with the alternative 
dispute-resolution field, her work is frequently cited in the resource management 
literature.  Early calls for more deliberative approaches to national forest management 
emerged during the Bitterroot and Monongahela NF controversies (see Chapter Five) 
leading to NFMA’s the public participation process (Bolle 1971, 1973).  Since its 
emergence as an alternative public participation process, proponents of collaborative 
management (Bolle 1971; Knopp and Caldbeck 1990) have pointed to the value of 
deliberative forms of public participation as a rationale for deregulation and devolved 
decision-making (McCarthy 2005) in favor of consensus-based models of deliberation 
(Stankey et al. 2003). 
Collaborative decision-making is perceived by proponents as the application of 
deliberative democracy natural resource management.  This is frequently attributed to 
Julia Wondolleck (1999:118), who argued for “a fundamental change in the way agency 
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officials conduct their business as, indeed, it was intended to be.”  In Making 
Collaboration Work: Lessons From Innovation In Natural Resource Management, 
Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000: xi) argued that collaborative management reflects “a 
period that is as significant as the period one hundred years ago when President 
Theodore Roosevelt, Gifford Pinchot and others invented a set of principles for 
management of public resources.”     
 A key to most collaborative management projects is the emphasis on the value 
of local and private stakeholders.  Although Rawls called for a “veil of ignorance” for 
participants to objectively arrive at decisions, Wondolleck instead argues for 
stakeholders to “recognize the ‘me’” and be “clear about their own interests, how these 
interests are similar and different from those of the other stakeholders, and who within 
the organization can effectively articulate these interests and persuasively advocate on 
their behalf…so that their own interests will be acted upon” (1999:127, emphasis 
added).  Despite this inconsistency with deliberative theories’ call for disinterested 
participants, proponents of collaborative management appear unconcerned with a 
potential conflict of interest, which is problematic given strict prohibitions in federal 
statutory laws, like the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463, Oct. 6, 1972) 
(FACA), that restricts parties with conflicts regarding privately-held special interests (see 
discussion below). 
 This role of individual stakeholders, especially local, in collaborative 
management is a key feature distinguishes it from conventional decision-making 
processes.  Gray (1989), Wondolleck (2000), and others (Phillips 1995; Bohman 1996; 
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Williams 1998; Young 2000) believe collaborative management provides for better 
stakeholder participation and releases federal agencies from the pluralistic processes 
that lead to gridlock and “analysis paralysis” (Bosworth 2002).   
 Some resource managers also embrace deliberative negotiations in part for the 
role of consensus-based decision-making as a replacement for the dominant aggregative 
pluralism (interest group) model criticized in the resource management literature.   
“Nearly every contemporary policy report urges regulators to build consensus with 
industry and other affected organizations,” using collaborative management to arrive at 
agency decision-making (Coglianese 1999:33).  Kenney asserts that the requirement for 
administrators to seek consensus represents a new trend in governance with 
“consensus-based decision-making processes based on field-level experimentation and 
learning” (2000: v).  While proponents of collaboration argue that consensus-building 
eliminate conflicts, saves time, and leads to better policy, critics, nonetheless, believe 
consensus-based negotiations runs the risk that public administrators will pursue 
consensus as an end in itself (Coglianese 1999).   “They should decide when and how to 
engage in public dialogue based foremost on what will serve the overall public interest, 
not on what will lead to a consensus among those inside the policy loop” (Coglianese 
1999:34). 
 The resource management literature includes several recent papers calling for a 
transition in Forest Service decision-making toward more collaborative forms of 
management.  Proponents believe that consensus-based decision-making would “alter 
the top-down, ‘environment-over-economy’ approach to the contemporary 
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environmental regulatory framework by infusing decentralized decision-making, 
stakeholder collaboration, and citizen participation” (Hibbard & Madsen 2003:704).  
Kenney believes the limits of the aggregative, pluralistic model and the “widespread 
dissatisfaction with the existing ‘system’” have been used to justify attempts to develop 
new democratic decision-making process, “but does not invalidate the importance or 
practical necessity of evaluating these new approaches on their own merits” (2000:v).  
The rationale for a transition to more deliberative forms of decision-making is based on 
the alleged problems pluralistic interest group model, especially with citizen appeals and 
litigation (see Chapter Five). 
Critics of traditional administrative processes believe collaborative management 
can expedite project level, site-specific resource management decisions in U.S. federal 
lands (White House 2002; Bosworth 2002).  “These characteristics of participatory 
democracy are said to improve plan implementation by resolving conflicts during the 
planning process, rather than delaying implementation of completed plans while 
decisions are reviewed through appeals and adjudication” (Moote & McClaran 475).  
Cheng & Fiero, for example, believe collaborative management “was specifically 
formulated to address both the complexity and the rancorous conflict that characterizes 
the management of the U.S. public lands and resources, such as the national forest 
managed by the U.S.  Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service” (in Gastil & Levine 
2005:164).   Wondolleck also believed (118) “acceptable decisions will result rather than 
decisions that are contested in lengthy judicial or administrative appeals processes.”    
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Although collaborative management for federal agency decision-making began 
as early as 1990’s (Leach 2006), the Bush Administration was one of the most 
enthusiastic proponents of negotiations that were theoretically more deliberative.  As 
the next section describes, the Forest Service under the Bush Administration replaced 
conventional decision-making processes with variations of deliberative democracy and 
collaboration (Manring 2005; McCarthy 2005).   
Healthy Forest Initiative 
With the forest still smoldering, President George W. Bush arrived in Oregon 
August 22, 2002 at the site of the 500,000 acre Biscuit Fires to shake hands with 
firefighters and announce the Healthy Forest Initiative (HFI) (White House 2002).  
According to the HFI, the public participation “process is complex, time consuming and 
burdensome” and “procedural delays are stalling critical forest and rangeland 
management projects” (White House 2002:1).  The HFI called for improving “regulatory 
processes to ensure more timely decisions, greater efficiency, and better results in 
reducing the risk of catastrophic wildfires by restoring forest health."  (NEPA 
Documentation Needed for Fire Management Activities; Categorical Exclusions, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 33,814 (June 5, 2003).  To this end, the Bush Administration unrolled one of the 
most sweeping regulatory changes to national forest management in decades (see 
Chapter Six). 
The day after President George W. Bush’s speech in Oregon’s Biscuit Fire, his 
administration began introducing specific policy proposals for Forest Service 
management (White House 2002).  That same week, U.S. Agriculture Secretary Ann 
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Veneman and U.S. Interior Secretary Gale Norton unveiled a four-part HFI regulatory 
package.  This proposal called for changes to "streamline unnecessary red tape that 
prevents timely and effective implementation of wildfire prevention and forest health 
projects on Forest Service lands.  Delays of these projects can have devastating 
environmental and social consequences when catastrophic fires strike" (White House 
2002).   
The Healthy Forest Initiative’s regulatory rule changes were, according to Forest 
Service officials, created to address “analysis paralysis” by eliminating Forest Service 
participation and environmental analysis from the majority of forest service 
management proposals (Bosworth 2002).  Under the literal smoke, the HFI was 
proposed to fundamentally change conventional interest group and agonistic processes, 
either by eliminating existing Forest Service participation requirements or replacing 
them altogether with new deliberative planning and collaborative management models.    
The HFI included new regulations for the expedited permitting of management 
that exempted conventional public appeals processes (Categorical Exclusions) while 
instituting new forms of collaborative decision-making (Huber 2005).   One of the new 
HFI regulations for “Hazardous Fuels”(CE #10) exempted up to 1,000 acres of logging 
and 4,500 acres of prescribed burning from standard National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) environmental assessment and Environmental Impact Statement process (36 
CFR 220((ii).  This exemption for “hazardous fuels reduction” activities also requires that 
proposals “shall be identified through a collaborative framework ” consistent with the 
agency’s guidelines outlined in the Collaborative Approach for Reducing Wildland Fire 
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Risks to Communities and the Environment – Ten-Year Comprehensive Strategy: 
Implementation Plan (USDA & USDI 2002).   
This “collaborative framework” is described by the Implementation Plan as the 
process of bringing together agency professionals, local participants, and state, federal 
and tribal governments to prioritize management and implementation (USDA & USDI 
2002 ).  This approach emphasizes “local level collaboration” with stakeholders who 
have expressed some expertise or interests in the forest (2002:9).  The HFI’s 
collaborative process was theorized as a way to bring (local) stakeholders to the table 
and avoid conflicts resulting in public challenges to a District Ranger’s decision through 
appeals to supervisors in regional offices.    
Following the HFI, the Bush Administration worked with Congress on the 
“Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003” (HFRA), which passed the U.S.  House May 20, 
2003 (HR 1904), the U.S.  Senate on October 30, 2003, and was signed by the president 
on December 3, 2003.  The HFRA produced new classes for “healthy forest” 
management that are similar, although separate, from the HFI regulation changes, 
including a pre-decisional objection process for hazardous fuel reduction projects.   
In addition to creating new expedited classes for management, the HFRA 
legislation also implemented additional collaborative processes for national forest 
management.  To accomplish this, the HFRA replaced conventional public participation 
processes with new “healthy forest” management to “reduce wildfire risk to 
communities, municipal water supplies, and other at-risk federal land through a 
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collaborative process of planning, prioritizing, and implementing hazardous fuel 
reduction projects” (HFRA § 2(1), 16 U.S.C.A. § 6501(1), emphasis added).   
Shortly after the HFRA passed, the Bush administration issued Executive Order 
13352, entitled “Facilitating Cooperative Conservation,” which defines collaborative 
management as involving “collaborative activity among Federal, State, local, and tribal 
governments, private for-profit and nonprofit institutions, other nongovernmental 
entities and individuals.”  The order calls on agencies to “properly accommodate local 
participation in federal decision making” (2004:1) and promote “cooperative 
conservation” by partnering with “local stakeholders” and “private for-profit” groups.   
The order calls for “implement*ing+ laws relating to the environment and natural 
resources in a manner that promotes cooperative conservation, with an emphasis on 
appropriate inclusion of local participation in federal decision-making, in accordance 
with their respective agency missions, policies, and regulations” (Bush 2004:1).  
 In 2007, the White House convened a “Conference on Cooperative 
Conservation” with the Departments of the Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Defense 
and the Environmental Protection Agency, for a three-day meeting to identify 
“innovative and effective approaches to promoting cooperative conservation.”  As the 
brochure states, “This conference reflects the President’s continuing commitment to 
ensure that the federal government listens to the concerns, ideas and insights of local 
citizens and works closely with them in restoring and conserving our natural heritage” 
(Bush 2007:1, emphasis added).   
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 Also in 2007, the Bush Administration directed the U.S. Council on Environmental 
Quality (NEPA oversight body) to publish the “Collaboration in NEPA, A Handbook for 
NEPA Practitioners” (2007), which instructs all administrative agencies to include 
collaborative management models for planning and public participation.  According to 
the CEQ, the handbook presents the “results of research and consultations… concerning 
the consideration of collaboration in analyses prepared under the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).  It introduces the NEPA practitioner and other 
interested parties to the issue of collaboration, outlines general principles, presents 
useful steps, and provides information on methods of collaboration“(CEQ 2007).  It is 
unclear, however, if the Obama Administration will continue to push these specific 
collaborative management directives. 
 The emergence of collaborative management, cooperative conservation, and 
other deliberative forms of decision-making represents calls in the literature for the 
Forest Service to reject the elite and interest group processes in favor of more 
stakeholder driven approaches.  It is too early to determine, however, if collaborative 
decision-making represents a lasting change in agency policy making, especially given 
recent court rulings have invalidated several HFI rule changes designed to insert 
deliberative processes in agency decision-making (Wilderness Society v Rey II 2006; 
Sierra v Bosworth 2007).  The literature is divided over the value and necessity of these 
new collaborative processes introduced in federal lands planning.  The final section of 
the paper explores the theory of agonistic pluralism as a competing democratic theory 
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that attempts to explain the proper role of citizen participation in agency decision-
making.   
AGONISTIC PLURALISM 
 Another democratic model advanced in both the conservation and policy 
literature, agonistic pluralism (Mouffe 1999), brings a radical participatory emphasis to 
decision-making.  This decision-making structure emphases two unique aspects of 
participatory democracy: 1) the role of conflict and dissent-based negotiations, and 2) 
the radical nature of individual participation.  This approach offers a distinct alternative 
to elite and conventional aggregative pluralism models that dominate public 
participation practices that limits the role of the individual (Laclau & Mouffe 1985; 
Connolly 1991, Honig 1993, Mouffe 2000; Petersen MN et al. 2005, 2006, 2007, 
Petersen T et al. 2007).  Agonism’s other central contribution (the attention to the 
inevitability of conflict, or ineradicable antagonisms, in Western liberal-democratic 
societies) also distinguishes it from censuses-based, conflict-resolution democratic 
processes  (Arendt 1971; Connolly 1991; Honig 1993; Mouffe 1999, 2000).   
 First, agonistic pluralism emphasizes direct, radical participation, and the 
ascendancy of individual citizens in agency decision-making.  The operational 
management of this democratic model can be seen in direct “dissent-based 
conservation” (Peterson et al. 2006) and forms of direct public involvement that 
privilege falsification and argumentation over consensus-based collaboration or interest 
group negotiations.   
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 The literature describes agonism as a rival model to deliberation for its attention 
to direct confrontation and contest between citizens, groups, and the government.  
Agonistic pluralism emphasizes the role of citizen participation in agency decision-
making while rejecting consensus-based decision-making as a model prone to coercion 
that builds unrealistic expectations for success.  Agonism, however, acknowledges the 
irreducibility of conflict, or the democratic paradox, in liberal democratic societies 
(Arendt 1971; Connolly 1991; Honig 1993; Mouffe 1999, 2000).   
 While general agonism is attributed to several authors in the literature, Chantal 
Mouffe’s central theory of agonistic pluralism, as well has her criticism of deliberative 
democracy, positions her ideas as a unique to both policy and conservation literature.  
Specifically, Mouffe’s alternative to the dominant interest representation, as well as 
deliberative democracy, instead presents democratic public participation as a “vibrant 
clash of positions” in which power and antagonisms in decision-making are redirected to 
positively affect the public interest (2000).  
 Instead of seeking stakeholder consensus or illusive interest group compromise, 
which they see as impossible, dissent-based agonistic theorists instead accept the 
inevitability of conflict in environmental decisions.  This perspective finds direct 
confrontation over scientific claims or political arguments between adversaries to be a 
desirable part of the process.  “Participants need not like each other, but they must 
respect each other as adversaries worth arguing against” (Peterson 2004).  Agonistic 
pluralism is a perceived as process through which individual antagonisms are 
transformed into understandings of others as legitimate contenders in a struggle for 
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preferred policy outcomes.   “Introducing the category of the ‘adversary’ requires 
complexifying the notion of antagonism and distinguishing two different forms which 
can emerge, antagonism properly speaking and agonism.  Antagonism is the struggle 
between enemies, while agonism is the struggle between adversaries” (Mouffe 2000: 
103).  Like the common definition of agonism as a contest between groups or individuals 
(Merriam-Webster 2010), this democratic model informs public participation in highly 
conflictual federal agency decisions.  Mouffe identifies this approach as a key difference 
from deliberative democracy, and instead argues that “the prime task is not to eliminate 
political passions from the public sphere but to mobilize those passions toward 
democratic designs” (2000: 103).  
Democratic Paradox  
 Agonistic pluralism’s theoretical framework relies an understanding of the 
“democratic paradox” (Rousseau 1751, Connolly 1991, Honig 1993, Mouffe 2000, 
Peterson MN et al. 2005, 2006, 2007, Peterson T et al. 2006, Cox 2007, Peterson N et al. 
2007), in which conflict is understood as an inherent tension in Western liberal 
democracy.   Although theorists as far back as Rousseau (1751) have discussed several 
paradoxes in constitutional democracies, agonists identify a “paradox of politics” 
(Connelly 1991) in modern liberal democracies requiring political theory that brings 
"politics forward" (Honig 1993) in public debates over controversial issues.   Honig, for 
example, believes politics “consists of settlement and unsettlement, of disruption and 
administration,” and rejects “the dream of displacement, the fantasy that the right laws 
or constitution might some day free us from the responsibility for (and, indeed, the 
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burden of) politics” (Honig 1993).   Honig’s political theory warns against displacing 
conflict, and instead calls for citizen participation that disrupts the consolidation of 
power.   
 In her book, The Democratic Paradox (2000), Mouffe identified this paradox as a 
tension where, “on one side, we have the liberal tradition constituted by the rule of law, 
the defense of human rights and the respect of individual liberty; on the other the 
democratic tradition whose main ideas are those of equality, identity between 
governing and governed and popular sovereignty” (Mouffe 2000:22).  Political theorists 
identify this tension between competing users and political passions as the innate 
conflict within Western liberal-democratic governments between popular sovereignty of 
the majority and the liberty of private minority interests.  “While democracy always 
carries the threat that the majority will choose to abrogate individual rights, liberalism 
always carries the threat that the polity will dissolve into anarchy. In tandem, however, 
they may maintain a check on each other’s excesses” (Peterson et al., 2006).  This 
analysis of the democratic paradox acknowledges the original tension between elite 
theory and more participatory models that describes popular citizen involvement as 
either the tyranny of the majority (Madison 1788) or “the people being the only safe 
depository of power” (Jefferson 1787). 
 This democratic theory informs the question of public participation in 
environmental management by advancing our understanding of “the agonistic 
relationship between equality and liberty… *where+ attempts to maximize individual 
liberty do so at the expense of political equality, while attempts to maximize political 
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equality similarly curtail individual liberty” (Peterson, T et al. 2006).  This tension is 
evident in environmental debates (climate change, endangered species, forests, etc.) 
between the rights of private resource interests and the public demand for conservation 
and ecological integrity.    
 Agonistic pluralists’ analysis of the democratic paradox is a distinct contribution 
to the democracy debate, providing a level of sophistication about the complexities and 
contradictions of power in conflict-based land management decisions.  Given the nature 
of conflict in environmental management, agonistic democratic theorists and dissent-
based conservationists call for acknowledging this paradox in order to navigate ‘wicked’ 
environmental debates with inherent tension between private minority interests and 
popular sovereignty (Mouffe 1999; Cox 2007; Peterson MN et al. 2007).    
 This condition is central to the debate regarding U.S.  agency decision-making 
and collaborative management models that are increasingly proposed to eliminate 
conflict between different stakeholders, including local interests and nationally 
dispersed interests.   Cox identified this “inherent tension between the discourses of 
‘liberty’ (individual rights of speech, press, property, etc.) and ‘equality’ or the will of 
popular majorities… *that requires+ instead, a process of conservation management that 
takes the idea of ‘bounded conflict’ as its guiding assumption” (2007:17).  As discussed 
below, new calls for “dissent-based conservation” are directly informed by political 
theory that encourages conflict, or at least the acknowledgement of difference, for 
resource management controversies (Peterson 2006).  
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Radical Democracy 
 To understand the elements of agonistic pluralism, it is important to explain the 
radical nature of direct democracy by individual, unaffiliated citizens.  In Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy (1985), Ernesto Laclau and Mouffe presented a political theory of 
“radical democracy” to explain the failure of Marx’s prediction of the inevitable collapse 
of capitalism (otherwise known as the crisis in Marxism).  Following Gramsci’s (1926) 
notion of hegemony, Laclau and Mouffe acknowledge the fundamental role of 
government as a collective ordering of power, requiring a “radical democracy” to 
displace “the traditional relation between democracy and power” (2000:14).   
 Laclau and Mouffe address hegemony through an analysis of “articulation 
theory,” based on Gramsci’s Notes from Prison “Italian Peasants” (1926), which replaced 
the idea of an inevitable collapse of capitalism with a conception of ongoing struggle 
over power and social norms.   Laclau and Mouffe’s theoretical position was based on 
the central thesis “that social objectivity is constituted through acts of power.  This 
implies that any social objectivity is ultimately political and that it has to show the traces 
of exclusion, which governs its constitution” (Mouffe 2000).   In short, radical democracy 
explains how agonistic democracy practice provides a space for individuals to challenge 
the socially constructed reigns of power with more direct, participatory forms of 
democracy.  Instead of an implosion of modern capitalism, Laclau and Mouffe focus on 
the “polyphony of voices, each of which constitutes its own irreducible discursive 
identity” (1985:191) in democratic societies as having authentic radical potential.  
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 The ‘radical’ democratic model, therefore, is the acknowledgement of difference 
and pluralism, or “the political,” at the intersection of power, conflict, and antagonism 
(2005: 9).  “Radical democracy,” writes Mouffe, "demands that we acknowledge 
difference" (26), which presents “a new way to think about democracy which is different 
from the traditional liberal conception of democracy as a negotiation among interests 
and is also different to the [deliberative democratic] model which is currently being 
developed by people like Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls” (2000:4).  This radical form 
of democracy, according to Mouffe, is positioned in the realm of politics and 
administrative decision-making, in which “the ‘other’ is no longer seen as an enemy to 
be destroyed, but as an ‘adversary,’ i.e., somebody with whose ideas we are going to 
struggle but whose right to defend those ideas we will not put into question (2000).”  
Conceived through the lens of radical democracy, public participation in agency 
decision-making influences management by acknowledging conflict as inevitable, 
decisions as temporary, and the ‘other’ as worthy opponents to be directly challenged in 
the agonistic ‘contest’ over policy.  
 Instead of resolving conflict through consensus-based deliberative processes, 
Mouffe calls for an appreciation of legitimate difference as an inherent condition for 
liberal democracies made up of multiple identities.  While difference is conceived under 
deliberative democracy as an impediment to be dismissed or eliminated through 
consensus-based processes, the nature of pluralism featured by most western 
democracies, according to Mouffe, requires “an appreciation for a diversity of values 
and identities, the symbolic ordering of social relations” (2000:25).   This contrasts 
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starkly with collaborative trends in management seeking to find and defend the lowest 
common denominator through consensus-based negotiations (McClosky 1999, 2005; 
Coggins 1999, 2001).   
 The lack of closure in political debates, or the "ongoing confrontation” between 
different segments of society (e.g. conservation and resource interests) is evidence of a 
healthy democracy (Mouffe 2000); not a justification for restricting public participation 
in agency decision-making (McCloskey 1999, 2005; Coggins 1999, 2001; Manring 2004, 
2005).  This alternative to the dominant aggregative pluralism model (conventional 
interest representation) and deliberative democracy instead presents democratic 
participation as a “vibrant clash” where power and antagonisms are identified and 
transformed to positively affect the public interest (Mouffe 2000). 
 Under agonistic pluralism, radical democracy allows for the transformation of 
antagonistic relationships between enemies into ‘agonistic’ struggles between 
adversaries deserving respect (Mouffe 2000).   “To come to accept the position of the 
adversary is to undergo a radical change in political identity, it has more of a quality of a 
conversion than of rational persuasion” (755).  Given that conflict between diverse 
groups is considered an inevitable, even desirable, condition in modern democratic 
societies, this theory helps explain how administrative processes for public participation 
can correct overrepresentation by resource interests by more fully engaging individual 
citizens in negotiation, argumentation, and open debate.  “Developing and working 
through bounded conflict enables participants to explore ways their fundamental 
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differences actually bind them together as part of a larger, not necessarily unified, 
whole” (Peterson 2004:758).   
Dissent-Based Conservation  
 Agonism and radical democracy informs the corresponding management 
practice called “dissent-based conservation,” in which individuals “challenge 
assumptions, debate scientific claims, identify areas of disagreement, and critically 
examine participants’ reasoning” (Peterson MN et al. 2006:576) through direct contest 
or argumentation to arrive at the most democratically healthy outcome.  Dissent-based 
negotiations and other direct participation models (Sirianni and Friedland 1995, 1997; 
Abel and Stephen 2000) are especially relevant to “multiple-use” management 
controversies where intractable conflict s exist between competing segments of the 
public (Coggins 1999; Moote and MaClaran 1997; Peterson MN et al. 2005, 2006, 2007; 
Peterson T et al. 2006).  These issues require “mechanisms for direct participation and 
not representative forms … innovative efforts that stand in contrast to environmental 
policy driven by national experts, interest groups, or social movements” (Abel & 
Stephan 2000:615). 
 Following agnostic pluralism, dissent-based conservation management strategies 
are informed by analysis of the democratic paradox, and downplay expectations for 
permanent solutions to the 100-yr old conflict over federal land management.  
“Conservation policy within contemporary democracies must, however, negotiate the 
complex relationship between equality and liberty, rather than attempt to avoid this 
relationship” (Peterson 2004).  An understanding of this paradox in agency decision-
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making addresses the difficulty in balancing frequently incompatible demands from 
different stakeholders, including private interests favoring extractive use and the 
general public’s interest in ecologically appropriate conservation management (Hays 
1959, 2007; McConnell 1966).  Dissent-based dissertation acknowledges that “bounded 
conflict is particularly and uniquely appropriate for managing environmental conflicts in 
liberal democracies because its practice requires that society be sufficiently open to 
allow political competition, yet sufficiently stable to render such competitive 
engagement safe” (Peterson 2004:758) 
 These conflicts may occur between citizens and administrators, as well as among 
citizens themselves, which agonists believe requires non-coercive, open debate without 
commitments to illusiveness of permanent solutions.  “This debate can only develop 
within a social environment that encourages participants to engage in argumentation. 
Meaningful engagement in argumentation requires participants to fully explain their 
own perspectives to those with opposing views, as well as to actively listen to opposing 
viewpoints with the goal of understanding those perspectives” (Peterson 2004:578).
 This is especially relevant to the current debate over participatory democracy 
theory and the longstanding conflict in over national forest decisions, beginning with the 
“classic confrontation” between Pinchot and Muir (Callicott 1999) and continuing today 
with the debate over “analysis paralysis” (Bosworth 2002) and citizen participation 
through official comment and administrative appeals processes (Manring 2004, 2005; 
Teich et al. 2005)) (see Chapter Four). 
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Limits of Deliberative Democracy 
 Agonistic pluralism theory speaks directly to the debate in the conservation and 
policy literature relating to deliberative democracy and consensus-driven, collaborative 
decision-making (McCloskey 1997, Coggins 1999, Teich 2000; Vaughn and Cortner 2005; 
Manring 2005; Peterson MN et al. 2005, 2006, 2007; Peterson T et al. 2006).  In 
Mouffe’s paper, “Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism,” (1999) she argues that 
direct, radical democracy is a suitable alternative to  deliberative democratic theory and 
the dominant interest group pluralism, because, according to Mouffe, they fail to 
acknowledge the democratic paradox or the irreducible nature of conflict in modern 
liberal democracies.   It is this failure, according to Mouffe, that prevents the 
development of a more adequate model of democratic politics.  “One of the 
shortcomings of the deliberative approach is that, by postulating the availability of a 
public sphere where power would have been eliminated and where a rational consensus 
could be realized, this model of democratic politics is unable to acknowledge the 
dimension of antagonism that the pluralism of values entails and its ineradicable 
character” (Mouffe 2000).    
 Given the limits of deliberative democracy and consensus-based decision-
making, agonistic pluralism develops an understanding of the problems involved when 
commercial interest are invited to collaborate over publicly held resources (Coggins 
1999, Moote and MaClaran 1997; Peterson MN et al. 2005, 2006, 2007; Peterson T et al. 
2006).  Acknowledging conflict among participants, interest groups, and government 
administrators, argumentation and dissent-based negotiations promotes improved 
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communications and an appreciation of difference as a healthy tension, not an 
obstruction to some potential future scenario.   
 Mouffe specifically addresses this inability to address this irreducible character 
of the democratic paradox as a fundamental shortcoming to deliberative democratic 
theory.  “It is the incapacity of democratic theorists and politicians to acknowledge the 
paradox of which liberal-democratic politics is the expression which is at the origin of 
their mistaken emphasis on consensus and sustains their belief that antagonism can be 
eradicated” (2000:8).   According to Mouffe, deliberative political theorists mistakenly 
attempt to reach agreement and reconcile fundamentally different interests (e.g. 
ecological and commercial forestry), and they approach conflict with mistaken 
assumption that a universalist-rationality, or ultimate, objective truth will emerge 
(Peterson 2004).  
 Mouffe is also critical of the deliberative democratic emphasis on consensus-
based decision-making, which is also a central component of collaborative management.  
Concerned with the potential for coercion and the pressure to reach agreement when 
fundamental values are in conflict, Mouffe points to Wittgenstein’s criticism about 
consensus, who wrote, “Where two principles really do meet which cannot be 
reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and an heretic.  I 
said I would ‘combat’ the other man, but wouldn’t I give him reasons?  Certainly: but 
how far do they go?  At the end of reason comes persuasion” (1969:81).  Consensus-
based decisions in such circumstances are usually products of power or clever rhetoric 
instead of genuine consensus.  According to Mouffe, consensus is only made possible by 
71 
shutting out interests from the deliberative process, and these exclusions create 
“antagonisms” that produce artificial closure or assign permanent solutions to 
incomplete consensus.  By acknowledging limits in conflict, "antagonism is constitutive 
and irreducible” in democratic society and instead requires an understanding of the 
dynamic tension between diverse groups in a pluralistic democracy.   
 Furthermore, deliberation and consensus-based decision-making can rarely 
move people to abandon fundamental value differences, especially when publicly held 
resources are at stake (Gastil and Levin 2005).  Mouffe addressed this inherent dilemma 
for deliberative democrats, rejecting Rawls’ and Habermas’ position “that consensus is 
possible if people are only able to leave aside their particular interests and think as 
rational beings. However, while we desire an end to conflict, if we want people to be 
free we must always allow for the possibility that conflict may appear and to provide an 
arena where differences can be confronted” (Mouffe 2007).  Rejecting the perspective 
that government decision-making can be improved with the right (universal-rational) 
consensus-based design, agonistic and dissent-based approaches to conservation may 
be preferable given the potential for false consensus in deliberative decision-making to 
backfire once issues boiling below the surface inevitably emerge (Peterson 2004).  
Limits of Collaboration Management 
 Many authors agree the operational implementation of deliberative democracy 
(collaborative management) faces significant hurdles in its application to national forest 
management, including internal agency inertia against new processes (Lawrence et al. 
1997), problems attracting the attention of the general public (Stankey 2003), and the 
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requirement to rely on local stakeholders (Coggins 1999, McCloskey 1999, Petersen MN 
et al. 2006, 2006, 2007).  The “who, what, where and how of governing are, by their 
very nature, highly political.  They reach to the very core of the nation’s democratic and 
federal system of government and to the balances struck among levels and branches of 
government and between citizens and their government” (Vaughn & Cortner 2005:3).    
The following section of this paper will provide a critique of collaborative democracy as 
a model of consensus-based, deliberative processes for U.S. federal agency decision-
making in national forests.  According to Cortner (1999:48), “The current popularity of 
the community/collaborative model of decision-making, after all, is a product of 
centuries of experimentation and learning, and is undoubtedly a step to a yet unknown 
preferred future form of governance and problem-solving.”    
 While this “deliberative turn” (Dryzek 1990) in agency decision-making has 
translated into more collaborative planning projects for U.S.  National Forests, it is 
unclear whether the process actually conforms to Habermas’s deliberative democracy 
theory.  Collaborative management principles relating to participants with a personal 
interest at ‘stake’ runs counter to the deliberative democrats’ emphasis on “subjectless 
communication” (Habermas 1989) or the rational decisions informed by a universalist 
truth (Rawls 1971).  Modern collaborative management is inconsistent with the 
deliberative emphasis on an “ideal speech situation,” in which citizens deliberate 
without the influence of personal interests or the erosion from “systematically distorted 
communication” (Habermas 1981).    The stakeholder approach proposed for modern 
collaborative management fails to consider Rawls’ process by which individual citizens 
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deliberate “behind a veil of ignorance,” or Habermas’ “subjectless communication”—
each requiring each stakeholder to overlook their own selfish interests for the larger 
project.   In short, collaborative decision-making’s reliance on individuals with direct 
interests at stake runs counter to the tenets of deliberative democracy. 
 Additionally, “wicked” public participation processes described in the resource 
management literature (Allen and Gould 1988) are magnified, not eliminated, by 
collaborative national forest planning.   In Coggins’ article about forest planning in 
California, he rejects the claim that collaboration helps build rational decision-making, 
calling calls the “assumption demonstrably false *considering the+ disproportionate 
number of every kind of obdurate extremist, demagogue, and outright crook” involved 
in agency decision-making (1999:607).   Coggins and others reject the assumption that 
participants will act reasonably and rationally (Rawls 1971; Habermas 1975), see all 
sides (Gastil 2000), or find the best mutually agreeable compromise or “best solution” 
(Rawls 1971).   
There is also extensive debate in the anthropological, cultural studies, 
communications, conservation, and policy literatures about the definition and meaning 
local.  Similar to the way the “gaseous” public interest remains a slippery subject 
criticized by pluralists (Stewart 1975), few authors agree on how to precisely describe 
the “local” interest identified by collaborative management.  Definitions include all 
stakeholders engaging in the deliberative process or only individual local participants, 
and the term is often interchangeable with “community based,” “place-based,” and 
“grassroots” throughout the conservation and resource management literature.  In 
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some studies, local is defined as in-state (Steelman 1996) while others focus on the 
watershed level (Snyder 1993).   
 The shift of power to local stakeholders, according to McCloskey’s early critique 
of collaborative management, is a “prescription for frustrating the national will of the 
majority *and+ subvert basic tenets of democracy and nationhood” (1999:427).  Calls for 
local stakeholder control often accompany proposals to abandon established decision-
making processes for consensus-based models that “displace this national constituency 
and transfer control to the local level” (McCloskey 1999:624).  Collaborative proponents 
often call for limiting participation by ‘outsiders’ who are not granted stakeholder 
status.  Although Coggins argues that “when the nation’s lands and resources are at 
stake, there are no outside interests” (Coggins 1999:807), a November 2007 editorial in 
the Arizona Daily Sun, for example called environmental groups “outsiders” three times 
while lamenting the failure of collaborative management decision-making. 
 Criticisms of the “local” legitimacy assumption are found in the different 
literatures and illustrate the challenge in applying collaborative decision-making 
processes to federal lands.  As McCloskey warned, “Without purporting to represent all 
claims, any legitimacy the collaborative process might claim is lost.  Some are seeking to 
resolve this dilemma by engineering a conscious transfer of power.  They want to shift 
the focus from national policy making to one focused on rural regions and to citizens 
close to the sites affected.  With regard to federal land management, they want to 
reverse the trend toward national control and revest control in local hands” (2000:426).    
McCloskey argues devolving control to local interests means that negotiations will limit 
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participation by ‘outsiders,’ “displace this national constituency, and transfers control to 
the local level…Local control is really about promoting the agenda of the business 
community” (1999:624).  Many scholars believe this shift of power to local stakeholders 
is a ruse to subvert established environmental laws and reverse progress made through 
citizen participation.   
 The literature also describes other objections to collaborative management 
based on the capacity of individuals or public interest groups to participate in 
collaborative processes (McCloskey 1999, Kerr 1999, Manring 2004).  The processes 
often disadvantage groups and citizens who are untrained in professional negotiating 
(Kerr 1999; Abel and Stephan 2000), have limited budgets prohibiting participation in 
“interminable meetings” (Manring 2004); and often live in urban areas while resource 
interests are generally able to shift resources to geographic areas where they intend to 
invest (Kaufman 1960; McCloskey 1999).  Critics of the collaborative management 
model identify the emphasis on local stakeholders as disenfranchising national public 
interests represented by organizations or individuals that are prevented from 
participating if local status is required (McCloskey 1999).  The “very name of these 
forests… *means+ all of us decide how these forests should be managed when we vote in 
national elections… *which+ serves as a mechanism of democratic accountability to a 
national constituency (McCloskey 1999:624).   
 As James McCarthy agued in “Devolution in the woods: Community forestry as 
hybrid neoliberalism” (2005), collaboration fails to provide solutions for local 
management and instead helps resource interests and the “ascendance of particular 
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forms of neoliberalism” (995).  The Bush Administration's HFI proposals, according to 
McCarthy, “make clear the links to a broader logic of neoliberalism” (1000) draped in a 
“soft-edged rhetoric” of collaborative management.  McCarthy sees this as a “benign 
front” concealing trends in federal lands management toward privatization of public 
resources, shifts from binding standards to “neo-corporatist” frameworks of voluntary 
compliance and self-regulation, and an antagonism towards scientific or governmental 
interference in the free-market (McCarthy 2005:276). 
 These criticisms are also consistent with findings in Hibbard and Madsen’s (2003) 
study of two collaborative management projects (e.g. California’s Quincy Library Group 
(QLG) and the Applegate Partnership in Oregon).  While the authors found some 
qualified support for collaborative management, Hibbard and Madsen’s study 
documented how the majority of conservation groups involved in these high-profile 
case studies expressed “worry that place-based collaboration is a tool of industry that 
threatens the current regulatory framework.  These skeptics also fear that collaboration 
will draw environmental activists away from tested tactics [comment and appeal] into 
uncharted waters” (2003:708).   Unlike those who believe in handing control to local 
stakeholders to overcome “analysis paralysis” in national forest management (Bosworth 
2002; Wondolleck 1996, 1999, Cheng & Fiero 2003) opponents fear, as McCloskey 
warned, “in reality, however, ‘breaking deadlocks’ means getting timber production 
back into high gear.  Local control is really about promoting the agenda of the business 
community” (1999:624).   
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In Moote and McClaran’s study on the application of collaborative management 
to public lands projects (1997), the authors identify several challenges facing the 
implementation of deliberative decision-making for national forest management.  
According to the authors, collaboration is problematic because, 1) greater public 
involvement in land use planning does not automatically create consensus; 2) 
participants cannot overcome complicated logistical and financial hurdles; 3) many 
disputes entail fundamental, individual values and disagreements about conservation 
and resource management, not misunderstandings; 4) continuity of public participation 
is undermined by participant burnout or procedures that bring closure to the project 
despite continued conflict; and 6) statutory and legal history prevent completely sharing 
the control of decision-making power over national forests (1997). 
 Another criticism in the literature relates to the ‘devolution’ or shift of decision-
making power to collaborative management as a shirking of agency responsibility 
(Coggins 1999).  This criticism of collaboration relates to federal laws that prevent 
agencies from lawfully delegating public land management decisions entirely to ‘local’ 
stakeholders (Coggins 1999, McCarthy 2000, 2004, 2005).  Although federal statutes 
prevent the delegation (or ‘devolution’) of power over national forests “unelected, 
unappointed local citizen councils... devolved collaboration has become the latest 
ideological fad in federal land management” (Coggins 1999:602).    
 The literature includes several studies describing collaborative management as 
an incomplete model in need of further development “to address logistical and legal 
barriers to participatory public land planning and decision-making” (Moote and 
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McClaran 1997:473).  The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) (Pub. L. 92-463, Oct. 
6, 1972), for example, governs the behavior of advisory committees with jurisdiction 
over partnerships and environmental decisions.   According to Moote and McClaran 
(1990: 478), “FACA has been interpreted to require that all planning and decision-
making groups in which federal agencies take part follow the open meeting and public 
disclosure requirements of advisory committees under the act.” 
 The law requires federally related planning and decision-making to follow open 
meeting and public disclosure requirements and mandates that federal agencies to 
withdraw membership from processes if the group does not meet FACA’s procedural 
requirements.  FACA has forced federal agencies into withdrawing membership in 
collaborative management processes out of fear from being sued for becoming involved 
in, or taking advice from a group that does not meet the strict procedures of the 
Administrative Procedures Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 706, 551:13).   FACA also has strict conflict-
of-interest prohibitions that limit the degree to which private interests can participate in 
projects in which resource extraction benefits negotiating corporations or individuals..  
FACA requires, for example, that committees need “appropriate provisions to assure 
that the advice and recommendations of the advisory committee will not be 
inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority or by any special interest, but 
will instead be the result of the advisory committee's independent judgment.” (FACA, § 
5, part 3) 
 While collaborative planning processes are described by some as a new 
paradigm for national forest management (Wondolleck 2000) that produces better 
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decisions (Leach 2005) and reduces conflict (Wondolleck 1996, 1999; Cheng and Daniels 
2003), these outcomes appear to be rare (Hendriks 2002).   Most importantly, there is 
little evidence that decisions produced through so-called collaboration actually results in 
better conservation practices, and instead are the products of coercion and power that 
displaces rational consensus (Knopp and Thomas 1990; Abel and Stephan 2000).  
“Consensus-building shifts the ultimate goal away from reaching quality decision and 
moves it toward reaching a merely agreeable one,” writes Coglianese.  “They can lead to 
policies that are based on cumbersome compromises of principles, the lowest common 
denominator, and on the most tractable but least important issues” (1999:32).   
 Despite these shortcomings and legal barriers to implementation, many 
proponents of collaboration believe deliberative theory satisfactorily addresses the 
limits of conventional pluralistic forms of administrative decision-making (Wondolleck 
1996, 1999; Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000; Cheng and Daniels 2003, Leach 2005).  Calls 
for deliberative democracy continue throughout the resource and conservation 
literature, in which proponents favor more decentralized, devolved collaborative 
processes informed by local stakeholder and consensus-based decision-making.    While 
deliberative democracy and collaboration informs decision-making by foregrounding the 
role of local stakeholders in conservation debates, many believe these models are 
inadequate post-pluralistic models.   Given this disagreement, it is difficult to determine 
how well deliberative democratic theory informs collaborative management as a model 
for public participation in agency decision-making in U.S. National Forests.    
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 Thomas and Koontz’s 2006 paper addressed similar questions, arguing that little 
to no empirical study has addressed whether collaborative management actually 
produces better environmental outcomes.  “Many tout the benefits of collaborative 
environmental management as an alternative to centralized planning and command and 
control regulation, but the excitement over collaborative processes has not been 
matched by evidence that these processes actually improve the environment” (Thomas 
and Koontz 2006:111).   These critics have called for more research to address the 
environmental effects of these processes.  Chapter Seven provides an analysis of 
collaborative management in North Carolina from 2003 through 2008. 
  
CONCLUSION 
This review of the policy and conservation literature allows for an exploration of 
the prevailing decision-making processes present in national forest management in 
North Carolina under the Healthy Forest Initiative.  The current study used 
characteristics in Table 1 to provide a framework for evaluating whether elite, 
pluralistic, deliberative, or agonistic democratic theories most adequately explained the 
processes for 67 HFI projects issued in North Carolina.   
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Table 1.  Characteristics Of Elite, Pluralist, Deliberative, And Agonistic Democratic 
Theories * 
 ELITE PLURALISTIC DELIBERATIVE AGONISTIC 
ROLE OF THE 
PUBLIC 
Limited/Passive Represented 
by interest 
groups 
Represented by 
stakeholders 
Active Citizens 
LOCUS OF 
POWER 
Vested in Elite Vested in 
interest groups 
Stakeholder 
Collaboration 
Vested in 
Individuals 
VALUE OF 
DEMOCRACY 
Instrumental; as 
a means 
Instrumental Intrinsic Intrinsic 
VIEW OF 
FOREST 
SERVICE 
Idealistic. 
Trusting and 
competent 
Moderates the 
Political Arena 
Devolved Skeptical 
PRIMARY 
CONCERN 
Efficiency and 
stability 
Political 
Accountability 
Conflict 
resolution 
Growth of 
Individual 
LOCUS OF 
PARTICIPATION 
Voting, ratifying 
leadership 
Interest group 
negotiations 
Consensus 
driven Local 
deliberation 
Local 
participation, 
Dissent-based 
negotiation, 
argumentation 
VIEW OF THE 
PUBLIC 
Disinterested 
Skeptical, 
Malleable, 
Apathetic, 
Uneducated 
Disinterested 
Skeptical, 
Malleable, 
Apathetic 
 
Legitimate, 
Knowledgeable 
Legitimate, 
Knowledgeable, 
Diverse, Active 
*  Adapted from Steelman (1996) 
 
 Characteristics from these democratic theories, described in Table 1 provide a 
design, adapted from Steelman’s study (1996) using two categories (elite and 
participatory), to determine which model best describes the democratic processes 
present in national forest planning under the Healthy Forest Initiative from 2003 though 
2008.   Chapter Nine concludes this dissertation with a determination of the prevailing 
decision-making process (and forest management, see Chapter Four), based on analysis 
found in Chapter Seven and Eight. 
  
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 This dissertation explored variations of democratic theory from the policy and 
conservation literature to develop an understanding of  the processes present in Forest 
Service management of North Carolina’s national forests under the Bush 
Administration’s Healthy Forest Initiative from 2003-2008.  This management is then 
evaluated based on the conservation outcomes occurring under the prevailing 
democratic theories.   Project-level decision-making for national forests was selected as 
the unit of analysis for this study.  This topic is timely given the substantial use, public 
participation, and controversy surrounding national forest management in the United 
States.  North Carolina’s federal land was selected as the case study for ecological, 
pragmatic, and theoretical reasons based on the unique status of the states’ Croatan, 
Nantahala, Pisgah, and Uwharrie National Forests.   
 To determine which democratic decision-making processes were present under 
the Healthy Forest Initiative in North Carolina, public files for each site-specific project 
obtained through a “Freedom of Information Act” (Public Law 89-554, 80 Stat. 38) 
(FOIA) request to conduct an analysis of the process, participant, policy, and project 
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characteristics.  Methods for this dissertation included records research, content 
analysis, and archival analysis that were used to collect, analyze, and explain the 
relevant characteristics present during “pre-decisional” and implementation processes 
for 67 projects authorized in North Carolina from 2003 through 2008.   
 
THE CASE STUDY METHOD, SELECTION OF SITE-SPECIFIC MANAGEMENT, 
AND NORTH CAROLINA’S NATIONAL FORESTS  
 Although there is a long history of public participation in decision-making in the 
United States, citizen involvement in environmental decisions is rare given the level of 
ecological change occurring without formal or direct involvement by independent 
citizens or interest groups (National Research Council 2008).  Law governing Forest 
Service decision-making, however, is unique for the substantial access and oversight 
offered to the public for forest-wide and project-level management relative to other 
environmental decisions that proceed with no public participation.  In fact, the Forest 
Service is the only federal agency in the country with statutory language specifically 
requiring an administrative appeals process for project-level decisions (Coulombe 2004).   
Public participation is a useful indicator for analyzing democratic theory, and the 
Healthy Forest Initiative provided a worthy case study to explore the strengths and 
weakness of elite, pluralistic, deliberative, or agonistic democratic theories. 
According to a GAO study of vegetation management CE projects in the United 
States from 2003-2005 (GAO 2007), of the nine regions governed by Forest Service, the 
agency approved the largest number of project-level CE decisions in the Southeast 
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(Region Eight), with 633 CE projects covering 1,608,973 acres.  This accounts for more 
than twice the average of CE projects per region.  Of all CE’s issued nationwide from 
2003-2005, the GAO found Region 8 accounted for over 29 percent of the projects 
nationally.  The GAO also showed that for the number of CE’s proposed from 2003-2005 
in North Carolina (n=32) was well above the national average by individual forest (20) 
and was the median compared to other forests in Region Eight.   
In Region Eight, North Carolina’s 1,251,710 million acres of national forests also 
contain the most representative sample of the geographic and demographic variation 
among the southeastern federal land, with four national forests covering the Southern 
Appalachian Blue Ridge, Piedmont, and Mid-Atlantic Coastal ecoregions (Griffith et al. 
2000).  No other state in the region contains all three forest types.   The state also has 
highly-populated cities within a one-hour drive distance of each forest.  Finally, the 
Pisgah National Forest is ranked second behind the Angeles National Forest in California 
as the most heavily visited national forest in the country. 
North Carolina also has a unique history with respect to active citizen 
involvement in Forest Service management.  This includes controversy over an appeal 
over the 1987 Forest Planning process (Syden 1998), the 1997 Bluff Mountain 
controversy in Hot Springs North Carolina (Syden 1997), and a 1999 forest-wide 
moratorium on logging in the Nantahala National Forest after the discovery of 
undocumented endangered Indiana Bats (Bagby 1999).  This rich history of public 
participation in national forest management in North Carolina provided for an 
uncommonly large number of public comments (n=171) for the CE project-level 
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decisions relevant to this research.  This level of participation is substantial given the 
obscure and expedited CE approach that theoretically do not “individually or 
cumulatively have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment” (40 CFR 
1508.4).   
Case-study methodologies were appropriate for this dissertation due to the 
attention to decision-making processes used by bureaucratic federal agencies (Patton 
1980; Yin 1980).  “Federal agencies have made surveys and questionnaires a 
bureaucratically hazardous affair due to the clearance procedures required.  Case 
studies have therefore become the preferred method” (Yin 1980).  Furthermore, case 
studies provide an empirical approach for investigating “a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context” using “multiple sources of evidence” (Yin 1980:13, 97).  
Unlike descriptive or exploratory case study methods, this dissertation relied on an 
explanatory case study design aimed at documenting competing structures or processes 
of decision-making under elite, pluralistic, deliberative, or agonistic democratic theories 
to determine which model most adequately described the process of public 
participation under the Healthy Forest Initiative in North Carolina.   
This dissertation investigated the presence of decision-making and forest 
management characteristics in 67 site-specific project-level actions in North Carolina 
from 2003-2008, using records research, content analysis, and archival documents.  The 
Forest Service is required to maintain a project file for each proposed project, which 
includes documentation of the scoping process (public participation), the potential 
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extraordinary circumstances present in the project area (documented in an “Biological 
Evaluation”), and a notice of the final decision (Decision Memo).    
First, records research was used to identify and obtain primary source records.  
This allowed for a process of discovery of 67 project files from the Forest Service’s 
regional, state, and district offices.  Next, a content analysis was used to catalogue 
process and participant characteristics present in 171 individual comments sent to the 
Forest Service during what is known as the pre-decisional public scoping period.  Finally, 
archival analysis used published newspaper announcements, notarized correspondence, 
and letters mailed to interested parties.   Archival documents were used to verify data 
obtained during the records research and content analysis methods.  These strategies 
allowed for a “triangulation” of data types to strengthen the research design (Patton 
1980; Yin 1980). 
The majority of public comments analyzed for this study were received by the 
Forest Service during the NEPA required “scoping” of the public attitudes. This process is 
limited to providing information in short announcements in local papers and brief 
letters sent directly to members of the public who have previously expressed an interest 
in Forest Service management and are presently on the agency’s mailing list.   This 
official scoping process, required by the NEPA, was the only process available for the 
public to address HFI projects until federal district and appeals courts (Earth Island v 
Ruthenbeck 2005) invalidated portions of the HFI.  After three years when the HFI was in 
use, this ruling effectively returned the right of administrative appeal guaranteed by the 
National Forest Service Decision-making and Appeals Reform Act (ARA).    
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Records Research 
Records research and archival document analysis were used to identify and 
verify each individual project-level CE management action in North Carolina beginning in 
2003 with the promulgation of the Healthy Forest Initiative.  This included discovery and 
analysis of public and internal Forest Service and General Accounting Office (GAO) 
publications and databases to document the names and locations of North Carolina’s 67 
vegetation management CE projects.   
Until 2009, the Forest Service maintained no central database of vegetation 
management projects occurring across the different national forest districts.  Instead, 
the Forest Service published quarterly listings, or a “schedule of proposed actions” 
(SOPA), on a non-standardized and inconsistent posting on the Forest Service’s website.  
The SOPA postings were difficult to use because, during the course of this study, many 
postings about projects were found to be inaccurate, incomplete, and poorly identified.  
The information was useful, however, in providing a rough list of the vegetation 
management CE projects in NC.   
Next, this study used a 2007 GAO compendium of all Forest Service projects 
nationally from 2003-2005 to improve and verify the original list based on SOPA 
postings in the four national forests in North Carolina.  On March 25, 2009, the GAO 
officially released their new data collection instrument and spreadsheets for the 
purposes of this dissertation, and a quick comparison between the GAO’s data and the 
SOPA-based list uncovered several projects missing from each source.  The GAO study, 
based on surveys of the Forest Service, only identified 32 out of 48 vegetation 
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management projects in North Carolina for calendar years 2003-2005, including several 
controversial “Southern Pine Beetle Prevention” projects that were clearly identified in 
the Forest Service SOPA.    
During the summer of 2009, the Regional 8 Headquarters in Atlanta, GA 
disclosed that the Forest Service had a new internal database (separate from the GAO) 
of all management projects, called the Planning, Appeals, and Litigation (PAL) tracking 
system.  On June 19, 2009, employees from the Forest Service Supervisors Office in 
Asheville, NC ran a report of PAL of all CE projects from in the Croatan, Pisgah, 
Nantahala, and Uwharrie National Forests beginning in 2003, and released a digital copy 
of the report for this dissertation.  This report was then culled to document and verify 
all vegetation management CE projects in North Carolina, which produced a total 
population of 67 projects.   
After a July 6, 2009 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request was filed to 
obtain copies of the individual project files listed in the PAL report, the Forest Service 
Region 8 Headquarters in Atlanta approved the FOIA and determined that the research 
adequately met the criteria for a fee waiver.  Based on the FOIA agreement, the Forest 
Service was required to release all vegetation management CE’s identified in the PAL 
database, although the agency was not required to provide non-HFI prescribed burns or 
maps of the specific projects.  On October 2, 2009, the Supervisors Office began 
releasing copies of the individual project files listed in the FOIA.   
Based on the project files obtained for this study through FOIA, this dissertation 
collected public comments (n = 171), environmental surveys, and internal Forest Service 
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correspondence documented in the public record.  On December 1, 2009, the final 
project files were received from the Forest Service.   Policy and project characteristics 
(analyzed in Chapter Eight) were identified through an analysis of the Decision Memos 
(DM) and Biological Evaluations (BE) to determine the nature of the individual projects 
with respect to the size, location, and composition of rare-species identified in each 
project.  The Forest Service tracks rare species called “Proposed, Endangered, 
Threatened, and Sensitive” (PETS) for each project.  Then, NEPA requires the Forest 
Service to document the BE in the public record, and the final decisions (DM) discusses 
the public comment, the BE, and other surveys (e.g. archeological).   Unlike an 
environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS), a categorical 
exclusion is exempted from more rigorous analyses if the Forest Service determines no 
extraordinary circumstances or potential significant issues were identified in the surveys 
and scoping process.  Chapters Five and Six discuss the rules governing CE management 
projects for U.S. National Forests.   
These data collected during records research were analyzed in Chapter Eight to 
determine the ecological outcomes of the individual Forest Service CE projects.  The 
prevailing management type was understood as a function of the policy and project 
characteristics (Figure 3).  The type of management for each project (either commodity 
forestry or ecological forestry) depended on where it was proposed, what type of CE 
classification and stated purposed was used, and when the projects occurred (see 
discussion below). 
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Content Analysis 
Content analysis is a common research methodology for natural resource policy, 
and it has been used to measure attitudes about a number of different environmental 
cases, including measuring attitudes toward animals (More 1977), wilderness areas 
(Fazio 1979), and management proposals (Stankey 1972).   Berelson presents a 
commonly cited definition for content analysis as “a technique for the objective, 
systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication” 
(1952:18).  Stempel described the objective as defining categories so different coders 
can get the same results consistently, and the "results depend upon the procedure and 
not the analyst” (1989, p. 125).   Manheim and Rich (1981) defined this process as the 
“systematic counting, assessing, and interpreting of the form and substance of 
communication,” which can be used to provide a set of methods for summarizing direct 
physical evidence (behaviors and relationships) of political actors.   As long as a 
researcher has access to the primary documents, content analysis can be used 
whenever there is a physical record of communication among participants.   
A content analysis of the management proposals and comments documented in 
the project files was conducted to determine the process and participant characteristics 
for each project.  This followed Stankey ‘s (1972) four steps for selecting the appropriate 
categories for considering process and participant characteristics, including 1) Who 
commented on the management proposal; 2) What they said; 3) Why they said it; and 4) 
Where the response came from (1972: 149).  More broadly, Burrus-Bammel et al.’s 
methodology (1988) was used following five steps for content analysis research: 1) 
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defining the population; 2) determining the sample; 3) isolating the unit of analysis, 4) 
undertaking the substantive or structural content analysis (encoding the data), and 5) 
coding the statistical analysis (1988:33).   This process mirrors other studies in the policy 
and conservation literature that relied on content analysis (Fazio 1979; Ferguson 1981; 
Nachmias & Nachmias 1987; Denq 1990; Oh 1992; Steelman 1996).   
A coding sheet was adapted from Steelman’s 1996 study of public comments 
made during the Monongahela National Forest planning process, and was modified to 
address specific characteristics of the North Carolina process.  A pretest was conducted 
on the modified coding sheet for inter-rater reliability using the Kappa statistic, and the 
test found substantial agreement among coders (.72 Cohen’s Kappa).  Coding began 
during the first week of October 2009 and continued for eight weeks until 171 
comments were coded.  A copy of the coding sheet is included as Appendix D. 
To describe the data set, the results of the content analysis and records research 
were imported into Microsoft Excel to produce percentages and totals for analysis.  
These data were then imported into Microsoft Access to provide for additional analysis 
based on relationships between different tables and variables.  Finally, the statistical 
software R 2.10 (RDevCor 2009) was used to test hypotheses relating to participation 
predictions and project frequency identified in Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight.    
Contingency tables were created using outputs from Excel and Access, and were then 
used in R 2.10 to test for independence and goodness of fit using chi-square to 
determine the variables which contributed to significance.   
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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
The conceptual design for this research held that the type of decision-making 
structure used by the Forest Service is understood as a function of the process and 
participation characteristics (Figure 2). Under this framework, process characteristics 
were envisioned as a function of general scoping (National Environmental Policy Act), 
administrative appeal (Forest Service Decision-making & Appeals Reform Act), and 
Collaboration (Healthy Forest Initiative). Additionally, content analysis was used to 
identify the participant characteristics of the public reaction to individual CE projects in 
North Carolina, which was understood as a function of who the commenter was 
(Affiliation, Representation, and Locus), what the comment said (Attitude, Source of 
Concern, and Potential Effects), and how the comment was delivered (Vehicle, Style, 
Detail, and Length).    
Decision-Making Process 
To document the decision-making structures (elite, pluralist, deliberative, 
agonistic) present in North Carolina’s national forest management during the period in 
question, this dissertation focused on process, participant, policy, and project 
characteristics of individual vegetation management CE projects.  In Chapter Seven, the 
dissertation provides an analysis of the pre-decisional process and the participants 
involved to determine which democratic decision-making structure was present.  Figure 
2 provides a description of the process and participant characteristics.   
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Process Characteristics: Scoping; Appeals, & Collaboration 
The Forest Service is required by the National Environmental Policy Act to 
“scope” the public to determine whether significant issues may be present that would 
require the agency to conduct an Environmental Assessment (EA) Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS).   The public is allowed to participate in scoping for all Forest Service 
actions, including those that are “categorically excluded” from NEPA’s EA process.   Even 
for projects that the agency considers routine (CE’s), it is possible that a citizen may 
raise issues relating to extraordinary circumstances that would normally require the 
agency to conduct an EA or EIA.  This automatic trigger by an extraordinary 
circumstance was eliminated by the Bush Administration as part of the first rule change 
under the HFI (see policy characteristics below).    
In addition to “pre-decisional” scoping-level comment periods, the public has 
historically had the opportunity to appeal Forest Service decisions for forest-wide 
planning and site-specific project-level activity.  Under the HFI, however, the 
administrative appeals process was eliminated for CE projects by the Appeals Rule.   This 
Figure 2.  Conceptual Framework For Research Design: Decision-Making Process. 
Decision-making process   = f  (Process Characteristics  +  Participant Characteristics) 
Decision-Making Process  Process Characteristics Participant Characteristics 
Elite 
Aggregative Pluralistic 
Deliberative Democracy 
Agonistic 
Scoping Comments 
HFI Appeals Rule 
Collaboration 
 
Who participated 
What they said 
How they said it 
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HFI rule was in effect for less than three years before it was invalidated by federal 
district and appeals courts (Earth Island v Ruthenbeck).   After this ruling, the public was 
allowed to appeal decisions again, although appellants could only gain standing to 
appeal if they submitted “substantive” comments during the scoping process (§ 
215.13(a)) The HFI defines “substantive comments” as those that “are specific to the 
proposed action, have a direct relationship to the proposed action and include 
supporting reasons for the Responsible Official to consider” (§ 215.13(a)).  Four years 
after it was established, the substantive comments rule HFI rule was invalidated in 
Wilderness Society v Rey (2006) (See Chapter Six).  
Another process characteristics analyzed in this study was the collaborative 
management process, which relies on deliberative negotiation, involvement of key 
stakeholders, and consensus-based decision-making to resolve conflict (see Chapter 
Two).  The HFI included new regulations for Categorical Exclusions (CE) and “Goods for 
Services” (GFS) contracting that required collaborative decision-making for federal 
forest management (see Chapter Five).   Chapter Six analyzes eight projects 
implemented in North Carolina governed by the new HFI process for collaborative 
decision-making.   
Participant Characteristics  
Who, What, and How categories serve as participant variables for this level of 
analysis.  Who was defined by Affiliation, Representation, and Interest Identification.  
Affiliation was determined using the commenter’s signature or letterhead to identify if 
they were individuals or if belonged to an interest group, professional association, or 
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agency (twenty-three groups were present in all comments).  If an individual 
commented on more than one project, they were identified with a unique code.   
Representation was coded based on the commenter’s status as representatives of non-
governmental organizations (NGO), governmental agencies, or as individuals 
representing themselves. 
Interest Identification classified each comment based on the specific interest 
expressed in national forest management writ large.  Nine unique types of interests 
were identified for coding, including Hunters/Anglers who expressed an interest in game 
management or management aimed at conserving foraging, migration, breeding or 
other habitat for game species.  A commenter who addressed ecological issues was 
coded as Environmental.  Recreationalists were coded according to whether they 
expressed an interest in non-consumptive recreation, such as day-hiking, mountain-
biking, and backcountry hiking along the Appalachian Trail.  If a commenter expressed 
an interest in commodity forestry or commercial use, they were coded as Commercial.  
Professional/Scientific/Historical commenters were identified based on the direct 
interests based on their involvement with local research projects or land uses issues 
regarding archeological or Native American tribal concerns.   If an administrator or 
scientist from a specific North Carolina resource agency commented, it was coded as 
State Agency/ Commission, which included comments from the Division of Water 
Quality, Department of the Environment and Natural Resources, and, more commonly, 
the Division of Wildlife Resources.  If the commenter was an administrator or scientists 
from a federal agency, they were coded as Federal Agency, including the U.S. Fish and 
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Wildlife Service and the Division of Coastal Resources.  Finally, those who did not specify 
an interest in any form of national forest management were coded as None Identified.  A 
primary interest was determined based on the focus of the comment if more than one 
interest was identified in national forest management.  
Another component under the Who category was whether the commenter was 
local or out-of-state.  In this case, Locus of Commenter was based on the address on the 
commenter’s envelop or letterhead to determine whether they were Local, Out-of-
state, or Unknown.   Based on Steelman (1996), the commenter was coded as Local if 
they had a North Carolina zip code, or Out-of-State if they used zip code from another 
state.  Of all the comments, only one had no zip code and they were therefore coded as 
Unknown.  If the comment was phoned in, the Forest Service usually noted the origin of 
the commenter, or included a phone-number, from which an area code was used to 
establish the state from which the commenter was calling. 
Under the What variable, content analysis of the comments explored the 
Attitude, Criticisms, Sources of Concern, and Potential Effects the commenter 
communicated to the Forest Service.  Participant characteristics (reaction to a project) 
was coded as support, opposed, mixed, or neutral based on the attitude expressed in 
comments toward the individual project-level decision.  If the commenter showed 
support for the project, they favored the proposal and expressed no criticisms.  If the 
commenter was opposed to the project, they identified specific problems with the 
project or disagreed with the project generally.   If the commenter was mixed about the 
project, it meant they supported and opposed different parts of the same proposal.  
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Finally, if the commenter was neutral, it meant they were only acknowledging the 
project and their right to participate but did not express support or opposition.  
Additionally, comments were grouped according to critical and uncritical 
categories based on whether or not the commenter provided objections to the project.    
Comments were also analyzed through another process to identify the specific 
subcategories of problems expressed by the commenter.  These subcategories allowed 
for an exploration of issues presented by the commenter that were not necessarily their 
primary concern (commenters could address more than one issue or concern).   This 
allowed for additional analysis of the process concerns that were never identified as 
primary concerns but cumulatively were significant given the large percentage of 
commenters who expressed concerns about the way the Forest Service involved the 
public in the process. 
Beyond the general discussion of the commenters attitude toward the national 
forest management, specific Sources of Concern were identified to capture the project-
specific concerns held by the commenter.  These were categorized by Road 
Construction, Pre-commercial Thinning, Logging, Prescribed Burns, Other, or None 
Mentioned.   If the commenter expressed a source of concern, the Potential Effects or 
consequences of the specific concern were coded based on Ecological Forestry, 
Aesthetics, Recreation/Hunting, Scientific, Other, or None-mentioned.    
The method in which the commenter communicated to the Forest Service was 
catalogued under the How variable, which included the comment’s Length, Style, 
Vehicle, and Detail.  The Length of the comment was coded based on whether it was a 
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half, one, two, or was three or more pages.  The Vehicle of a comment referred to 
whether the comment was verbal or written.  If it was written, the comment Style then 
identified whether it was either handwritten, typed, a form-letter, or other.  Finally, the 
Detail of the comment was determined based on whether the comment expressed 
specific points of support or opposition to the projects.   If the commenter failed to 
identify anything specific about the project and only provided their position in support, 
opposed, mixed, or neutral, the comment was identified as No Detail.   If the comment 
offered no specific comments about the project but discussed the project generally, it 
was identified as Generalized.  The commenter was categorized as having 1-2 Topics, 3-4 
Topics, or 5+ Topics based on the number of concrete, project-specific issues addressed 
in comments that went beyond discussing the forest management or the project 
generally.  If the commenter offered a specific criticism or support for project-specific 
attributes, these topics were captured under the What variable (discussed below). 
Forest Management 
In Chapter Eight, this dissertation follows the analysis of pre-decisional public 
participation process in Chapter Seven to provide an analysis of the resulting forest 
management decisions.  The chapter includes a discussion of the policy and project 
characteristics to facilitate an analysis of the Healthy Forest Initiative regulation changes 
that effect forest management, and the project-level characteristics describing the site-
specific effects relating to where, what, and when the vegetation management CE’s 
occurred.  Figure 3 provides a summary of the conceptual framework relating to the 
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forest management taking place under the HFI in North Carolina from 2003 through 
2008. 
 
Policy Characteristics  
Chapter Eight explores policy characteristics present in the data set to develop 
an understanding of forest management under the Healthy Forest Initiative.  First, this 
chapter explores the Bush Administration’s changes to rules governing Forest Service 
authorities when “extraordinary circumstances” are present.  Under the original 
implementing language, the Forest Service could not implement CE projects if 
extraordinary circumstances were present in the activity area (40 C.F.R. § 1508.4).  
Extraordinary circumstances include a list of environmental and cultural issues that, if 
present in the proposed activity area, requires the Forest Service to conduct a full EA for 
any national forest management.   
The first rule change under the Healthy Forest Initiative was the “Clarification of 
Extraordinary Circumstances for Categories of Actions Excluded from Documentation in 
an Environmental Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement” (67 Fed. Reg. 
54,622, 54,622 (Aug. 23, 2002).  The new HFI directive revised the Forest Service 
Handbook (1909.15 Chapter 30) by changing the extraordinary circumstances’ 
Figure 3.  Conceptual Framework for Research Design:  Forest Management. 
  
Forest Management = f  (Policy Characteristics + Project Characteristics) 
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automatic mechanism triggering an EA and replaced it with discretionary language in 
which the agency was only required to “consider” “resource conditions” to determine 
whether extraordinary circumstances were present (Huber 2005).   
Another important policy characteristic identified in this study relates to the use 
new CE’s authorized by the HFI.  If the Forest Service determines that specific classes of 
management have no significant effect, individually or cumulatively, on the quality of 
the environment, regulations implementing NEPA allow the Forest Service to establish 
categories of management that are excluded from both the EIS and EA requirements (40 
C.F.R. §§ 1507.3(b)(2)(ii); 1508.4.)   NEPA requires the Forest Service to conduct an EA 
for all management except “routine actions that have no extraordinary circumstances” 
(57 Fed. Reg. 43180 (September 18, 1992).   
Under new provisions established by the Healthy Forest Initiative, the Forest 
Service authorized five new CE’s for hazardous fuels reduction, post-fire rehabilitation, 
“limited” commercial logging, and weather and insect-related salvage logging (see Table 
5).   Before the new HFI CE’s were promulgated in the summer of 2003, the Forest 
Service had existing CE’s for vegetation management exempted from NEPA analysis, 
including road rehabilitation, special uses, regeneration, and timber-stand 
improvements.  The existing CE’s for vegetation management were also modified by 
additional HFI provisions that released the Forest Service from the administrative appeal 
process (see Chapter Six).  Additionally, all CE’s (new and old) could be authorized by the 
Forest Service in areas previously restricted if extraordinary circumstances were 
present.   
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Project Characteristics 
 Last but not least, the specific project characteristics were identified by where 
the projects were proposed, what the projects were, and when they were proposed.  
This analysis provides part the evidence analyzed to answer questions relating to the 
affects of the HFI on democratic decision-making and the site-specific ecological 
consequences of those decisions.  
Projects were first catalogued based on ecoregions, including the Blue Ridge, 
Piedmont, and Mid-Atlantic Coastal Plain.  The national forests in these ecoregions were 
Croatan National Forest near the coast, the Uwharrie National Forest in the central-
piedmont, and the Pisgah and Nantahala National Forests in the western and far-
western part of the state, respectively.   
Next, the projects identified in this study were based on the GAO’s definition of 
vegetation management (2007), and descriptions of the CE type used the Forest Service 
name and number of each project.  Based on this definition, the CE name and number 
identified ranged from Special Uses (#3), Roads (#4), Regeneration (#5), and Timber-
Stand Improvement (#6), Hazardous Fuels Reduction (#10), Post-Fire Rehabilitation 
(#11), Limited Commercial Logging (#12), Weather-Related Salvage Logging (#13), and 
Insect-Related Salvage Logging (#14).  The latter CE types (10-14) were authorized under 
the new HFI regulations (White House 2002). 
While several projects had several purposes, this study identified the primary 
purpose based on the agency descriptions in scoping notices, correspondence, and 
decision-memos.  The Stated Purposes identified in this study were Pre-commercial 
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thinning, Commercial Logging, Burns, Southern Pine Beetles, Wildlife Openings, 
Watershed Restoration, and Other.  After determining the stated purpose for each 
project, the Acreage is identified based on the agency’s description of the proposed 
projects in public notices and agency correspondence.    
Chi-Square Tests, Independence, Participation Predictors, and Frequency Modeling 
Following the descriptive statistics in Chapters Seven and Eight regarding the 
processes, participants, policies, and projects present under the HFI in North Carolina 
from 2003 through 2008, an additional level of analysis provides findings based the 
patterns and relationships between the selected variables of interest.  The response and 
explanatory variables investigated in this section offer a glimpse into the significant 
influences and processes behind implementation of the Bush Administration’s Healthy 
Forest Initiative.   
Contingency tables were developed using Microsoft Excel and Microsoft Access, 
and analyzed using chi-square tests in the R statistical software (R Development Core 
Team 2009) to explore the attitude response variable (What) to representation, interest 
identification, and affiliation explanatory variables (Who) from Chapter Seven.  Chapter 
Eight addresses the patterns and relationships between the where response variable 
and the what explanatory variables (CE type and Stated Purpose).  Chi-square tests were 
used to examine the relationships for levels of significance, or evidence for rejecting 
independence, between the response and explanatory variables.   
Additional analysis of the chi-square statistic is conducted using the standardized 
residuals to explore precisely which observations in the contingency tables deviated 
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from expected frequencies and are responsible for rejecting the independence model.  
Standardized residuals are used to determine which values are major contributors to 
rejecting the null hypothesis. 
After creating a contingency table in Excel, they run through the “R” software’s 
chi-square tests.  In addition to the chi-square statistic outputs, R can produce the 
residual outputs.  If the chi-square statistic is significant, the residuals greater than 2.00 
shows the researcher which parts of the contingency table led to the significance.  
Finally, once the observations are identified, comparisons are made with Concern and 
Potential Effect, participant characteristics, and other evidence to explain the 
significance found in the table.   
Chapter Seven also included an analysis of the predictors of public participation, 
including acreage and species occurrences in each project.  Logistic regression models 
were used to determine which combination of variables best predicted citizen 
participation.   These included the physical size of the project, both raw and log-
transformed, number of species in the project, both raw and log-transformed, and these 
two variables in combination.  Using an R function (plot.logi.hist) published in the 
Bulletin of the ESA (de la Cruz Rot, 2005), one-predictor models were used to visualize 
the predictors graphically.  To understand how variables act in concert in the same 
model, predicted probabilities, 𝜋 , for various predictor combinations can be used to 
classify an observation’s participation type.  A so-called confusion matrix was then used 
to describe the accuracy of the classification rule.  Another strategy compared models 
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using a range of possible values for c, which is traditionally done using a receiver 
operating characteristic (ROC) curve. 
Additionally, Chapter Eight explores the potential patterns in data relating to the 
number of projects proposed over the six years identified in this study.  Statistical tests 
were used to model project occurrence, including the Laplace test (Cox and Lewis, 1978, 
p. 47) and Poisson regression for polynomial regressions and piecewise linear models 
(Davies 1978).  The segmented package of R (Muggeo 2008) used Poisson models that 
were fit to the data, including a linear model, quadratic model, segmented regression 
model, and a breakpoint regression model.   To analyze the waiting times between 
events, modeled using asymmetric probability distributions with positive support were 
used, including the exponential, Weibull, lognormal, and log-logistic distributions. This 
area of statistics that fits models to duration data is known as survival analysis, also 
called event history analysis, and it can be tested using the survival package of R 
(Therneau and Lumley, 2008).  These tests identified trends that were compared to 
findings in the GAO study (2007) that found a substantial drop in project frequency after 
public participation rights were broadened.  
Conclusions 
For the conclusion, the projects were analyzed according to different democratic 
theories outlined in the policy and conservation literature (see Table 1)   To evaluate the 
prevailing decision-making processes present in national forest management in North 
Carolina, characteristics of different democratic theories were identified in the literature 
(see Chapter Two).   This chapter begins with a design adapted from Steelman’s study 
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(1996) using two categories (elite and participatory) to evaluate the democratic 
structures present in the Monongahela National Forest planning process.  Building on 
this approach, the current study used characteristics in Table 1 to provide a framework 
for evaluating whether elite, pluralistic, deliberative, or agonistic democratic theories 
most adequately explained the processes for 67 HFI projects issued in North Carolina.   
Interdisciplinary Study 
This dissertation attempted to bridge the democratic theory, conservation, and 
resource management literatures using an interdisciplinary (Klein 1990) or 
transdisciplinary (Jantsch 1970) approach, constructing a research design based on both 
social and natural science methodologies.  This allowed the study to adequately address 
citizen participation and processes affecting environmental outcomes that are limited by 
the traditional silos constructed by the disparate disciplines.  Because conflict over 
national forest decision-making has been present since the creation of federal public 
land, this study’s problem-centered, social/natural science orientation required 
interdisciplinarity to address parallel questions orbiting distinct literatures.   Moreover, 
this study used a transdisciplinary approach to move beyond “free” or “basic” research 
towards a “field induced,” problem-centered study (Klein 1990) to comprehensively 
broaden the scope of the research question beyond the traditional disciplines (Jantsch 
1970). 
Validity Threats & Limitations 
 Due to the fact this dissertation was based on a non-random selection of a case 
study focusing on North Carolina’s vegetation management projects, it is important to 
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address external validity threats.   Although this study focused on only four of the 155 
available national forests governed by the Forest Service, selecting one was necessary, 
given the arduous task of data collection.  Furthermore, to test for the presence of 
different democratic models, it was necessary to select a small group of forests (the 
Croatan, Nantahala, Pisgah, and Uwharrie).  In Steelman’s (1996) study of national 
forest planning, she justified using only one forests (the Monongahela National Forest) 
“on the grounds that it was appropriate to test two competing theories of decision-
making” (60).   North Carolina’s national forests provided a wealth of public 
participation data to analyze, serving as an important case to address the democratic 
theories present during decision-making.  These finer-scale analyses would have been 
lost if this dissertation instead addressed national forest decision-making through a 
substantially broader study.   
It is important to emphasize the limits of this study.  By focusing on Healthy 
Forest Initiative projects, projects proposed before the 2003 policy changes were not 
included.  Future study could learn much from these projects, including the level of 
extraordinary circumstances (see Chapter Eight).  Additionally, the surveys used to 
document extraordinary circumstances were conducted by the Forest Service, which 
were not verified by independent biologists.  There were also no project identified in 
this study that were authorized by the Healthy Forest Restoration Act because there 
were no such projects proposed in North Carolina during the scope of this study.  
Finally, this study did only included prescribed burns that were authorized under the HFI 
category for burns (CE 10).  Approximately 20 additional prescribed burns authorized in 
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North Carolina were not included in this study due to settlement reached with the 
Forest Service during negotiations over the FOIA request (discussed above).  
This dissertation focused on only four classes of Healthy Forest Initiative polices 
(appeals rule, categorical exclusions, extraordinary circumstances, and goods for 
services) in the Croatan, Nantahala, Pisgah, and Uwharrie National Forests in North 
Carolina.  These findings are therefore not immediately generalizable to other decision-
making processes or national forests in other regions.  Although the North Carolina case 
was chosen for its important forest and management history, this selection also limits 
the general applicability to other forests given the state’s unique status.   
Despite these tradeoffs, several findings address in Chapter Nine have direct 
relevance to federal policies and other national forest regions, including policy 
implications for the appropriate use of categorical exclusions, the difficultly in 
implementing collaborative management, watershed restoration, the “forest health 
vortex,” “bullet-proofing” environmental analysis, Critical Habitat loopholes, and the 
case for a “conservation democracy” theory of environmental decision-making.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 This chapter has outlined the methods used in this dissertation address 
questions relating to the models of democratic theory that best explain the decision-
making processes and conservation outcomes embodied in the Healthy Forest Initiative 
in North Carolina from 2003 through 2008.  The next chapters (Four, Five, and Six) 
provide the historical and legal context for an analysis of the HFI conducted in Chapter 
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Seven and Eight.    Chapter Four provides the context for the case study by addressing 
history of conservation, with an emphasis on commercial forestry, ecological forestry, 
and conservation biology.  Chapter Five provides a history of federal land management, 
public participation, and environmental law in the U.S..   Chapter Six provides context 
for, and characteristics of the Healthy Forest Initiative, as well as the legal challenges 
invalidating portions of this Bush Administration policy change.   Chapter Seven provides 
an analysis of public participation in North Carolina’s CE projects, with an emphasis on 
processes and participants.   Chapter Eight addresses the forest management and 
environmental outcomes of decisions addressed in Chapter Seven.  Chapter Nine 
concludes by providing an interdisciplinary lens to synthesize the analysis and provide 
potential policy recommendations arising from this study.  
  
CHAPTER FOUR: COMMERCIAL FORESTRY, ECOLOGICAL 
FORESTRY, AND U.S. NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT 
 
 
“The botanist looks at the world from a point of view precisely the reverse of 
that of other people. Rich fields of  corn are to him waste lands; cities are his 
abhorrence, and great open areas under high cultivation he calls 'poor country'; 
while on  the other hand the impenetrable forest delights his gaze, the rocky cliff 
charms him, thin-soiled barrens, boggy fens, and unreclaimable swamps and 
morasses are for him the finest land in a State. He takes no delight in the 'march 
of civilization,' the ax and the plow are to him symbols of barbarism, and the 
reclaiming of waste lands and opening up of his favorite haunts to civilization he 
instinctively denounces as acts of vandalism."   
Lester F. Ward 1881 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 For much of the last century, two central groups (i.e., commercial and ecological) 
have engaged in an evolving debate about the meaning and significance of conservation 
(Hays 2007). The disputation actually began prior to the creation of federal public land 
in the United States. The writings of early naturalists and some who were called 
conservationists (e.g., William Bartam (1773), George Perkins Marsh (1864), John 
Audubon (1839), Ralph Waldo Emerson (1836), and Henry David Thoreau (1854) 
revealed essential differences about the meaning of conservation.  The creation of 
federal forest reserves in 1891, however, triggered a unique conflict that is the central 
focus of a substantial body of research (See Chapter Five).   
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 Before using elite, pluralistic, collaborative, and agonistic democratic theories to 
explain the processes involved with citizen engagement and oversight of federal land, it 
is important to define conservation, as the concept is used in the present study, and 
describe the nature of this continuing conflict between commercial and ecological 
interests in the management of U.S. National Forests.  Knowledge of the history of the 
conservation issue is essential in developing an understanding of the contemporary 
United States Forest Service (Forest Service) and the democratic processes that 
influenced the decision-making processes and subsequent ecological outcomes for the 
U.S. National Forest system.    
 This chapter explores the history of the conflict between commercial and 
ecological forestry in the United States, which provides background for an analysis of 
Forest Service management proposals addressed in Chapters Seven and Eight.  The first 
section explores the history of the Forest Service and its founding figures, including 
Gifford Pinchot and John Muir.  The tension between the Conservationist and 
Preservationist philosophies of the late 19th century closely mirrors the current tension 
between commercial and ecological forestry.  This chapter also addresses the history of 
Conservationist “Resource Use” management administered under the traditional elite 
democratic model; this provides insight into the collision involving disparate views in the 
“environmental era” addressed in Chapter Five.  Finally, this chapter outlines the history 
of ecological forest management philosophies in the United States, beginning with the 
Preservationists and including modern conservation biology.  
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COMMERCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL MANAGEMENT  
 Early debates over U.S. federal land ownership and management originated in 
the late 19th century, beginning with campaigns by the American Forestry Association, 
the Progressive movement, and the passage of the Forest Reserve Act of 1891 (Hays 
1959).  In his seminal book on conservation movements in the U.S., Samuel Hay 
describes the infamous split between key leaders during debate over commercial use in 
the Forest Management Act of 1897, which was inserted in the bill by Gifford Pinchot 
without the knowledge of John Muir and others (Hays 1959; Nash 1968).   “These 
differences emerged in the fall of 1896… *Muir+ hoped the government could be 
persuaded to reserve more forests without provision for commercial use, in the manner 
of the 1891 Forest Reserve Act.  [Pinchot], favored opening all the reserved to carefully 
managed economic development” (Nash 1968:135-136). 
 This was the beginning of the “classic conservation conflict” (Callicott 1999) 
between resource focused interests (Conservationists) and ecological interests 
(Preservationists) (Leopold 1949, Hays 1959, McConnell 1966; Nash 1968; Stegner 1990; 
Hirt 1994; Noss 1998; Callicott 1999; White 2005).  The 100-year-old debate over forest 
management originates with this divide between Conservationists interested in 
efficiencies and commercial use, and Preservationists focused on maintaining intact 
native forests for their beauty and perceived value to the human spirit (Nash 1968).   
 This divide has long been recognized by scholars as an “A-B cleavage” (Leopold 
1949), a conflict over “imperialist” and “arcadian” views of science (Worster 1985), 
between “traditionalists” and “stewards” (Alexander 1989), “Old forestry” and “New 
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Forestry” (Foss 1990), “modernist” and “post-modernist” (McQuillan 1992), 
“agronomic” and “ecological” (Hirt 1994),  and, most recently, “commodity forestry” 
and “ecological forestry (Minckler 1974; Hays 2007).  In his seminal book on ecology 
(1948), Leopold’s chapter on the “A-B Cleavage” described resource use interests 
(Group A) as diametrically opposed to the ecologically-minded interests (Group B).    
 The conflict between Conservation and Preservation, however, represents an 
oversimplified dualism of the resource debate that ignores industrial extraction taking 
place during the late-19th century in privately-owned native forests.  One might label the 
wholesale liquidation of native forests on privately-held national forests of that time 
(and today) as a third form of forest use.   Additionally, thinking in such dualistic terms 
also ignores the fact that the Progressives’ Forest Service, designed by Pinchot (1947) as 
a professional corps of efficient scientific experts, departed from the original “gospel of 
efficiency” (Hays 1956) during the post-WWII housing boom to become an industrially-
driven commodity forestry agency consumed by a “conspiracy of optimism” (Hirt 1994).  
Indeed, as C.P. Snow warned (1959), “Attempts to divide anything into two ought to be 
regarded with much suspicion.”  Despite these complexities and caveats, the different 
philosophies and missions of Gifford Pinchot (Conservation) and John Muir 
(Preservation) are useful in developing an understanding of the actual ongoing bounded 
conflict and ideological cleavage that exists today over national forest management.   
 Although modern resource management is described in the literature as 
inconsistent with many principles of ecological forestry or conservation biology, 
commodity forestry of today has roots extending directly down into the rich history of 
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Gifford Pinchot’s Conservationism (Hays 2007).  “Resourcism,” originally described by 
Pinchot (1947), represented the Progressive attempt to manage public resources, for 
the public interest, that has today evolved into what is most commonly defined as 
“resource extraction” or “commodity forestry” (Hirt 1995; Hays 2007: XIII).   
 “Commodity forestry” views forests as “composed of plants that could be a 
source of wood, measured in terms of board feet and cubit feet, categorized in terms of 
sapling, pole, and mature timber, all steps along the way to wood harvest” (Hays 2007: 
XIV).   This approach is not unlike Pinchot’s obsession with efficiency and scientific 
resource use, and it represents a distinct perspective contrasting greatly with modern 
conservation management described by ecologists and conservation biologists (Leopold 
1949; Meffe & Carroll 1994; Holling and Meffe 1994; Noss 1994, 1999).   In short, the 
classic binary is still best explained as a divide between commodity forestry and 
ecological forest management. 
 Distinct from commodity forestry, ecological management today is based 
primarily on principles of conservation biology.  From this perspective, modern 
conservation is best understood as distinct from Pinchot’s Conservationist approach, 
and is also far more scientific than the original philosophies of the “naturo-bot” Muir.  
Hays credits Leon Minckler for first calling for ecological forestry in an article in 1974 
that was rejected by the Society of American Foresters (the organization originally 
founded by Gifford Pinchot), in which Minckler argues for a new approach to forestry 
distinct from management relying on clearcutting and other industrial approaches (Hays 
2007:63).   
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 This ecological forest management grew “to encompass a wide range of 
subjects, such as the habitats needed to support biodiversity, old forests; watershed 
protection; the specific value of large, intact, forested areas; human forest disturbances, 
and forest restoration” (Hays 2007:63).  Modern ecological forestry includes “such 
objectives as biodiversity management, the protection and enhancement of diverse 
flora and fauna; using habitats rather than ‘stands’ as units of management; maintaining 
the structural diversity of tree species and age; promotion of native forests and old 
growth; organizing forest management around watersheds; protecting forests from 
disturbances such as roads, harvest methods, motorized recreation, and mineral 
extraction; and soil erosion and depilation of soil nutritional capacity”  (Hays 2007: xiii).   
These scientific objectives of ecological forestry do not, many would argue, share 
common principles with Conservationism or modern resource extraction, even through 
the latter asserts it is also guided by science and sustainable “wise-use” of natural 
resources. 
 The “Group B” ecological approach (Leopold 1949) is wary of claims that 
technical fixes can solve environmental problems, or that professional and political 
elites can maintain current levels of commodity management of national forests 
without significant ecological costs (Hirt 1994).  “The ecologist does not generally share 
this rosy assessment of the potential of industrial technology to solve social or 
environmental problems through expanded production (Hirt 1994:2).  Instead, 
ecological forestry is focused on perceived threats to biodiversity and ecosystem 
integrity, and it employs the science of conservation biology to address those threats 
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(Minckler 1974; Meffe 1994, Holling and Meffe 1994, Noss 1999).   The “gospel of 
efficiency” (Hays 1959) and resource-use model is viewed, by advocates of conservation 
biology, as incompatible with modern conservation management and ecological forestry 
(Holling & Meine 1996; Berry 2003).   
 This next section explores the history of this conflict over national forest 
management to better understand the tensions between modern commodity and 
ecological forestry, establishing a framework for addressing site-specific Forest Service 
actions in North Carolina through an analysis of elite, pluralistic, deliberative, and 
agonistic democratic theories. Beginning with the Progressives, this next section traces 
the separate evolution of commodity and ecological forestry to the current raucous 
debates over endangered species, “Healthy Forest” proposals, and collaborative 
management.  
Conservationism, Pinchot, & Resource Management 
 This section attempts to describe the complex and evolving definition of 
conservation management by placing Gifford Pinchot and Conservationism in the 
appropriate historical context.  As the application of Progressivism to natural resource 
decisions (McConnell 1954), Conservation represented the first wide-scale use of 
scientific forestry and efficiency in the management of forest reserves, to satisfy what 
Pinchot believed was in the public interest of present and future generations 
(McConnell 1966, Hays 1959).  Although this resource-use agenda conflicted with the 
Preservationist approach, Pinchot’s position can also be viewed as  contrasting with 
modern “resource” management, in which “the George W. Bush administration, the 
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wood products industry, the forestry profession, and the Republican Party have used 
executive power and authority with considerable imagination in an attempt to 
hamstring ecological forestry advances” (Hays 2007: XV).  In its historical context, 
however, Pinchot’s Conservationism is understood as a form of resource-use 
management based on efforts to achieve efficient and scientific use, in the public 
interest.   
 Identified as the founder of Conservationism, Pinchot graduated from Yale in 
1889, attended the French National Forestry School, later returned as the first 
‘professionally trained forester’ in the U.S., and founded the School of Forestry at Yale 
(Pinchot 1947).   Pinchot first worked as a forester at the Biltmore Estate property in 
Asheville, NC, with German born forester Carl Alwen Schenck, who established the 
Biltmore Forest School, the first school of forestry in the U.S. known today as the “cradle 
of forestry” located in the Pisgah National Forest near Brevard, North Carolina.   
 Pinchot would become the second Chief of the Division of Forestry after his 
predecessor, Bernhard E. Fernow, left the Division 1898 to become the first dean of the 
New York State College of Forestry at Cornell.   Unlike Fernow, a German-trained 
forester who was “convinced that neither the public nor the forest industry would yet 
support scientific management” (Hays 1959:29), Pinchot transformed the Division into 
the U.S. Forest Service.  Following passage of the Weeks Act of 1911, the federal public 
land system came to the East coast, thus concretizing the first truly national forest 
enterprise. 
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 Under Pinchot’s guidance, the Forest Service became an agency built upon 
utilitarian principles of the Progressive movement; the mission was to efficiently use 
national forest resources for the public good “for the longest amount of time” (Pinchot 
1910; McConnell 1955; Hays 1959; Callicott 1999).   His success in established a 
professional corps of scientific foresters was based on his ability to convince the private-
logging industry to accept scientific public land management as a mechanism to 
guarantee unsaturated timber markets based on sustainable harvests (Hays 1959). 
 In his position as Forest Service Chief, Pinchot led the movement in the U.S. to 
emphasize “sustained-yield” forest management, which, according Pinchot would 
provide for the “greatest good for the greatest number for the longest amount of time” 
(1910).  Following a utilitarian ethic and the Progressivist faith in technical expertise, 
efficiency, and value-neutral science, Pinchot believed unbiased so-called professional 
managers could guide federal lands through ‘scientific’ management.  Pinchot 
restructured federal agencies and incorporated a resource-use ethic driven, in theory, 
by scientific management based on a mechanized worldview to achieve the most 
efficient, utilitarian use (Callicott 1999).   Pinchot believed Conservation would push the 
federal government “to abandon some of the worst of its shortsighted wrong-
headedness in dealing with the immense resources of the public lands, and to go at least 
through the motions of establishing the public interest, instead of the private interests, 
in the first place” (Pinchot 1947:117).   
 Sustained-yield management, for example, was “derived from Pinchot’s 
experience with European forestry.  There, forests were no longer wild, but rather were 
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fully ‘regulated’” (Hirt 39).  Much like a crop, old “decadent” forests were targeted for 
liquidation and replaced with intensely managed stands of younger trees without 
consideration for the ecological conditions that originally established the forest as a 
whole.  These conditions included providing “a continuous supply of timber for the 
future, annual cutting should never exceed annual growth, and lumber men should 
utilize waste materials and reduce fire and disease damage” (Hays 1959:28).   
The U.S. Forest Service & Elite Administrative Management  
 It is well accepted in current policy literature that the traditional structure of U.S. 
administrative law during the first half of the 20th century, and especially after the post-
WWII housing-boom, conforms to elite democratic theory.  Proponents of the 
traditional elite administrative model argued the public interest could be realized 
through Group A, resource management and guaranteed through technical fixes by 
professional, neutral managers.  This emphasis on scientific expertise under the 
traditional administrative model, originally proposed by Pinchot and other Progressives, 
followed three core management principles: 1) “develop” the resources, 2) prevent 
waste, and 3) guarantee resource use benefits for the general public, not just private 
interests (McConnell 1954).  The Forest Service slowly earned the reputation as an 
“excellent” administrative body (Kaufman 1960), which, until the WWII housing-boom, 
focused on local and regional economies instead of national or international markets 
(Hirt 1995; Andrews 1999).   The Sustained Yield Unit Act of 1944 (58 Stat. 132; 16 U. S. 
C. 583-5831), for example, was established to support forest industries, local 
economies, employment, and taxable forest products (Hirt 1995). 
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 Although Pinchot originally believed efficient, scientific management could guide 
multiple uses of resources (Hays 1959), the agency culture established through 
traditional administrative processes, perhaps inadvertently, prevented the Forest 
Service from adapting to new scientific information (Kaufman 1960, Schiff 1962).  Two 
important conservation programs—prescribed burning in Southern Longleaf Pine 
ecosystems and flood-prevention and forest hydrology for Eastern National Forests—
were highlighted in Schiff’s important study on “scientific heresy in the Forest Service” 
(1962).  Schiff identified an unwillingness and inability of agency officials to implement 
new, unorthodox management principles, and the elite administrative model sheltered 
the Forest Service and administrative officers from the influence of its own research 
offices.  Schiff called for separating the agency’s research and administrative functions, 
given “the absence of professional maturity and competing professional power centers 
located outside the organization” (Schiff 1962). 
 McConnell’s (1966) critique of private power identified shortcomings in the 
Progressive ideal embodied by the Forest Service, which allowed for the 
overrepresentation of private resource extraction interests.  As McConnell explained, 
(1966:50): 
Where virtual autonomy was achieved in departmental 
structure and the demand for extreme administrative discretion 
was clothed in an appeal to science and a policy without 
standards—the so-called ‘multiple use policy… the Forest 
Service developed its own informal lines of responsibility, its 
own political ties to a particular constituency.  In short, simple 
insistence upon the virtue of administrators as wardens of the 
public interest led deviously but certainly to ties with special 
interests, opposition to which had been the point of Progressive 
beginnings.   
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 The influence of private interest groups “captured” the Forest Service 
administrative decision-making process and redirected national forest management, 
after the post-WWII housing-boom, away from the original Conservationist multiple-use 
policy based on selective logging and “wise” use.  Although not the rule, private 
interests were able to control administrative processes in the Forest Service, 
“responsive to the power that can be wielded over the official agency.  The process 
amounts in some situations to the capture of government” (McConnell 1966:7).   
 The Forest Service followed traditional administrative trends occurring 
throughout the federal government that led toward the concentration or 
overrepresentation of private interest groups agency decision-making, (Landis 1960, 
McConnell 1966, Lowi 1969, Stewart 1975, Twight 1983, Hirt 1994).  As Richard Stewart 
warned in his seminal treatise on administrative reform, “the comparative 
overrepresentation of regulated or client interests in the process of agency decision 
results in a persistent policy bias in favor of these interests” (1975:1713).   These 
inherent biases still persist in administrative decision-making and are addressed in the 
political science literature as “agency capture” (McConnell), the “iron triangle,” agency 
transaction costs, the free rider effect, agency non-acquiescence, the revolving door, 
and the “seat at the board” phenomenon.  
The literature describes several limitations of the traditional elite model, 
including an inability to “balance all elements essential to a just determination for the 
public interest (Frankfurter, 1944) FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co. 320 U.S. 591. 627. 
(1944).  Other challenges to the traditional administrative process emphasize the 
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problems relating to the Forest Service’s Group A, technocratic culture, which produced 
public dissatisfaction with the Forest Service and so-called professional, rational 
technocratic assumptions about sustainable use and environmental effects (Bolle 1970, 
Fortenbery & Harris 1983; Jones & Taylor 1995, Vaughn & Cortner 2004).    
There is a longstanding criticism in the conservation literature relating to the 
tendency of the Forest Service decisions to traditionally benefit commercial groups 
(Bultena and John 1972; Robbins 1985; Clary 1986; Twight and Lyden 1990).   In A 
Lumberjacks and Legislators (1982) and American Forestry (1985), for example, historian 
William G. Robbins documented a “highly congenial relationship between the Forest 
Service and the commercial interests consuming national forest outputs.”  Additionally, 
in Timber and the Forest Service, former Forest Service historian David Clary 
documented a strong commercial forestry bias grounded in the agency’s historical goal 
of maximum commercial logging, concluding "the wood chopper's voice will remain 
important, but someday it just might cease to be the dominant one in the Forest 
Service" (1986:199).   
As the agency with the “tradition of being one of the most insular and 
independent of the federal bureaucracies” (Fortenbery and Harris 1983:75), criticism of 
the Forest Service structure and decision-making processes can be viewed as a direct 
result of its commitment to elite democratic administrative theory.  The Forest Service 
culture led to a “breakdown” in the democratic decision-making process “through which 
the public need is translated into law by the legislature and in turn carried out by 
administrative agencies” (Bolle 1970:497).  These criticisms of the agency’s technocratic 
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bureaucracy relate to problems of “procedures and regulations laid down by the 
Supervisor, Regional Forestry, and Washington officials which were all locked into the 
system” (Bolle 1970:498) favoring resource management and private interests over 
conservation of public forests.   
There is near universal agreement in the literature about the manner in which 
the traditional administrative model reinforced undue Forest Service discretion and 
contributed to an imbalance in representation favoring resource extraction (Hays 1959, 
Kaufman 1960, Schiff 1962, McConnell 1966, Bolle 1970, Twight 1983; Wilkinson 1987; 
Twight & Lyden 1988, 1989; Anderson 1993; Hirt 1994, Norton 1995).  The public 
administration literature includes several calls for reforming the traditional 
administrative model to correct substantive policy biases favoring resource extraction 
interests in Forest Service planning decisions (Sax 1970, Stewart 1975; Jones and Taylor 
1995; Hirt 1994, Andrews 1999; Steelman 1999, Hays 2007).   Early criticisms were 
aimed at the false assumptions of the Progressives relating to administrators ability to 
operate as objective professionals without engaging political, value-driven decision-
making.   Schwartz’s early analysis of administrative theory demonstrated that agencies 
are tasked with more than “collecting data, describing, and, to a limited extend, 
predicting,” and instead include the “relative ordering of values in a society” in 
identifying alternatives (Schwartz 1954).    
The Conservation Limits of Conservationism  
 These critiques of the so-called objective scientific manager fueled debate which 
would reach a fever pitch in the early 1970’s, when several egregious forest 
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mismanagement controversies provoked public outrage and culminated in 
congressional moves to rebalance the Forest Service’s statutory mission between 
resource extraction and conservation management (see Chapter Five).  Critics of the 
Forest Service’s adherence to the traditional administrative model believed resource 
extraction was primarily benefiting organized minority interests with economic stakes in 
national forest planning (Olson 1965).  Agency professionals traditionally “had a greater 
interest in a dominance of resource policy (timber and mining) for the National Forest 
than any other orientation,” which translated into an overrepresentation of resource 
management, leading to the “inability of traditional democratic structures to deal 
adequately with the specifics of complex land management process” (Fortenbery and 
Harris 1983:52).  
 While Pinchot’s utilitarian model claimed “wise,” scientific, efficient, and 
sustainable uses, modern conservation literature describes many shortcomings with 
“Conservationism” as a model that is today better understood as a resource extraction 
model incompatible with conservation management objectives as defined by 
conservation biology.   Conservation philosophers (Callicott 1990) and biologists (Noss 
1998) assert that Pinchot improperly reduced “Nature” to resources and subordinated 
all other uses to this resource management approach.   Many conservation biologists 
and ecological scientists claim this simplification of ecological processes has led to the 
eclipsing of Pinchot Conservationist’s model after post-WWII the housing-boom to 
mutate into the more industrially-driven resource-use model embraced by commercial 
forestry interests of today (Hirt 1995).   
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 Most scholars agree that Pinchot’s approach allowed for the emergence of more 
intense, commodity driven forestry adhering  to “tenets of professional 
overspecialization, purely reductionist science, and economic dogma” (Leopold 1949), 
which was “conceived in arrogance, born in the Neanderthal age of biology and 
philosophy, when it was supposed that nature exists for the convenience of man” 
(Carson 1962: 297).  Although modern resource management claims Pinchot’s 
Conservationism as its intellectual lineage, commodity forestry today is more accurately 
viewed as a departure from Pinchot’s early work with the Forest Service, the Society of 
American Foresters, and the Yale School of Forestry.  
Current conservation biology and ecological forestry literature, for example, 
flatly rejects elements of commercial forestry, such as the sustained-yield management 
model and attempts  to grow merchantable trees on rotations indefinitely (Perry, Vaux, 
& Dennis 1983; Clary 1986; Hirt 1994).   “The ideology of endless growth and maximized 
production threatened the foundation of forest management as practiced by the Forest 
Service” (Hirt 1994:219).  Although Pinchot did not have an adequate scientific basis to 
assess the effects of sustained-yield logging, modern conservation scientists have 
identified many flaws in this approach to national forest management, including the 
effects of logging on an ecosystem’s capacity to sustain the productive capability of the 
land to grow merchantable trees (Hirt 1994; Holling & Meffe 1996)). 
Modern resource extraction and sustained-yield models are built on assumptions 
about strict empiricism and positivist-driven science, which opposing scholars have 
labeled “pathological” (Berry 2000) and “a pathology that permeates much of the 
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natural resource management and precludes long-term sustainability” (Holling & Meffe 
1996:329).   Modern ecological forestry and conservation management, described by 
conservation biologists and ecological foresters, rejects this mechanistic paradigm for 
resource management (Minckler 1974).  The flaws of modern resource management 
models, according to Holling & Meffe (1996:329), are driven by the assumptions that 
solutions are “direct, appropriate, feasible, and effective over most relevant spatial and 
temporal scales” and are “well-bounded, clearly defined, relatively simple, and generally 
linear with respect to cause and effect.”   Norton (1988:237) also pointed to the 
tendency for resource managers to attempt to “adjust the mechanism of nature” to 
extract goods for commercial use.  “On this positivist view of science, facts and values 
can be separated, and science can operate in a world of pure description… The result is 
a bureaucratic brand of science” Norton (1988:237).   The ecological conservation 
literature has largely rejected the modern resource management approach based on 
positivist, reductionist interpretations of science aimed at controlling nature to establish 
predictable resource outcomes (Holling & Meffe 1996).  
Contemporary conservation biology and ecological scientists argue against the 
mechanistic approach of resource extraction practices, including industrial tree 
monocultures, agricultural development in fragile ecosystems, and predator eradication 
(Norton 1988:93).  Holling & Meffe assert that problems with manipulating ecosystems 
for resource extraction arise from the inability of resource management to conserve 
complex, nonlinear, and poorly understood ecosystems while extracting resources 
indefinitely.  “A common theme of many resource-management efforts is to reduce 
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natural bounds of variation in ecological systems to make them more predictable, and 
thus more reliable, for human needs…. *they+ dampen extremes of ecosystem behavior 
or change species composition to attain a predictable flow of good and services or to 
reduce destructive or undesirable behavior of these systems” (Hollings & Meffe: 1996 
329).   These writers offer the 100-year-old practice of fire suppression and fighting pest 
outbreaks in federal lands to protect tree plantations as examples of this mechanistic, 
resource-driven approach.  The view of conservation biology and ecology forestry 
theorists identify the drive to control complex natural systems as fueled by a “pathology 
of natural resource management” that leads to a “growing institutional myopia and 
rigidity” (Hollings & Meffe 1996: 331) among agency managers, which often ‘backfires’ 
when agencies rely exclusively on simplistic resource management models for complex 
ecosystems.   Unnaturally large wild-fires, drought, and climate change are just some of 
the results (Hollings & Meffe 1996) 
Although the Conservationist management model was originally established to 
prevent the kind of resource exploitation taking place in private lands during Pinchot’s 
time (Hays 1959), the modern resource extraction model has been sharply criticized by 
conservation biologists and ecological scientists as an invalid management approach for 
‘conserving’ biological diversity and ecosystem function in U.S. national forests (Hirt 
1994, Grumbine 1993; Orr & Ehrenfeld 1995, Arno & Allison-Bunnell 2002).  Many 
authors in this area of the conservation literature have called for reforming this 
dominant paradigm influencing the Forest Service.  They recommend ending the 
commercial logging program entirely (McKinney Leach House Bill), moving the agency 
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under the Department of Interior with the U.S. Parks Service (Fairfax 2005), and 
rejecting libertarian arguments about market-based environmentalism which 
recommend selling large portions of the public forest system to private interests.   
Preservationists, Muir, & Ecological Forestry  
Following passage of the 1891Forest Reserves legislation, angry Preservationists 
splintered off from Conservationists to form a movement based on wilderness, national 
parks, and an appreciation for native land consistent with modern ecological forestry 
(Hays 1959; Nash 1968; Minckler 1974).  While Pinchot worked “quietly, though 
effectively” to introduce commercial use into the new reserves (Hays 1959:40), the 
Preservationists, made up of national park supporters, arborists, natural historians, 
sportsmen organizations and others worked to prevent Pinchot’s “basic view that the 
reserves should be developed for commercial use rather than preserved from it 
…Pinchot felt that his major problem was to restrain the influence of *preservationists+ 
who wished to leave them in their natural state, untouched by lumberman and 
stockman” (Hays 1959:40).   
This new preservation movement was initially spearheaded by John Muir, a self-
described “Poetico-trampo-geologistsbot + ornith-naturalist, etc etc etc”, and 
wilderness advisor to President Roosevelt.  Muir was an early friend of Pinchot’s who 
would later come to oppose the “deconservationist” resource-use model for national 
forests (Nash 1968).  Muir’s ideas were published in Century Magazine in 1889 after 
hiking the Sierras with Robert Underwood Johnson, a colleague with whom he worked 
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to win popular support that led to the designation of the Yosemite National Park on 
October 1, 1890. (Nash 1968). 
The “bitter conflict” between Conservationists and Preservationists represented 
the classic schism “between those who favored resource development and others who 
argued that wild areas and wildlife should be preserve from commercial use” (Hays 
1959:189).  Pinchot successfully influenced the final language in the Forest Management 
Act of 1897, which opened—for the first time—the forest reserves to commercial 
logging and grazing (Hays 1959; Nash 1968).   
Later, a conflict of the damming of the Hetch-Hetchy Valley embroiled these two 
rival sides in a protracted struggle over the use of a Yosemite National Park valley as a 
reservoir site for San Francisco (Hays 1959).  This split culminated with the so-called 
Ballinger-Pinchot controversy, which erupted when Interior Secretary Ballinger refused 
to follow Pinchot’s policy reforms.  Instead, Ballinger openly supported the 
preservationists in the Hetch-Hetchy debate, supported the creation of a separate 
Bureau of National Parks, and called for protecting parks from the Right-of-way Act of 
1901 “in order that they may be preserved for the purposes for which they were 
created” (Ballinger report on HR 3907 in RG #49, Bill Bolok #29:174-175). 
Muir believed that despite the “present flourishing triumphant growth of the 
wealthy wicked, Pinchot’s and their heirlings, will not thrive forever… We may lose this 
particular fight, but truth and right must prevail at last” (Muir in Hays 1959:193).    In 
fact, efforts by Pinchot to block Preservationist gains backfired when President 
Roosevelt signed the Antiquities Act of 1906, supported the creation of the New York 
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Adirondack State Park, and supported the establishment of a separate National Park 
Bureau in the Department of the Interior.   Congress blocked bills by Pinchot in 1906 and 
1907, for example, when he attempted to place new National Parks (where resource-
extraction is prohibited) under the Forest Service to open them to commercial 
use.  These efforts, and the damming of the Hetch-Hetchy canyons, ultimately backfired 
when Congress permanently established a separate bureau to administer the National 
Parks in 1916—one year after Muir died (Hays 1959).    
In addition to representing the preservationist and national parks campaigns, 
Muir also worked to utilize the Romantic and Transcendental philosophies of Emerson 
and Thoreau in a model for managing federal lands. These perspectives enhanced the 
emerging science of ecology, which was giving shape to a radically different worldview 
from the mechanistic paradigm that inspired Pinchot’s resource use model (Nash 1968; 
Callicott 1990).  Muir was one of the first naturalists to acknowledge an inherent value 
for all species (Muir 1916)—an understanding that influenced the science of biodiversity 
in conservation biology, as well as eco-philosophies like biocentrism and deep ecology 
(Naess 1989).   As the emergent ecology science began to explain ‘nature’ as more than 
a collection of useful, useless, or noxious parts of the landscape, Muir spoke for 
managing public lands by maintaining them as vast, intricately organized, and tightly 
integrated systems (Callicott 1990).   
Muir’s prescient understanding of the biosphere and ecological systems can be 
found through much of his writing (Muir   He embraced an appreciation of species that 
has evolved into what some call “compositionalists” or an emphasis on biodiversity, 
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arguing in support of “the smallest transmicroscopic creature that dwells beyond our 
eyes and knowledge” (Muir 1916:139).  Muir was also known for his geological 
descriptions of Yosemite Valley, as well as his poetic predictions of early systems 
ecology (Odum 1968).   
Although more ecologically oriented than Pinchot’s Conservationist approach, 
Muir’s preservationist ethic is a problematic foundation for modern ecological forestry.  
Modern conservation biologists, for example, point to “paradoxes of preservation” that 
arise when managers attempt “to preserve systems that must change … and interject 
the human hand into systems we seek to preserve as human-free” (White and Bratton 
1980).  These internal dilemmas require approaches that paradoxically seek to preserve 
systems that continue to change due to biogeography and new climate change 
dynamics (White & Bratton 1980).   
Also problematic is the preservationists’ “cultish” obsession for wilderness (Nash 
1968).  This has provoked controversy, according to some scholars, because the word 
‘wilderness’ reflects a human idea (Cronon 1995), and relies on terms like “pristine” and 
“untouched,” which do not fully consider the influence of  indigenous cultures (Mann 
2005) or the ubiquitous effects of modern industrial pollution (McKibben 1989).  “The 
rejoinder should begin with the thought that it is technological power and human greed, 
and not the idea of wilderness and wilderness preservation, that separate people and 
nature.  Sure, humans are ‘natural,’ but somewhere along the evolutionary way from 
spears to spaceships they dropped off the biotic team and, as Henry Beston recognized, 
became cosmic outlaws” (Nash 2001:368).   
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Conservation biologists have addressed these criticisms by focusing on biological 
diversity (compositionalist/evolutionary ecology) and ecological systems (functionalist/ 
ecosystem management) to avoid controversy relating to inadequate descriptions of 
pristine, virgin wilderness.  “These paradoxes of preservation are further arguments for 
the focus on biological diversity rather than human-free nature and the shift from the 
preservation ethic to a conservation ethic in a broader sense” (White 2005: Ch. 1).  
Because these debates require an honest appraisal of complicated terms like ‘wild’ or 
‘native’, scholars today instead call for valid, measurable levels of biological diversity 
and ecosystem complexity (White 2005).   
 While Muir’s position was more ecological than Pinchot’s, “we have to realize 
[Muir] wrote often of the value of nature to humans, albeit a value (spiritual value) that 
was non-material and non-consumptive” (White 2005: Ch. 3).   These limits to a purely 
preservationist approach are described in the conservation literature and are important 
for developing an understanding of how modern conservation management has 
evolved.  “In Muir’s opinion, people going to forest groves, mountain scenery, and 
meandering streams for religious transcendence, aesthetic contemplation, and healing 
rest and relaxation put these resources to a ‘better’—i.e., morally superior – use than 
did the timber barons, mineral kings, and captains of the industry” (Callicott 1990: 16).   
Although the preservationist ethic does not map directly to modern conservation 
management (White 2005), Muir’s writings and contribution to conservation 
management are a key to understanding the modern conflict over federal lands 
management.  Although the different “conservation” and “preservation” models 
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emerged as competing approaches to public lands management, a third philosophy of  
modern resource management, anchored by the traditional model of administrative 
theory (discussed below), has dominated U.S. Forest Service decision-making since the 
post-WWII housing boom in the U.S. (Hirt 1994).  
Leopold and the A/B Cleavage  
This dissonance in the concept of conservation was most eloquently described 
by Aldo Leopold (1949), perhaps the most influential environmental writer of the 20th 
century history.  In his seminal ecology book A Sand Country Almanac, Leopold defines 
an “A & B Cleavage” where “one group (A) regards land as soil, and its function as 
commodity-production; another group (B) regards land as biota and its function as 
something larger.”  Leopold gained these insight into this tension within conservation 
after beginning his career in the Group A (commodity forestry) camp and abandoning 
the perspective during his famous encounter as a wildlife manager with a California 
Gray Wolf (Canis lupis).  In “Thinking like a Mountain,” (1949:130), Leopold reflected on 
shooting a mother wolf and coming upon the dying animal "in time to watch a fierce 
green fire dying in her eyes.  I realized then, and have known ever since, that there was 
something new to me in those eyes—something known only to her and to the 
mountain.”   This altercation with the gray wolf inspired Leopold’s famous “Land Ethic,” 
which is now described by modern conservation scientists as the ‘ecological- 
evolutionary’ land ethic (Callicott 1999).  
The Group A resource extraction model, according to Leopold, represented “man 
the conqueror,” which “grew trees like cabbages, with cellulose as the basic forest 
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commodity” (1949:221).    Noss expanded on this description by adding, “with rare 
exceptions, [Group A managers] remain narrowly oriented toward particular resources 
of direct use to humans, display a short-term perspective, seem arrogantly confident in 
the ability of humans to manage nature wisely, emphasize control and domination over 
living in harmony with nature, are enamored with high-tech approaches to 
management, are comfortable with high risk to ecosystems, suffer from disciplinary 
fragmentation and competition and are still highly responsive to industry and 
bureaucracies” (1998:717).   
This description of the Group A camp, with the emphasis on commodity forestry 
over ecological forestry (Minckler 1974; Hays 2007), helps explain why many modern 
conservation scientists reject resource management as a model for ecological 
management.  In addition to “the stirrings of an ecological conscience” (1949:221), 
Leopold’s ecological-evolutionary land ethic presented an alternative perspective that 
challenged the longstanding dominance by commodity forestry and other resource 
extraction interests (Hays 1959, 2007; Stewart 1975). 
Group B’s approach, on the other hand, “describes ecosystems at a landscape 
scale—plants, animals and other organisms with the physical template of soils and 
topography in the setting of climate” (White 2005: Ch. 3).   Leopold embraced the 
emerging science of ecology, writing “it is a century now since Darwin gave us the first 
glimpse of the origin of the species.  This new knowledge should have given us, by this 
time, a sense of kinship with fellow-creatures; a wish to live and let live” (1949:109).   
According to Noss, Leopold’s “distress was based not only on ecological or economic 
134 
concerns, but on moral ground: the immorality of ending another life form’s existence, 
especially given our evolutionary knowledge that all species are related” (Noss 
1998:714,715).   
What Leopold identified as the Group B management approach is more aligned, 
although not perfectly, with the Preservationist intellectual lineage and is positioned as 
an ecological alternative to resource extraction ‘management.’   As Leopold wrote in The 
Sand County Almanac, “Group B, on the other hand, sees forestry as fundamentally 
different from agronomy because it employs natural species, and manages a natural 
environment rather than an artificial one” (1949: 22). Management under the Group B 
model follows the ecological principles of “man the biotic citizen” who considers 
“science the searchlight on his universe” (Leopold 1949:223).   
Leopold began formulating the so-called Land Ethic in his 1933 article, “The 
Conservation Ethic,” and later crystallized this theory in A Sand County Almanac, in 
which he offered what has become an important conservation credo: “A thing is right 
when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community.  It 
is wrong when it tends to do otherwise” (1949:225).   Integrity, stability, and beauty are 
interpreted differently by contemporary conservation biologists, to include ecosystem 
complexity, dynamic equilibrium, and biodiversity.  Clearly, Leopold’s contribution to 
conservation biology remains important in the conservation literature (Noss 1999).   
Leopold’s Group B management principles identified in “Land Ethic” map closely 
to ecological forestry principles (Minckler 1974), originally rejected by members of the 
Society of American Foresters, “to encompass a wide range of subjects, such as the 
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habitats needed to support biodiversity, old forests; watershed protection; the specific 
value of large, intact, forested areas; human forest disturbances, and forest restoration” 
(Hays 2007:63).  These principles of ecological forestry are consistent with Leopold’s 
Group B management, as well as with one of the general principles in ecology, the 
Species-Area Curve (Arrhenius 1921), which holds that, other things being equal, larger 
patches of land usually support more species than smaller patches (McGuinness 1984).   
 Today, there is almost universal agreement within the conservation and 
ecological literature that Group B management is required to maintain biological 
diversity and ecological integrity in federal public lands.   Many scholars agree the Group 
B model is more adequate for the purposes of ecological management’s main task: 
conserving biological diversity and ecosystem complexity (relative to the system at 
hand) (White 2005).   Although the term is still contested in the resource management 
literature, modern ecological forestry is consistent with a Group B (ecological 
evolutionary) approach.  
 This early conflict is particularly relevant to this study of modern forest 
management issues because it exposes the tensions in current federal land disputes. 
These disputes are, then, more fully understood by knowledge of democratic theories, 
which are inextricably interwoven into the process of contemporary resource 
management.  Because statutory requirements compel federal agencies to include 
public participation and environmental review in federal land management (see Chapter 
Five), this study requires an analysis informed by democratic theories that relate to the 
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century-long Pinchot-Muir, A/B conflict and concomitant decision-making for American 
national forests.   
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 
 To explain the environmental outcomes of different democratic practices, 
conservation biology informs modern ecological forest management by addressing 
biological diversity and ecological complexity on genetic, species, and landscape scales 
(Leopold 1949, Soulé 1985, Grumbine 1994, 2997, Meffe 1994, Noss 1994, Meine 1999, 
Wilson 2002, White 2005).  Ecological forestry and conservation management are 
environmental planning models informed by conservation biology principles for project 
design and implementation (Meffe 1994; Wilson 2002, Noss 1998, White 2005).   
 While there is much debate between conservation and resource management 
scholars relating to the goals and definition of the term “conservation,” this dissertation 
is concerned with management consistent with conservation biology (Soulé 1985; 
Meine, Soulé & Noss 2006), ecosystem management (Grumbine 1994) and ecological 
forestry (Minckler 1974, Hays 2007).  Meffe addressed this ecological basis for 
conservation management in Principles in Conservation Biology, writing: “Good 
management approaches have a strong dependency on the wealth of theoretical and 
empirical studies in biology.  There is no particular field of training that prepares one to 
be a good conservation manager; management approaches have changed over several 
decades, and continue to evolve” (1994).  The resource management literature, 
however, describes the evolution of conservation in significantly different terms (Hays 
1959; 2007; Hirt 1994; Wondolleck 1999, 2000; Stanley 1995; Grumbine 1997).  Given 
137 
this distinction, this section uses conservation biology to further define ecological 
forestry and conservation management to allow for an analysis in Chapters Seven and 
Eight of the results of democratic processes that open federal decision-making for forest 
management.   
 This study accepts the definition of ecological forestry and conservation 
management as fundamentally guided by the science of conservation biology (Minckler 
1974; Meffe 1994; Noss 1998, Hays 2007).  Conservation biology is now recognized as a 
legitimate scientific, interdisciplinary field of study, which also incorporates normative 
dimensions relating to the mission-driven goal of preserving biological diversity and 
ecosystem complexity (Meffe 1994; Wilson 2002, Noss 1998, White 2005).  These 
characteristics of conservation biology describe a rigorous scientific enterprise that 
guides ecological research and management. 
 This description in the conservation biology and ecology literature, inspired by 
Muir, Leopold and others, as described by Leopold (1949), Hirt (1994) and Hays (2007) 
distinguishes this understanding of conservation from descriptions in the commodity 
forestry (Journal of Forestry) and wildlife literature (Journal of Wildlife Management).  
Conservation biology, properly understood, appears to offer an appropriate 
understanding of ecological forestry or “conservation”, including an approach scientific 
principles and practices for protecting biological diversity and ecological complexity.  
The following section addresses conservation biology to examine the manner in which 
this “mission-oriented” crisis-discipline helps explain the competing paradigms within 
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conservation and ecology, including the compositionalist, as well as functionalist, 
interpretations of scientific management.   
 These descriptions of conservation are helpful in explaining the role of science in 
democratic societies and develop an understanding of forest management.  Unlike the 
orientation in resource management, committed to extracting goods for primarily 
private interests, conservation biology emphasizes scientific management that 
maintains and enhances the biotic composition of forest systems.   
What is Conservation Biology 
 In the seminal conservation biology essay, “What is conservation biology,” 
Michael Soulé (1985) called upon scientists to establish this new discipline with the 
“goal to provide principles and tools for preserving biological diversity,” setting a “new 
stage in the application of science to conservation problems” (727).  The challenge for 
this “discipline with a deadline” (Wilson 2000) began after many respected scientists 
(e.g., Pete Brussard, William Conway, Jared Diamond, David Ehrenfeld, Thomas Lovejoy, 
Bob May, Curt Meine, Bryan Norton, Reed Noss, Peter White, and EO Wilson) joined 
Soulé in the creation of the Society for Conservation Biology.   
 These scientists described the core goal of conservation biology as conserving 
biological diversity– “the marvel of life” (White 2005).  “The logic is that the higher the 
number of species and the greater the genetic diversity within species, the larger the 
range of future possibilities and the faster the rate of response to change” (White 2005).  
According to its founders, conservation biology was focused on a “core function: 
providing reliable and useful scientific information on biological diversity and its 
139 
conservation” (Meine, Soulé & Noss 2006:646, emphasis added).  Central to the science, 
the composition of biotic diversity on genetic, species, and landscape scales is also 
fundamental for the application and practice of conservation at the site-specific level 
(Meffe 1994, White 2005).   
 The mission of conservation biology requires scientists to develop new principles 
and technologies for guiding management of biological diversity and ecosystem 
complexity.   The approach signaled a new focus for individual scientists who felt 
“compelled to devote themselves to the rescue effort. [Conservation biology] is a way of 
pledging our support for life” (Soulé 1991:225).   Another founder, David Ehrenfeld, 
asserted that conservation biology “is not defined by a discipline but by its goal—to halt 
or repair the undeniable, massive damage that is being done to ecosystems, species, 
and the relationships of humans to the environment” (1992:1625).  Individual 
conservation biologists distinguish themselves by following this mission orientation and 
committing themselves to the production of scientific knowledge while guiding research 
with a fundamental normative question: how to best conserve biotic diversity?   
 Conservation biology also informs management and further develops Leopold’s 
theory of the A/B Cleavage by advancing two ecological paradigms that develop 
understanding of biotic diversity and ecosystem processes:  the “functionalist,” 
ecosystem ecology (Odum 1968) and the “compositionalist,” evolutionary ecology 
(Soulé 1980; 1985; Norton 1988; Meffe 1994; Noss 1994; White 2005).  Functionalism, 
or ecosystem ecology theory, is a “process-oriented, thermodynamic approach to 
ecology that begins with solar energy coursing through a physical system that includes 
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but is not limited to the biota” (Callicott 1999).   In Odum’s classic formulation of 
ecosystem ecology (1968), the functionalist perspective regards the presence of species 
as parts of an interlocking process of energy transfer and nutrient cycles.  The 
functionalist approach values ecosystem health, ecological services, ecosystem 
management, sustainable development, and other more anthropocentric approaches 
(Callicott 1999).   
 Recently, Callicott made the argument that the early Conservationist resource 
management approach was better understood as a functionalist paradigm (1999).  This 
was based on the rationale that “human management can improve, or at least not 
degrade, environmental quality” (Robertson & Hull, 2001:973).  This anthropocentric 
focus is “dedicated largely to the task of gaining knowledge and formulating policies 
that would rather save either economically useful (including agricultural and 
pharmacological uses) or aesthetically pleasing species” (Barry & Oelschlaeger 
(1996:907).  While ecosystem function is important to ecology and conservation 
management, the emphasis of conservation biology remains instead on processes that 
maintain biotic diversity, not merchantable forest products.   
 Unlike resource management, ecological forestry and conservation management 
are guided by principles of conservation biology that are instead anchored by a 
“compositionalist” paradigm, consistent with Leopold’s description of Group B 
management, which involves emphasizes biological diversity on a variety of levels 
(genetic, species, ecosystem, and landscape). “Conservation decisions based on the 
compositionalist school of thought emphasize the conservation of species and 
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historically natural conditions (e.g. ecological restoration, biological integrity, native 
species), [where] humans are considered to be distinct from nature, and thus 
environmental quality is best when human modification is least” (Robertson & Hull 
2001:973).   
 The compositionalist paradigm views conservation through the lens of 
evolutionary ecology, which is an approach to ecology focused on entity-oriented, 
biological approaches to “organisms aggregated into populations” (Callicott et al. 1999).  
Ecological forestry and conservation management are guided by a compositionalist-
oriented paradigm that emphasizes biological diversity, ecosystem complexity, and 
ecological restoration.  This description in the literature is consistent with the original 
interpretations of conservation management based on Leopold’s Group-B Land Ethic.    
 Conservation biology is primarily driven by this compositionalist approach based 
on ecological-evolutionary principles (Group B), which address biotic diversity as the 
standard for management.  Following the Group B, evolutionary-ecology framework, 
conservation management is informed by compositionalist concerns for native species 
and the processes that maintain them, as well as the problem of irreversibility and 
species extinction (Leopold 1949, White 2005, Cox 2007).   
 The conservation literature, for example, describes species extinction as part of 
the larger pattern of biotic homogenization occurring globally.  This specific 
phenomenon is identified as the “Homogeocene” (Olden 2006) — the growing global 
extinction spasm that has led to the catastrophic loss in species diversity (genetic, 
taxonomic, and functional) and the increase in cosmopolitan, invasive species.  Unlike 
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the five previous ‘extinction spasms’ on earth, the latest is the largest and only human-
caused mass loss of biodiversity.   
 Social scientists also identify a homogenization of culture, which provides a 
positive feedback loop that may intensify the loss of biodiversity and ecological systems 
(Kunstler 1993; McKinney & Lockwood 1999; Olden 2005).  While the ecological and 
evolutionary consequences of homogenization are often discussed for biota, new 
attention is being paid to the “manner in which social aspects of human life may also be 
affected” and the “social repercussions resonating in the wake of biotic 
homogenization” (Olden 2005:2036).  Some authors draw parallels between the 
homogenization of culture and biotas in order to discuss how the public and 
policymakers can address the “social implications of biotic homogenization” (Olden 
2005:2036).     
 Given the diversity requirement of the pluralist and agnostic democratic model, 
as well as the role of heterogeneity in nature, the parallels between homogenization of 
ecological and social systems informs debates over public participation in national forest 
management.  As explored in Chapter Seven, there may be evidence to suggest 
democratizing decision-making and conservation management decisions, for example, 
privileges discourses and cultural models that strengthen biotic and cultural systems.  
Although citizen participation is restricted only to public lands, a broadened discursive 
space might have beneficial effects for private land management by privileging 
evolutionary (compositionalist) and ecosystem (functionalist) ecology (Callicott 1999).  
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Indeed, as biotic and cultural homogenization cross property-ownership boundaries, so 
conservation managers must also embrace new approaches. 
Mission Oriented Crisis-Discipline 
 From its origin, the founders of conservation biology have focused on a mission-
orientation for the new discipline (Soulé 1985, Norton 1988, Lovejoy 1989).  In his 
seminal paper, Soulé added the terms “crisis-oriented” and “crisis-driven” to the list of 
modifiers (1985), and called conservation biologists to the mission of preventing the 
worst effects of the current species extinction spasm—the Homogeocene (Oldon 2005)-
-- the Earth’s largest and first anthropogenic biodiversity collapse (Soulé 1985; Ehrenfeld 
1992; Wilson 1999; Ehrlich 2002).  In the opening chapter of Conservation Biology: an 
Evolutionary-Ecological Perspective (1980), Soulé and Wilcox described conservation 
biology as "a mission-oriented discipline comprising both pure and applied science” that 
defined an orientation similar to the framework explained by Leopold’s Land Ethic and 
the Group B management approach.  
 As a crisis-discipline, conservation biology was defined in a manner analogous to 
the mission-driven nature of medical science.  Conservation biology’s practitioners 
consider themselves “physicians to nature” based on the “many parallels between 
conservation biology and the fields of medicine and public health—disciplines infused 
with morality” (Ehrenfeld 2000:106).  Comparing conservation biology to “a crisis 
science like AIDS and cancer research” (Naess 1990:169), this analogy has a long legacy 
extending back through the conservation literature to Wallace (1876), Marsh (1864), 
Muir (1916), Leopold (1949), and Carson (1962).  Leopold, for example, believed the 
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environmental crisis represented a “world of wounds” where the ecologist “must be the 
doctor who sees the marks of death in a community that believes itself well and does 
not want to be told otherwise” (Leopold 1953:197,165).   
 The mission orientation of conservation biology is based on normative 
dimensions that, as Soulé argued (1985:42), “are a genuine part of conservation 
biology.”  Noss (1999) noted that conservation biology’s distinguishing characteristic is 
an "overarching normative assumption… that biodiversity is good and ought to be 
preserved.”  Recently, in the Journal of Conservation Biology, Meine, Soulé, and Noss 
wrote, “This explicit recognition of conservation biology's ethical dimension stood in 
contrast to the careful avoidance of such considerations, even within ecology, in prior 
decades” (2006:641).  In short, unlike other approaches described in the resource 
management literature, management based on conservation biology accepts the 
normative dimensions relating to the value of biotic diversity and ecological complexity.   
 The conservation biology literature includes an investigation into the specific 
value-laden, normative underpinnings of conservation biology, beginning with its 
rhetorically significant name (Soulé 1985; Rolston 1988:240; Oelschlaeger 1996:909).  
Most importantly, the term ‘conservation’ is itself normative, and signals a 
“commitment to the goal of protecting habitat and preserving biodiversity” (Barry & 
Oelschlaeger 1996:909).  Soulé also wrote in “What is Conservation Biology?” that the 
discipline is based on “value statements that make up the basis of an ethic of 
appropriate attitudes toward other forms of life” (1985:42).   
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 Defining the discipline in this way, the normative dimensions and empirical goals 
are merged in a tenuous, dynamic approach to conservation.  Barry and Oelschlaeger 
(1996: 909) maintain that conservation biology is not “applied biology but rather hinges 
on an explicit evaluative judgment:  Biodiversity is good and should be preserved.  For 
good or ill, contextual values have an effect on the practice of conservation biology.”  As 
its name reflects, conservation biology suggests a particular “tension inherent in the 
field of conservation biology and in the term itself” (Meine & Meffe 1996:917).  
Conservation is a collective term used to define the maintenance of biotic diversity and 
ecosystem complexity, while ‘biology’ is recognized as the dispassionate, objective, and 
systematic study of life (Meine & Meffe 1996).  While the practice of conservation 
biology is based on objective scientific principles, conservation is fundamentally 
influenced by a normative emphasis and “framework for a specific ‘right’ outcome” (Van 
Houtan (2006:1368).    
 These assumptions also include, for example, the collective norms that “diversity 
of organisms is good, ecological complexity is good, evolution is good, and biotic 
diversity has intrinsic value” (Soulé 1985:42).  These norms have been expanded to 
include, 1) extinctions caused by humans are bad; 2) ecological complexity is inherently 
good; 3) evolution is good; and, 4) biological diversity has intrinsic value (Matsuda 
1997).  These normative statements demonstrate how “the whole foundation of 
conservation biology is based on values.  None of these assumptions can be scientifically 
proven” (Matsuda 1997: 1449).  Instead, empirical and objective research is aimed at 
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important conservation questions that are ordered according to normative 
understandings of the value of species and ecosystems.  
 These normative dimensions of conservation distinguish the science from other 
disciplines in relation to the accepted value-laden quality of the term.  Unlike physics, 
for example, which describes conservation in non-normative terms, conservation 
biology incorporates value-based assumptions and “a more comprehensive, moral role 
in their conservation of biological values,” which are not testable through the scientific 
model and empirical science (Rolston 1989:240).   Identifying conservation biology’s 
normative dimensions aids practitioners in navigating environmental conflicts, directs 
research questions, sets policy standards and guidelines, and informs public 
participation and management outcomes (Robertson & Hull 2001:973).   
Positivism  
 Conservation biology’s is also informed by the tradition of positivism, a scientific 
discourse originating in the 1930’s that strives for objectivist scientific explanations 
based on value-freedom, verifiability, confirmation, and falsification.  The empirical 
scientific framework of positivism has created a tension within conservation biology, 
which has normative (or value) claims that can be neither proved nor disproved 
(Hempel 1970; Putnam 1987, 2002).  Many pages in the Journal for Conservation Biology 
have been dedicated to the debate over science, advocacy, and activism (Noss 1996;  
Barry & Oelschlaeger 1996; Matsuda 1997). 
 While the goals of conservation biology may be driven by normative questions, 
its science and application are influence a tradition within scientific philosophy called 
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positivism.  These include: 1) a verifiable theory of truth where meaning is provided by 
empirically proven statements (Ayer 1956; Hempel 1970); 2) the idea that verification, 
confirmation, and falsification are grounded by theory-neutral "basic sentences” 
(Popper 1959; Kuhn 1962; Feyerabend 1975: Popper 1963; Lakatos & Musgrave 1970; 
Toulmin 1972); 3) deductive-nomological conceptions of explanation (Hempel & 
Oppenheim 1948; Hempel 1965); and, 4) analytical approaches to identify the "laws of 
nature" (Goodman 1954; Chisholm 1966).   
 According to positivists, science is a neutral dimension that provides “the 
observer an objective account of the world as an object, one that stands apart from 
human intention and purpose…. a picture of the way things actually are, good for all 
people in all places at all times” (Barry & Oelschlaeger 1996:970).  The literature 
describes this approach as the ‘normal’ state of science, in which “uncertainties are 
managed automatically, values are unspoken, and foundational problems unheard of” 
(Funtowicz & Ravetz 1994:146).   The positivist approach to ecology as ‘pure’ science is 
based on “a theory of knowledge that assumes a fundamental division between the 
knower and the known, the subject and the surrounding objects” (Evernden (1992:73).   
 Some scholars who accept positivist approaches to conservation disregard 
evaluative and prescriptive statements as nonscientific and irrelevant (Walker 1992), 
and call for a ‘measurable distance’ between scientific investigation of biodiversity and 
activism (Brussard et al. 1994).   According to some authors, scientific knowledge is only 
meant to resolve the technical questions of policy formulation (Murphy 1990).  The 
positivist approach to science includes ‘normal’ science’s assumptions in which 
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uncertainties are problematic, values are separate, and foundational problems do not 
exist (Robertson & Hull 2001).   
 The literature has a long tradition of debate relating to assumptions of 
positivism, including Kuhn’s early rejection of the positivist claim that “one full, 
objective, true account of nature and the proper measure of scientific achievement 
…brings us closer to that ultimate goal” (1970:171).  In fact, positivism itself has been 
significantly reworked by positivist scholars over the last several decades.  According to 
Roebuck & Phifer, “every key tenet of this perspective has been either abandoned, 
liberalized to the point of triviality, or thoroughly undermined by positivism's own 
original practitioners…yet, because it is easy to pick and choose among its elements, it 
continues to be taken for granted as the basis of most popular and mainstream scientific 
discourse” (1999:445).  As a new post-positivist science, conservation biology aims to 
provide the ‘pure’ scientific mechanisms to achieve the normatively defined ecological 
forestry and sustainable conservation management. 
 The conservation literature describes efforts to distance conservation biology 
from a positivist approach that conflicts with the inherent value-laden ‘mission’ of the 
discipline.  Norton’s (1988:238) rejection of the “false façade of value-free science”   
provided scientists an early warning in the conservation literature.  “Any science that 
hitches its wagon to positivism rests on the claim that scientific knowledge is value-free 
and thus disguises (at the risk of forgetting) its normative commitments” (Barry & 
Oelschlaeger 1996:970).   
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 Many conservation biology scholars believe the discipline faces the problem of 
building a credible scientific discourse while remaining committed to the normative 
mission to maintain and conserve biotic diversity and ecological complexity.  
Conservation biology is not alone in this endeavor; most scholars believe every scientific 
discipline is value-laden (Putnam 1981, 1987, 1995; Longino 1990; Shrader-Frechette & 
McCoy 1993).  Shrader-Frechette & McCoy (1993:82, 83, 86) argue that “no science can 
avoid completely the difficulty of methodological value judgments associated with 
interpretations of confirmation.”   
  In his influential article, “What is a Conservation Biologist?,” Norton (1988:238) 
called for questioning the positivistic assumptions of science, in which “the first point of 
attack in this discussion should be on the positivist view of science itself—on its model 
of nature as a mechanism composed of interchangeable parts.”    The rigidity of 
positivism often prevents individual scientists, once they have produced empirical 
findings on an important conservation issue, to take the next step to present a public 
argument, which can inform advocacy and strategic activism.  Under the influence of 
positivism, scientists may be “notoriously unwilling to take a stand against issues such as 
environmental degradation and biodiversity loss” (Robertson & Hull 2001:972), which 
clashes with the role of conservation biology as an inherently normative discipline.  
“Under the hegemony of positivism, it is difficult to formulate and defend conservation 
goals on ‘scientific’ grounds” (Robertson & Hull 2001:972).    
 More recently, through the process of articulating the normative dimensions of 
conservation biology and developing a critique of positivist science, proponents of 
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conservation management and ecological forestry have a foundation to develop sound 
policy based on the most urgent environmental issues relating to biological diversity and 
ecosystem function.  Many scholars call this alternative, post-positivist approach as “a 
new, enriched awareness of the functions and methods of science … In this sense, the 
appropriate science for this epoch is ‘post-normal’” (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1995:146).   
 Many believe conservation biology should become a “post-normal science” 
informed by normative goals of biodiversity and ecosystem integrity, while it “reflexively 
evaluates the knowledge it constructs for the qualities that make it effective at 
influencing conservation decisions” (Robertson & Hull 2001:971).  Barry and 
Oelschlaeger (1996: 907, 909) assert that “a post-positivistic, self-reflective awareness 
of societal influence on science is a step forward…The view of conservation biology as 
value-driven does not discredit its scientific legitimacy.”   Masi succinctly articulated the 
post-positivist possibility for conservation biology arguing, “Our science is not neutral, 
because we care about the outcome (1994).”   
 Occupying both realms of values and ‘facts’ (contingent, consensus-based truths) 
allows conservation biology to embrace a ‘post-normal’ approach to environmental 
dilemmas.  Van Houtan (2006:1371) calls for grounding conservation biology in both 
scientific and normative dimensions, because “if conservation is a virtue then scientific 
arguments alone are insufficient and the battle visibly involves ethics and social 
traditions, as well as science.”   
 Democratic theory and public participation are informed by this appraisal of 
value questions and the influence of normative dimensions in environmental policy 
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decision-making process (McCann 1986; Paehlke 1988; Clark et al. 1994).  Although “in 
principle it might be possible to avoid contextual values, it would be almost impossible 
not do so…. *Positivism+ is not sufficient to ground environmental policy” (Shrader-
Frechette & McCoy 1993:83).   This dissertation is informed by the movement in 
conservation biology toward a post-positivist science grounded by normative goals 
favoring biological diversity and ecosystem complexity, while reflexively accepting the 
value of constructed knowledge for its potential to influence national forest decision-
making.   
Constructivism  
 On the other side of the spectrum from positivism, the ‘constructivist’ critique of 
science also informs ecological forestry and conservation management.  Scholars from 
this school believe science is a “historically situated cultural practice” (Robertson & Hull 
2001:972), and scientists “construct” knowledge that inevitably reflects the social 
context in which it was created and used (Marx, L 1970; Harvey 1974; Tobey 1981; 
Kingland 1985; McIntosh 1985; Sagoff 1988; Golley 1993; Barbour 1995; Bocking 1997). 
 As Sterling (1990:80) maintains, in constructivist theory, “the classical disjunction 
between subject and object, fact and value is invalid; the knower is implicated in the 
known and there can only be ‘relative objectivity.’  How facts are investigated, selected, 
and interpreted depends upon one’s values, which are colored by how one sees the 
world.”  Constructivist scholars make the argument that scientific knowledge is not the 
product of an objective observation, but is informed by a socially constructed and 
accepted worldview (Latour 1987; Haraway 1991; Golinski 1998).  Science is therefore 
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an “intersubjective social activity that (re)produces and extends particular visions of 
reality through and with networks of power” (Robertson & Hull 2001:972).     
 This appraisal is helpful for developing an understanding of ecological forestry 
and conservation management by acknowledging the culturally constructed nature of 
science and policy present in environmental management.   This ontological position 
provides a difficult challenge to science in general, and is especially problematic for 
conservation scientists working to develop the most appropriate, scientifically verifiable, 
and tested approaches for their mission-driven science.   
 One of conservation biology’s founders, Michael Soulé, recently engaged leading 
constructivists in a debate, rejecting the claim “that the scientific enterprise is biased 
and value-ridden and that, as a project that seeks knowledge, it is no better than 
astrology… that scientific texts are just stories, no better or worse than novels, no more 
authoritative than religious canons or science fiction” (1995:151,154).   Soulé believes 
the constructivist argument sets up a “solipsistic trap” where scientists “suffer from 
sensory deprivation—a kind of developmental deficit of nature exposure that causes the 
solipsistic hallucination that the world is illusionary” (Soulé & Lease 1995:151).   
Additionally, as Shrader-Frechette warns, “If there is no reality independent of the mind, 
there would be no way to test our scientific hypothesis and no reason that better 
theories should yield more-accurate predictions” (1996:914).   
 Contemporary conservation literature includes much discussion of this paradox 
and calls for balancing the constructivist critique with the best description of ‘real,’ 
material environmental conditions necessary to produce conservation management 
153 
outcomes.   The construction of science can be understood as a cross-cultural, 
congruent explanation of the natural world, in which scientific consensus gains a 
tentative reality.   
 This approach is consistent with the post-positivist position that scientific 
societies, including the Society for Conservation Biology and the Ecological Society of 
America, are influenced by normative dimensions while individual conservation 
practitioners use the “best available science,” as required by statutory environmental 
law like the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321-4327).  Conservation 
biology, ‘constructed’ as a mission-driven, value-based scientific practice, requires 
attention to this constructivist critique.  However, accepting the influence of individual 
and cultural values, however, does not indicate a flaw in conservation biology.  The 
constructivist critique helps develop an understanding of science as a complex natural 
and social enterprise.  Conservation management and ecological forestry are therefore 
tasked with acknowledging the social construction of science developed by 
constructivist theory while also designing and implementing post-positivist conservation 
practices based on the best available science. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, this chapter has explored the history and evolution of 
conservation philosophies in the United States as an ongoing struggle over the nature of 
science and its application to management of federal public land.  This chapter has 
addressed the contested definitions and intellectual lineage of different conservation 
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philosophies that subscribe to either resource management or ecological management 
of national forests.  This history of environmental policy and law in the United States is 
informed by democratic theories that explain why different decision-making structures 
produce unique conservation outcomes, or a lack thereof.   
 The next chapter will address the legal and political channels through which 
conservation has been integrated into federal lands management in the United States, 
with special attention to mechanisms that democratize decision-making to produce 
disparate ecological outcomes.  Chapter Six will outline the changes to forest 
management under the Healthy Forest Initiative, which are analyzed in Chapter Eight 
and discussed in Chapter Nine.   
  
CHAPTER FIVE: THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE, ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW, & PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
 
 
"National parks are the best idea we ever had. Absolutely 
American, absolutely democratic, they reflect us at our best 
rather than our worst." 
Wallace Stegner, 1983.  
“The best idea we ever had.”  
Wilderness (spring), 4-5. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 Debate over public participation in natural resource decisions reached a fever 
pitch during the late 1960’s after several high-profile environmental emergencies broke 
through to the collective American consciousness.  As a result of new environmental 
legislation established during this era, policy and conservation scholars had 
opportunities to study the role of public participation in federal agency decision-making 
and federal land management (Burch 1974; Friesema & Culhane 1976, 1979; Sewell & 
O’Riordan 1976; Wengert 1976; Ingram &Ullery 1977).   
 Today, there is considerable agreement in the policy and conservation literature 
that democratizing federal agency decision-making processes improves national forest 
management (Moote & McClaran 1997; Overdevest 2000, Vaughn 2003, Teich et al. 
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2004, Manring 2004, 2005, Germain 2005, Petersen MN et al. 2004, National Research 
Council 2008).  Many conservation scholars argue that statutory requirements for public 
participation, through traditional interest group representation (Stewart 1975) and 
direct citizen participation (Tiech et al. 2004; Peterson 2004) have opened Forest Service 
decision-making to more ecological, non-consumptive considerations (Kessler, 
Salwasser, Cartwright, & Caplan 1992, Jones & Mohai 1995; Jones & Taylor 1995; 
Baldwin 1997). New statutes have facilitated more direct exchange with decision-
makers (Moote and McClaran 1997), and promoted legal accountability by federal 
agencies (Coggins 1999; Manring 2005).  Other studies have demonstrated that citizen 
oversight and participation compelled “the Forest Service to comply with environmental 
laws and regulations” (Manring 2005:62) and “follow laws more closely” (Baldwin 
1997:2).   
 This chapter will address the creation of federal environmental and public 
participation law governing the Forest Service and identify recent trends in national 
forest policy. This will allow for a comprehensive review in Chapter Six of the “Healthy 
Forest Initiative” under George W. Bush’s administration, which created a complex suite 
of controversial changes to public participation and ecological management rights 
established in the 1970’s environmental era.  This assessment of the constantly shifting 
legal landscape will provide a starting point for analyzing national forest management 
decisions in North Carolina from 2003 to 2008 in Chapters Seven and Eight, with the 
ultimate aim of assessing which models of democratic decision-making actually guided 
those processes and helped shape the eventual ecological outcomes (Chapter Nine).   
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 This chapter also addresses several important controversies regarding the Forest 
Service that help explain the move away from traditional elite administrative modes in 
these circumstances.  These events helped transform the Forest Service into an agency 
driven by the modern aggregative pluralism (interest group representation) that is the 
dominant model in most Western liberal-democratic countries.  After tracing the 
eclipsing of the traditional administrative model by interest-group representation, this 
chapter addresses more recent, alternative processes that include more direct, dissent 
based participation through the statutorily guaranteed administrative appeals process. 
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION  
Even before the “participation explosion” (Almond & Verba 1963) during the 
“environmental era” beginning in the late 1960’s (Andrews 1999:13), New Deal reforms 
of the 1940’s had established the first ‘sunshine’ provisions providing more 
transparency and public documentation for many federal agency actions.   Most 
importantly, the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) was a process-oriented statute 
requiring specific public participation procedures for all federal agencies. In 1946, 
Congress passed the APA to establish practices and procedures for all government 
agency rulemakings to guarantee greater information exchange through new citizen 
rights to receive notice, submit evidence, and address hearings officers.   The APA 
mandated that courts “shall” “set aside” an “agency rule” found to be “arbitrary, 
capricious *or+ otherwise not in accordance with law” (5 U.S.C. §§ 706, 551:13).  The 
specific reforms placed responsibility on the public to engage the process, although the 
public was limited to taking part in only certain phases of the decision-making process 
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(Rosenbaum 1978:82).  “In this era, participation was consistent with elite democratic 
themes” (Steelman 1996:34).   
 Early controversy relating to the concentration of powerful interests in National 
Forest decision-making in the 1950’s led to the passage of the “Multiple-Use, Sustained-
Yield Act of 1960” (MUSYA), which was aimed at expanding “uses” beyond the 
dominance of resource extraction interests to include outdoor recreation, watershed, 
and wildlife (16 U.S.C. § 528).   MUSYA mandated that the Secretary of Agriculture 
manage forests for "multiple use and sustained yield of the several products and 
services obtained therefrom” (MUSYA 1969:529)… “with consideration being given to 
the relative values of the various resources, and not necessarily the combination of uses 
that will give the greatest dollar return or the greatest unit output” (MUSYA 1969:531). 
 Despite its name, MUSYA did little to change the dominant Group A resource 
extraction paradigm shaping decisions in the Forest Service (described in Chapter Four).  
“While the purposes were expanded from those of the Organic Act, the legislation 
remained broad and discretionary.  MUSYA only required that the Forest Service give 
‘due consideration’ to the multiple resources that the forests have to offer” (Parent 
1992:703).   Although MUSYA called for the Forest Service to consider non-commodity 
interests, “it is equally important to note that MUSYA preserved agency autonomy *and+ 
gave the agency the legal cover it needed to continue its campaign of timber production 
while publicly embracing multiple use rhetoric” (Burnett & Davis 2002:207).  In short, 
while MUSYA provided statutory authority for the consideration of other uses in agency 
decision-making, Group A resource extraction continued to thrive under the traditional 
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elite democratic model until passage of the National Environmental Policy Act and the 
National Forest Management Act.   
National Environmental Policy Act 
On April 22, 1970, an estimated twenty million people gathered nationwide as 
part of the first celebration of Earth Day.   Only three months earlier, the reformation of 
the traditional administrative model for environmental decision-making became evident 
in the passage of the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332).  
As a form of ‘process’ legislation, Congress mandated specific legal and regulatory 
requirements for agencies to involve the public in any federal action—prior to final 
decisions—and file in the public record environmental impact statements (EIS) for any 
“major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” (42 
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).    
During the “environmental era” of the 1970’s (Andrews 1999), NEPA was used to 
transform the traditional elite model of federal decision-making (based on the 
Progressive’s ideal of resource management) into an aggregative, pluralistic process that 
allowed for increased public participation (Sax 1970; Steward 1975; Andrews 1999; 
Bocking 2004).   “Statutory mandates were strong enough to force agencies to stand up 
to powerful industries” and transform the apolitical administrative traditional model “to 
openly political administrative decision processes” (Andrews 1999: 219).  Congress 
mandated public participation requirements for U.S. federal lands to allow for citizen 
groups to represent publicly-held environmental interests in federal agency decision-
making (Parent 1992; Andrews 1999; Manring 2004, 2005; Germain 2005).   
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 Congress specifically intended to grant citizen oversight for federal agency 
decision-making to correct the decades of overrepresentation by resource interests (Sax 
1970, Stewart 1975).  The pluralistic administrative model transformed the Forest 
Service decision-making process, requiring “effective public participation within the 
decision process of natural resource agencies” (Bolle 1970:504).  Fortenbery and Harris 
(1983:52) argued “the challenge of public participation, in the land management 
planning process, is to balance democratic notions of citizen involvement in 
government” to address the “inability of traditional democratic structures to deal 
adequately with the specifics of complex land management process” (1983:52).     
The major environmental statutes passed during the 1970’s represent important 
milestones in the evolution of democratic theory in the United States, in which Congress 
attempted to include public interest groups to help balance decision-making, navigate 
the “democratic paradox” (discussed in Chapter Two), and address the fundamental 
conflict between private resource extraction interests and public demands for increased 
ecological forestry and conservation management (discussed in Chapter Four).   
While NFMA (discussed below) addresses long-term forest-wide planning 
procedures, regulations established under NEPA created three processes of review for 
site-specific, project-level management.  The Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ), 
which was created to oversee NEPA, established levels of review for 1) an EIS for all 
projects that may significantly affect the quality of the environment; 2) an 
Environmental Assessment (EA) that documents a “Finding of No Significant Impact” 
(FONSI) or a notice to prepare an EIS; and, 3) in limited circumstances, the agency is 
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allowed to move forward without documented review if the action fits into a previously 
defined categorical exclusion (CE).   
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) directs the Forest Service to 
prepare a detailed “environmental impact statement” (EIS) for major federal actions 
that may significantly affect the quality of the environment.  The EIS must address all 
unavoidable adverse environmental effects, alternatives to the proposed action, and 
any irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources (42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)).  If 
the Forest Service is unable to determine whether a project may significantly affect the 
quality of the environment, the agency must perform an environmental assessment (EA) 
( 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(b), 1508.9).  If, through the EA, the agency concludes the proposed 
project will not significantly affect the environment, the agency must issue a finding of 
no significant impact (FONSI).  40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(e), 1508.13.  Otherwise, the agency 
must prepare an EIS.  40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(c).  
If the Forest Service determines that specific classes of management have no 
significant effect, individually or cumulatively, on the quality of the environment, 
regulations implementing NEPA allow the agency to establish categories of 
management (CE’s) that are excluded from the EIS and EA requirements (40 C.F.R. §§ 
1507.3(b)(2)(ii); 1508.4.)  Under the original implementing language for the regulations, 
the Forest Service could only implement a CE projects if no extraordinary circumstances 
were present (40 C.F.R. § 1508.4.)   As Chapter Six and Eight demonstrate, this 
extraordinary circumstances rule was changed by the Bush Administration’s Healthy 
Forest Initiative. 
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In explaining the original intent of the regulations, the Forest Service stated, “It is 
the intent of the agency that only routine actions that have no extraordinary 
circumstances should be within the categories for exclusion” (57 Fed. Reg. 43184, 
emphasis added).  Federal courts have upheld this language, including in Rhodes v. 
Johnson, 153 F.3d 785, 790 (C.A.7(Ill.)1998.), in which the judge explained, “It is not 
enough that the Forest Service has conducted an internal review to determine whether 
the extraordinary circumstance will cause the proposed action to have a significant 
impact on the environment.  An environmental assessment is the process required to 
make that determination.”  
NEPA also requires agencies to “make available to States, counties, 
municipalities, institutions, and individuals, advice and information useful in restoring, 
maintaining, and enhancing the quality of the environment” (42 USC § 4332(2)(G).   
Federal courts have upheld NEPA’s provisions mandating substantive weight be given to 
public input, which set up a “minimum requirement that the decision-making process 
demonstrates the consideration and effect of valid public input, and challenges the 
perception that public input is simply an information exchange” (Earth Island 2006:45).  
Moreover, the requirement to explore a range of alternatives has been described as the 
“Heart of NEPA” (40 C.F.R. § 1502.14) for its power to compel administrators to justify 
their course of action in relation to other alternatives, including a “no-action” option.   
Public participation for site-specific projects under NEPA is limited to a “scoping” 
process, through which the Forest Service identified issues it would later address 
through an environmental assessment (EA) process to determine whether there were 
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significant environmental issues worthy of an EIS.  Specifically, public comments are 
generated during public hearings or accepted directly by Forest Service “NEPA 
coordinators” during the scoping period, as well as following the completion of a draft 
EA or EIS (Westman 1985).  In initiating a “scoping process”, the CEQ requires agencies 
to “make diligent efforts to involve the public in preparing and implementing their NEPA 
procedures.” (42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)).   Under NEPA, “the comments and views of the 
appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and 
enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the President, the Council 
on Environmental Quality and to the public” (42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2000).  These 
procedures provided data for this dissertation described in Chapter Seven and Eight. 
When a National Forest project is authorized through the CE process, the Forest 
Service is required to conduct a scoping process that includes a 30-day public notice and 
comment period.  After scoping is complete, the Forest Service publishes a Decision 
Memo (DM) summarizing the effects analysis and gives a rationale for the decision.  As 
described below, the Forest Service Decision-making and Appeals Reform Act provides 
an additional 45-day appeal period to challenge the DM.  If any appeals are filed, 
another 45 days are required to address them; otherwise the project goes forward 
immediately.   NEPA, however, only requires the scoping process for projects that are 
categorically excluded from the documentation process. 
Most importantly, NEPA modified the traditional administrative process by 
providing opportunities for citizen law suits challenging federal agency decisions and 
environmental impact statements for Forest Service resource extraction projects 
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(Parent 1992).  In an important test case in 1973, for example, the Tenth Circuit ruled in 
Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz that the Forest Service was required to 
created an EIS for two clearcut logging projects covering over 10,700 acres (Parent 
1992). “The court held that the mandatory language of NEPA’s specific requirements 
does not leave the decision not to prepare an EIS to administrative discretion” (Parent 
1992:705).  The court rejected the Forest Service claim that the logging did not 
constitute a “major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment” (42 U.S.C. § 4332: (2)(C), and compelled the agency to reevaluate its 
approach to industrial management.   
Despite legal precedence established through NEPA, the Forest Service 
maintained much control over decision-making authority (Burnett and Davis 2002), and 
“this so called participatory legislation did little to allow the public to influence policy 
making” (Steelman 1996:39).  Other authors have argued that complex scientific and 
technical dimensions of environmental decisions were inaccessible to the average 
citizen (Wengert 1976).  The EIS process has also been criticized as a highly-politicized 
process that deemphasizes quality science (Friesema & Culhane 1976).   DeSario and 
Langton argued that interest groups had co-opted administrators responsible for 
implementing scientific and technical programs (1987).    
In short, NEPA was successful in opening major federal actions to public scrutiny, 
yet the degree of influence available to citizens had failed to meet expectations to fully 
transform the Forest Service into a more responsive agency.   As recently as 2005, for 
example, the Bush Administration initiated sweeping overhauls of the regulations 
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implementing NEPA (CEQ) that would “increase flexibility” (Bosworth 2002) by giving 
administrators more discretion to consider alternatives or categorically exclude 
additional classes of management from environmental review.   
After the passage of NEPA, powerful private interests reacted by calling upon 
members in Congress to elevate resource extraction as the “dominant” Forest Service 
policy concern.  “The continuing influence of the commodity industries was reflected in 
the 1971 report to of the Public Land Law review Commission, chaired by rep. Wayne 
Aspinall of Colorado… *which+ sought to reaffirm a national policy priority for 
commodity extraction on the public lands, and to declare logging the ‘dominant use’ 
(rather than just one among other ‘multiple uses’ of the national forests” (Andrews 
1999:310).  Allies in the industry were trying to rescue commodity forestry and other 
forms of resource extraction (Grazing, Mining, Oil & Gas), which were coming under 
increased legal challenges from the newly established NEPA requirements. 
Bolle, Church, and Monongahela  
Three pivotal events contributed to the more complete transformation of the 
traditional elite administrative model and mandated more participatory structures that 
led to the current aggregative, interest-group pluralism.  Shortly after Ashley Schiff 
(1962) and Grant McConnell’s (1966) publications, other important political and legal 
events—the “Bolle Report”, the “Church Report”, and ruling on the Isaac Walton League 
v Butz (Monongahela)—added to criticism of the Forest Service specifically, as well as 
other agencies governed under the traditional administrative model, including the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers (Maass 1950), the Bureau of Land Management (Foss 1960), 
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the Soil Conservation Service (Morgan 1965), and the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(Selznick 1949).  These critiques triggered the passage of federal statutes specifically 
aimed at correcting the imbalances created by the traditional administrative model 
(Parent 1992; Wilkinson 1992; Burnett and Davis 2002).   
The first event to influence the transformation from the elite administrative 
model was the publishing of “The Bolle Report” (1970B:141-142), which included a 
stinging assessment of controversial clearcut logging practices in Montana’s Bitterroot 
National Forest.  During the late 1960’s, steep slope terracing and plantation logging had 
provoked substantial outrage among the public, which compelled Senator Lee Metcalf 
(D-MT) to appoint a commission to investigate Forest Service administrative procedures.  
This committee produced the Bolle report, a “scathing document highly critical of Forest 
Service management practices in general and clear-cutting practices in particular” 
(Burnett and Davis 2002).    
The report, named after its main author, Arnold Bolle, argued the Forest Service 
had abandoned multiple-use management “as the governing principle… Consideration 
of recreation, watershed, wildlife, and grazing appear as afterthoughts... The Forest 
Service... needs to be reconstructed so that substantial, responsible, local public 
participation ... can ‘naturally’ take place” (Bolle 1970B:).  The influence of resource 
extraction interests over federal lands management was producing an imbalance that 
was leading toward more frequent and intense commodity forestry practices (Bolle 
1970B).   
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Another important event leading to a rejection of the traditional Forest Service 
administrative model was the publication of what became known as the “Church 
Guidelines” by the Subcommittee on Public Lands of the Senate Committee on Interior 
and Insular Affairs entitled, “Clearcutting on Federal Timberlands” (1972).  These 
guidelines, named for Senator Frank Church, recommended new criteria for federal 
lands management that attempted to end the practice of clearcut logging in many areas 
across the national forest system.   Specifically, the committee called for restricting 
logging on "highly scenic land, land with fragile soils, land with low reforestation 
potential, and land where reforestation or environmentally acceptable harvesting would 
be uneconomical" (Wilkinson 1992:142).  The Church Guidelines would eventually be 
written into the National Forest Management Act (discussed below) to restrict—
although not completely prohibit—clearcutting in areas with steep slopes or aesthetic 
considerations (16 U.S.C. §1604(6)(3)(E)-(F) (1988).   The committee hearings 
contributed to the criticisms of the resource extraction model, and Congress would use 
the committee’s final report to ensure the “Forest Service works within the outer 
bounds of the NFMA, as set forth in the Church Guidelines” (Parent 1992:715).  
As the Bolle report and Church guidelines demonstrated, the dominant resource 
management practices used by the Forest Service raised substantial doubt about 
overrepresentation of private commodity forestry interests in the traditional 
administrative model for federal land management (Hirt 1995).  These events can be 
described as policy windows, defined by Kingdon as opportunities for advocates of new 
proposals to seek support (1984).  Policy windows are infrequent opportunities that 
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allow policy entrepreneurs to attach solutions to perceived problems that take 
advantage of politically opportune events (Kingdon 1984).   The Bolle and Church 
reports “provided a window of opportunity for fundamental reform.  However, after the 
publicity died down, Congress simply handed national forest policy back to the Forest 
Service with instructions to undertake ‘remedial action’ … Consequently, these two 
events might have passed into oblivion with little real change, if a third event had not 
occurred” (Burnett and Davis 2002:208).    
The third pivotal event was a November 1973 ruling by Federal District Court 
Judge Robert E. Maxwell on Isaak Walton League v. Butz (Monongahela, 522 F.2d 945, 
950-52 (4th Cir. 1975)).   This was a significant legal decision enjoining the Forest Service 
from using the commodity forestry practice of clearcutting in the Monongahela National 
Forest (MNF) in West Virginia, which was later upheld by the Forth Circuit Court of 
Appeals and applied to West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina.   
“Local residents had protested the use of clearcutting practices on the MNF, and finding 
the *Forest Service+ unresponsive to their concerns, sought recourse through the courts” 
(Steelman 1996:116).  The lawsuit was the product of controversy from the Forest 
Service’s “even-aged” clearcutting, labor-saving automation, logging incentives, and the 
required road-building to access logging areas (Weitzman 1977).   
The Monongahela decision relied on the 1897 Organic Act that established the 
federal forest reserves, which required only selective logging of marked trees—not 
wholesale liquidation of entire watersheds through clearcut logging.  Responding to the 
controversy, the Chief of the Forest Service halted not only clearcutting, but all timber 
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sales on nine national forests in the four states in an attempt to avoid precedence that 
may have prevented logging throughout the entire national forest system (Berman & 
Howe 1992).  “For all practical purposes, this ruling eliminated the Forest Service’s 
preferred method of clearcutting in the Four Circuit” (Parent 1992:708).  The court held 
in Monongahela that the Forest Service had exceeded its authority to sell “dead, 
matured, or large growth trees” that were “marked and designated” for sale (16 U.S.C. § 
473-482 1988:476).    
As a judicial check to elite administrative power, the Monongahela decision 
created a political vacuum Congress filled by passing the National Forest Management 
Act (discussed below).  “The fact that the courts had interpreted the Organic Act 
stringently prompted Congress to take action sooner than it probably would have under 
other circumstances” (Parent 1992:708).  In the wake of the “Bolle Report” and Church 
Guidelines, the Monongahela ruling was the proverbial final straw compelling Congress 
to rewrite federal laws to balance competing demands for conservation and resource 
extraction (Fortenbery & Harris 1983; Parent 1992; Andrews 1999).  The Monongahela 
case demonstrated “public concern with forest policy, and to a lesser degree, a public 
statement that Forest Service has been unable to manage for values other than timber 
and commercial resource” (Fortenbery & Harris 1983:60).   
In effect, these three events created a policy window necessary for members of 
Congress to find political traction to fundamentally reform the Forest Service and eclipse 
the dominance of the traditional elite model.  Most importantly, new national forest 
legislation would establish the first statutory protections for public participation directly 
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in planning and management of federal lands (Rosenbaum 1973; Hirt 1994, Andrews 
1999; Steelman 1998, Overdevest 2000, McCloskey 2005).   
National Forest Management Act 
Under NEPA, the Forest Service exempted itself “on the ground that its 
management of the national forests was a ‘proprietary’ function under the property 
clause of the Constitution” (Andrews 1999:426).  With NFMA, the Forest Service lost its 
claim that the agency was simply managing federal property, and instead, public 
participation was established to address ‘sovereign’ protections for citizens.  In addition 
to the APA’s transparency and NEPA’s procedural hurdles, NFPA allowed individual 
citizens and interest groups to directly participate in long-term planning for specific 
national forests. 
The traditional model and longstanding dominance of resource extraction in 
national forests fundamentally changed with passage of the National Forest 
Management Act (16 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976)) (NFMA), which established the first statutory 
requirement to open Forest Service decision-making to public participation.  Scholars 
asserted that the legislation was a “firm step in the direction of Congress mandating 
management procedures… necessary because professional foresters had not been able 
to resist industry pressures to cut timber” (Barlow 1977:539, 544).   Most importantly, 
new statutory provisions for public participation in federal lands planning established 
“the most extensive review and planning in [Forest Service] history, and possibly in the 
history of any federal land management agency” (Fortenbery & Harris 1983:1).     
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NFMA’s passage came on the heels of the 1974 Forest and Range Renewable 
Resources Planning Act (RPA) (16 U.S.C. §1600), which required forest-wide planning for 
federal public land.  The RPA was “the first congressional response to the litigation 
regarding national forest planning” (Parent 1992:706), which established funding for 
agency planning of “long- and short- term goals for national forest use” (16 U.S.C. 
§1600c).  The RPA directed the Forest Service to promulgate long-range, system wide 
plans by providing for “public participation in the development, review, and revision of 
land management plans” (16 U.S.C. §1600:c).    
In addition to preparing forest-wide management plans for each national forest 
every five years, the RPA required the Secretary of Agriculture to make “plans or 
revisions available to the public at convenient locations in the vicinity of the affected 
unit for a period of at least three months before final adoption, during which period the 
Secretary shall publicize and hold public meetings or comparable processes at locations 
that foster public participation in the review of such plans or revisions” (16 U.S.C. 
§1600:c).   Although this congressional mandate included specific planning procedures, 
“there were not many real constraints on Forest Service discretion” (Parent 1992:707).  
Although the RPA was eventually incorporated into NFMA, it provides one of the earliest 
examples of a federal law establishing statutory protections for direct public 
participation in federal lands planning and management. 
Building on the RPA, NFMA included statutory mandates for the Forest Service to 
include the general public in federal lands management (Fortenbery and Harris 1983, 
Andrews 1999), which “specify procedures to insure that land management plans are 
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prepared in accordance with *NEPA+” (16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(1) (1976).   “Never before had 
the Forest Service been required to open up the decision-making process to the general 
public, and then consider and react to that input” (Fortenbery and Harris 1983:60).   
Specifically, NFMA directs the Forest Service to “provide for public participation 
in the development, review and revision of all land management plans, and to hold 
public meetings, or comparable processes in locations that foster public participation” 
(16 U.S.C. § 1604(d)).  For over 75 years, public participation in federal lands 
management was mostly an informal procedure (Coulombe 2004).  “*NFMA’s+ success 
was the need to make concessions to the amenity coalition, which pushed hard for 
provisions allowing public participation in forest planning processes and land use 
decisions” (Burnet & Davis 2002:222).    
NFMA signaled a major breakthrough by establishing citizen participation in 
management plans as “mandatory public input, which had not been required under 
previous Forest Service practices” (Andrews 1999:311).  Using the plain meaning 
standard to interpret legislative intent, NFMA states, “land management planning shall 
be accomplished with improved opportunity for public participation at all levels” (16 
U.S.C. § 1604(d)).   
Legal scholars also interpret legislative intent through congressional history of 
speeches, committee hearings, and conference reports during the bills passage.  An 
early conference committee report on NFMA, for example, shows the committee 
considered and rejected an amendment that would have released the agencies from 
measurable guidelines, and consequently, accountability to the public.  Instead, the 
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committee included a provision that required planning regulations include specific 
standards and guidelines consistent with the APA.  “All proposed amendments 
pertaining to increased participation in the planning process were accepted in the 
Congressional debates.  Congress saw the need to provide this check at every important 
stage in the planning-management process.  This recognition of the importance of 
participation, and the value it brings to the decision making process cannot be 
deemphasized” (Fortenbery & Harris 1983:86).       
Congress also mandated that strict guidelines and scientific standards be 
documented in the public record of decision to provide substantive information for 
citizens to engage in forest management.  “Congress specifically considered an option 
that would allow the Forest Service greater flexibility and discretion in forest planning 
and rejected it in favor of a scheme that required the Forest Service to implement 
statutory directives through a transparent and open rulemaking process” (Flournoy 
2005:15).  NFMA required agencies to document environmental analysis in the public 
record to provide the “public a crucial check on the Forest Service’s activities…a 
benchmark against which the public has been able to track the agency’s performance” 
(Flournoy 2005:15).  Congress embedded the guidelines in the statute itself and 
required the Forest Service to incorporate proposed standards into the public planning 
process (S. CONF. REP. NO. 94-1335 at 22 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6720, 
6724).    
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Commodity Forestry Criticism of NFMA 
NFMA’s mandates for public participation in federal lands management 
provoked significant scorn from resource management interests, which fought to 
include provisions in NFMA that reaffirmed the status of resource extraction in federal 
lands.  Some congressmen worked to offset conservation gains and prevent 
“repercussions from the timber industry, which would find its profit margin falling if it 
were forced to use a harvesting method less economically efficient than clearcutting” 
(Parent 1992:708).  NFMA actually increased resource extraction through inclusion of 
“ambitious timber harvesting goals established for each national forest through the 
implantation of multiyear management plans” (Burnet & Davis 2002:222).  While 
Congress secured concessions aimed at radically transforming the traditional elite 
administrative model for national forests, the Forest Service held on to controversial 
commodity forestry management practice, including clearcutting, steep-slope terracing, 
and tree-plantation farming (Hirt 1994).  
Although NFMA signaled the transformation of a traditional elitist administrative 
model for the Forest Service decision-making process, public participation in agency 
decision-making did not produce a reduction in the level of resource extraction taking 
place in national forests.  The first round of national forest plans developed in the 1980s 
doubled logging in both Rocky Mountain and Eastern national forests, approved more 
than 100,000 miles of new logging roads, and opened “millions of acres of previously 
inaccessible forests to logging and other development” (Beaver et al. 2000:3).    
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During the 1980s, the Forest Service resisted change to resource management 
policy and increased controversial resource management practices favored by the 
private interests that traditionally dominated agency decision-making.  In addition to 
the creating a more insular culture in the Forest Service, the Reagan Administration also 
increased industrial logging in national forests, which “led to casualties in scientific 
integrity and agency credibility as timber planners, under pressure to ‘get out the cut,’ 
adopted unreliable assumptions and used flawed data to justify harvest quotas.  On 
many forests, reforestation accomplishments and suitable timber base calculations 
were exaggerated, existing timber volumes and ‘yield’ annual growth assessments were 
inflated, while assumptions regarding environmental damage were underestimated” 
(Hirt 1994:xi).  In fact, industrial logging accelerated during the post-NFMA period to 
12.7 billion board feet of trees in 1987, 40 percent of which came from the Pacific 
Northwest (Beaver 2003).  NFMA’s environmental goals “were largely unrealized during 
the 1980s as the Forest Service resisted making changes in timber policy” (Beaver et al. 
2000:3).  Public participation in federal lands management came with a high political 
price tag: while the public gained access to federal agency decision-making, the Forest 
Service rejection of scientific knowledge, along with pressure from private interest 
groups, prevented change in the Forest Service management practices (Hirt 1994).   
The resource management literature also included significant discussion about 
the flaws of NFMA, including discussion of NFMA as representing unjustified 
acquiescence to public calls to change national forest decision-making processes.  
O’Loughlin, for example, believed the process was a “hopeless morass” and 
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“unworkable situation” that encouraged “public participation at too many points in the 
forest plan process” (1990:19).  In Allen and Gould’s (1986) highly cited article in the 
Journal of Forestry, the authors rejected “wicked’ management issues produced by 
NFMA and called for a return of the “technocratic” Pinchot resource management 
approach by “professionals” instead of emotive citizens.   Allen and Gould also believed 
NFMA mandated plans were analogous to “Soviet agriculture,” and they called upon 
Congress to reject NFMA and “go back and search closely its directives” in order to 
“unleash and upgrade the talents of forest managers to do incremental planning” 
(1984:23).   
The traditional elitist resource management approach, according to Allen and 
Gould, avoided intractable “wickedness” relating to public participation by upholding 
the elite democratic reliance on the rational-technical administration.  The solution, 
according to the authors, was to repeal NFMA’s public participation requirements, 
including “long-range forest plans involving power struggles, imprecise goals, fuzzy 
equity questions, and nebulous information and thus become wicked” (Allen & Gould 
1986:23).   The authors considered the Monongahela decision as “a seemingly innocent 
local problem [that] precipitated the wicked problem of a multilayered power struggle 
to determine who had a legitimate role in planning the use of national forests” 
(1986:22).    
This critique of NFMA, public participation, and environmental policy in general 
persists in contemporary resource management literature and continues to attract 
significant attention by policymakers and agency bureaucrats.   The Bush 
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Administration, for example, recently lost a court battle to remove formal public 
participation procedures required by the National Forest Management Act and exempt 
entire forest plans from NEPA’s requirement to conduct an EIS (Citizens for Better 
Forestry v USDA Forest Service 2009.   The Bush Administration’s critique of NFMA’s 
public participation was based on the claim that the forest-wide planning process is 
unnecessary and time-consuming, and should be closed to formal public oversight 
(Zwight 2004).  One Bush Administration Forest Service designee published an article on 
the agency web page with the claim that a forest plan, unlike an individual project, “only 
has an environmental effect if it is knocked off the table and lands on the ground” 
(Zwight 2004:28).   According to Zwight, forest-wide planning does not “affect the 
environment” (2004:28) and is therefore not subject to NEPA and NFMA’s public 
participation requirements.     
Like Allen (1986), Zwight called public participation a “wicked problem” 
exacerbated by NFMA, which creates “promised procedural gridlock” requiring the Bush 
Administration “to cut through the procedural thickets” and make the agency “more 
business-like, in the most positive sense of that term” (Zwight 2004:30).  Scott Berg, 
with the American Forest & Paper Association, wrote another critique of NFMA (2005), 
claiming mandatory standards and procedures in the original 1982 regulations should 
not be applied through the forest planning process, but instead to individual projects.  
Berg argued that public participation in planning should “limit objectives to the handful 
of the most important issues and priorities confronting the forest” (2005:33).  The 
degree of public participation in planning, according to NFMA’s critics, should be up the 
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discretion of the agency and limited to the “objectives” that relate to project-level 
affects on the environment—not forest-wide planning that could, for example, limit 
resource extraction in wide portions of national forests.  In short, this critique 
subscribed to the basic tenets of elite democratic theory, which enshrouds much of the 
Bush Administration’s “Healthy Forest” regulation changes (discussed in Chapter Six).  
Ecological Forestry under NFMA 
Despite these limitations, the passage of NFMA is upheld in the conservation 
literature as a significant moment representing the incremental democratization the 
national forest management process.  Conservation groups used NFMA to “block the 
agency from approving, planning for, or engaging in a commodity production activity, 
typically involving timber harvests, or to force the agency to meet its NFMA obligations 
to ensure the viability of species within the National Forests” (Jones & Taylor 1995:322).   
Seventy-five percent of all NFMA-based litigation and appeals of Forest Service 
decision-making challenged resource extraction, and litigants successfully prevented 
thirty-seven percent of those projects (Jones & Taylor 1995).    Studies showed public 
interest groups predominantly used NFMA to gain access and partially succeeded in 
shifting the “emphasis of National Forest management away from commodity 
production, in favor of resource protection” (Jones & Taylor 1995:323).  In short, NFMA 
litigation was used by conservation groups to counterbalance the overrepresentation of 
private resource extraction interests in the management in federal public forests.  
Federal agencies were required to open planning processes to the public to address 
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systemic agency bias, which transformed federal administrative law and opened forest-
wide management decisions to public participation.   
Once individual citizens and conservation organizations gained access to forest-
wide planning, this new participation—coupled with NFMA’s environmental 
requirements—brought some balance to Forest Service decision-making.  Although 
planning and oversight did not guarantee immediate change in agency planning, Forest 
Service Chief Dale Robertson admitted the agency was running into trouble with appeals 
based on development of sophisticated environmental analysis (GAO 1989).  During to 
testimony before a September 28, 1988, Subcommittee in Forestry, House Committee 
on Agriculture, the Chief told members of Congress the agency was overwhelmed by 
“numerous complex environmental issues raised in appeals,” based on “water quality, 
wildlife habitat, or other aspects of the environment.  The Forest Service has often had 
difficulty adequately documenting theses effects” (GAO 1989:22).    In short, the adverse 
effects of commodity forestry were now open to direct challenge at the forest-wide 
planning level, and environmental law was beginning to create the changes Congress 
originally intended.   
An early conference committee report on NFMA (S. CONF. REP. NO. 94-1335 at 
22 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6720, 6724) provides evidence showing the 
committee considered and rejected an amendment that would have released the 
agencies from complying with hard and fast environmental regulations.  Instead, the 
committee included a provision that required planning regulations to include specific 
standards and guidelines consistent with the APA, and inserted guidelines that required 
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the Forest Service to incorporate proposed standards into individual forest plans 
(Flournoy et al. 2005).   
NFMA’s 1982 implementing regulations approved under the Reagan 
Administration, for example, required the agency to “maintain viable populations of 
existing native and desired non-native vertebrate species in the planning area” (47 Fed. 
Reg. 43026, 1982).  In October, 1984, this provision allowed citizens groups to appeal 
agency actions relating to the Spotted Owl Environment Impact Statement (EIS) in the 
Pacific Northwest.   In fact, after Chief Robertson rejected a citizen group’s appeal of the 
EIS, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Agriculture later reversed the Chief’s decision and 
sent it back to the region for additional work (USDA 1988). 
More recently, conservation groups have used NFMA’s monitoring requirements to 
hold the Forest Service to enforceable standards and guidelines, resulting in several 
lawsuits that successful blocked hundreds of logging projects during over the past 
decade.  Table 3 summarizes several cases used by public interest groups to enforce 
NFMA’s rare species guidelines.    
Table 3. Summary of recent lawsuits upholding environmental standards 
and guidelines for species protections. 
Conservation Northwest et al. v. Mark Rey et al. 2009 
The Land Council v. Powell, 379 F.3d 738 (9thCir. 2004) 
Utah Environmental Congress v. Bosworth, 372 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2004) 
Idaho Sporting Congress v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2002) 
Utah Environmental Congress v. Zieroth, 190 F.Supp.2d. 1265 (D. Utah 
2002) 
Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Service, 180 F.Supp.2d 1273 (D. N.M. 2001) 
Sierra Club v. Martin, 168 F.3d 1, 7 (11th Cir. 1999) 
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Without strict ecological standards and guidelines that require monitoring for 
rare and endangered species, it is difficult to determine whether the public participation 
process could have influenced an insular agency to challenge forest planning.  As the 
next section shows, public participation at the site-specific project level also evolved to 
provide another avenue through which groups and individual citizens could influence 
agency decision-making.  
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION & SITE-SPECIFIC PROJECT-LEVEL MANAGEMENT 
With the landmark 1970’s environmental laws—and subsequent court decisions 
upholding the legal status and application of those laws—public participation gained 
statutory protection, affording citizen groups access to forest-wide planning (NFMA) 
under the emerging aggregative pluralism administrative model.   Project-level planning, 
however, was not open to formal public participation, such as notice, comment, and 
administrative appeals, until the 1992 National Forest Decision-making and Appeals 
Reform Act (§ 322, Pub. L. No. 102-381, 106 Stat. 1419 (1992).  This law specifically 
provided statutory protections for public participation in project-level resource 
management decisions.  These public participation rights represent important 
advancements toward in the dominant aggregative pluralism, as well as emergent 
agonistic, dissent-based conservation models of democratic theory.  
The ability for the public to participate directly in site-specific Forest Service 
project-level decisions was an informal process until 1965, when the Forest Service 
established an independent Board of Forest Appeals to hear citizen challenges to agency 
decisions (Coulombe 2004).  As resource extraction intensified in national forests under 
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the elite traditional administrative model, especially after the post-WWII housing boom, 
commodity forestry came under increased scrutiny from the public and lawmakers.  The 
pluralistic interest group model began to eclipse the elite administrative approach, and 
conservation groups came to “view access to administrative review of agency decisions 
as a very powerful tool for affecting management of the country’s national forests” 
(Jones & Taylor 1995:313).  During the 1980’s, NFMA intensified the level of formal 
participation in forest-wide agency decisions, and the informal appeals process for 
individual project decisions also increased during this period (Beaver et al. 2000).   
Unlike the regulations governing comment and administrative appeals process 
for forest-wide decisions (36 CFR 217), the notice, comment and appeals process for 
individual projects (36 CFR 215), was used by citizens and group with standing (Sierra v 
Morton (1972) 405 U.S. 727) to directly challenge site-specific management projects.  
“The administrative appeals process offered by the Forest Service is best characterized 
as an extension of public participation provided for under NEPA and NFMA.  The process 
allows any individual to request an agency review” (GAO 1992:5).   
Public participation in project-level decisions reinforced agency adherence to 
statutory environmental requirements, including surveying and monitoring rare species, 
management indicator species, and other protections at the project level implementing 
forest-wide plans (GAO 1989).  The Forest Service “had to expend considerable time and 
staff resources incorporating the new environmental study requirements into their 
responses to timber sale appeals” (Harmon in GAO 1989:5).  Public participation forced 
the Forest Service to address “the increasing number of complex environmental issues 
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raised in appeals, particularly with regards to documenting the environmental effects of 
planned actions” (Harmon in GAO 1989:5).   Forest Service Chief Dale Robertson 
testified before the House Subcommittee in Forestry that public participation was 
reducing resource extraction through the use of appeals that were informed with 
sophisticated environmental analysis (GAO 1989).  In short, the major environmental 
statutes required public participation in site-specific resource management projects, 
which provided some counterbalance to the longstanding overrepresentation of 
resource extraction interests in agency decision-making under the traditional elite 
democratic model.   
These appeals often targeted conflicting statutory language (e.g. MUSYA and 
NFMA) when Forest Service planners implemented incompatible uses.   The continuing 
tension between conservation/ecological forestry and resource/commercial forestry in 
the literature (Leopold, Hirt 1994, Hays) was most visible in project-level management.  
These project level decisions also demonstrated site-specific inconsistencies with agency 
proposals and statutory language in NFMA or NEPA (Hirt 1994).   
The conservation literature includes significant discussion of the legal challenges 
the Forest Service faced when public participation was increased in individual project-
level decisions.  Despite the many criticisms of public participation (discussed in the 
previous section), the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), for example, published a 
frequently cited congressional briefing report rejecting claims that informal public 
participation was resulting in time consuming, costly, and frivolous appeals of project-
level actions (GAO 1989).   This argument has also been discredited in more recent 
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studies by the GAO (2003), which undermined the Bush Administration’s claim 
(discussed in Chapter Six) that public comment and appeals creates “analysis paralysis” 
and a “process predicament” (Bosworth 2002).  Like the more recent studies, the GAO 
demonstrated in 1989 that the source of agency problems was not public participation.   
“The excessive time the Forest Service took to process appeals did not appear to be due 
to the problems with the appeals system itself.  Rather, the timeliness problems were 
related to difficulties the agency has experienced in resolving numerous complex 
environmental issues raised in appeals” (GAO 1989:22).   
According to the GAO, the Forest Service was not able to prepare environmental 
analysis in time because it was confronting new ecological scientific knowledge about 
the effects of resource extraction on “water quality, wildlife habitat, or other aspects of 
the environment.  The Forest Service has often had difficulty adequately documenting 
theses effects” (GAO 1989:22).  The Forest Service’s inability to document 
environmental impacts of resource extraction created “the bulk of excess time…because 
it often had difficulty resolving appellant’s concerns about how adequately it had 
documented the environmental effects of its challenged decisions” (GAO 1989:16).   
According to the GAO, “prescriptions for reforming the current system vary widely, but 
the problem is commonly attributed to Forest Service failure to involve the public 
effectively in forest planning” (GAO 1992:77).   The GAO report demonstrated that the 
appeals process was beginning to work as Congress had intended: correcting the 
imbalance in overrepresentation of resource interests by opening agency decisions to 
public participation.   
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In 1992, the Office of Technology Assessment published a report documenting 
the positive effects the administrative appeals process (and pluralistic and participatory 
models generally) in improving the decision-making process.  “The administrative 
appeals process has helped the Forest Service to: 1) clarify planning decisions; 2) set 
standards for environmental analyses required by NEPA; and 3) resolve various issues, 
such as use of management indicator species, protection of biological diversity, and 
adequacy of resource monitoring plans” (OTA: 1992:5).  The report specifically identified 
the administrative appeals process as “an internal mechanism for clarifying the legal 
requirements and for testing the soundness of decisions and the appropriateness of 
current policies and procedures” (OTA: 1992:55).  The report also argued that the 
process improved decision-making by “encouraging more responsibility and 
accountability on the part of deciding officers” (OTA 1992:97).  Even the Forest Service 
acknowledged the significance of the administrative appeals process in a 1990 report 
where authors concluded, “the appeals process has made us better implementers of 
NEPA, which results in better decision-making.  This, in turn, results in better land 
management” (USDA 1990:15).    
Participatory democratic theory helps explain how the public notice, comment, 
and administrative appeals processes allowed individual citizens and interest groups to 
correct the longstanding dominance of resource extraction interests in Forest Service 
decision-making.  Incidentally, these rights gained statutory protection after the Forest 
Service proposed eliminating them during a controversial 1992 rule making (57 Fed Reg. 
59:10445).  The initiative emerged in May 1988 following a review of the appeals 
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process, when the Forest Service proposed changes in regulations governing appeals, 
arguing reduced participation would “simplify the process to make it less costly to 
administer and easier to use and to give greater emphasis to discussion between the 
Forest Service and potential appellants to avoid appeals” (GAO 1989:26)    
Although the Forest Service presented its proposal for reform as an opportunity 
to improve public participation, there is near universal agreement in the literature that 
the proposed regulations were aimed at removing more participatory forms of citizen 
involvement from national forest management decisions.  According to the GAO, “The 
Forest Service changes do not directly address the difficulties that the Forest Service has 
experienced in resolving environmental issues raised by appeals—the factor that is 
principally responsible for these time overruns (GAO 1989:27).  During congressional 
testimony concerning the Forest Service appeal, Harmon stated, “Although we believe 
that these changes may reduce the number and processing times of appeals, they do 
not directly address the problems the Forest Service has had with environmental 
analysis” (1989:9).   The agency’s inability to conduct legally required environmental 
analysis—not citizen participation processes—prevented the Forest Service from 
expediting resource extraction projects.  In the agencies own words, the Forest Service 
proposed to “remove impediments to economic growth arising from the current appeals 
process” (57 Fed. Reg. 59:10445).    
Some scientists and professionals, like the Association of Forest Service for 
Environmental Ethics, reacted harshly to the proposal, arguing “the agency should be 
trying to figure out why so many community and environmental groups are appealing… 
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rather than trying to stop the appeals process altogether” (Inner Voice 1992:3 in Jones & 
Taylor 1996).  Even the Forest Service admitted the proposal “provoked considerable 
general comment, largely critical, on the relationship between the Forest Service and 
the public… There were a substantial number of people who feel that by tightening the 
appeals rules, the Forest Service is trying to close a legitimate avenue of involvement… 
The ‘trust’ and ‘bad faith’ comments are legitimate, if troubling, expressions of public 
concern” (54 Fed. Reg. 13:3334-44).  As the Forest Service soon discovered, the proposal 
to remove the public appeals process was “opposed adamantly by forces interested in 
maintaining citizen involvement in and review of agency decision-making” (Parent 
1992:55).  This opposition to the agency’ action included outraged members of Congress 
who passed the National Forest Decision-making and Appeals Reform Act (ARA) 
(discussed below), which today serves as the primary citizen tool for engaging and 
challenging agency decisions for site-specific, project level management in U.S. National 
Forests.   
Although the Forest Service defended its proposal to reduce citizen involvement 
by arguing it would allow the agency to better follow federal environmental law and the 
duty to formally incorporate the public, the May 1988 initiative would have reverted 
management back to traditional elite administrative processes that restrict participation 
to pre-decisional, scoping processes.  Senator Wyche Fowler Jr. (D-GA), reacted to the 
Forest Service proposal on the Senate floor, stating, “For some reason that I can only 
label as bizarre, the White House has taken the position that after more than 95 percent 
of our forests have been chopped down, clear cut, permanently destroyed, the 
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[informal] public appeals process in place since 1907 is blocking progress.  An appeals 
process, which is simply a chance for a citizen’s views, a taxpayer’s views about his own 
forests that incidentally, affects less than 1 out of 7 timber sales of public forests, 
somehow the administration has decided this is just too much to bear, and they are 
recommending repealing it “(Fowler 1992:1 in Earth Island v Ruthenbeck 2005).     
Rep. Bill Richardson (D-NM) spoke out against the Forest Service proposal on the 
House floor and entered a letter into the record from conservation scientists who 
rejected “the agency’s recent proposal to eliminate appeals of timber sales, oil and gas 
leases, and other project level activities [as] a slap in the face of democratic values.  It is 
all the more onerous when juxtaposed with the administration’s aggressive support for 
legislation that would severely limit judicial review of forest managements” (Earth 
Island v Ruthenbeck 2006).  The Forest Service and allies in Congress attempted to 
restrict opportunities for judicial review (court intervention) and reduce the ability of 
the public to establish standing, through the comment and administrative appeals 
process, to challenge agency decisions in the court room.  According to Jones and Taylor 
(1995:313), “at least six time in the last decade, Congress has attached a ‘rider’ to the 
annual appropriation bill for the Forest Service that either prohibited or severely 
constrained legal challenges of agency actions, usually timber sales.”    
U.S. Forest Service Decision Making and Appeals Reform Act 
In reaction to the Forest Service’s attempt to restrict the administrative appeals 
process, Congress passed the statutory protections for notice, comment, and 
administrative appeals for Forest Service project-level decisions (ARA, 1992).  The “U.S. 
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Forest Service Decision Making and Appeals Reform Act” (Pub. L. 102-381, Title III, 
Section 322, 106 Stat. 1419 (Oct. 5, 1992) (ARA), passed in October of 1992 as a rider on 
the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of Fiscal 1993.  The legislation 
provided statutory language guaranteeing citizens the right to directly participate in 
site-specific management through a formal public notice, comment, and administrative 
appeals process.  According to language in the conference report, “The process will 
allow for continued citizens' rights to participate in, and appeal decisions of, the Forest 
Service while providing for more timely consideration of such appeals” 
(138 Cong. Rec. S15843-01 at 15848, 1992 WL 250710 (Sept. 30, 1992).   
The ARA represented a significant shift towards more participatory models of 
agency decision-making.  Specifically, the ARA requires the Forest Service to “establish a 
notice and comment process for proposed actions and activities implementing land and 
resources management plans [and] modify the procedure for appeals of decisions 
concerning such projects” (§ 322).  The ARA guarantees individual citizens and interest 
groups the right to “file an appeal” of “proposed actions of the Forest Service 
concerning projects and activities” (ARA §§ (a)(c).  During passage of the bill, Senator 
Wyche Fowler (D-GA) argued the bill was “imperative if the American people are to 
reclaim some rights...  I guess, to put it another way, a basic not only American right but 
democratic right with a small ‘d’, and that is to appeal a decision of a free Government 
of a free people if that decision adversely affects an individual citizen” (in Earth Island v 
Ruthenbeck 2005).   
190 
The ability to publicly comment on Forest Service environmental analysis and 
justifications for management set up a process by which individuals and interest groups 
enter the public record, establish standing, and fulfill the legal requirements to 
challenge a decision.  In negotiations over the bill, Sen. Dennis DeConcini, a long-time 
supporter of the Forest Service, argued the agency needed more transparency and 
accountability, and a process for accepting, documenting, responding to public 
comments, “so that the agency cannot exclude people from appeals through its own 
failure to catalog their participation. (US House Committee on Agriculture 1993).   
In short, the ARA was a rejection of the traditional elite model of agency 
decision-making, and heralded not only a more pluralistic approach, but, more 
specifically, opportunities for agonistic interaction directly between individuals and their 
government (see Chapter Two).  These participatory approaches supported direct, 
dissent-based negotiations by individuals as opposed to interest group representation 
or consensus-driven collaborative deliberation. 
This interpretation of the ARA has been upheld, for example, in recent federal 
court hearings, including Wilderness Society v Rey (180 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Mont. 2002) 
(TWS v Rey I), a case brought in 2002 in which the Forest Service attempted to waive 
appeal rights for a large logging project in the Bitterroot National Forest.  In that case, 
Judge Molloy, addressing the values of appeals, arguing  “ultimately its force is to allow 
the democratic process of participation in governmental decisions the full breadth and 
scope to which citizens are entitled in a participatory democracy” (TWS v Rey I 2002:51).  
Additionally, as discussed below, researchers have shown that the comment and 
191 
administrative appeals process has been used more often by individual and ecological 
forestry groups (Teich et al. 2004), which is best understood as examples of pluralistic 
and agonistic models of democratic participation. 
 Today, the Forest Service is the only federal agency with statutory requirements 
for administrative appeals of project-level management (Coulombe 2004).  The ARA is 
best explained as an attempt by Congress to correct the overrepresentation of private 
resource interests by strengthening the process for participation by independent, 
unaffiliated individuals in agency decision-making (Parent 1993; Anderson 2004).  The 
ARA serves as the primary statutory guarantee for direct citizen participation in site-
specific, project-level Forest Service actions.    
Public Notice, Comment, & Administrative Appeal 
 Consistent with agonistic pluralism and dissent-based conservation, the ARA 
represented a radical departure from elite forms of administrative management by 
providing for individual citizens and public interest groups to directly challenge resource 
extraction projects for national forests.  In addition to interest group representation or 
consensus-based negotiations, direct dissent-based participation presents an additional 
explanation of citizen participation in agency decision-making that was used in Chapter 
Seven and Eight to evaluate the prevailing process occurring under the Healthy Forest 
Initiative in North Carolina from 2003 through 2008. 
 Conservation management and forest planning in the United States, as 
envisioned by recent legislation, reflects this direct participation trend in democratic 
decision-making (Moote and McClaran 1997, Overdevest 2000; Abel & Stephan 2000; 
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Petersen MN et al. 2005, 2006, 2007; Petersen T et al. 2007; Vaughn 2003; Teich et al. 
2004; Manring 2004, 2005; Germain 2005; Cox 2007).  Like Mouffe (2000), these authors 
call for broadening the conventional pluralistic interest group participation process to 
include more democratic exchanges and individual participation directly through citizen 
comment and administrative appeal opportunities.   
 The literature describes the development of the appeals process that began as 
an informal procedure for permit holders (Coulombe 2004) and evolved into a legally 
protected process for individual, independent citizens unaffiliated with either 
conservation or resource groups.  In his landmark study on Forest Service bureaucracy, 
Herbert Kaufman (1967) specially addressed the value of the administrative appeals 
process and the threat of appeal as a substantial influence over the forest ranger.  The 
process built in democratic accountability through the ability to challenge individual 
decisions by bringing their challenge up the bureaucratic ladder where administrators 
were less likely to be influenced by special interests saturating the local level.  Kaufman 
discovered in his study that every agency staffer he interviewed had been approached 
by higher-level officers as a “result of a complaint by some private person denied a claim 
of one kind or another (1967:153).   
More recent scholarship has documented the same role of comments and 
administrative appeals.   Proponents argue the process is consistent with the 
“fundamental tenet of good government to provide organizations and individuals 
affected by government actions with an opportunity to seek supervisory review of lower 
level officials’ decisions” (Kircher in US House Committee on Agriculture 1993).  
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Administrative appeals also provide “democratic accountability of the forest planning 
process…without having participated in lengthy place-based collaborative processes” 
(Manring 2005: 5873).    In the TWS v Rey case, Federal District Judge Molloy 
(2002:1149) explained the value of the administrative appeal as “the one time when 
interested appellants can find out if relevant data was relied upon or ignored and it 
provides the agency the opportunity to flesh out conclusive statements or findings that 
lack the requisite close look or analysis at first blush” (1149).   
The conservation literature discusses the appeals process as a direct, potentially 
radical democratic exchange between citizens with each other and with their 
government (Moote & McClaran 1997, Mouffe 1999). Such exchanges broaden 
participation beyond organized interest groups (public or private) to include individual 
citizen participants.  Consistent with more participatory democratic theories of public 
participation, the administrative appeal process is intended to be used by independent 
citizens to challenge the dominance of representation by resource interests in national 
forest management. 
According to Federal District Judge Donald Molloy, “The administrative appeal 
assures compliance with applicable standards, science, and sound analysis” (TWS v Rey I 
2002:51).    Because of the potential threat of a legal issue emerging after a decision has 
been signed, “appeals have helped compel the agencies to follow laws more closely” 
(1997:2).  Teich et. al., argue that “appeals lead to more ecologically sensitive and 
socially acceptable project designs” (2004:15)., while Manring (2005:70) demonstrated 
that the process serves to “push the Forest Service toward the adoption of the 
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ecosystem-based policy of sustainable forest management that now better reflects 
public values and scientific opinion” (Manring 2005:70).   
Teich’s NAU team, for example, determined that 33 percent of appeals were 
filed to challenge commodity forestry projects (including salvage logging, pre-
commercial thinning, and traditional commercial logging) (2004).  On the other hand, 
citizens and groups only used appeals to challenge legitimate fuels reduction and 
restoration projects 4.1 percent and 3.7 percent of the time, respectively. These findings 
directly contradict Forest Service and Bush Administration claims that environmental 
groups abuse the democratic process to delay or dominate the national forest decision-
making process, thereby preventing management that aimed at preventing dangerous 
conditions in the forests that produced massive, high-profile wildfires (discussed in 
Chapter Six).   
On the contrary, the NAU team discovered that the agency had no national 
appeals and litigation database.  Instead, using published notices of appeals from on-
line sources, the researchers created their own database of over 3,736 cases of public 
appeals of Forest Service decisions from January 1997 through September 2002.   Teich 
et al. argued justifications for new Healthy Forest Initiative rule changes (discussed in 
Chapter Six) would “have the potential to affect a significant percentage of appeals.  
Although the perception has been that environmental groups are the primary appellants 
using project appeals to delay Forest Service projects, the data paint a more complex 
picture” (18).   
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Although critics assert that the appeals process has distorted the influence of 
policy making in favor of interest groups and citizens intent on creating agency gridlock 
(Steelman 1999; Bosworth 2002), other research (Knopp and Caldbeck 1990, Overdevest 
2000) demonstrates the appeals process is most often directed at addressing concerns 
for conservation.  Knopp and Caldbeck’s comparative studies demonstrated that the 
public overwhelmingly favors ecological forestry, and is usually less divided than either 
the agencies or special interest groups (1990).  According to Overdevest’s findings 
(2000), the increase in comments and appeals in the Nantahala National Forest projects 
“leveled the field for diffuse environmental interests, *and+ the leveling of the playing 
field appears to have the effect of well representing public interests” (Overdevest 
2000:695).   
Teich, Cortner and Vaughn’s study of administrative appeals in the U.S. 
documented that the majority of appeals are filed by independent individuals who are 
unaffiliated with any group (2004).  These researchers from the Ecological Restoration 
Institute at Northern Arizona University (NAU) showed unaffiliated citizens filed or 
joined in the most appeals (85% of the time), accounting for 1,152 appeals filed 
independently of any organization or business.  Furthermore, this study documented a 
broad spectrum of participant challenges to Forest Service projects, from individuals, 
tribes, business interests, and environmental groups.  “Although the perception has 
been that environmental groups are the primary appellants using project appeals to 
delay Forest Service projects… 85.5 percent were not filed in conjunction with any other 
organization” (Teich, Vaughn, & Cortner 2004:18).   
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Conservation scholars have put forth numerous practical and strategic reasons 
for the value of an appeals process and improvements to decisions for individual 
projects and forest-wide management.   Such proponents believe citizen participation, 
through administrative appeals, may trigger an automatic stay or temporary halt of 
federal decisions until the agency directly responds to the appeals consistent with NEPA, 
NFMA, and ARA requirements.  The ARA provides a stay on agency actions for 45-days 
after an appeal is filed to allow the agency to address issues, which “allows a party to 
get into court after approval” and prevents the agency from implementing the project 
“until court review can be had” (Earth Island v Ruthenbeck 2006:40).  In addition to 
temporarily preventing resource management, the stay provision allows agency 
managers to revise their projects given issues brought forward through citizen appeals. 
“From the agency’s perspective the administrative appeal provides an opportunity to 
correct mistakes or to reconcile inconsistencies, thus narrowing issues that might be 
subject to judicial review… The appeal may avoid a legal challenge or narrow the issues 
that can be reviewed” (Molloy 2002:1149). 
Conservation scholars also argue the administrative appeals process affords 
citizens the opportunity to file a substantive challenge to a federal action without the 
expense of court proceedings (Earth Island v Ruthenbeck 2006).  The ARA was 
established to provide an informal means for citizens to address problems without 
having to hire a lawyer or go to the federal courts, both of which require substantial 
financial resources.   “In the past, appeals provided a relatively efficient and low-cost 
way for the national environmental groups (as well as local and regional groups) to 
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exercise oversight over forest management decisions” (Manring 2005:72).   This value of 
appeals in public participation is significant for “certain meritorious appeals, where the 
appellant could win at the administrative stage but not the judicial stage… because the 
appellant does not have the resources or cannot find a pro bono lawyer to take the case 
to court.” (Earth Island v Ruthenbeck 2006:40).   The appeals process provides the public 
with an inexpensive and informal avenue to directly challenge agency decisions without 
the necessity of legal or interest group representation (57 Fed Reg. 59:10445). 
 Finally, the conservation literature discusses the administrative appeals as an 
opportunity for citizen participation and challenge without having to meet difficult legal 
standards for winning a temporary restraining order in the face of longstanding 
deference toward federal agencies (Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)) given to the agency (TWS v Rey I 2002 : 1149).  A 
member of the public could use the appeals process and succeed, while litigation could 
prove more difficult challenge, “given the deferential standards courts often employ 
when evaluating agency decisions” and measuring the “potential for irreparable harm” 
(Earth Island v Ruthenbeck 2005:41).  These costly and difficult legal hurdles 
demonstrate the value of a free and open comment and appeals process for national 
forest decision-making that is inexpensive, accessible, and easy for most citizens. 
 Moote and McClaran’s influential paper, “Implications of Participatory 
Democracy for Public Land Planning” (1997) in the Journal of Range Management 
addressed the role of citizen appeals and comments, in which the authors compare the 
process with emergent collaborative approaches to national forest management.   
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According to Moote and McClaran, the comment and appeals process 1) encourages 
broad representation by the public; 2) assigns substantive weight to citizen involvement 
in decision-making, and 3) requires agencies to disclose information, and 4) provides for 
continuity of participation throughout the process (1997).  Moote and McClaran argue 
the comment and administrative appeals process ensures “active dialogue that 
encourages the needs and concerns of each interested group and individual, including 
the agency, to be articulated and addressed in the planning process” (1997:476).  This 
promotes public participation in issue identification, consideration of alternatives, and 
evaluation at the “beginning of the process and maintained throughout … especially 
when key decisions are being made” (Moote & McClaran 1997:476).   These findings 
suggest the current comment and appeals process, as well as other variations of direct 
democratic participation, are sufficient for radical citizen access and influence in agency 
decision-making.   
 Given the conflict-laden nature of public lands management, and the inherent 
tension in most Western liberal democracies generally, agonistic pluralism theory 
(discussed in Chapter Two) helps develop another understanding of the Forest Service 
decision-making process. This understanding identifies the value of dissent-based 
conservation strategies based on the comment and administrative appeal process.   The 
inevitability of conflict requires participation processes that acknowledge the 
paradoxical nature of liberty and popular sovereignty and include accessible, free, and 
transparent processes.  Without focusing on permanent resolutions or unrealistic 
consensus-based decision-making processes, dissent-based appeals processes are 
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appropriate for addressing the tensions of conservation and resource interests in 
contemporary agency decision-making.    
Direct, inexpensive, and democratic participation, guaranteed through the 
citizen comment and appeal process in U.S. National Forest management, satisfies the 
requirements of agonistic pluralism and provides an alternative to elite administrative 
theory as well as the dominant aggregative pluralism model of interest representation.  
Agonistic pluralism, therefore, advances our understanding of agency decision-making 
and the effects of public participation as part of a process in which conflict is irreducible, 
the “political” is always in play, and dissent-based negotiations are protected and 
encouraged under the current statutory framework.  As Mouffe explained, these new 
approaches “offer alternatives to the dominant aggregative perspective and its 
impoverished view of the democratic process” (Mouffe 2000:83).  Agonistic pluralism 
provides a useful explanation of how public participation works, through direct 
comment and administrative appeals, by incorporating active citizen involvement to 
correct the overrepresentation of resource interests. 
 
CONCLUSION  
Many scholars identify the administrative appeals process as a significant factor 
behind improvements in the Forest Service decision-making process (Kessler, Salwasser, 
Cartwright, & Caplan, 1992, Jones & Mohai, 1995; Jones & Taylor, 1995; Baldwin, 1997), 
These public participation processes help secure legal accountability to force “the Forest 
Service to comply with environmental laws and regulations” (Manring 2005:62).  In 
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short, the right to challenge agency decisions has been used by citizens to “ensure that 
USDA Forest Service managers follow the law and provide a legitimate forum for 
resolving controversy” (Anderson 2004:48).  
Agonistic theories describe the national forest comment and appeals process as 
an opportunity for a radical democratic process challenging agency decisions and 
restoring balance to public lands management.   “Supporters of the system point to the 
opportunities that appeals allow for additional and meaningful public participation in 
the decision-making process and the political accountability that the system provides, 
*which leads+ to more ecologically sensitive and socially acceptable project designs” 
(Knopp & Caldbeck 1990: 15).   There is substantial evidence the citizen comment and 
appeal process can improve national forest planning, prevent unecological 
management, or both (Vaughn 2003, Burley 2004; Teich et al. 2004; Manring 2004, 
2005; Vaughn & Cortner 2005).   
Direct dissent-based participation is not without its critics.  As the next chapter 
highlights, criticism about individual citizen participation and the administrative appeals 
process was used by the Bush Administration to justify the “Healthy Forest Initiative.”  
Whether or not these criticisms of direct participation and appeals were valid, when a 
policy window created a favorable opportunity for regulation change, the Bush 
Administration established one of the most comprehensive sets of policy changes 
restrictions to citizen notice, comment, and administrative appeal (Vaughan and Cortner 
2005).
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX: PROCESS PREDICAMENTS, THE HEALTHY FOREST 
INITIATIVE, AND THE COURTS 
 
 “The administrative appeal assures compliance with applicable 
standards, science, and sound analysis . . . Ultimately its force is to allow 
the democratic process of participation in governmental decisions the full 
breadth and scope to which citizens are entitled in a participatory 
democracy”   
Federal District Judge Donald Molloy  
TWS v Rey 2002:51 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
The public participation process in national forest management, through 
comments and administrative appeals, is almost as old as the agency itself (Coulombe 
2004).  As explained in Chapter Five, many scholars believe the processes provides an 
important opportunity for citizens to influence public lands management (Vaughn 2003; 
Teich et al 2004; Anderson 2004; Manring 2005)   There are also opponents of public 
participation in general (see Chapters Two and Five),  and of administrative appeals in 
particular.  This chapter, therefore, begins with a description of the Bush 
Administration’s critique of administrative appeals used to justify changes made under 
the Healthy Forest Initiative.   
The chapter then summarizes the major Healthy Forest Initiative policy changes 
issued by the Bush Administration that effected national forest management.  This 
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includes a discussion of the policies for categorical exclusions, extraordinary 
circumstances, and new commercial logging contract systems called “goods for 
services.”  These HFI policies are analyzed in Chapter Eight using projects authorized by 
the Forest Service in national forests in North Carolina from 2003 through 2008. 
Additionally, this chapter includes a brief summary of the legal challenges that 
invalidated portions of the Healthy Forest Initiative, including restrictions on public 
appeal (36 CFR. § 215.12(f))), requirements for “substantive comment” (36 CFR § 
215.13(a)), and exemptions for 5,500-acre burn and logging projects for “hazardous 
fuels reduction projects” (CE 10, § 31.2).  Most important for this study, the Healthy 
Forest Initiative eliminated the right to appeal Categorical Exclusion (CE) projects in 
2003 (36 CFR. § 215.12(f)), only to be reinstated from July 2005 to March 2009 as a 
result of federal district and appeals court rulings.  On March 3, 2009, the U.S. Supreme 
Court sided with the Bush Administration on a 5-4 decision (No. 07-463, 490 F. 3d 687 
2009), which threw out the challenge against the HFI on a standing technicality.  This 
fluctuating legal status of public participation sets up a natural experiment for the 
Healthy Forest Initiative policies discussed in this chapter, which describe the decision-
making and forest management characteristics analyzed in Chapters Seven and Eight. 
Process Predicaments 
 There are many critics of the role of independent citizen involvement in Forest 
Service decision-making.  In addition to democratic elite opposition to direct public 
participation, recent criticism relates to the administrative appeal process for allowing 
citizens to challenge district ranger decisions by going directly to supervisors (Kaufman 
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1960).  This section, therefore, describes arguments against the administrative appeals 
process in the policy and resource management literature. 
 The literature includes much debate relating to the use of administrative appeals 
of agency decision-making in preventing resource management (Bosworth 2002; 
Vaughn 2003, Teich et al. 2004; Manring 2004, 2005; Vaughn & Cortner 2005).  These 
criticisms trace back to the 1988 Subcommittee on Forestry hearings (see Chapter Five), 
in which “several senators expressed frustration over the continuing controversies… 
*concluding+ that the planning process had ‘broken down’” (57 Fed. Reg. 59:10445; GAO 
1992:77).  At the hearing, Chief Robertson criticized the appeals process for being “a 
significant generator of paperwork and a time-consuming, procedurally onerous, 
confrontational, and costly effort, diverting resources that otherwise might be directed 
to substantive on-the-ground resources management needs and accomplishments” (57 
Fed. Reg. 59:10445).   
 Under the Bush Administration, these arguments were advanced by the Forest 
Service, including Chief Bosworth’s claim of “a correlation between the rising number of 
appeals in recent years and falling volumes of timber harvest” (2002:36).   Many claims 
are uncritically accepted by agency officials, members of Congress, and commercial 
forestry interests (Vaughn & Cortner 2005; Manring 2005).  Public participation is 
criticized for generating, according to Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-CO), “a 
hailstorm of lawsuits and appeals from environmentalists who purport to protect our 
forests” (in Vaughn 2003:19).  The resource literature includes the claim that 
conventional public participation processes represent a “costly, confrontational, 
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procedurally onerous, and time-consuming endeavor that diverts resources from on-
the-ground management” (Manring 2005:58).   Even President Bush called for new 
reforms that, he asserted, were needed to “expedite the environmental review process 
so we can move forward more quickly on projects that restore forests to good health.  
We don't want our intentions bogged down by regulations. We want to get moving” 
(2003).   
The most common criticism of the current process relates to the alleged time 
delays the agency encounters when processing administrative appeals.  “Critics argue 
that appeals are costly and procedurally onerous, co-opt resources (time, personnel, 
financial) that could be used more productively elsewhere, and act as deterrents to 
effective pre-decisional Forest Service involvement and stakeholder collaboration.  
Critics also contend that most appeals are frivolous and are being used as tools of 
obstruction rather than to solicit beneficial outcomes” (Teich et al. 2004:15).    
In 2002, the Forest Service Chief oft-cited report, The Process Predicament 
(Bosworth 2002), which claimed environmental groups were using the process to 
prevent resource management projects, as well as ecologically justifiable hazardous 
fuel-reduction projects, required to protect communities and homes from large 
wildfires.  Bosworth called for legislation to “advance common sense forest health 
efforts that prevent damage caused by catastrophic wildfires and move past ‘process 
gridlock to improve agency land management efficiency” (Bosworth 2002:5).  The Chief 
specifically called for “repealing the Appeals Reform Act *and+ procedural requirements 
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that are not required of any other Federal agency… that limit our ability to work 
collaboratively with the Forest Service” (Bosworth 2002:7).   
Chief Bosworth argued against “analysis paralysis” (2002:21), in which agency 
officials are forced to “bulletproof” environmental assessments before management can 
be proposed (Manring 2005:58; Teich et al. 2004).  The Chief argued the appeals process 
creates management gridlock, a “process predicament” (Bosworth 2002) in which 
paralysis prevents the agency from approving resource extraction projects as it did 
under the traditional elite administrative model.  “The vast majority of timber sales 
proceed to completion unchallenged.
   
However, some groups have successfully used 
appeals to obstruct timber sales, and Forest Service employees therefore treat almost 
every ground-disturbing project as a potential target” (Bosworth 2002:36). 
Critics of the appeals process believe delay and management gridlock are an 
“intended outcome” of citizen appeals aimed at keeping “resources from going to on-
the-ground management activities” (Steelman 2006).  Some scholars believe the process 
has been used to prevent resource extraction, “that many appeals are ‘frivolous’ and 
brought for the purpose of frustrating rather than improving land management actions, 
and that appeals greatly increase the costs of management” (Baldwin 1997:1).   Agency 
‘paralysis’ is the fault of more participatory models of agency decision-making that, 
according to some authors, are exploited “by a vocal minority of environmental 
extremists who oppose any national forest management.  These critics view appeals as 
little monkey wrenches thrown at the Forest Service to halt all logging” (Little 2003:48).   
The American Forest and Paper Association’s (AF&PA) spokesperson, Michael Klein, 
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argued the appeals process is abused by groups who “don’t think a tree should be cut 
down—ever.  If they have to go to court, chain themselves to trees, they’ll do it” (Little 
2003:48).    
Another common criticism of the contemporary appeals process is based on the 
claim that public participation wastes agency funding.  Charles Burley (2004:50), for 
example, argued in the Journal of Forestry that the appeals process has “become a huge 
waste of time and money, often leading to projects not being completed, and 
consequently, resource objectives not being accomplished on the ground.”   The AFPA 
even made the claim that that public participation rights should be waived to save 
money that could instead be used to defend the country from terrorism (2005). the 
AFPA filed an amicus curi  brief in Earth Island Institute v Ruthenbeck (see discussion 
below), in which the group argued “the Forest Service can reduce some of its agency 
appeal costs and conduct fuels reduction projects more cost-efficiently.  In the post 
9/11/01 world where the Forest Service has a reduced budget, this policy [of eliminating 
appeals] is reasonable” (AFPA 2006:25, emphasis added).   
One criticism that merits particular attention is the assertion that forty percent 
of the Forest Service budget is lost when the public is included in agency decision-
making (through comment, appeals, and litigation).  The number was first reported in a 
1999 report by the National Academy of Forest Service Administration (NAPA) report, 
which based its estimated on the educated guesses of Forest Service personnel.  The 
estimate related to the agency’s entire planning process, not specifically appeals and 
litigation, and instead includes all spending for environmental planning mandated by 
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NEPA, NFMA, and the ARA.    “Guesstimates of Forest Service personnel were thus 
presented in reports by other entities, which were, in turn, then cited by the agency in 
its own reports and then repeated by other officials” (Vaughn 2003:12).  This allowed 
for the figure to take on a life of its own, and it eventually emerged in policy debates as 
fact.  
During debate for the Healthy Forest Restoration Act, Arizona Rep. Jeff Flake 
authored a guest column in the Arizona Republic entitled, “Costly Lawsuits Provides 
Kindling for Forest Blazes,” where the congressman stated that “40 percent of our 
Forest Service's budget is swallowed up just fighting lawsuits filed by 
‘environmentalists.’  The bottom line is this: If we want to save what remains of our 
forests in Arizona, we've got to get a handle on the frivolous lawsuits that prevent us 
from doing so.”  The next day, Arizona Senator Jon Kyl published an opinion piece 
stating, "Standing in the way of these [fuel reduction] efforts are radical 
environmentalists who file litigation and seek to otherwise obstruct forest treatment. As 
of last month, there were 5,000 legal challenges pending against the U.S. Forest Service, 
which devotes nearly 40 percent of its resources to defending against lawsuits and 
complying with environmental regulations" (Kyl in Vaughn 2003). 
Chief Bosworth (2002:5) also made this claim, stating the “Forest Service officials 
have estimated that planning and assessment consume 40 percent of total direct work 
at the national forest level.  That would represent an expenditure of more than $250 
million per year.”   Although this claim has been discredited, it remains an unfounded 
allegation passed along as fact by mainstream media outlets and elected officials 
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(Vaughn 2003).  Although these critics believe public participation and environmental 
analysis prevent “on-the-ground” resource extraction, others (see Chapter Five) argue 
the ARA and other environmental laws were specifically established to balance resource 
extraction with ecological forest management objectives (Anderson 2004; Jones & 
Taylor 1995). 
Another criticism claims public participation blocks legitimate fuel-reduction 
projects aimed at protecting communities from large, catastrophic wildfires (Bosworth 
2002).  According to the Bush in a HFI-related radio address, problems with the pubic 
participation process justified the HFI’s changes to “reduce bureaucracy and speed up 
thinning on Forest Service lands” (Bush 2002).   This specific argument for removing 
appeals was allegedly supported by a Forest Service report entitled, “Factors Affecting 
Timely Mechanical Treatment Programs” (USDA 2002).  The report alleged that forty-
eight percent of all decisions made in FY 2001 and 2002 for fuel reduction were 
appealed, and that an additional 21 decisions (six percent) were litigated (USDA 2002).  
In this report, the Forest Service claimed environmentalists were obstructing forest 
thinning projects and endangering rural communities threatened by wildfire.   
In September 2002, however, the Forest Service released documents in response 
to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request revealing the methodology for the 
report, in which Frederick Norbury, Director of Ecosystem Management Coordination 
admitted "the timeframe for gathering the information used to develop the report was 
limited to hours" (2002).  “The Forest Service report supposedly provided statistical 
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information that had been lacking in earlier attempts at reform, despite substantive 
questions about the study's methodology” (Vaughn & Cortner 2004:772).    
According to Morton and McCarthy (2002), a closer look of the Forest Service 
report showed significant problems with the reliability of the data, sampling bias, and 
data errors.   “The Forest Service Report does not use a consistent definition to identify 
mechanical treatments to reduce hazardous fuels.  The majority of appealed projects 
listed in the Forest Service Report (eighty-eight percent) include commercial timber 
sales” (Morton & McCarthy 2002:2).  In other words, these findings show the process is 
working as Congress intended by giving the public an avenue through which to challenge 
controversial and often unlawful ecologically destructive projects.   
As Jacqueline Vaughn of Arizona State University explains, “Through the use of 
methodologically questionable and uncorroborated data, rhetoric, and focusing events, 
government policy makers framed the debate by shifting the blame for wildfires from 
previous Forest Service policies and management to environmental organizations, 
demonized as overzealous obstructionists to common sense wildfire policy”  (Vaughn 
2003:1).  These efforts were part of a campaign to cast blame for the large wildfires on 
environmental groups who allegedly abused the public participation process and 
prevented the agency from conducting treatments necessary to protect threatened 
communities from wildfire.    
Research from the GAO, however, thoroughly debunks this claim.  The GAO 
reported in August 2001 that 1% (20 projects) of 1,671 fuel reduction projects proposed 
by the Forest Service during FY 2000 and 2001 were appealed, and none were litigated 
210 
(GAO-01-114R).   In another study, the GAO (2003a, 2003b) determined that over 95% 
(777 out of 818) of legitimate fuel reduction projects between FY 2001 and 2002 were 
ready for implementation within the standard 90-day review period, while 97% went 
forward without litigation.  Another GAO report in 2003 found that opposition was not a 
leading factor in slowing fuel reduction projects, and “while the issue of formal Forest 
Service resistance, such as appeals and litigation, has recently been contentious, only a 
few local land unit officials we visited indicated that this type of resistance had delayed 
particular fuels reduction treatments” (GAO-03-805).  
One GAO researcher, speaking to the press about the discrepancy between 
agency claims and their findings, asserted that “the Forest Service is a case study in spin.  
I think the Bush Administration has done a wonderful job of turning those who we think 
of as saviors of the environment into those we now think of as threats to the 
environment” (Cortner in Thacker 2004).    As Teich, Vaughn and Cortner argue, 
“policymakers and Forest Service officials used the issue of delays repeatedly as 
justification for changes in the appeals process” (2004:18).   These arguments paved to 
way for the Healthy Forest Initiative, under which the Forest Service was authorized to 
eliminate the ARA’s citizen notice, comment, and appeal process—the first time in the 
agency’s 100-year long history (Hays 2007).    
The next section outlines the specific regulatory changes established under the 
Healthy Forest Initiative that eliminated the administrative appeals process, as well as 
environmental review and documentation requirements, for entire classes of 
management.   As Teich et al. discovered in their study, “significant interests (and not all 
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of them environmental) are likely to be affected by changes in the administrative 
appeals process.  Limiting input from individuals, environmental groups, tribes, 
companies and other government agencies could have unanticipated consequences” 
(2004:18).   
 
HEALTHY FOREST INITIATIVE  
The Healthy Forest Initiative was a wide-ranging regulatory proposal 
encompassing several changes to established national forest management guidelines, 
restricted citizen involvement, and instituted new incentives for logging called 
“Stewardship Contracts.”   The current study is concerned primarily with three sets of 
HFI rule changes that addressed “Extraordinary Circumstances” for Forest Service 
management, eliminated public participation rights for notice, comment, and 
administrative appeal (Appeals Rule), and created five new categories of management 
the agency can perform without a full environmental review and documentation it in 
the Forest Service record (Categorical Exclusions).   After this chapter outlines the 
relevant policy changes in the HFI, Chapter Seven and Eight include detailed analysis of 
the effects these rule changes had on public participation and conservation for U.S. 
National Forests in North Carolina.   
Beginning July 13, 2002, the Biscuit Fire burned nearly 500,000 acres in the 
Oregon’s Siskiyou and Six Rivers National Forests, capturing international attention as 
the largest wildfire in state history.  With the forest still smoldering, President Bush 
arrived in Oregon August 22, 2002 to shake hands with firefighters and announce the 
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“Healthy Forests: An Initiative for Wildfire Prevention and Stronger Communities,” 
commonly known as the “Healthy Forest Initiative” (White House 2002).  According to 
the Healthy Forest Initiative (HFI), “procedural delays are stalling critical forest and 
rangeland management projects,” and “the appeals process is complex, time consuming 
and burdensome” (White House 2002:1).  The HFI called for improving “regulatory 
processes to ensure more timely decisions, greater efficiency, and better results in 
reducing the risk of catastrophic wildfires by restoring forest health."  (68 Fed. Reg. 
33,814 (June 5, 2003).  Like the 1990 Forest Service proposal to eliminate administrative 
appeals (OTA 1993) (see Chapter Five), the HFI’s sweeping changes reduced public 
participation and waived requirements to conduct and document an environmental 
assessment for commercial logging, prescribed burns, and other management 
exempted under new “categorical exclusion” (CE) rules (discussed below). 
In an August 24th 2002 radio address, President George W Bush claimed the HFI 
would bring "common sense" to national forest management and “discourage the 
endless delays that prevent good forest policy from going forward…. *and+ expedite 
procedures for forest thinning and restoration projects [to] ensure the sustainable 
forest management and appropriate timber production” (Bush 2002:1).   President Bush 
believed “excessive red tape and endless litigation *and+ a hands-off approach to forest 
management'' were responsible for the million acre wildfire and deaths of 28 
firefighters and 22 civilians (USDA 2003).   The wildfires provided a policy window 
(Kingdon 1984) through which the Bush administration proposed new legislative and 
regulatory changes (Vaughn and Cortner 2005) to “reduce bureaucracy and speed up 
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thinning on Forest Service land” (Bush 2002).    “The Healthy Forests Initiative is 
ultimately a statement of policies and goals, not a final agency action in itself. To 
implement the Healthy Forests Initiative it was, therefore, necessary to promulgate or 
change numerous regulations, policies, and procedures for the agencies involved (Huber 
2004:803). 
The same week President Bush announced the HFI, U.S. Agriculture Secretary 
Ann Veneman and U.S. Interior Secretary Gale Norton unveiled a four-part regulatory 
package calling for changes to "streamline unnecessary red tape that prevents timely 
and effective implementation of wildfire prevention and forest health projects on Forest 
Service lands.  Delays of these projects can have devastating environmental and social 
consequences when catastrophic fires strike" (USDA 2002).    Although there was a 
legislative component of the HFI, the Healthy Forest Restoration Act of 2003, (see 
below), the regulatory changes of the HFI went forward without Congressional oversight 
or approval.  Instead of waiting on a Congressional legislative “process that was time-
consuming, partisan, and highly visible, the administration sought to use the 
administrative rulemaking process to affect change” (Vaughn and Cortner 2004:776). 
The Healthy Forest Initiative’s regulatory rule changes were, according to the 
Bush Administration, created to address “analysis paralysis” (Bosworth 2002) by 
eliminating public participation and environmental analysis from the majority of forest 
service management proposals.  “The Bush administration acted swiftly and almost 
simultaneously to use the regulatory process as a way of changing both the 
administrative appeals process and the overall direction of forest policymaking” 
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(Vaughn & Cortner 2005:775).   Under the literal smoke, the HFI was changed 
conventional processes by eliminating existing public participation requirements or 
replacing them altogether with new so-called deliberative planning and collaborative 
management models.   “Along with the help of a lot of smoke and a few mirrors—the 
Forest Service . . . made NEPA virtually disappear from its entire decision-making 
process” (Vaughan 2006:44). 
Following the HFI, the Bush Administration worked with Congress on the 
“Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003” (HFRA), which passed the U.S. House May 20, 
2003 (HR 1904), the U.S. Senate on October 30, 2003, and was signed by the President 
on December 3, 2003.  The HFRA produced new classes for “healthy forest” 
management that are similar, although separate, from the HFI regulation changes.  The 
Forest Service did not implement any HFRA projects identified in this study, while there 
were over 67 HFI projects from 2003 through 2008 (see Chapter Eight).   
The HFRA is the only significant national forest legislation passed since the ARA 
of 1992, but it is too early to predict whether it will meet the declared goal to protect 
communities from wildfire and promote forest health.  Some of the first research on the 
HFRA has documented shortcomings of the bill’s implementation and its difficulty in 
supporting the public interest (Steelman & 2009).  Although the HFRA directs the agency 
to focus on wildfire issues, the HFI applies to all Forest Service management, including 
non-wildfire related commodity forestry.   
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Healthy Forest Initiative Policy Changes  
 The day after President George W. Bush’s speech in Oregon’s Biscuit Fire, his 
administration began introducing specific policy proposals for Forest Service 
management (White House 2002).  These include the most substantial changes to 
established public participation (Wondolleck 2000) and ecological management (Hays 
2007) since the creation of more democratic processes and environmental legislation 
during the “participation explosion” (Almond & Verba 1963) of the 1970’s 
“environmental era” (Andrews 1999).   
The HFI encompassed numerous policy changes for Forest Service management, 
including removing restrictions on management in endangered and rare species habitat, 
reducing citizen involvement, instituting new commercial incentives for logging, and 
exempting whole classes of vegetation management from environmental analysis and 
disclosure.  The current research is concerned primarily with four HFI policy changes: 1) 
the “Appeals Rule” which eliminated public participation rights for notice, comment, 
and administrative appeal; 2) the creation of five new classes of management called 
“Categorical Exclusions” that released the agency from the NEPA process requiring a full 
environmental review and documentation in the public record; 3) removing the role of 
“Extraordinary Circumstances” in preventing the Forest Service authorizing projects 
under expedited “Categorical Exclusion” processes; and 4) creating a new “Goods for 
Services” contracting system that allowed .   Table 4 summarizes the HFI policy changes 
that provide groundwork for an analysis of their influence on public participation on 
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national forest decision-making (discussed in Chapter Seven) and on site-specific 
management (Chapter Eight) in North Carolina.   
  Table 4.  Healthy Forest Initiative Process And Policy Characteristics Identified and Analyzed. * 
Healthy 
Forest 
Initiative Rule 
Citation Result 
Appeals Rule 
 
36 CFR § 215.4(a);   
 § 215.12(f) 
Eliminated notice, comment, and administrative 
appeals for projects that were authorized through the 
categorical exclusion process. 
Categorical 
Exclusions 
 
68 Fed. Reg.  
33,814; 44,598 
Expanded the type of management that could be 
authorized without an environmental assessment. 
Extraordinary 
Circumstances 
 
67 Fed. Reg. 54,622 
Eliminated restrictions preventing categorical exclusion 
projects when extraordinary circumstances were 
present. 
Goods For 
Service 
 
68 Fed. Reg. 70,758 
Established a new contract system with commercial 
forestry incentives for authorized categorical 
exclusions projects. 
Substantive 
Comments 
36 CFR § 215.13(a); 
 § 215.2 
Only accepting substantive comments defined as 
“specific to the proposed action, have a direct 
relationship to the proposed action and include 
supporting reasons.”   
Automatic 
Stay 
36 CFR § 215.18(b)(1) 
Reducing the “automatic stay” following appeals 
requiring the agency to produce a decision within 40 
days. 
Interested 
Party 
36 CFR § 215.13(b) 
Eliminated “interested party” status for members of 
the public interested in joining an appeal. 
Waived 
Appeals 
36 CFR § 215.20(b) 
Waiving appeal rights for projects signed by the 
Secretary or Undersecretary of Agriculture. 
Delegated 
Authority 
36 CFR § 215.10(a) 
Delegating authority to district rangers to declare an 
emergency by waiving the automatic stay provision 
guaranteed by the ARA. 
Economic 
Emergencies 
36 CFR § 215.10 
Defining new “economic emergencies” as one of the 
categories that allows the agency to waive the 
automatic stay provision guaranteed by the ARA. 
* Only the top five HFI polices were explored in this study. 
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The next section provides a summary of the specific HFI rule changes that are 
addressed in Chapters Seven and Eight.    
Appeals Rule 
Of specific interest for this dissertation, the Bush Administration published new 
regulations in the Federal Register on June 4, 2003, eliminating public notice, comment 
(36 C.F.R. § 215.4(a)) and administrative appeal (36 C.F.R. § 215.12(f)) opportunities for 
all projects classified as Categorical Exclusions (discussed below).  Although the Forest 
Service was still subject to NEPA requirements to open projects up to scoping (discussed 
in Chapter Five), the agency was released by this new policy from opening project 
decisions to challenge by administrative appeals.  
This new Healthy Forest Initiative participation framework, commonly known as 
the “Appeals Rule,” removed guarantees established under the National Forest Service 
Decision-making and Appeals Reform Act (ARA) that provided interested citizens the 
right  of official notice, comment, (36 C.F.R. § 215.4(a) and administrative appeals (36 
CFR. § 215.12(f)) challenging broad classes of Forest Service management.  In addition, 
the Bush Administration replaced the existing ARA citizen participation process with 
new requirements for collaborative decision-making for “Hazardous Fuel” management 
(CE10) and “Goods for Service” contracting (discussed below).   
Although the public could still participate during NEPA’s required scoping phase 
of the decision-making process, the Forest Service only provides limited information at 
this stage about which the public is required to address.  Furthermore, the Bush 
Administration established a requirement that the public provide “substantive 
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comments” about proposed projects in order to establish standing (36 CFR § 215.13(a)).  
The agency defined these comments as those that “are specific to the proposed action, 
have a direct relationship to the proposed action and include supporting reasons for the 
Responsible Official to consider” (36 C.F.R. § 215.2) 
The Appeals Rule was later invalidated in federal district and appeals courts 
(Earth Island Institute v Ruthenbeck 2005; Wilderness Society v Rey II 2006), and then 
upheld by the Supreme Court on a standing technicality (Summers v Earth Island 2009).  
A new lawsuit, filed in U.S. District Court in Los Angeles on December 19, 2009, 
challenges the same HFI regulations (see discussion below). 
Categorical Exclusions 
The Appeals Rule applied to all Forest Service “Categorical Exclusion” (CE) 
projects, which are forms of management exempted from NEPA’s requirement to 
conduct an Environmental Assessment for projects that theoretically have an 
“insignificant effect on the environment” (40 C.F.R. 1501.4(a)(2)) and contain no 
extraordinary circumstance.  Of the statutory law governing the Forest Service, NEPA 
regulations specifically established three processes of review for site-specific, project-
level management.  These reviews, established by the Council of Environmental Quality 
(the federal body responsible for implementing NEPA), include 1) an EIS for all projects 
that may significantly affect the quality of the environment; 2) an EA that documents a 
“Finding of No Significant Impact” (FONSI) or a notice to prepare an EIS; and, 3) in 
limited circumstances, undocumented review where the action fits into a previously 
defined categorical exclusion (CE).  If the Forest Service determines that specific classes 
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of management have no significant effect, individually or cumulatively, on the quality of 
the environment, regulations implementing NEPA allow the agency to establish 
categories of management that are excluded from both the EIS and EA requirements (40 
C.F.R. §§ 1507.3(b)(2)(ii); 1508.4.)   
The CE process was originally established to facilitate routine activities, such as 
painting a government building, building campgrounds, or mowing lawns.  Instead, as 
the GAO discovered (2007), the Forest Service used CE’s for the majority of its 
management from 2003 to 2006, or “about 72 percent of all Forest Service vegetation 
management projects,” which accounted for over 6.2 million acres of forests (2007).   
In addition to eliminating the notice, comment, and administrative appeal 
process for existing CE projects, the Bush Administration also created five new CE’s or 
classes of management activities exempted from NEPA requirements to conduct an 
environmental assessment or environmental impact statement (68 Fed. Reg. 33814 & 
68 Fed. Reg. 44,598).  “The 2003 Rule provides that categories of actions that lack 
significant individual or cumulative environmental impacts (and therefore are 
categorically excluded from documentation in an EA or EIS)” (Earth Island v Ruthenbeck 
2005:33).  The new HFI CE’s exempted “hazardous-fuel” reduction, post-fire logging, 
“small” logging projects, salvage logging, and “sanitation” logging from full 
environmental analysis, which combined with the citizen participation restrictions to 
release the Forest Service from the duty to publicly document environmental analysis 
for public notice, comment, and administrative appeal.  Moreover, these regulations 
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established CE’s that applied to commodity forestry generally, not just wildfire related 
“healthy forest” activities. 
Table 5.  Five New Categorical Exclusions Created by the Healthy Forest Initiative.  
CE # Name of HFI CE Management Characteristics 
10 Hazardous Fuels Reduction   4,500 acres of prescribed burns and 1,000 acres of 
commercial logging;  
11 Post-Fire Rehabilitation 4,200 acres of tree planting, fence replacement, 
habitat restoration, heritage site restoration, repair 
of roads and trails, and repair of damage to minor 
facilities such as campgrounds. 
12 Limited Commercial Logging 70-acres of “small scale” commercial logging; Less 
than one-half mile of road construction  
13 Weather-Related Salvage 
Logging 
250 acres of commercial logging in areas with 
recent weather-related disturbance; less than one-
half mile of road construction  
14 Insect-Related “Sanitation” 
Salvage Logging 
250 acres of commercial logging for “sanitation 
harvests” in areas with recent or pending insect 
outbreaks; less than one-half mile of road 
construction 
 
Published June 5, 2003 (68 Fed. Reg. 33814), the first CE rule applied to 
“Hazardous fuels reduction activities” (CE 10, § 31.2) for up to 4,500 acre prescribed 
burns, and 1,000-acre “treatments,” including logging and mowing to “protect lives, 
communities, and ecosystems from the risk of high-intensity wildland fire.”  Although, 
these projects are supposed to be concentrated around urban areas to protect 
communities against wildfires, the projects can be in Inventoried Roadless Areas,  native 
forests, and wilderness study areas provided that they will not “impair *their+ suitability . 
. . for preservation as wilderness” (FSH 1909.15 ch. 30 (July 6, 2004) [ch. 31.2, pt. 10).   
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This CE was also the only CE proposed under the HFI that required collaborative 
decision-making, and “will only apply to areas identified through a collaborative 
framework.”  The hazardous-fuels CE expedited management projects while substituting 
the conventional public appeals processes with new forms of collaborative decision-
making (CE 10, § 31.2).   This CE required that proposals “shall be identified through a 
collaborative framework ” consistent with the agency’s guidelines outlined in the 
Collaborative Approach for Reducing Wildland Fire Risks to Communities and the 
Environment – Ten-Year Comprehensive Strategy: Implementation Plan (USDA & USDI 
2002).   
“Collaborative framework” is described in the Implementation Plan as the 
process of bringing together agency professionals, local participants, and state, federal 
and tribal governments to prioritize management and implementation (USDA & USDI 
2002).  This approach emphasizes “local level collaboration” with stakeholders who 
have expressed some expertise or interests in the forest (2002:9).  The emergence of 
collaborative management, cooperative conservation, and other deliberative forms of 
decision-making reflects calls in the literature that reject the elite and interest group 
processes in favor of more stakeholder-driven approaches.  As described below, this CE 
was invalidated by federal courts in 2007 (Sierra v Bosworth 2006).  
Another CE published June 5, 2003 was the “Post-fire Rehabilitation Activities” 
(CE 11) (68 Fed. Reg. 33814), which calls for restoring recently burned areas with tree 
plantations, road building, and “habitat restoration.”  CE 11 can be as large as 4,200 
acres in size and is restricted to post-fire systems outside wilderness areas or roadless 
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areas (Neznek 2004:8).  These CE’s are exempted from NEPA’s requirements for the 
agency to gather environmental analysis because, theoretically, 4,200 acres of 
plantation forestry will not have significant effects on the environment.   
The final three CE’s proposed under the were published on July 29, 2003 for CE 
12, CE 13, and CE 14, (68 Fed. Reg.44598). The CE for “Limited” commercial logging 
(CE12) exempts “small-scale” commercial logging projects in order to “allow low-impact 
silviculture treatments through timber harvest” (Neznek 2004:8). This CE allows for70-
acres of commercial logging activities such as including “thinning in overly dense stands” 
and one-half mile of road building.   
CE 13 was proposed for “Salvage logging” of up to 250 acre “treatments” and 
road construction up to one-half mile long in most areas in the national forests, except 
for wilderness, national recreation areas, or Inventoried Roadless Areas.   ‘Salvage’ 
logging is a commodity forestry term for commercial logging in post-fire systems with 
“damaged” trees that maintain economic value.   Salvage logging is substantially 
criticized in the ecological literature (Hanson et al. 2009) for intensifying forest health 
problems by reducing the natural resiliency of the forest to respond to wildfires and 
other disturbing events.  
Finally, the HFI CE for “sanitation harvests” (CE 14) allows for up to 250 acres of 
commercial logging and one-half miles of road building to “control the spread of insects 
and disease” (Neznek 2004:8).  Although the Forest Service is prohibited from proposing 
this CE in designated wilderness and Inventoried Roadless Areas, these procedures are 
not limited to the “wildland-urban interface” (Neznek 2004:8), where fire-prevention 
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research has demonstrated is 90 percent more effective in protecting homes and 
communities from wildfires (Cohen 1999). 
Extraordinary Circumstances 
Another important policy change under the HFI came the day after President 
George W Bush’s Biscuit wildfire speech, when the administration published a notice 
called “Clarification of Extraordinary Circumstances for Categories of Actions Excluded 
from Documentation in an Environmental Assessment or an Environmental Impact 
Statement, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,622, 54,622 (Aug. 23, 2002).  Previously, regulations under 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) required the Forest Service to conduct an 
Environmental Assessment (EA) for any management except for “routine actions that 
have no extraordinary circumstances” (57 Fed. Reg. 43180 (September 18, 1992).  
Unlike projects that required an EA, these “routine actions” could be authorized through 
the “categorical exclusion” process providing that “the activity will have little potential 
for soil movement, loss of soil productivity, water and air degradation or impact on 
sensitive resource values and is consistent with Forest land and resource management 
plans”  (56 Fed. Reg. 19718 (April 29, 1991).   
Extraordinary circumstances include a list of environmental and cultural issues 
that, if present in the proposed activity area, originally required the Forest Service to 
conduct a full EA for any national forest management.  Normally, for example, the 
Forest  Service could not use a CE if there are steep slopes, endangered or threatened 
species, wilderness or wilderness study areas, or if the project occurs in an “Inventories 
Roadless Area”(FSH 1909.15 §30.3(2)).  The Council for Environmental Quality, a federal 
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body responsible for implementing NEPA, requires that the Forest Service “shall provide 
for extraordinary circumstances in which a normally excluded action may have a 
significant environmental effect” (40 C.F.R. § 1508.4).  The agency is required to 
maintain a project file that explains why no extraordinary circumstances exist in the 
proposed management area (FSH § 1909.15, Ch. 30 § 31.2(10) (1992)).  
When introducing the original regulations, the Forest Service stated, “It is the 
intent of the agency that only routine actions that have no extraordinary circumstances 
should be within the categories for exclusion” (57 Fed. Reg. 43184, emphasis added).  
Federal courts have also upheld the requirement to conduct an EA when extraordinary 
circumstances are present, including Washington Trails Association v. Forest Service 935 
F. Supp. 1117 (W.D. Wash. 1996), Jones v Gordon 792 F. 2d 821 (9th Cir. 1986), 
California v. Cal. Coastal Commission, 150 F.Supp. 2d 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2001), Bensman v. 
Forest Service, 984 F.Supp. 1242 (W.D. Mo. 1997).  In Rhodes v. Johnson, for example, 
the judge determined “It is not enough that the Forest Service has conducted an 
internal review to determine whether the extraordinary circumstance will cause the 
proposed action to have a significant impact on the environment.  An environmental 
assessment is the process required to make that determination” (153 F.3d 785, 790 
(C.A.7(Ill.)1998).   
The new HFI directive revised the Forest Service Handbook (1909.15 Chapter 30) 
by changing the extraordinary circumstances’ automatic mechanism triggering an EA 
and replaced it with discretionary language in which the agency was only required to 
“consider” “resource conditions” to determine whether extraordinary circumstances 
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were present (Huber 2005).  As the Forest Service stated, “The mere presence of one or 
more of these resource conditions does not preclude use of a categorical exclusion,” 
and, instead, the agency argued that “the degree of the potential effect of a proposed 
action on these resource conditions determines whether extraordinary circumstances 
exist” (FSH 1909.15, ch. 30, 30.3 (2)).  “Previously, the presence of these ‘resource 
conditions’ were themselves defined as extraordinary circumstances, but the Forest 
Service changed the Handbook to make what was a mandatory duty into a discretionary 
act” (Vaughan 2006).     
In short, the HFI “clarification” of extraordinary circumstances allowed the 
agency to authorize management in areas that would have required substantially more 
environmental review (White House 2002).  Chapter Eight includes an analysis the 
effects of this HFI policy change to the extraordinary circumstances and the subsequent 
national forest management in North Carolina that would have previously required 
public documentation of potential environmental effects in an EA.    
Goods for Services (Stewardship Contracting) 
Under the HFI, the Bush Administration created a new “Goods for Services” (GFS) 
contract, which authorized the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management to 
use a new commercial logging contract system.  The new GFS contracts allow private 
companies to take merchantable trees from the national forests in return for 
“stewardship” (White House 2002).  GFS projects would “allow contractors to keep 
wood products in exchange for the service of thinning trees and brush and removing 
dead wood.” (68 Fed. Reg. 70,758 (Dec. 19, 2003).   
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These projects authorized commercial logging, presumably in relatively 
functional ecosystems, to fund restoration and “forest health” issues emerging from fire 
suppression, road-building, invasive species, climate change, and commercial logging 
(White House 2002).  Despite the curious circular logic and the obvious tension within 
the Forest Service between commercial and ecological forestry (see Chapter Four), the 
Bush Administration revised the new contract system and approved 145 contracts 
covering 80,000 acres in federal lands.  “This quid pro quo was met with alarm by 
environmentalists since it would allow logging companies to log the big, profitable trees 
in exchange for taking away the small ones that have little or no commercial value” 
(Huber 2005:800)   
The HFI also included provisions that the Forest Service should incorporate 
collaborative decision-making when planning projects with GFS contracts.  “Efforts 
should be made to involve a diversity of local interests and engage key stakeholders in 
collaboration throughout the life of the project, from project design through 
implementation and monitoring (FSH 61.12).   Whenever the agency plans a GFS 
contract, the “Principles of Collaboration” section of the agency’s handbook requires 
that “the line officer at the appropriate level shall seek to involve the public in a 
collaborative manner” (FSH 61.12a1).  The HFI defined this as seeking early involvement, 
incorporating a diversity of interests, and involving the Forest Service as a participant 
who does not “chair or direct the collaborative group” (FSH 61.12a1).  Furthermore, the 
directions include strategies for creating an “open, inclusive, and transparent process” 
to bring stakeholders into the process (61.12a2).  Chapter Seven provides an analysis of 
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the GFS projects proposed and implementing in North Carolina from 2003 through 
2008. 
In summary, the combined effect of the HFI regulatory changes reduced citizen 
participation (Appeals Rule) for expedited commercial forestry projects (CE’s) 
authorized in areas previously off-limits (extraordinary circumstances) while creating a 
contract system with commercial incentives to attract commercial forestry interests 
(GFS).   This new regulatory framework for national forest decision-making was in place 
for over two years before federal courts invalidated substantial portions of the Healthy 
Forest Initiative.   To better understand the type of democratic structure occurring in 
national forest decision-making in North Carolina’s national forests, the next section 
explores the results of three legal challenges to the Bush Administration that modified 
the original HFI by stripping several key components of the policy.     
 
LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE HEALTHY FOREST INITIATIVE   
Only sixteen days after going into effect, the new Healthy Forest Initiative public 
participation regulations came under challenge in federal district court (WildLaw v. U.S. 
Forest Service, No. CV-03-T-682-N (M.D. Ala. filed June 20, 2003).  This section addresses 
legal challenges filed by public interest groups that invalidated several key sections of 
the HFI, including the Appeals Rule, requirements for “substantive comment,” and the 
HFI CE (#10) for “Hazardous Fuels.”  Many other HFI provisions are still in effect, 
including the “clarification” to extraordinary circumstances, expedited processes for 
“economic emergencies,” and the “limited” and salvage logging CE’s.  Before addressing 
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analysis of the North Carolina case study, this section describes the legal status of the 
Healthy Forest Initiative and the deliberative process under the current administrative 
framework.  
In September 2003, the Forest Service in California proposed a 238-acre salvage 
logging project called the Burnt Ridge Project in the McNally fire area in the Sequoia 
National Forest.  The project was approved under the new HFI “Limited” logging CE (CE 
12) exemption from NEPA’s EA requirements, and the Forest Service also used the new 
Appeals Rule to waive public notice, comment, 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.12(f) and appeal 
procedures (36 CFR 215.4(a).  On December 10th, 2003, environmental groups filed a 
federal lawsuit in the Eastern District of California against the Forest Service for 
implementing the Burnt Ridge projects under the HFI’s Appeals Rule.   
Among several claims made in the case, Earth Island Inst. v. Pengilly (No. 03–
6386) (Earth Island v Pengilly) centered on the Appeals Rule’s elimination of notice, 
comment (36 CFR § 215.4(a)), and administrative appeal (36 CFR § 215.12(f)).  Plaintiffs 
called for the project to be halted because the agency failed to provide for notice, 
comment, and administrative appeal opportunities as required by the ARA.  In March 
2004, after the District Court issued a preliminary injunction against the agency, the 
Forest Service dropped the project and settled to avoid a precedent setting ruling 
challenging the merits of the HFI.  The District Court, however, proceeded to hear the 
plaintiffs’ facial challenge to the merits of the regulations. 
On July 2nd 2005, Federal District Judge James Singleton announced his ruling in 
Earth Island v Pengilly, holding the Bush Administration’s Appeals Rule and other HFI 
229 
provisions were illegal and the judge severed them from the regulations.  Judge 
Singleton found the regulations inconsistent with plain language in the ARA requiring 
public notice, comment, and appeal in any actions that concern “land and resource 
management plans…shall be subject to notice, comment and appeal procedures” (a).  
The court was unconvinced by Forest Service claims that opening CE projects to public 
participation would create an unreasonable burden on the agency given the large 
number of projects the agency was approving under the CE process, and Judge Singleton 
held the HFI Appeals Rule was “manifestly contrary” to the ARA (discussed in Chapter 
Five).  “The ARA was drafted in direct response to the Forest Service’s 1992 proposal to 
eliminate such appeals… While the Forest Service is clearly not required to make every 
minor project it undertakes subject to the appeals process, it is required to delineate 
between major and minor projects in a way that gives permissible effect to the language 
of the ARA” (Singleton 2005: 10). 
The judge also invalidated several other provisions of the HFI, including 
eliminating decisions signed by the Secretary of Agriculture from notice, comment, and 
appeal (36 C.F.R. § 215.20(b), the delegation of the authority to district rangers to 
declare an emergency (36 C.F.R. § 215.10(a), and the reduction of an automatic stay on 
a project after an appeal has been filed by the public (36 C.F.R. § 215.18(b).  After 
invalidating the Appeals Rule, the judge replaced the original regulations from 1993, as 
modified in federal court proceedings (Heartwood v. Forest Service, 73 F. Supp. 2d 962, 
980 (S.D. Ill. 1999), which required that national forest CE projects be subject to notice, 
comment, and administrative appeal. 
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The Forest Service reacted to the ruling by first limiting its application to federal 
lands in CA, arguing that “For National Forest System lands outside of the Eastern 
District of California, the Government’s current legal position is that the Court’s July 2, 
2005, order does not apply” (Holtrop 2003).  Later, however, Forest Chief Dale Bosworth 
directed the agency in a September 23, 2005 letter to the agency employees to comply 
with Earth Island v Pengilly by suspending all CE projects nationally.  The Chief wrote 
that, due to the federal District Court ruling, “All categorically excluded projects must be 
immediately suspended and subjected to notice, comment, and appeal” (Bosworth 
2005:1).   In response, however, the Forest Service extended the ruling to projects far 
beyond the scope of the original challenge in Earth II v Pengilly to almost 1,500 activities 
nationwide, including permits to cut the U.S. Capitol Christmas tree, 169 projects 
involving trail maintenance, 115 permits for guided hunting, fishing, river, and 
horseback trips, and permits to pick mushrooms on national forests in Oregon (Barnard 
2005).    
Some in the commodity forestry community, like Chris West with the American 
Forest Resource Council, asserted that environmentalist groups had intentionally caused 
the suspension of minor activities without anticipating the consequences (Barnard 
2005).  Others noted that the Forest Service application of the Judge Singleton’s orders 
to all minor activities was a “political ploy” intended to help the Forest Service “overrule 
*the district court’s decision+ legislatively,” and “should lead to more questions about 
the real motives of the agency that allegedly protects the nation’s forests” (Washington 
Post 2005:12).    
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The agency’s action provoked an angry response by several Congressmen, 
including Reps. Peter Defazio (D-CA), George Miller (D-CA), and Tom Udall (D-NM), who 
voiced their opposition directly to Forest Service Chief Dale Bosworth.  In their public 
letter, the Congressmen wrote, “As we understand the district court decision, your 
directive applies to categorically excluded actions far beyond those intended by the 
court… Your directive has caused unnecessary confusion and placed a significant burden 
on many who rely on the national forests for income, recreation, and general use.”  In 
another letter, Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) and Sen. Tom Harkin (D-IA) criticized the 
agency for its application of the ruling, concluding that “excluding important segments 
of the public from entering the National Forests is not good agency management. Nor is 
trying to exclude the public from the decision making processes governing the National 
Forests” (2005:2). 
Given the confusion of the Earth Island v Pengilly ruling, the plaintiffs returned to 
court under a new lawsuit (Earth Island v Ruthenbeck) to compel the Forest Service to 
properly apply the July 2nd ruling and to broaden its application nationally.  On October 
19, 2005, Judge Singleton clarified his early ruling by declaring that the agency was only 
required to open projects addressed in the ARA’s original 1993 and 2000 implementing 
regulations.  Judge Singleton wrote, “The Forest Service need not suspend actions not 
contemplated in the old rules, such as approval, modification, or continuation of minor, 
short-term special uses of National Forest System lands, such as for state-licensed 
outfitters or guides, or approving gathering forest products for personal use” (Earth 
Island v Ruthenbeck 2005:2).    
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As part of the October 2005 ruling, however, Judge Singleton also extended his 
earlier ruling by applying, nationally, the injunction against the HFI’s Appeal Rule.  In 
effect, this ruling invalidated the HFI’s Appeals Rule after 28 months.  This ruling was 
upheld in August 2006 by Ninth Circuit of Appeals (Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 459 
F.3d 954, 958), which affirmed “the district court’s judgment that 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.12(f) 
and 215.4(a) conflict with the Appeals Reform Act and affirm the nationwide injunction 
barring their application” (pg 9322).   
In a separate case announced April 24, 2006, Wilderness Society v Rey II (No. CV-
03-119-M-DWM) (TWS v Rey II), a federal district court in Missoula, MT, issued another 
ruling upholding the same ban against the HFI’s Appeal Rule regarding notice, comment 
(215.12(f)) and administrative appeals (215.4(a)).  Summarizing his decision, District 
Court Judge Molloy asserted that, “pulling the public out of those decisions I think is 
undemocratic” (TWS v Rey II).  The court also invalidated the HFI provision requiring the 
public to include “substantive comments” to secure standing and the right to appeal the 
final decision of the district ranger (36 C.F.R. 215.13(a)).   
Finally, on December 5, 2007, in the third successful legal challenge to the HFI 
regulations, Sierra Club v. Bosworth (No. CIV.S-04-2114-GEB-DAD) addressed the 
Hazardous Fuels CE (#10).  In this case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a 
summary judgment order by the district court and instead ruled against the Bush 
Administration’s new exemption for logging up to 1,000 acres and burning up to 4,500.  
The court determined the Bush regulations were “arbitrary and capricious” and 
concluded “the Forest Service failed to assess properly the significance of the hazardous 
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fuels reduction categorical exclusion.”    The Ninth Circuit found the Forest Service’s 
Fuels CE was illegal because the agency could not show the site-specific projects would 
not have a significant individual or cumulative impact on the environment.  Combined 
with the invalidation of the Appeals Rule in Earth Island v Ruthenbeck (2005), these 
rulings by the Ninth Circuit removed the only CE requiring collaborative decision-making 
while reinstating the direct participation process (administrative appeals) for individual 
citizens and interest groups.  
On March 3, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the Bush Administration’s 
appeal of the Earth Island v Ruthenbeck, and in a 5-4 decision the justices threw out the 
case based on a technicality (Summers v. Earth Island Institute (No. 07-463, 490 F. 3d 
687 2009). Formerly Earth Island v Pengilly, the court held that the conservation groups 
did not have sufficient standing to bring a challenge to the HFI regulations without 
evidence of direct injury to the plaintiffs.  As Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in the opinion, 
without standing “courts have no charter to review and revise legislative and executive 
action," (No. 07-463).  In splitting the court over the issue of standing to address 
environmental issues, the U.S. Supreme Court threw the case out on a technicality.  In 
July 2009, the federal district court vacated its injunction requiring appeals CE decisions, 
and the Forest Service, under the Obama Administration, once again began to exempt 
CE timber sales and other actions from notice, comment, and appeal.  A new lawsuit, 
filed in U.S. District Court in Los Angeles on December 19, 2009, has again challenged 
the same HFI regulations. 
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 CONCLUSION 
 The Healthy Forest Initiative’s Appeals Rule affecting public participation was 
created by the Forest Service in June 2003 and implemented for over two years before 
federal district and appeals courts severed the rule from the regulations on October 
2005.   This fluctuation in democratic processes for citizen participation sets up a natural 
experiment to address the role of the Healthy Forest Initiative’s Appeals Rule in national 
forest management.  Additionally, the creation of new exemptions for “Extraordinary 
Circumstances,” new classes of categorical exclusions, and the use of new “Good for 
Service’s Stewardship Contracts” all provide opportunities for studying implementation 
of the HFI and the democratic theories that explain its structure.  
 
  
CHAPTER SEVEN: AN ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN 
NORTH CAROLINA’S NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT 
  
The greater part of what my neighbors call good I believe in my soul to be 
bad, and if I repent of anything, it is very likely to be my good behavior. 
What demon possessed me that I behaved so well? 
 
Henry David Thoreau 
Walden 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Alternate democratic theories are offered, by various proponents, to provide the 
most adequate understanding of public participation in governance.  These theories 
address the role of conflict, power, and access in democratic cultures, illuminating the 
century-long experience with contentious federal forest management in the United 
States.  During the “participation explosion” (Almond and Verba 1963) of democratic 
law established during the “environmental era” (Andrews 1999), the U.S. Forest Service 
earned the status as the agency with the most “explicit public involvement mandate” 
(Daniels and Walker 1997).  This chapter addresses alternative theories of public 
participation in Forest Service decision-making under the Bush Administration’s Healthy 
Forest Initiative in North Carolina’s national forests. 
Although the agency is responsible for including the public in most of its 
decision-making, the legal process through which the public is granted access has 
recently taken many different forms—especially in light of the new Healthy Forest 
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Initiative (HFI) regulations created by the Bush Administration in 2002 (See Chapter Six).       
This chapter begins with an analysis of specific public comments made during “pre-
decisional” planning for national forest management in North Carolina under the HFI.  
These findings will provide data for assessing the extent to which elite, pluralistic, 
deliberative, or agonistic theories best describe the prevailing process governing 
national forest management in North Carolina under the HFI. 
 
THE CROATAN, NANTAHALA, PISGAH, AND UWHARRIE NATIONAL FORESTS  
 To understand the characteristics and processes for participation under the 
Healthy Forest Initiative, this section presents a content analysis of written and verbal 
comments submitted during official scoping and administrative appeal process for 
Forest Service vegetation management Categorical Exclusion (CE) projects in the 
Croatan, Nantahala, Pisgah, and Uwharrie National Forests from 2003 through 2008 (see 
Figure 1).   
From over 330 CE projects proposed by the Forest Service in North Carolina 
during this time, 67 HFI related vegetation management CE projects were identified for 
this study (see Chapter Eight).  During the pre-decisional planning phase for these 
projects, called the “scoping process,” the Forest Service received 171 verbal and 
written comments through phone calls, letters, and email.  These comments are 
analyzed below for their process and participant characteristics. 
The agency received only one administrative appeal (36 CFR 215) for the 67 
vegetation management projects selected for this research.   While “scoping” comments 
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were available throughout the time reviewed for this study, administrative appeals were 
only available half-way through the course of this study, in the end of 2005, when 
federal district and appeals courts (Earth Island v Ruthenbeck 2005) returned the right of 
appeal guaranteed under the ARA (see Chapter Six).  For additional discussion of the 
methods and definitions used for the analysis in this chapter, please refer to Chapter 
Three.   
 
Based on the comments obtained for this study, categories were constructed to 
facilitate an analysis of process and participant characteristics.   This research design 
allows for an assessment of the democratic theory(s) present in the HFI decision-making 
through an analysis of the public access (process characteristics) and citizen comments 
(participant characteristics).  The process characteristics identified in this study are 
scoping-level comments, administrative appeals, and collaborative decision-making.  
Participant characteristics are then analyzed to determine who participated, what they 
said, and how they said it.  Under the WHO category, participants were categorized 
based on the commenter’s 1) Affiliation (individual or one of twenty-three interest 
groups); 2) Representation (Individual, Non-Governmental Organization, 
Figure 2.  Conceptual Framework For Research Design: Decision-Making Process. 
Decision-making process   = f  (Process Characteristics  +  Participant Characteristics) 
Decision-Making Process Process Characteristics Participant Characteristics 
Elite 
Aggregative Pluralistic 
Deliberative Democracy 
Agonistic 
 
HFI Appeals Rule 
Collaboration 
Scoping Comments 
 
Who participated 
What they said 
How they said it 
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Governmental); 3) Interest identification (Hunters/Anglers, Ecological Forestry, 
Recreationalists, Commodity Forestry/Developer/Business, 
Professional/Scientific/Historical, State Agency/Commission, Federal Agency, and None 
Identified) and 4) Locus (Local, Out-of-State, or Unknown).  The WHAT variable was 
coded based on the commenter’s 1) Attitude (Support, Opposed, Mixed, and Neutral); 
2) Source of Concern (Road Construction, Pre-commercial Thinning, Commercial 
Logging, Prescribed Burns, Other, or None Mentioned; 3) Potential Effects (Ecological 
Forestry, Aesthetics, Recreation/Hunting, Scientific, Other, or None-mentioned).  Finally, 
the HOW variables were categorizes based on the comment’s 1) Vehicle (Written or 
Verbal), 2) Style (Typed, Handwritten, Form letter, Phone, or Other), and 3) Detail (no 
detail, general, 1-2 topics, 3-5 topics, 5+ topics). 
FINDINGS 
 The first level of analysis for this chapter describes the general characteristics of 
the data set.  These descriptive statistics provide a summary of the findings as they 
relate to process and participants variables identified in the conceptual framework for 
this dissertation (Figure 2).  Process characteristics describe the rules governing the 
public participation, while participant variables describe who participated, what they 
said, and how they said it. 
The second level of analysis tests for relationships between selected factor and 
response variables (dependent and independent variables) to offer a glimpse into the 
significant influences and processes behind implementation of the Bush 
Administration’s Healthy Forest Initiative.  The contingency tables explored in this 
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section included the attitude response variable (What) to representation, interest 
identification, and affiliation explanatory variables (Who).  Contingency tables were 
created to establish levels of independence between the independent variables (factor) 
and dependent variables (response) (Agresti 1990:2; Steelman 1996:206).  Several 
tables were analyzed though chi-square tests to determine which variables were major 
contributors to the rejection of several null hypotheses (assuming independence 
between what comments said and who the commenters were.  Chi-square tests are 
used to examine relationships for levels of significance, or evidence for rejecting 
independence, between the response and explanatory variables.   
Additionally, this chapter includes an analysis of the predictors of public 
participation.  Logistic regression models were used to determine which combination of 
variables (acreage and species occurrences in each project) best predicted citizen 
participation.   These include the physical size of the project, number of species in the 
project, and these two variables in combination.  To understand how variables act in 
concert in the same model, predicted probabilities, 𝜋 , for various predictor 
combinations can be used to classify an observation’s participation type.  In short, the 
final section summarizes the predictors of public participation to determine whether 
knowing a project’s size and species composition creates expectations about the level of 
public participation (and conflict) each project may entail. 
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PROCESS & PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS  
From 2003 through 2008, public comments in North Carolina’s national forests 
were filed under fluctuating legal processes based on HFI regulation changes, federal 
court orders, or established statutory law.  The processes identified for this study, 
described in Chapter Six, were the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) general 
scoping process, the National Forest Decision-Making and Appeals Reform Act (ARA) 
administrative appeal process, and new HFI policies requiring collaborative decision 
making (Hazardous Fuels Reduction CE and Goods for Services Contracting).   
Among these opportunities for participation, the public used the general scoping 
process to submit 99.94 percent of all comments.  There was only one administrative 
appeal filed in North Carolina by WildLaw against the Pekin Branch Ecosystem Project, 
which the Uwharrie National Forest created as a combined EA and CE proposal.  Finally, 
the Forest Service received zero comments through collaborative management decision-
making processes, as defined in the HFI (CE 10), implementing regulations in the Forest 
Service Handbook (FSH 61.12), and in the policy and resource management literature 
(Gray 1989, Wondolleck & Yaffee 2000, Leach 2006).  The agency did claim to be using 
forms of collaborative decision-making for one project, although this claim is weak given 
general definitions of collaboration (see discussion below).   Table 1 summarizes the 
process characteristics uses by the public to comment on Forest Service vegetation 
management CE projects from 2003 through 2008 in national forests in North Carolina. 
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PROCESS CHARACTERISTICS: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS 
In addition to “pre-decisional” scoping-level comment periods (discussed below), 
the public has historically had the opportunity to appeal Forest Service decisions for 
forest-wide planning and site-specific project-level activity (see Chapter Five and Six).  
Under the HFI, the administrative appeals process was eliminated for CE projects by the 
Appeals Rule.  This HFI rule was in effect for less than three years before it was 
invalidated by federal district and appeals courts (Earth Island v Ruthenbeck).   After the 
Earth Island ruling, the public was allowed to appeal decisions again, although 
appellants could only gain standing to appeal if they submitted “substantive” comments 
during the scoping process.  Four years after it was established, the substantive 
comments HFI rule was invalidated in Wilderness Society v Rey II (2006) (See Chapter 
Six).  
During the three years when the HFI Appeals Rule was legal, the agency 
proposed 49 projects in North Carolina (not subject to appeal).  After the Forest Service 
was enjoined from using the regulations, the agency authorized 18 projects over the 
Table 6.  Type of participation in Vegetation Management CE 
projects in North Carolina National Forests. 
Types of Participation Total 
Administrative Appeals 1 
Collaborative Decision-Making 0 
Scoping Comments 171 
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next three years.  In relation to the “substantive comment” rule, the agency was able to 
waive the right to appeal for six of the 18 projects if it determined that the comments 
were not “substantial” based on the HFI rule.  The final 12 projects were open to appeal 
without substantive comment thresholds established by the HFI.  Chapter Eight 
addresses the process and project characteristics identified in this study, including the 
types of projects proposed (new or existing CE’s), ecological issues (extraordinary 
circumstances) relating to the different projects, and the frequency of proposed projects 
in North Carolina. 
 
PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS 
Who Participated 
Of the CE projects subject to formal administrative appeal rights, only one was 
appealed in North Carolina by the Asheville-based office of the WildLaw legal firm.  This 
was filed against the 4,765 acre Pekin Ecosystem Management Project in the Uwharrie 
National Forest that originally included over 3,898 acres of logging authorized through 
the CE process.  This project combined activities on 867 acres documented in an 
environmental assessment (road construction, logging, and herbicides) and 3,898 acres 
of activities categorically exclude from documentation under NEPA.  No other projects in 
North Carolina were challenged using an administrate appeal that involved a CE.   
The WildLaw appeal was filed on behalf of Wild South, Southern Appalachian 
Forest Coalition, and Southern Appalachian Biodiversity Project, which are 
environmental organizations based in Asheville, North Carolina.  Each of these groups 
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participated in scoping-level commenting, thereby establishing the right to appeal the 
project.  Of all the participants involved in the scoping-level commenting period, none 
filed supporting comments.  Wild South, for example, specifically addressed the process, 
writing “Looking at the project as a whole, it cannot be authorized under a categorical 
exclusion to the National Environmental Policy Act… Given the large area and potential 
effects of these actions, an Environmental Assessment, or Environmental Impact 
Statement should be performed prior to the implementation of any portion of this 
proposed project” (Doughty & Schenk 2005:1-2).   
After the responsible officer received these comments, she separated the Pekin 
project’s EA and CE portions and issued a decision notice on the former on 9/30/2005.  
After the agency entered a formal resolution meeting with all parties, the appeal was 
withdrawn based on several conditions, including an agreement that the agency would 
publicly disclose its response by appending the comments to its decision notice in the 
project file.   After two years, the agency reissued the CE portion of the project entitled 
the Pekin Wildlife Opening Expansion, which only included 10 acres of logging 
vegetation, stumps, and “merchantable” trees.   
The lack of administrative appeals filed in North Carolina against CE’s can be 
explained first by the elimination of the process during the first three years identified in 
this study.  When the public could use the process, there were far fewer projects to 
appeal (See Chapter Eight).  Based on modifications made to the Pekin project, the 
appeal filed appeared to have some influence over the process. Chapter Eight explores 
244 
the policy and project characteristics of the Pekin Branch and 66 other CE vegetation 
management projects issued in North Carolina. 
 
PROCESS CHARACTERISTIC: COLLABORATION 
According to the literature, collaborative management processes rely on 
deliberative negotiation, involvement of key stakeholders, and consensus-based 
decision-making to resolve conflict (see Chapter Two).  The HFI included new regulations 
for Categorical Exclusions and “Goods for Services” (GFS) contracting that required 
collaborative decision-making for federal forest management (see Chapter Six).  This 
next section investigates eight projects implemented in North Carolina governed by the 
new HFI processes for collaborative decision-making. 
“Hazardous Fuels Reduction” Categorical Exclusion & Collaborative Management 
One of the new HFI regulations, the “Hazardous Fuels Reduction” CE #10, is a 
procedure for exempting up to 1,000 acres of logging and 4,500 acres of prescribed 
burning from the standard National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) environmental 
assessment and Environmental Impact Statement process (36 CFR 220((ii)).  This 
exemption for “hazardous fuels reduction” activities also requires that proposals “shall 
be identified through a collaborative framework” consistent with the agency’s 
guidelines outlined in the Collaborative Approach for Reducing Wildland Fire Risks to 
Communities and the Environment – Ten-Year Comprehensive Strategy: Implementation 
Plan (USDA & USDI 2002).   
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This “collaborative framework” is described by the Implementation Plan as the 
process of bringing together agency professionals, local participants, and state, federal 
and tribal governments to prioritize management and implementation.  This approach 
emphasizes “local level collaboration” with stakeholders who have expressed some 
expertise or interests in the forest (2001:9).  According to a decision diagram in the 
Forest Service’s HFI Field Guide, the first step in determining whether the Hazardous 
Fuels CE is appropriate includes identifying whether the project is “collaborative as 
described in the Implementation Plan” (USDA ).  Otherwise, the project cannot proceed 
and the Forest Service instructs officers to “consider authorities other than the HFI CE” 
(USDA).    
“Goods for Services” Contracting  
Another effort that was intended to include collaborative decision-making for 
national forest management was a new HFI provision for Stewardship End Use 
Contracting, Otherwise known As “Goods for Services” (GFS) contracting, which 
authorizes the Forest Service to pay contractors with merchantable trees..  The GFS 
contract provision was created by the Healthy Forest Initiative and authorized “agencies 
to enter into long-term stewardship contracts with the private sector, non-profit 
organizations, and local communities” (White House 2002).  The Forest Service and the 
Bureau of Land Management were authorized to use this new commercial logging 
contract system that allows private companies to take merchantable trees from the 
national forests in return for “stewardship” (White House 2002).    GFS projects would 
“allow contractors to keep wood products in exchange for the service of thinning trees 
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and brush and removing dead wood.”  After the Bush Administration revised the new 
contract system, the Forest Service approved 145 contracts covering 80,000-acres of 
federal lands.   
For these projects, the Forest Service is directed to establish a collaborative 
decision-making process to “involve States, counties, local communities, and interested 
stakeholders in a public process to provide input on implementation of stewardship 
contract projects” (FSH 61.12).    This was theorized as a process that would bring 
stakeholders to the table to avoid conflicts resulting in formal challenges to a District 
Ranger’s decision by appealing to supervisor’s offices.   
As a result of the combined Appeals Rule (described above) and the new 
collaborative requirements, participants must either engage Forest Service collaborative 
management decision-making or challenge projects in federal court (see discussion in 
Chapter Six).  The following section includes an investigation of the public process for 
three HFI projects authorized in North Carolina using the new GFS contract provisions. 
PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS: COLLABORATION 
The Hazardous Fuels CE was used five times in North Carolina between the time 
the regulation was established in 2003 (68 Fed. Reg. at 33,814) and invalidated by a 
federal district judge in 2007 (Sierra v Bosworth).  Content analysis of public 
participation in the project files available for the five “Hazardous Fuels Reduction” CE 
used in North Carolina show little to no evidence of deliberative negotiations or 
collaborative stakeholder involvement.  Based on the available documentation obtained 
through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, there were no stakeholder 
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meetings, decentralized (devolved) decision-making, or evidence of formal collaborative 
partnerships between the Forest Service and the public that would pass scrutiny under 
transparency rules of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). 
The only public participation for these projects involved a scoping letter and 
published announcements requesting public comments.  There was no opportunity for 
the public to enter face-to-face negotiations or formally object to decisions.  This 
approach, according to Germain et al., is defined as “Informing,” which represents the 
least substantial form of participation on “a scale from one-way flow of information to 
complete decision-making authority” (2001:115).   On the other hand, Germain defined 
collaborative decision-making as process in which the “citizen and agency become 
partners; [the] public begins to have decision-making clout; [and] can negotiate and 
engage in trade-offs with power holders” (2001:115).  Furthermore, environmental 
analysis was not included in the project announcements, which makes effective 
collaborative negotiations unlikely for expedited projects exempted from NEPA’s more 
detailed and involved environmental review process.   
The lack of deliberative meetings or stakeholder negotiations is also inconsistent 
with the Forest Service’s requirements under the HFI rules that compel the agency to 
follow a “collaborative framework” as defined by the Collaborative Approach (2001).   
According to the guidelines defined in this manual, “local level collaboration should 
involve participants with direct responsibility for management decisions affecting public 
and/or private land and resources, fire protection responsibilities, or good working 
knowledge and interest in the local resources” (2001:9).  Although the agency informed 
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members of the public who previously expressed an interest in national forest 
management, the Forest Service did not engage in collaborative decision-making.   
Public participation for three of the HFI CE 10 projects (proposed and 
implemented in the Uwharrie National Forest) was a scoping process limited to half-
page announcements of the projects sent to participants on the Forest Service’s mailing 
list and published in the Montgomery Herald.  Although 13 participants responded to 
the agency’s scoping request within the 30-day comment period, in each case the 
Uwharrie National Forest published an abbreviated decision memo (DM) with little to 
no evidence of incorporating the public’s comments into the decisions.  Moreover, there 
were no opportunities for formal collaboration as required by the HFI.    
Two other Hazardous Fuels Reduction projects were planned and implemented 
in the Highlands District of the Pisgah National Forest.  These projects were also limited 
to the scoping process and precluded any collaborative decision-making opportunity.  
Furthermore, considering there was no public participation documented in the project 
files, the public either refused to comment on these projects or the comments were lost 
by the agency.  As the Forest Service acknowledged, “Unfortunately, this is all the 
documentation we have for these two projects, as some of it may have been lost during 
the consolidation of the Wayah and the Highlands Ranger Districts” (Forest Supervisors 
Office 2009:1).   
Nationally, the Forest Service used the new HFI CE for “Hazardous Fuels 
Reduction” over 450 times before it was invalidated by the federal courts (Sierra v 
Bosworth 2007).  Although it is unknown how many of these projects used 
249 
collaboration, the five occurring in the Pisgah and Uwharrie National Forests did not use 
collaborative planning based on the available evidence gathered through a federally 
approved document request.  Furthermore, the call for public comments (scoping 
request) did not invite participants to engage in any form of collaborative decision-
making, as defined by either the HFI or the conservation, resource management, and 
policy literatures (McCloskey 1999; Wondolleck 1999; Manring 2005; Leach 2006; 
Koontz & Thomas 2006).   
Under the new GFS contracting provisions, the Forest Service authorized the 
Fires Creek Stewardship Project in the Nantahala National Forest, the Catpen 
Stewardship Project in the Pisgah National Forest, and the Brice Creek Stewardship 
Project in the Croatan National Forest.  Although not required by the force of law, the 
Forest Service’s Handbook directs the agency to incorporate collaborative decision-
making when planning projects with GFS contracts.  “Efforts should be made to involve a 
diversity of local interests and engage key stakeholders in collaboration throughout the 
life of the project, from project design through implementation and monitoring” (FSH 
61.12).   Whenever the agency plans a GFS contract, the “Principles of Collaboration” 
section of the agency’s handbook requires that “the line officer at the appropriate level 
shall seek to involve the public in a collaborative manner” (61.12a1).  This is defined as 
seeking early involvement, incorporating a diversity of interests, and involving the 
Forest Service as a participant who does not “chair or direct the collaborative group.”  
Furthermore, the directions include strategies for creating an “open, inclusive, and 
transparent process” to bring stakeholders into the process (61.12a2).   
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As addressed in Chapter 2, collaboration—as understood through the lens of 
deliberative democracy (Rawls 1971; Habermas 1975) or collaborative management 
(Gray 1989; Wondolleck & Yaffee 2000)—is currently debated at length in the 
conservation literature (Peterson et al. 2004, 2005, 2007; Leach 2006; Thomas and 
Koontz 2006).  There are also many examples where new partnerships have formed to 
collaboratively design a federal land management projects (Hibbard & Madson 2003).  
Collaborative management also continues to serve as a policy tool in new federal law 
(Healthy Forest Restoration Act).    
The three GFS projects identified in this study do not share features with the 
type of collaborative management defined in the literature, historical precedence, 
statutory language, or current policy-making trends.  The projects did not include any 
public meetings or deliberation, and key stakeholders were not identified or brought 
into a public negotiation process early.  In short, there was no evidence of any formal 
collaborative planning and negotiation.   
The Fires Creek Stewardship Project, located in the Nantahala National Forest in 
Clay Country, North Carolina was the first GFS contract authorized in the state.  The 
original proposal called for logging 230 acres, including 15 acres in the Tusquitee Bald 
Roadless Area, while providing funds for “wildlife habitat enhancement,” watershed 
restoration, and access for anglers and other visitors.  In the announcement of the 
project, the scoping letter stated, “Areas were selected with cooperation from the local 
Grouse Society” and that the proposal was informed by “interviews with local 
sportsmen and members of the local Ruffed Grouse Society” (on file with author).  
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The project file for the Fires Creek Stewardship Project, however, included no 
public records or transcripts documenting this cooperation.  If the agency did formally 
collaborate with local hunting groups without making the negotiations public and 
inclusive, or documenting the communication in public record, it would be in direct 
violation of the Administrative Procedures Act, Federal Advisory Committee Act, and the 
Freedom of Information Act.  Instead, the better explanation is that the project was not 
a formal collaborative endeavor, and the Forest Service was merely adhering to its 
traditional elite decision-making structure (see discussion in Chapter Two, Four, and 
Nine) by informally speaking with privileged interest groups.   
Although the participant characteristics for scoping-level participation for all 
comments are described below, the Fires Creek Stewardship Project is noteworthy.   
This project was opposed by more participants than any other project, with the 
exception of the Dillingham Salvage Logging Project (described below) and two with 
equal numbers of opposing comments (the Catpen Stewardship Project and Cheoah 
Prescribed Burn).  Analysis of the individual objections raised per comment showed that 
participants raised more criticisms for this project than any other, and more than 28 
percent of these specific objections were process related.  As one commenter explained, 
“Apparently, the district contacted interested parties when it began this collaborative 
process, but we are disappointed that our organization was not notified” (Gale 2005:1).  
Another commenter stated, “While the Forest Service has apparently been involved 
with the local Grouse Society in planning this project, there is little evidence that there 
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has been an effort to make the project truly collaborative” (Irwin 2005:2, on file with 
author). 
These scoping-level comments and others were critical of the agency’s 
interpretation of the collaborative provisions in the GFS contracting policy for the Fires 
Creek Stewardship Project.  In response, the Forest Service district ranger considered 
criticisms “non significant” because the agency considered the scoping process as 
fulfilling the commitment to “involve as collaborative partner” participants in addition 
to those interested in hunting (Vann 2006:1, on file with author).   According to the 
district ranger “input from these groups provided during scoping has been considered in 
the final development of the proposal” (Vann 2006:1, on file with author).   As 
previously discussed, however, few credible policy scientists in the literature would 
identify scoping-level input as collaborative management (Germain 2001).   
  The two other GFS projects, the Catpen Stewardship Project in the Pisgah 
National Forest and the Brice Creek Stewardship Projects in the Croatan, also failed to 
show any evidence of collaborative decision-making as defined by the Forest Service 
handbook or other definitions of collaboration in the literature.  Like the Fires Creek 
project, formal public participation in the Catpen and Brice Creek Stewardship Projects 
was limited to scoping-level comments.  Also like Fires Creek, the Catpen Stewardship 
project was overwhelmingly opposed by participants, with no comments showing 
complete support for the proposal.   
Although project files for the Catpen Stewardship Project included no 
documentation of any meetings with stakeholders (formal or otherwise), the Decision 
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Memo stated that “additional funds and labor will come from the NC Wildlife Resources 
Commission, the National Turkey Federation, the Appalachian Trail Conference, the 
Backcountry Horsemen, the Hot Springs Hiking Club, and/or the Carolina Mountain 
Club” (Catpen 2005, on file with author).   Based on the public record, however, 
negotiations with these potential stakeholders either failed to comply with applicable 
federal sunshine laws (APA, NEPA, FACA, and FOIA) or these negotiations were not 
formally conducted through an official collaborative decision-making process.  Instead, 
the project was best described by democratic theories other than deliberative 
democracy (see Chapter Nine).    
 While the Hazardous Fuels CE and Goods for Services contracting provisions 
required or recommend collaboration for federal forest planning, the projects 
authorized under the HFI in North Carolina would not qualify as formal collaborative 
management.  Based on the evidence obtained through a formal Freedom of 
Information Act Request, there were no collaborative decision-making processes in 
North Carolina under the Healthy Forest Initiative.   
 
PROCESS CHARACTERISTICS: SCOPING  
The Forest Service is required by the National Environmental Policy Act to 
“scope” the public to determine whether significant issues may be present that would 
require the agency to conduct an Environmental Assessment (EA) or an Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) (see Chapter Five).  According to the Forest Service Handbook, 
“If the responsible official determines, based on scoping, that it is uncertain whether the 
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proposed action may have a significant effect on the environment, prepare an EA. If the 
responsible official determines, based on scoping, that the proposed action may have a 
significant environmental effect, prepare an EIS” (36 CFR 220.6(c)).    
The public is allowed to participate in scoping for all Forest Service actions, 
including projects that are exempted from NEPA’s EA process.  As the Forest Service 
Handbook explains, “Scoping is required for all FS proposed actions, including those that 
would appear to be categorically excluded (ch.10, sec. 11).  Scoping is important to 
discover information that could point to the need for an EA or EIS versus a CE as well as 
to inform the public.  Scoping complexity should be commensurate with project 
complexity” (ch.10, sec 11).  Even for projects that the agency considers routine and 
approved through the CE process, a citizen may raise issues relating to extraordinary 
circumstances that would normally require the agency to conduct an EA or EIS.  This 
automatic trigger by an extraordinary circumstance was eliminated by the Bush 
Administration as part of the first rule change under the HFI (see Chapters Six and 
Eight).    
In addition to announcing the call for scoping in the Schedule of Proposed 
Actions (SOPA) (see Chapter Three), the Forest Service is required to use other 
mechanisms for soliciting public comment for a proposed action.  These include letters 
mailed to citizens who have expressed interest in Forest Service management in the 
past.  The agency is also required to publish a notice in one of the local newspapers.     
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PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS: SCOPING  
WHO PARTICIPATED  
 The first level of analysis addresses who participated in categorical exclusion 
projects in North Carolina from 2003 through 2008 (Table 2).   Content analysis of these 
comments revealed that individuals made 17 percent of the comments submitted to the 
Forest Service during the scoping process for CE projects.  Interest group representation 
from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) accounted for 33.33 percent of the 
comments, while state and federal agencies made approximately half of all the 
comments (See Table 3).  The comments were predominantly submitted by in-state 
participants, making up 95 percent of all comments.  Finally, those with an interest in 
ecological forestry submitted the most comments (46 percent) while those with 
commodity interests accounted for six percent of the total.   Table 7 summarizes the 
Who characteristics of participation in vegetation management projects in North 
Carolina.  
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Participant Affiliation 
 The level of participation by individuals (17 percent) is low compared to other 
findings from other national forest decision-making research, although the temporal 
scale for the CE process is compressed relative to other federal land decisions (Manring 
2005).  Friesema and Culhane, for example, found that 33.5% of all comments on Forest 
Service EIS projects in South Dakota, Utah, and New Mexico were from unaffiliated 
concerned citizens (1976).  This level of is similar to Teich, Vaughn, & Cortner’s finding 
that 30 percent of all administrative appeals filed between 1997 and 2003 were filed by 
individuals (2004).  These levels contrast with Force and Williams’ study (1989:34) that 
Table 7. Who Participated In NC National Forest CE Scoping. 
AFFILIATION OF 
COMMENTER 
Individuals 
Interest Group 
 
n=171 
16.95% 
29 
83.04% 
142 
REPRESENTATION Individuals NGO State Federal 
 
n=171 
 
16.95% 
(29) 
33.33% 
(57) 
32.16% 
(55) 
17.54% 
(30) 
INTEREST 
IDENTIFICATION 
(w/ Gov 
Agencies) 
Hunter
-Angler 
Ecological 
Forestry 
Recreation 
Commodity 
Forestry 
Professional Unknown 
n=171 
16.37
% 
28 
48.54% 
(83) 
12.87% 
(22) 
6.43% 
(11) 
5.85% 
(10) 
9.94% 
(17) 
LOCUS OF 
COMMENTER 
In State Out of State Unknown 
n=171 
94.74% 
(162) 
4.68% 
8 
0.58% 
1 
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found participants in Washington and Idaho’s national forest planning represented 
themselves 57 percent of the time.  Furthermore, these findings contrast strongly with 
Steelman’s (1996) study on participants in the Monongahela National Forest planning 
process, which showed individual participation accounted for 92 percent of all 
comments.   
 Given that more than 83 percent of the commenters from North Carolina were 
representing interest groups, including government agencies (50%) and NGO’s (33 
percent), the process appears to be more suited for organized groups and employees of 
state or federal agencies (see Table 3).  This is consistent with Force and Williams’ 
(1989:37) study of Washington and Idaho EIS processes, which argued that interest 
groups were “better prepared to take advantage of participation opportunities, but also 
the requirements necessary to be involved in public participation programs may bias 
involvement toward organized participants.”    
Table 8. Participation by Representation. 
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Over half of all participation came from employees of government agencies, 
including three of the top four most active participants with over 37 percent of all the 
comments (see Table 8).  Government wildlife agencies are directed by state and federal 
law to comment on projects in U.S. National Forests, including formal consultation when 
there are federally listed threatened or endangered species (e.g. Endangered Species 
Act, (7 U.S.C. § 136, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq., Section Seven).  Until the Healthy Forest 
Initiative, however, rare species occurrences were considered extraordinary 
circumstances that triggered an EA under NEPA, requiring substantial environmental 
analysis and formal consultation (see Chapter Eight).  Further analysis of participation in 
CE’s by wildlife agencies before the HFI, as well as comments on EA’s, may explain more 
about the high proportion of these groups in the CE projects in North Carolina.    
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Participation by NGO’s accounted for one-third of all comments.  Four of the top 
ten most active participants were NGO’s with interests in ecological forestry (Southern 
Appalachian Biodiversity Project and Sierra Club) or recreation (Appalachian Trail 
Conference and Mountain High Hikers) who accounted for over 13 percent of all public 
comments.  Given this study’s interest in different democratic theories, and especially 
Table 9.  Interest Groups by number of comments made on vegetation 
management CE projects in North Carolina, January 1, 2003, through December 31, 
2008. 
Affiliation  Ranking Number Percent  
North Carolina Wildlife Resources Commission 1 30 17.34% 
Unaffiliated Individuals 2 29 16.76% 
United States Fish and Wildlife Service 3 20 11.56% 
North Carolina Natural Heritage Program 4 14 8.09% 
Southern Appalachian Biodiversity Project 5 12 6.94% 
North Carolina Forest Service 6 9 5.20% 
Appalachian Trail Conference  7 8 4.62% 
Mountain High Hikers 8 7 4.05% 
Natural Resources Conservation Service  9 7 4.05% 
Sierra Club Group 10 6 3.47% 
National Wild Turkey Federation 11 5 2.89% 
North Carolina WildLaw 12 4 2.31% 
Western North Carolina Alliance  13 4 2.31% 
Eastern Band of Cherokee 14 3 1.73% 
Ruffed Grouse Society 15 3 1.73% 
Southern Appalachian Forest Coalition 16 2 1.16% 
North Carolina Div of Water Quality 17 2 1.16% 
Southern Appalachian Multiple Use Council  18 2 1.16% 
Appalachian Trail Riders  19 1 0.58% 
Hot Springs Mountain Club 20 1 0.58% 
NC Department of Cultural Resources 21 1 0.58% 
North Carolina Division of Coastal Management 22 1 0.58% 
The Nature Conservancy 23 1 0.58% 
Trout Unlimited 24 1 0.58% 
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the influence of citizen groups on Forest Service processes, identifying NGO 
participation (33 percent) offers a more reliable reading of public participation than 
descriptions of affiliation defined broadly to include government agencies.  While some 
research of national forest participants and processes combined NGO’s and government 
agencies, including Force and Williams (1989) and Steelman (1996), others (Cheng & 
Mattor 2006) isolate “local government” participation from other identified interests.  
This study includes an analysis using both interpretations of interest groups.   
Interest Identification  
Ecological Forestry accounted for interests identified by individuals, NGO’s, and 
government agencies in 49 percent (n = 83) of all comments.  State and federal agencies 
identified ecological forestry interests 30 percent of the time (n = 52), and NGO’s and 
individuals accounted for 18 percent (n = 30).  These findings are similar to Germain et 
al.’s study of appeals nationwide from 1993 through 1995, which recorded 63 percent of 
all appellants (2001) represented “environmental” interests.   The portion of 
commenters with ecological forestry in North Carolina CE projects was double what 
Friesema and Culhane found in their study (1976:350).   In their study, Firesema and 
Culhane combined “environmental, conservationist, preservationists, and sportsmen” 
together to show the group accounted for over 26 percent of comments during the EIS 
processes.  Force and Williams also found 27 percent of commenters in their study had 
“preservation or environmental interests,” and “had lower incomes, were Democrats or 
independents, held moderate or liberal political beliefs [and] had some education 
beyond a baccalaureate degree” (1989:34).   
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In contrast, Steelman only found three percent of the commenters were 
identified with environmental organizations, although “unidentified” and “other” groups 
accounted for 78.86% of all comments, which may account for the low number of 
identified interests in her study by any group.  “The relative absence of interest groups, 
however, indicates that there were fewer interest groups involved in the MNF planning 
process than in other National Forests” (1996:208).  The MNF example contrasts with 
the North Carolina’s national forests, which had 23 different NGO and government 
agencies participating in the process.   
Of all the NGO’s who commented, only one was a commodity forestry group 
from the Southern Appalachian Multiple Use Council (SAMUC), and the North Carolina 
Forest Service was the only state agency that expressed a commodity forestry interest in 
the federal forests, providing eight comments (4.68%).  When combining the two 
unaffiliated individuals and two NGO comments supporting commodity forestry, 
commodity forestry interests accounted for only seven percent of all the comments.  
This is similar to findings by Steelman, (1996:208), who found only one percent of 
commenters with commodity forestry interests in the Monongahela National Forest 
Planning process.  Teich, Vaughn, and Cortner also found zero (n=0) commodity forest 
NGO’s among the top appellants to Forest Service NEPA projects (2004:17).   
With seven percent of participation by commercial forestry interests, this level 
for North Carolina is lower than what Friesema and Culhane (1976) found for 
consumptive users (17 percent) in comments for EIS projects in 1973.  Force and 
Williams also found 21 percent of the participants in their study identifying with 
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“timber” interests were typically “male, had a high income, were Republican, and held 
conservative beliefs… *and+ had some education beyond high school”  (1989:34).   
Locus of Commenters  
 Commenters in this study had North Carolina residency 95 percent of the time, 
while out-of-state comments came from fewer than five percent of the participants.  
These findings are consistent with Steelman’s findings that nearly 92 percent of 
comments had in-state addresses (1996:208), and contrasts with Blahna and Yonts-
Shepard’s study showing an equal mix of public comments among state, regional, and 
national levels (1989).   
The high levels of participation in this North Carolina case study may explain the 
corresponding level of participation by individuals and NGO’s, which combined to share 
over 50 percent of the total comments.  This is consistent with Sirianni and Friedland’s 
argument that direct participation often occurs at the local level (1995), and Abel and 
Stephan’s claim that independent citizens may become involved in local issues given the 
proximity of “direct impacts on their neighborhoods and families” (617).   
This issue about the relationship between locality and direct citizen participation 
is useful for developing a better understanding of participation as it is commonly 
debated in the literature (Escovar, Cox 2006:291, McCloskey, Coggins 1999:807; 
McCarthy 2002, 2005; McCarthy & Purdham 2004).  Many scholars argue local 
participation in federal land management produces better decisions, including 
Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000) who promote more collaborative forms of decision-
making to incorporate local participation.  In Steelman’s study, she argued the 
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substantial level of local participation (92 percent) “may partly explain why consensus 
was able to be reached in the MNF planning process” due to the fact that participants 
held a greater degree of shared values (1996:209).   
   Others warn against an uncritical move toward devolution and deregulation 
favoring local control, given the power of commercial interests in dominating agency 
decisions (Coggins 1999; McCloskey 2003, McCarthy 2005).  McCarthy, for example, 
addressed the tendency for local or community to be “structured by hegemonic 
neoliberal ideas, making community forestry in this context supplementary, rather than 
oppositional, to neoliberal restructurings.”  In other words, McCarthy warns community-
based forestry risks cooptation by powerful commercial interests.  Abel and Stephan 
also provide an analysis of local control that questioned whether “mechanisms for 
participation that are nominally participatory may instead be more conducive to elite or 
pluralistic participation” (2000:618).  In short, local participation does not automatically 
translate into more democratic control by independent citizens instead of powerful 
commercial interests.   
The next sections of this chapter address what these predominantly in-state 
participants (95 percent) with ecological interest (59 percent) said about CE 
management projects in North Carolina and how their comments were delivered.   
Finally, this chapter includes an analysis of the patterns and relationships that were 
present during this “pre-decisional” process decisions, using chi-square tests.  These 
findings are important for understanding the final decisions and subsequent outcomes 
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for site-specific management in North Carolina’s national forests discussed in Chapter 
Eight.   
WHAT PARTICIPANTS SAID 
  The responses to vegetative management CE projects in North Carolina were 
critical 58 percent of the time (n=99) and uncritical 42 percent of the time (n=72).  
Additionally, comments were almost equally distributed between support (28 percent), 
opposition (23 percent), and mixed (35 percent), while neutral comments were made 
only 14 percent of the time.  This distribution of respondent attitudes shifts only slightly 
when isolating for participant types among government agencies, NGO’s, and 
individuals (See Table 10).  Further inspection shows differences in attitudes among 
participant types, with government agencies filing the most supportive comments, 
NGO’s most likely to oppose projects, and individuals showing little deviation in 
attitudes toward the different projects.  Finally, commercial logging was the most 
common source of concern among participants (27 percent), and potential effects of 
agency actions on species and habitat accounted for the most common issue 
commenters raised about the projects (46 percent).  Table 5 summarizes what 
participants said. 
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Participant Attitudes: Response to Projects 
Analysis of the respondent’s attitudes demonstrates that Supportive and 
Opposing comments were distributed within one standard deviation (7.68 percent) from 
the average (25 percent), while Mixed comments totaled 35 percent of the comments, 
or more than one standard deviation from the average number of commenters.  This 
Table 10.  What Participants Said. 
Type of Comment UNCRITICAL  CRITICAL 
171 42.11% 
(72) 
58% 
(99) 
Total Response 
to Projects 
 
Support 
 
Neutral 
 
Mixed 
 
Oppose 
 
n=171 
 
28.07% 
(48) 
14.04% 
(24) 
35.09% 
(60) 
22.81% 
(39) 
Individual 
Response 
(n=29) 
5.26% 
(9) 
0.00% 
(0) 
5.26% 
(9) 
6.43% 
(11) 
NGO 
Response  
n=57 
8.19%  
(14) 
4.68% 
(8) 
9.94% 
(17) 
10.53% 
(18) 
Government 
Agency Response 
N=85 
14.62% 
(25) 
9.96%  
(16) 
19.88%  
(34) 
5.85% 
(10) 
Source of 
Concern 
 
None 
Mention
ed 
 
Other 
Roads 
  
 
Thinnin
g 
Logging Prescrib
ed Burn  
n=171 
42.11% 
(72) 
 2.95% 
(5) 
2.92% 
(5) 
17.54% 
(30) 
26.90% 
(46) 
7.60%  
(13) 
Potential Effect 
 
None 
Mention
ed 
Other 
 Ecological 
Forestry 
 
Aesthet
ic 
Recreatio
n/ 
Hunting 
 
Scientifi
c 
n=171 
 
42.11% 
(72) 
3.51%  
(6) 
46.20% 
(79) 
0.58% 
(1) 
5.85% 
(10) 
1.75% 
(3) 
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level of Mixed commenting is similar to Steelman’s study that found 45 percent of 
commenters expressed both support and opposition (1996).  This is noteworthy, given 
Steelman’s argument that “Comments that were mixed in their response to the *MNF+ 
Draft Plan provided more information to the planning staff” (1996:213).  Chapter Nine 
includes a discussion of how these findings are used to define the Healthy Forest 
Initiative based on competing democratic theories in the literature (elite, pluralist, 
deliberative, and agonistic).   
Important for this study was an analysis of the objections—or conflict— 
surrounding the projects (see Table 10).   Given the substantial portion of Mixed 
comments submitted to the Forest Service (35%), grouping comments based on 
objections, as well as counting the individual points of contention and support, provides 
a better understanding to the total level of opposition (or conflict) expressed about the 
projects (Stankey 1972).  Additionally, identifying the sources of concern about potential 
effects provides insight into the precise site-specific issues raised for each project 
(Steelman 1996).   
As Stankey argued in his paper on content analysis of decision-making 
(1972:151), an analysis of critical comments helps “to provide administrators with an 
idea of the extent to which respondents objected to specific management details for an 
alternative they otherwise favored.”  As discussed in Chapter Two, conflict is a central 
focus of different democratic theories used in this dissertation to analyze the Healthy 
Forest Initiative, which was itself proposed as a solution to ongoing controversy and 
“process predicaments” (Bosworth 2002).  
267 
Grouping responses to the projects based on the presence of any negative 
comments or objections showed 58 percent of the comments were oppositional 
(Opposed and Mixed).   Likewise, Supporting and Neutral comments can be grouped 
according to the logic that neither identified concerns or potential issues with the 
projects (See Table 10).    The comments grouped by a lack of any objections 
(Supporting or Neutral) toward the projects accounted for 42 percent of all projects (see 
Table 11, which is consistent with the findings in Table 5 showing the number of 
commenters who identified no concerns or potential issues for the projects (42 
percent).  Focusing on specific objections allows for an appraisal of the public’s overall 
attitude toward the projects and provides administrators with additional information 
about which to potentially alter their decisions (Stankey 1972). 
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Table 11.  Response to the Projects by Criticism 
from Individuals. 
 
 
 
Sources of Concern  
Commenters who identified problems related to commercial logging as their 
primary concern accounted for nearly 27 percent (n=46) of all comments, and almost 
half of all critical comments (n=99).  This is similar to Teich et al.’s 2004 study of 
administrative appeals nationwide showed that “Timber” received the greatest level of 
objections (31 percent).   
Combed with conflict surrounding pre-commercial thinning (n=30), these two 
commercial forestry categories accounted for over 44 percent of all potential concerns 
41 44
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expressed, and 75 percent of all critical comments.  Additionally, given the argument 
that roads relate to logging access and industrial tree farming, commercial forestry was 
the only extractive commodity use identified among mining, grazing, oil and gas drilling, 
and land exchanges.   
In their 2006 study of Colorado’s national forests, Cheng and Mattor found 44 
percent of participants held concerns relating to coal, motorized recreation, ranching, 
and private land inholder’s (private land within the boundaries of the national forest).  
Although the Forest Service’s Region 8 includes a range of these extractive commodity 
uses, internal Forest Service records (PAL) showed the agency proposed no grazing, 
mining, drilling, or land exchanges as CE’s in North Carolina from 2003 through 2008 
(Forest Supervisors Office 2009, personal communication).  These categories were not 
raised in any of the comments in this North Carolina study. 
Potential Effects 
The most common potential effect identified by participants related to ecological 
forestry issues (42 percent), which accounted for over 80 percent of all critical 
comments.  Steelman also found a substantial portion (60 percent) of comments 
addressed potential effects on wildlife from the Forest Service’s proposed MNF plan, 
which she attributed to the issues emphasized in public education campaigns by interest 
groups.  As discussed below, projects with rare species were more likely to receive 
public comments, even in the absence of organized education campaigns or access to 
Forest Service surveys documenting species occurrences. 
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Commenters who worried about the potential effects of commercial logging on 
rare species and their habitat (32 percent) delivered the largest portion of criticisms 
received by the Forest Service in North Carolina.  The next biggest group of objections 
addressed the potential effects of pre-commercial thinning on rare species and habitats 
(28 percent), which, combined with logging, showed that 60 percent of all criticisms 
addressed issues relating to commercial forestry.  This is similar to Steelman’s findings 
that 60 percent of comments shared a concern about logging and associated practices 
on wildlife resources.  In short, more than one out of every three comments (35 
percent) addressed the potential effects of different forms of commercial forestry on 
species diversity and ecosystems. 
Subcategories 
In addition to primary sources of concern or potential effects, another level of 
analysis counted multiple issues made in each comment to understand what 
participants said (Steelman 1996:214).   By a wide margin, the majority of all issues 
raised were objections (84 percent), which is consistent with previous analysis that the 
majority of comments were critical (see Table 6).  Calculating multiple issues also shows 
that, on average, commenters found only .77 issues of support compared to nearly four 
objections on average for each project (see Table 12).    
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Recording multiple issues also revealed concerns beyond the primary categories 
raised by the commenters (see Table13).  More than any subcategory, for example, 
commenters criticized the lack of disclosure by the Forest Service (6 percent), even 
though it was never a primary concern of any individual commenter.  In other words, 
while process issues for a specific project never emerged as a commenter’s primary 
issue, accounting for multiple issues shows that disclosure was identified by more 
commenters than any specific subcategory.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12. Overview Of All Supporting And Opposing Issues Raised In 
Comments. 
Total Issues Addressed 
(n=801) 
Support Objections 
16.30% 
(132) 
83.52% 
(669) 
Average Issue Per Comment 
(n=171) 
0.77 3.91 
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Other studies of public satisfaction with participation in National Forest 
management have shown that stakeholders expect their contributions will have 
quantifiable effects on final decisions (Knopp and Caldbeck 1990; Brown and Harris 
1992).  Germain et al.’s study found “mild dissatisfaction with the overall process,” 
which triggered more confrontation because most participants believed the process was 
unfair, ineffective, or inefficient (2001:119).  Additional process issues in North Carolina 
combined to account for nearly 19 percent of all subcategories (see Table 14), including 
concerns regarding documentation (3 percent), project compliance with forest plans 
under NFMA (3 percent), and the short duration of comment periods (one percent).   
 
Table 13. Overview Of Subcategories Combining Sources Of Concern And 
Potential Effects By Total Criticisms. 
SUBCATEGORY* TOTAL** PERCENT 
Disclosure 38 5.69% 
Species / Biodiversity 32 4.79% 
Sedimentation / Erosion 26 3.89% 
Restoration 22 3.29% 
Road Construction 21 3.14% 
Monoculture 19 2.84% 
Surveys 18 2.69% 
Invasive Species 17 2.54% 
Water 17 2.54% 
Plan Compliance 15 2.25% 
Longleaf 15 2.25% 
Pre-commercial thinning 15 2.25% 
Fire Suppression 14 2.10% 
* 121 Subcategories 
** Total does not equal 669 because table excludes concerns or issues raised by 
commenters 1% of the time or less. 
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Table 14.  What Participants Said About Process Subcategories. * 
Process Issue Total Percentage 
Disclosure 38 5.69% 
Documentation 18 2.69% 
Plan Compliance  15 2.25% 
Comment Time 9 1.35% 
Monitoring 8 1.20% 
Categorical Exclusion 7 1.05% 
Notification  7 1.05% 
Inclusive  4 0.60% 
Stakeholders 4 0.60% 
Restart Process 4 0.60% 
Alternatives 3 0.45% 
Collaboration 3 0.45% 
Appeal Rights 2 0.30% 
Open-Ended Contract 2 0.30% 
Interest Diversity 1 0.15% 
* Commenters could have identified multiple subcategories 
 
HOW PARTICIPANTS COMMENTED 
 When participants commented on Forest Service HFI projects in North Carolina, 
they usually submitted a one-page, typed letter addressing one or two topics.   Table 10 
summarizes how comments were submitted against HFI projects in North Carolina. 
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Comment Vehicle  
Commenters were more likely to mail a letter (92 percent) than call or speak 
directly with agency personnel (eight percent).  This is similar to Steelman’s finding 
written comments 90 percent of the time, and Friesema and Culhane’s (1976:350) study 
showing 63 percent of all comments were written.  Again, although email was not 
available to many of the commenters from previous Forest Service decisions, the more 
likely explanation for the lack of verbal communication may be due to the length and 
number of detailed issues commenters entered into the public record (discussed 
below).   
Another explanation of why there were only eight verbal comments may also 
relate to perceived agency bias toward commodity interests.  There is a longstanding 
criticism in the conservation literature that commercial groups are traditionally the 
Table 15.  How Participants Commented. 
Vehicle Letter Verbal 
N=171 
157 
91.81% 
14 
8.19% 
Style Handwritten Typed Form Letter Other 
N=171 
4.09% 
(7) 
88.30% 
(151) 
0.00% 
(0) 
7.60% 
(13) 
Length >150 words 150-249 250-499 500+ 
N=171 
70 
40.94% 
45 
26.32% 
31 
18.13% 
25 
14.62% 
Detail No Detail Generalized 1-2 topics 2-4  topics 5+ topics 
N=171 
26 
15.20% 
25 
14.62% 
63 
36.84% 
18 
10.53% 
39 
22.81% 
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beneficiaries of the Forest Service decisions (Bultena and John 1972; Robbins 1985; 
Clary 1986; Twight and Lyden 1990).   This is consistent with Friesema and Culhane’s 
finding that non-commodity groups were likely to document their comments in writing, 
while verbal comments were most likely filed by commodity industries.  Although 
interesting, determining why written communication was responsible for the largest 
portion of comments is impossible to ascertain from the available data.   
Comment Style 
 Unlike findings in other research (Clark & Stankey 1976; Steelman 1996), content 
analysis of comments from North Carolina found no form letters (n=0).  In contrast, 
Steelman found 23 percent of comments in the 1993 Monongahela Forest Planning 
process were submitted as form letters (1996:211), while Clark and Stankey found as 
much as 32 percent of comments on EIS projects were form letters.   
This vehicle for commenting is generally available if interest groups have the 
capacity to produce campaign materials and mail them to constituencies in time to 
make comment deadlines.  With the shorter (30-day) pre-decisional comment process, 
HFI projects in North Carolina provided little opportunity for organized letter-writing 
campaigns.  Likewise, groups apparently had enough time during the longer forest 
planning process for the MNF (90-day), as Steelman found several different form letters 
in the public record.  Of course, form letters in 1993 operated under different 
constraints compared to internet-based participation today.  Although many of the 
typed letters from North Carolina were submitted electronically, it was impossible to get 
a precise count of the digital comments given the lack of information in the project files.    
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Comment Length and Detail 
 While many of the comments were equal to or less than one page in Length (41 
percent), a majority wrote more, which explains the substantial level of Detail made by 
commenters who identified specific project issues (70 percent) compared to 
commenters with little or no discussion (30 percent) (see Table 15).  As the analysis of 
subcategories showed, commenters found an average of less than one issue of support 
and nearly four objections per project (See table 12).   This difference shows the public 
was more likely to address objections in greater detail than commenters addressing 
issues of support.   Given the large portion of comments with documented objections 
(58 percent), as well as the high percentage of criticisms lodged per comment relative to 
supporting issues, these findings demonstrate how the public was most likely to submit 
detailed objections against CE projects.    
This may be explained by the fact that project designs are already outlined in 
Forest Service “scoping letters” describing the proposal, albeit with limited site-specific 
analysis.  Coincidentally, the Forest Service does not include findings from their 
Biological and Archeological Evaluations, which document extraordinary circumstances 
present in the project area (see discussion in Chapter Six and analysis in Chapter Eight).  
It is also unclear if surveys are conducted before scoping letters are sent to the public.  
Such disclosure might change or intensify a commenter’s attitude toward a project, 
given their reaction to documentation of sensitive and federally listed endangered, 
threatened, and sensitive species.  This argument is buttressed by the fact that the 
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subcategory identified the most by participants related to problems with Forest Service 
disclosure (n=38).  
 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN VARIABLES OF INTEREST: “WHO SAID WHAT?” 
As the previous section provided a description of the participants and comments 
regarding HFI projects in North Carolina, the next level of analysis explores the patterns 
and relationships between the selected variables of interest.  The response and 
explanatory variables (dependent and independent variables) investigated in this 
section offer a glimpse into the significant influences and processes behind 
implementation of the Bush Administration’s Healthy Forest Initiative.  
The contingency tables explored in this section identified the attitude response 
variable (What) to representation, interest identification, and affiliation explanatory 
variables (Who).  Chi-square tests were used to examine the relationships for levels of 
significance, or evidence for rejecting independence, between the response and 
explanatory variables.   
Additional analysis of the chi-square statistic is conducted using the standardized 
residuals to explore precisely which observations in the contingency tables deviated 
from expected frequencies and are, therefore, responsible for rejecting the 
independence model.  A null hypothesis holds that the explanatory and response 
variable found in the data are completely independent and are therefore 
indistinguishable from a random pattern.  If the chi-square test fails to uphold the 
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independence model, standardized residuals are then used to determine which values 
are major contributors to rejecting the null hypothesis. 
 After creating a contingency table in Excel, they are run through the “R” (R 
Support Team 2009) software to produce a chi-square statistic.  In addition to the chi-
square statistic outputs, R can produce the residual outputs.  If the chi-square statistic is 
significant, the residuals greater than 2.00 show the researcher which parts of the 
contingency table led to the significance.  Finally, once the observations are identified, 
comparisons are made with Concern and Potential Effect, participant characteristics, 
and other evidence to explain the significance found in the table.   
Participant Attitude by Representation  
The first test explored the relationships between participant attitudes (e.g., 
“support,” oppose”) and representation from government agencies, NGO’s, and 
individuals (See Table 15).   In this case, a chi-square test provided evidence for rejecting 
the independent model, (χ2 = 16.6297; p-value = 0.00984).  The next step is to analyze 
the precise residuals in the contingency table to determine which elements contributed 
to rejecting a null hypothesis of no significant relationship between attitude and 
representation (see Table 16).  In this case, the all three response variables (individuals, 
NGO’s, and government agencies) were found to be important influences in predicting 
participant opposition to the projects.   
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Table 16. Participant Attitude toward Project by Representation. 
 
 
 
First, opposing comments from government participants were exceptionally 
small relative to the other response variables.  Based on the observations, the chi-
square test predicted approximately 19 comments from government employees to the 
Forest Service projects.  Instead, there were only 10.   
One explanation why government groups were disinclined to oppose Forest 
Service projects relates to the disproportionately high level of participation by the NC 
Wildlife Resources Commission (NCWRC) (See Table 9).  This agency’s dominance in the 
process, with 17 percent of all comments, may explain the conspicuously low level of 
opposition, considering NCWRC submitted only one opposing comment out of 30 (See 
Table 17).  NCWRC was also the only agency to publicly support the use of the HFI’s new 
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expedited categorical exclusion process, stating in several comments that land 
management “should go forward under this rule without documentation in an 
environmental assessment or environmental impact statement” (McHenry 2005:2, on 
file with author).  This close affinity for Forest Service policies for management and 
decision-making helps explain the relationship between government agencies and low 
opposition present in this test.   
 
Table 17.  Mosaic Plot of Residuals from Chi-Square Test of Attitude by Representation 
 
 
High levels of opposition from individuals and NGO’s were the next important 
findings from the chi-square test, which provides another explanation for rejecting the 
independence model.  Based on the expected values for the individual (6.6 comments) 
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and NGO (13 comments), these two explanatory variables resulted in higher opposition 
to the Forest Service projects (11 and 18, respectively) than predicted by an 
independence model. 
The higher than expected level of opposition from individuals may be explained 
in part by the fact that these participants were primarily concerned with issues relating 
to commercial forestry 91 percent of the time.  NGO’s also opposed projects based 
concerns over commercial forests 66 percents of the time.  Furthermore, individuals and 
NGO’s who criticized Forest Service projects addressed ecological forestry and potential 
effects on species and habitat 78 percent of the time.   
As the next chapter explains, the policy and project characteristics of Forest 
Service management proposals demonstrates that projects were designed with a 
substantial commercial forestry orientation.  Therefore, the high level of opposition 
from individuals and NGO’s is most likely due to the conflict between the public’s 
valuation of ecological forestry and the substantial commercial forestry bias (described 
in Chapter Four and Five) of HFI projects in North Carolina from 2003 through 2008.   
Attitude by Interest Identification 
 The next explanatory variable tested in this section addressed participant’s 
interest identification as a predictor for the attitude response variable.  In this case, the 
chi-square test found a level of significance (X-squared = 44.7624, p-value = 8.347e-05) 
present in the contingency table, leading to the rejection of the independence model.    
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Table 18.  Overview of Participant Attitude by Interest Identification. 
 
 
Commercial Forestry Interests 
 The most striking finding is the high level of support for HFI projects from 
participants with an interest in commercial forestry.  In this case, those who identified 
with commercial forestry interests (11 comments) were twice as likely to submit 
supporting comments as expected under a model of independence.  These participants 
also had less opposition to the projects than predicted in the chi-square test.   
Again, this support by participants may be a logical reaction to commercial 
forestry characteristics of the HFI projects proposed in North Carolina (see Chapter 
Eight).  Unlike other identified interests, those with preferences for commercial forestry 
submitted zero (n=0) opposition to the Forest Service.   
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In one case, for example, evidence from the project file for the Bald Mountain 
Salvage Logging Project shows that the Forest Service engaged in planning with a 
commercial forestry NGO (Southern Appalachian Multiple Use Council) before the 
project was disclosed to the general public.  The Forest Service also included those with 
commercial forestry interests in early, private planning for the Fires Creek Stewardship 
Project, although regulations call for collaborative planning.  Stewardship contracting is 
required by the Forest Service Handbook (FSH 61.12b) to identify and engage all key 
stakeholders in collaborative planning from project design through implementation and 
monitoring (see Chapter Six).  This willingness to accommodate commercial forestry 
interests may also explain the relatively low level of formal participation by individuals 
with an interest in commercial forestry (less than 7 percent), the lack of formal 
participation by commercial forestry NGO’s (1 percent of all comments), and the 
absence of any documented process concerns identified by commercial forestry groups.  
Recreational 
 The next most important finding relates to the higher than expected level of 
neutral comments from recreational groups.   The test found more than twice as many 
neutral comments from recreational groups than would be expected under an 
independent model.  This is primarily explained by the fact that the Appalachian Trail 
Conference (ATC), which ranked seventh among all commenting groups, submitted 
neutral comments 75 percent of the time.  Given fact that the ATC submitted so many 
neutral comments, and only two critical comments, it is clear this group considered HFI 
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projects in North Carolina only a marginal concern for the experience of those hiking the 
Appalachian Trail.   
Professional 
Another important finding from the chi-square test was the unpredicted level of 
opposition from professional groups.  In this case, those identified with these interests 
opposed projects more than three times the predicted value based on an independent 
model.  Professional interests include those with ongoing scientific or cultural research 
in the national forests.   
One explanation for rejecting the independence model relates to the Forest 
Service “Dillingham Salvage” logging project proposed in the Pisgah National Forest, 
which triggered half of all opposition by participants with professional interests in the 
forests.  This Forest Service proposal included commercial logging in the Big Ivey and 
Corner Rock area of the northern slope of the Craggy Mountains, which contained field 
plots for UNCA-sponsored research approved by the Forest Service and funded by 
National Science Foundation.  As one commenter stated, “I use that area of the National 
Forest extensively for the many classes I teach at UNCA and in undergraduate research 
projects.  I have carried out extensive off-trail botanical reconnaissance in that area and 
believe that area to be the highest quality natural area in the Pisgah National Forest, 
containing the largest percentage of mature, diverse ‘old growth’ forests remaining in 
the area” (Clark 2004:1, on file with author).    
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Ecological Forestry  
Another significant finding from the chi-square test relates to participants with 
an identified interest in ecological forestry.  In this case, comments from these 
participants had levels of support and opposition deviating with values of 64 percent 
less support and 137 percent more than predicted by an independence model.   Given 
that ecological forestry was identified more than any other interest in this study, with 
almost half of all comments, it noteworthy that this group accounted for 67 percent of 
opposed comments.  Again, as discussed in Chapter Eight, the commercial forestry 
orientation of the HFI projects was most likely responsible for the significant levels of 
participation by interests who primarily identified with ecological forestry.   
 
Table 19. Mosaic Plot of Attitude by Representation 
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Participant Attitude by Affiliation  
The final test investigated the relationship between participant attitudes and 
affiliation (see Table 20).  This chi-square test showed the highest level of significance 
among the three explored in this chapter (X-squared = 212.7219, p-value < 2.2e-16), 
with several explanatory variables contributing to the rejection of the model of 
independence.   
 
Table 20.  Overview of Participant Attitude by Affiliation. 
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To understand which values made a major contribution to the chi-square result 
(see Table 21), it is important to begin with the level of support from the North Carolina 
Forest Service (NCFS), which is separate from the U.S. Forest Service.  Except for neutral 
comments by the Natural Resources Conservation Service, the NCFS’s support (n=9) was 
the greatest contributor toward rejecting the null hypothesis.  Without expressing any 
attitude other than support, the observed values from the NCFS were triple that 
expected in an independent model, representing the highest standardized residual 
(4.07) found in this chi-square test.  In addition to stating no concern or potential effect 
relating to the HFI projects, this participant usually submitted comments less than one 
page in length discussing one or two topics.  This suggests the most significant 
contribution to the chi-square statistic came from short comments of support from the 
NCFS.   
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The next explanation for rejecting the null hypothesis relates to opposition from 
the Southern Appalachian Biodiversity Project (SABP), which had the second highest 
residual value of all explanatory variables.  With nine opposing comments, these 
observed values were three times what would be predicted under the null hypothesis.  
The high level of criticism from this NGO is consistent with findings from Teich et al. 
(2004), which found SABP was the leading appellant of Forest Service decisions in the 
Table 21.  Mosaic Plot of Participant Attitude by Affiliation* 
Attitude 
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Southeast, and the 14th most active appellant nationally from 1997 through 2002.  Also 
noteworthy was SABP’s lack of full support for any project, although the group did 
submit mixed comments for three projects.  SABP was also the most active NGO, and 
the forth most active participant found in this study (see Table 9).   
Like SABP, the Sierra Club’s higher than predicted opposition to the HFI projects 
also contributed to the chi-square result.  This group showed no full support for any 
project and only mixed support for a third of the projects it commented on.  The Sierra 
Club was the second most active NGO with a primary interest in ecological forestry.  Not 
surprisingly, 80 percent of the Sierra Club’s objections were against Forest Service 
commercial logging projects, with greater opposition occurring on the Croatan National 
Forest by the “Cypress” group of the Club.  As the next chapter explains, pre-commercial 
thinning on the Croatan National Forest was the second most common management 
type proposed by the Forest Service in North Carolina from 2003 through 2008.  
Another major group contributing to the rejection of the null hypothesis of 
independence was the National Wild Turkey Federation (NWTF).  Similar to the NCFS, 
this group supported every project it commented on (n=5).   Of the five different 
decisions the NWTF addressed, four were insect-related salvage logging projects.  The 
fifth was the Fires Creek project that included commercial logging proposals for portions 
of the Tusquitee Bald Roadless Area (See Chapter 7).  The NWTF and another hunting 
organization (the Ruffed Grouse Society) were the only NGO’s to offer uncritical support 
the Fires Creek project.   
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Every comment from the NWTF was half a page, and two were limited to one 
sentence, stating “NWTF fully approves of this project” (TM Hasell 2004, on file with 
author).  Other comments addressed potential benefits of logging for hunting, which 
they argued provides early succession habitat (recent clearcuts) for game species (see 
Chapter Eight).  In addition to these claimed ecological benefits, the NWTF argued 
logging would provide access and “walk-in” opportunities for wild-turkey and ruffed 
grouse hunting.  
 Finally, as discussed in a previous section (see Attitude by Representation), the 
North Carolina Wildlife Resource Commission (NCWRC) contributed to the chi-square 
results due to their high level of support, and low level of opposition to the Forest 
Service’s proposals.  Most strikingly, the observed lack of opposition by the NCWRC was 
six times predicted values under the null hypothesis.  As the participant with the highest 
level of comments (n=32), the NCWRC’s level of opposition (one comment) was 
conspicuously low.  As addressed in the final chapter, this may explain why the Forest 
Service went forward with every project it proposed as planned, with little evidence of 
any modification based on criticism from the public.   
Summary of Chi-Square Tests 
 In addition to the descriptive statistics addressed in the beginning of this 
chapter, this section provided an analysis of the relationships between selected 
variables of interest.  These included response variables (Representative, Interest 
Identification, and Affiliation), and explanatory variables (Attitude).  In this case, all 
three tests provided evidence for rejecting models of independence, as summarized by 
291 
the significant chi-square statistics in Table 22.   The explanations for these significant 
chi-square statistics were also addressed through an analysis of the groups and attitudes 
were contributed most to the patterns relevant to the rejection of independent models.  
The following section provides another level of analysis to address different patterns 
(predictors of participation) to provide further evidence used to evaluate which 
democratic theory best describes the decision-making process present under the Bush 
Administration’s Healthy Forest Initiative.     
Table 22.  Chi-Squared Tests: Representation By Attitude. 
 
Representation Interest Identification Affiliation 
Attitude 
16.6297; p-value = 
0.00984 
44.7624, p-value = 
8.347e-05 
212.7219, p-value 
= 2.2e-16 
 
PREDICTORS OF PARTICIPATION  
The final statistical testing for this chapter included an analysis of the variables 
that predict public participation, including acreage and species occurrences in each 
project.   This section used logistic regression models to determine which combination 
of variables best predicted citizen participation.  These include the physical size of the 
project, number of species in the project, and these two variables in combination.  Using 
an R function (plot.logi.hist) published in the Bulletin of the ESA (de la Cruz Rot, 2005), 
one-predictor models were used to visualize the predictors graphically.  To understand 
how variables act in concert in the same model, predicted probabilities, 𝜋 , for various 
predictor combinations can be used to classify an observation’s participation type.   
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These predictors of participation help explain which elements of HFI projects 
were likely to trigger a reaction to the public.  As this section explains, the substantial 
likelihood of the public to participate in projects with large acreage and high species 
concentrations demonstrates that the commenters had knowledge about these projects 
despite the lack of discloser on behalf of the Forest Service.  This finding, explained 
below, is addressed further in the conclusion and policy implications sections in Chapter 
Nine.  
Species and Acreage Predictors  
 This section examines the distributions of the number of species per project (Fig. 
4) and the physical size (acreage) of the projects separately by project type.  This 
explores the relative number of species found in each project are greater for projects 
which attracted more participation (participatory), while the projects without 
participation or with comments from predominantly government agencies (elite) 
showed fewer number of species.   Fig. 4 demonstrates this visually, with the Elite 
category clearly has greater concentrations of projects (dots) with fewer species present 
(x-axis).  
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Figure 4.  Distribution of Number of Species by Project Type. 
 
 
 
 
  
Another predictor for public participation is the size of the projects.  Although 
the distributions of both variables do vary by project type according the species 
numbers (Fig. 4), the acreage distributions are more distinct (Fig. 5).   This is evident by 
the difference in concentration of projects occurring in the Elite category (with greater 
distribution of projects with fewer acreage (log#acres), while the Participatory projects 
were more concentrated among larger projects (log#acres).  The log is essentially the 
exponent of the acreage number.  The Encyclopedia Britannica defines logarithms as "a 
series of numbers in arithmetical progression, corresponding to others in geometrical 
progression; by means of which, arithmetical calculations can be made with much more 
ease and expedition than otherwise." 
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Figure 5.  Distribution of log(#acres) by project type. 
 
 
 
 
 
A sequence of logistic regression models were fit using participation type as the 
binary response to determine which combination of variables is the best predictor of 
participation type.  These include the physical size of the project, both raw and log-
transformed, number of species in the project, both raw and log-transformed, and these 
two variables in combination.  Appendix E provides further explanation of these 
statistics tests.    
This analysis of the predictors of public participation demonstrates the public is 
more likely to submit comments in large projects with federally listed and rare species.  
Chapter Nine provides an explanation for this outcome based on democratic theory 
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addressed in Chapter Two.  This finding also holds implications for current and future 
national forest management policies. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 This chapter provided an analysis of the process and participant characteristics 
for vegetation management projects authorized in national forests in North Carolina 
from 2003 through 2008.  Among the comments documented 67 project files (made 
available through a FOIA), there were 171 scoping level comments received by the 
Forest Service, one administrative appeal, and no evidence of collaborative decision-
making.  These findings are summarized in Chapter Nine to explain the prevailing model 
of democratic theory present in these data.   
Ecological forestry was identified more than any other interest in this study, with 
almost half of all comments, who worried about the potential effects of commercial 
logging on rare species and their habitat (32 percent).  This accounted for the largest 
portion of criticisms received by the Forest Service in North Carolina.  The next biggest 
group of objections addressed the potential effects of pre-commercial thinning on rare 
species and habitats (28 percent), which, combined with logging, showed that 60 
percent of all criticisms addressed issues relating to commercial forestry. Those with 
commodity interests accounted for only six percent of all comments, a conspicuously 
low number, which contributed to significant chi-square statistic.    
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Content analysis of the scoping comments shows the comments were submitted 
by in-state participants 95 percent of the time.  17 percent of all comments submitted 
to the Forest Service during the scoping process for CE projects were submitted by 
unaffiliated, independent individuals.  Interest group representation from Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGO) accounted for 33.33 percent of the comments, 
while state and federal agencies made approximately half of all the comments.   
 Commenters in North Carolina were critical 58 percent of the time (n=99) and 
uncritical 42 percent of the time (n=72).  Further inspection shows differences in 
attitudes among participant types, with government agencies filing the most supportive 
comments, NGO’s most likely to oppose projects, and individuals showing little 
deviation in attitudes toward the different projects.     
At this point, it is difficult to investigate the HFI in North Carolina without 
additional analysis of the policy and project characteristics described in Chapter Eight.  
Building on this analysis of the what, who, and how participant characteristics, the next 
chapter describes the site-specific projects to determine which type of forest 
management best described the characteristics of the HFI projects.  Finally, in Chapter 
Nine, this dissertation summarizes the interdisciplinary analysis of the decision-making 
and forest management chapters and provides policy implications for ecology, 
democratic theory, and U.S. National Forest management. 
  
CHAPTER EIGHT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE HEALTHY FOREST 
INITIATIVE & NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT IN NORTH 
CAROLINA 
 
To keep every cog and wheel is the first precaution of intelligent tinkering.   
Aldo Leopold 
A Sand County Almanac 
 
INTRODUCTION 
New Bush Administration policy promulgated in 2002, known as the Healthy 
Forest Initiative (HFI), substantially modified forest management and public 
participation processes for 155 U.S. National Forests (Chapter Six).  In addition to 
addressing “Hazardous Fuels,” this chapter demonstrates how the HFI went well beyond 
wildfire-related forest management with new authorities for logging, burning, and 
thinning on public land.  Chapter Seven provided an analysis of the “pre-decisional” 
(scoping) process and participant characteristics to explain the decision-making 
structure for site-specific HFI projects in North Carolina from 2003 through 2008.  This 
chapter explores the stated purpose, location, and potential ecological consequences of 
those decisions.  Following previous analysis of the role of public participation in HFI 
decision-making, this chapter addresses the ecological outcomes resulting from the 
forest management under the HFI.   
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This chapter provides a description of 67 proposed projects in North Carolina 
authorized by the Forest Service under new HFI regulations from 2003 through 2008.  
First, this chapter addresses the policy characteristics of two HFI rule changes 
(Categorical Exclusions and Extraordinary Circumstances) that authorized new processes 
for management of federal forests in North Carolina.  Next, this chapter explores the 
site-specific dimensions of HFI through an analysis of project characteristics based on 
Where it was proposed, What type of management it was, and When it occurred.  Figure 
3 summarizes the conceptual framework for analyzing the forest management discussed 
in this chapter.  
 
The project characteristics for project location (where) include the eco-regions, 
national forests, and ranger districts in North Carolina.  Next, to explain precisely what 
kind of forest management projects were proposed, this chapter provides an analysis of 
the type of Categorical Exclusion (CE) and stated purpose for each project.  This chapter 
also analyzes When projects occurred to investigate whether increased public 
participation opportunities (administrative appeals) affected the rate at which the 
Forest Service proposed CE projects in national forests in North Carolina.  Finally, this 
chapter addresses the relationships between different variables of interest (project 
Figure 3.  Conceptual Framework for Research Design: Forest Management. 
Forest Management = f  (Policy Characteristics + Project Characteristics) 
Forest Management  Policy Characteristics  Project Characteristics  
Commodity forestry 
Ecological forestry 
 
Extraordinary Circumstances 
Categorical Exclusions 
 
Where project occurred 
What occurred 
When project occurred 
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characteristics), including response variables from the What category and explanatory 
variables from Where the project was proposed. 
SITE-SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT  
 Many scholars believe environmental policy and conservation studies have 
focused on the deliberative processes behind decision-making while failing to explain 
the environmental outcomes from those decisions (Mohai & Verbyla 1987; Steelman 
1996; Press 1997; Gastil & Levin 2005; Koontz and Thomas 2006; National Research 
Council 2008).  One way to bridge these research agendas focuses on project-level U.S. 
National Forest management decisions, which are open to public participation and 
include site-specific ecological analysis.  This study provides an analysis of management 
activity as well as ecological consequences of project-level decision-making for the 
Croatan, Nantahala, Pisgah, and Uwharrie National Forests in North Carolina. 
Although most research of national forest decision-making addresses forest-wide 
planning (Steelman 1996), the unit of analysis for this study is project-level “categorical 
exclusion” management actions.   As Germain et al. explain, “In contrast to forest-plan 
appeals, which address the multi-faceted issues of managing a national forest, forest 
projects are specific management activities that guide on-the-ground management and 
implementation within the designated forest plan” (2001:117).  These “ground” level 
activities include pre-commercial and commercial logging, “timber-stand improvement,” 
prescribed-burns, road-construction, watershed restoration, wildlife openings, and 
salvage logging following weather or insect-related events.  Building on the last 
chapter’s analysis of the decision-making processes, the next section provides an 
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analysis of the outcomes of those decisions for 67 site-specific projects in North Carolina 
authorized from 2003 through 2008.     
In 2007, the General Accounting Office (GAO) released findings from the first 
nationwide study of Forest Service CE projects, entitled “Use of Forest Service 
Categorical Exclusions from Calendar Years 2003-2005” (2007).  The GAO discovered the 
Forest Service used the CE exemption 72 percent of the time, which resulted in “3,018 
vegetation management projects to treat about 6.3 million acres” (2007:2).  Data from 
the GAO report were gathered for this dissertation to identify the CE projects in 
authorized in North Carolina (See Appendix G).  Additionally, the NC Forest Supervisor’s 
office provided a list of 330 CE projects from 2003 through 2008, which included all CE’s 
authorized in North Carolina under the new HFI regulations.  Archival analysis from 
newspapers was also used to triangulate the data (See Chapter Three for additional 
discussion of methodology).  This records research identified 67 vegetation 
management CE projects in North Carolina from 2003 through 2008 (See Appendix C).   
Policy Characteristics 
One important policy characteristic identified for this section relates to the HFI’s 
“Clarification of Extraordinary Circumstances,” which allows the Forest Service to 
authorize a project in a culturally or ecologically sensitive area previously off-limits to 
management through expedited processes (67 Fed. Reg. 54,622, 54,622 (Aug. 23, 2002).  
This chapter also addresses “Categorical Exclusions” authorized under provisions of the 
HFI, which affected existing Forest Service CE’s as well as new Healthy Forest CE’s (#10, 
11, 12, 13, and 14).   
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In addition to exempting all CE’s from National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
requirements to conduct and publish environmental assessments (EA) or an 
environmental impact statement (EIS), the HFI included provisions that waived appeal 
rights (see Chapter Seven), and authorized the agency to approve CE’s in areas with 
extraordinary environmental and cultural resources (see below). Under these forest 
management policy changes, combined with rules eliminating the administrative 
appeals process for all CE projects, the HFI established new authorities for the Forest 
Service to increase management while simultaneously restricting public participation 
and reducing NEPA analysis.   
Project Characteristics 
After project files for this study were obtained through a Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) request, categories were constructed to facilitate an analysis of policy and 
project characteristics.  In addition to the policy characteristics described above, project 
characteristics were identified based on where projects were proposed, what type of 
projects were authorized, and when projects occurred.  First, project location (WHERE) 
was based on 1) Eco-region (Blue Ridge, Piedmont, Mid-Atlantic Coastal Plain), 2) 
National Forest (Croatan, Nantahala, Pisgah, and Uwharrie), and 3) Ranger District 
(Appalachian, Cheoah, Croatan, Grandfather, Nantahala, Pisgah, Tusquitee, and 
Uwharrie).  
Next, the type of project used (WHAT) was determined by addressing 1) the CE 
Type (Special Use, Road Rehabilitation, Regeneration, Timber Stand Improvement, 
Hazardous Fuel Reduction, Post-Fire Rehabilitation, Limited Commercial Logging, 
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Salvage Logging, and Sanitation Logging following insect outbreaks); 2) the Stated-
Purpose (Pre-Commercial Thinning, Commercial Logging, Prescribed Burns, Watershed 
Restoration, Wildlife Openings, Southern-Pine Beetles, and Other), and 3) the Project 
Size (acreage).  Finally, this chapter explores the intensity of project occurrence (WHEN) 
to explain the frequency of proposals “scoped” (made open for comment) by the Forest 
Service. 
 
FINDINGS 
The first level of analysis for this chapter describes the general characteristics of 
the vegetation management projects.  These descriptive statistics provide a summary of 
the findings as they relate to policy and project variables identified in the conceptual 
framework for this dissertation (Figure 3).   This research design provides an analysis of 
the forest management authorized under HFI rules for vegetation management 
proposals (policy characteristics) and ecological outcomes (project characteristics).  
Policy characteristics describe the rules governing the management design, while 
project variables describe what was planned, where they were planned, and when the 
projects occurred. 
The second level of analysis tests for relationships between selected factor and 
response variables.  Contingency tables were created to establish levels of 
independence between the explanatory variables (factor) and dependent variables 
(response) (Agresti 1990:2; Steelman 1996:206).  Several variables were analyzed 
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through chi-square, logistic regression, confusion matrices, receiving operation 
characteristic curves and other statistical tests.   
POLICY CHARACTERISTICS 
Categorical Exclusions 
Statutory laws governing the Forest Service include the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1970 (NEPA), the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), and 
the National Forest Service Decision-making and Appeals Reform Act of 1992 (ARA) (see 
Chapter Six).   While NFMA addresses long-term forest-wide planning procedures, 
regulations established under NEPA created three processes of review for site-specific, 
project-level management.  The Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ), the federal 
body responsible for implementing NEPA, established levels of review for: 1) an EIS for 
all projects that may significantly affect the quality of the environment; 2) an EA that 
documents a “Finding of No Significant Impact” (FONSI) or a notice to prepare an EIS; 
and, 3) in limited circumstances, undocumented review where the action fits into a 
previously defined categorical exclusion (CE).   
NEPA requires the Forest Service to conduct an EA for all management except 
“routine actions that have no extraordinary circumstances” (57 Fed. Reg. 43180 
(September 18, 1992).  These include activities that “will have little potential for soil 
movement, loss of soil productivity, water and air degradation or impact on sensitive 
resource values and is consistent with Forest land and resource management plans”  (56 
Fed. Reg. 19718 (April 29, 1991).   If the Forest Service determines that specific classes 
of management have no significant effect, individually or cumulatively, on the quality of 
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the environment, regulations implementing NEPA allow the Forest Service to establish 
categories of management that are excluded from both the EIS and EA requirements (40 
C.F.R. §§ 1507.3(b)(2)(ii); 1508.4.)   
Under new provisions established by the Healthy Forest Initiative, the Forest 
Service was authorized to use five new CE’s for Hazardous Fuels Reduction, Post-Fire 
Rehabilitation, “Limited” commercial logging, and weather and insect-related salvage 
logging.  Table 5 summarizes the five new categorical exclusion processes established by 
the Bush Administration in 2003. 
Table 5. Five New Categorical Exclusions Created by the Healthy Forest Initiative. 
CE # Name of HFI CE Management Characteristics 
10 Hazardous Fuels Reduction   4,500 acres of prescribed burns and 1,000 acres of 
commercial logging;  
11 Post-Fire Rehabilitation 4,200 acres of tree planting, fence replacement, 
habitat restoration, heritage site restoration, repair 
of roads and trails, and repair of damage to minor 
facilities such as campgrounds. 
12 Limited Commercial Logging 70-acres of “small scale” commercial logging; Less 
than one-half mile of road construction  
13 Weather-Related Salvage 
Logging 
250 acres of commercial logging in areas with 
recent weather-related disturbance; less than one-
half mile of road construction  
14 Insect-Related “Sanitation” 
Salvage Logging 
250 acres of commercial logging for “sanitation 
harvests” in areas with recent or pending insect 
outbreaks; less than one-half mile of road 
construction 
 
Although the new HFI CE’s were not promulgated until the summer of 2003, the 
Forest Service also had existing CE’s for vegetation management it exempted from NEPA 
analysis, including road rehabilitation, special uses, regeneration, and “timber-stand 
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improvements.”  There was also a category for “timber sales” until 1999 when it was 
invalidated in Heartwood v United States Forest Service (73 F. Supp. 2d 962 (S.D. 
Ill.1999)).  Lastly, the Forest Service has other CE’s that do not address “vegetation 
management” as defined by the GAO to “include, but are not limited to, activities such 
as using prescribed burning, timber harvests, or herbicides; or thinning trees, grass, 
weeds, or brush” (GAO 2007a).   
The existing CE’s for vegetation management were modified by additional HFI 
provisions that released the Forest Service from the administrative appeal process (See 
Chapter Six and Seven).  Additionally, all CE’s (new and old) could be authorized by the 
Forest Service in previously restricted areas if extraordinary circumstances were present 
(described below).  Table 23 provides an overview of the projects issued in North 
Carolina under the new HFI and existing CE’s available to the Forest Service.  This study 
identified 18 projects issued under the new HFI CE’s, and 49 additional projects were 
proposed under existing CE regulations, which were authorized under other HFI 
authorities, including rules regarding extraordinary circumstances, administrative 
appeals, and substantive comments (described in Chapter Six). 
Table 23.  Overview of Categorical Exclusion Vegetation Management 
Projects Proposed by the U.S. Forest Service in North Carolina from 2003 
through 2008. 
Types of Categorical Exclusions Total 
Healthy Forest Initiative Categorical Exclusions 18 
Existing Categorical Exclusions* 49 
* These CE’s were authorized under other HFI rules, including the 
Extraordinary Circumstances provision and the Appeals Rule. 
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Extraordinary Circumstances 
If the Forest Service determines that an entire class of management has no 
significant effect, individually or cumulatively, on the quality of the environment, 
regulations implementing NEPA allow the Forest Service to establish CE’s excluded from 
both the EIS and EA requirements (40 C.F.R. §§ 1507.3(b)(2)(ii);1508.4.).  Under the 
original implementing language, the Forest Service could not implement CE projects if 
extraordinary circumstances were present in the activity area (40 C.F.R. § 1508.4).  The 
agency is required to maintain a project file that explains why no extraordinary 
circumstances exist in the proposed management area (FSH § 1909.15, ch. 30 § 31.2(10) 
(1992)). 
Extraordinary circumstances include a list of environmental and cultural issues 
that, if present in the proposed activity area, requires the Forest Service to conduct a 
full EA for any national forest management.  Normally, for example, the Forest Service 
would have to conduct an EA if there are steep slopes, endangered or threatened 
species, wilderness or wilderness study areas, and if the project occurs in an 
“Inventories Roadless Area”(1909.15 §30.3(2)).  The CEQ requires that the Forest Service 
“shall provide for extraordinary circumstances in which a normally excluded action may 
have a significant environmental effect” (40 C.F.R. § 1508.4).   
Healthy Forest Initiative “Clarification of Extraordinary Circumstances”  
The first rule change under the Healthy Forest Initiative was the “Clarification of 
Extraordinary Circumstances for Categories of Actions Excluded from Documentation in 
an Environmental Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement” (67 Fed. Reg. 
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54,622, 54,622 (Aug. 23, 2002).  The new HFI directive revised the Forest Service 
Handbook (1909.15 Chapter 30) by changing the extraordinary circumstances’ 
automatic mechanism triggering an EA and replaced it with discretionary language in 
which the agency was only required to consider “resource conditions” to determine 
whether extraordinary circumstances were present (Huber 2005).   
As the Forest Service stated, “The mere presence of one or more of these 
resource conditions does not preclude use of a categorical exclusion,” and, instead, the 
agency argued that “the degree of the potential effect of a proposed action on these 
resource conditions determines whether extraordinary circumstances exist” ((36 CFR 
220.6(b)).    “Previously, the presence of these ‘resource conditions’ were themselves 
defined as extraordinary circumstances, but the Forest Service changed the Handbook 
to make what was a mandatory duty into a discretionary act” (Vaughan 2006).     
Under the HFI rule changes, the Forest Service authorized CE projects in North 
Carolina that included 36 occurrences of federally listed Endangered and Threatened 
species.  Based on available data, these species were present in nearly 40 percent 
(n=26) of all CE vegetation management projects, while Forest Service Sensitive Species 
(another extraordinary circumstance category) were present in 63 percent (n=42) of all 
projects.  Cumulatively, these species occurrences contributed to presence of 
extraordinary circumstances in 43 projects, while the presence of archeological 
resources, Inventoried Roadless Areas, and other issues increased the number of these 
projects to nearly 66%.  Table 24 provides a summary of the extraordinary 
circumstances present in vegetation management in national forests in North Carolina 
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that would have previously required public documentation of potential environmental 
impacts in an EA.    
 
Table 24.  Overview of Extraordinary Circumstances* Occurring in 67 
Categorical Exclusion Vegetation Management Projects in National Forests 
in North Carolina. 
Type of Extraordinary Circumstance Total 
Federally Listed Endangered & Threatened Species 36 
Forest Service Sensitive Species** 187 
Inventoried Roadless Areas 2 
Archeological Resources*** 17 
*Other Extraordinary Circumstances not analyzed for this study include steep 
slopes, flood plains, wetlands, municipal watersheds, Congressionally designated 
areas, Research Natural Areas; and American Indian cultural sites. 
** Sensitive Species were added to the list of Extraordinary Circumstances by the 
Forest Service in 2003 
*** Archeological surveys for projects were not included in the FOIA.  Evidence of 
presence of archeological resources is based on Forest Service correspondence 
available in the project files. 
. 
 Prior to the HFI, the presences of federally listed endangered and threatened 
species would have automatically triggered an EA.  Based on the available surveys by 
Forest Service biologists, there were eight different types of these species that were 
documented or likely present in the proposed activity areas of 26 separate CE projects.  
Regardless of the potential adverse or positive effects of Forest Service management, 
the occurrences of these species would have compelled the agency to conduct an 
environmental assessment to determine whether the potential impacts may have 
effects on the environment.  Table 25 summarizes the endangered and threatened 
species identified. 
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Table 25.  Endangered Species Identified as Likely Occurring In North Carolina. 
Name Occurrences Class 
Picoides borealis (Red Cockaded Woodpecker) 12 Bird 
Myotis sodalis (Indiana bat)  10 Mammal 
Alasmidonta raveneliana (Appalachian Elktoe) 4 Mussel 
Helianthus schweinitzil (Schweinitz's sunflower) 4 Plant 
Haliaeetus leucocephalus (Bald eagle) 2 Bird 
Lysimachia asperulifloia (Rough-leafed Loosestrife) 2 Plant 
Symphyotrichum georgianum (Georgia Aster) 1 Plant 
Cyprinella monacha (Spotfin Chub)  1 Fish 
 
In addition to federally listed species, there were a number of other 
extraordinary circumstances present in the projects identified in the current study.  For 
example, there were 187 separate occurrences of sensitive species, which was a class of 
endangerment that the new HFI regulations included in the regulations as extraordinary 
circumstances (67 Fed. Reg. 54,622, 54,622 (Aug. 23, 2002) while simultaneously the 
giving the Forest Service the discretion to conduct an EA if those species were present.   
Other extraordinary circumstances described in the project proposals included the 
Cheoah Bald and Tusquitee Bald Inventoried Roadless Areas in the Nantahala National 
Forest.  Although logging in the Tusquitee Bald (Fires Creek Stewardship Project) was 
dropped, the project in the Cheoah Bald went forward after the district ranger 
determined the project “will not affect the roadless characteristic” (Bonnette 2005:3, on 
file with author).  Finally, based on internal Forest Service correspondence, 
archeological resources were presence in 25 percent (n=17) of the projects identified in 
this study.     
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PROJECT CHARACTERISTICS 
 The four national forest offices in North Carolina combined to issue 67 CE 
projects from 2003 through 2008.  The Nantahala National Forest proposed nearly 43 
percent (n=29) of all projects.   The CE for “Timber-Stand Improvements” (#6) was used 
most often, while commercial logging was the most common purpose stated by the 
agency.  Among all North Carolina national forests, the average project size was 
approximately 375 acres, with the Uwharrie National Forest skewing the distribution 
with an average of 2,425 acres per project for large burns authorized under the HFI CE 
for hazardous fuels reduction (# 10).    The following section provides a description of 
the project characteristics of the data set. 
WHERE PROJECTS OCCURRED  
Federal forest ownership in the United States began as an amendment to the 
General Land Revision Act of 1891, granting the President authority to create forest 
reserves by proclamation (See Chapter Four).  Today, the U.S. Forest Service administers 
155 national forest and grasslands covering 193 million acres.  The next section explores 
the North Carolina case study with analysis of the forest management CE projects in the 
Nantahala, Pisgah, Uwharrie, and Croatan National Forests.   
Beyond the United States Department of Agriculture’s national offices in 
Washington, DC, the Forest Service is organized by region, state, forest, and local 
districts.   Planning and implementation of project level forest management occurs at 
the district level.  Some national forests have several districts, while others have only 
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one, operating under the same title as the forest.   The Forest Service in North Carolina 
recently merged the Highlands and Wayah Ranger Districts to form the Nantahala 
District.   Together, the four national forests total 1,251,710 acres of federally managed 
land.  This study uses the eight districts under the most current restructuring to describe 
the geographic location of CE management in North Carolina (see Appendix C).   
Us National Forests in North Carolina 
To develop the most adequate understanding of the democratic processes and 
management regime operating under the HFI, this section includes analysis of the 
geographic characteristics of four U.S. National Forests investigated in this North 
Carolina case study.  The geographic extent of projects spans the Mid-Atlantic Coastal 
eco-region (Croatan National Forest), Piedmont eco-region (Uwharrie National Forest), 
and Blue Ridge eco-region (Nantahala and Pisgah National Forests).   
Based on the administrate record, Forest Service rangers in the Nantahala 
National Forest proposed 43 percent (n=29) of all CE projects in North Carolina, which 
combines with the Pisgah National Forest (n=14) to give the Blue Ridge the largest 
concentration of CE’s (64 percent).  Although the Croatan Ranger District issued the 
most projects (18), this district represents the only administrative unit in the Croatan 
Forest, while the Tusquitee Ranger District proposed the most projects relative to 
similar districts.  Table 26 summarizes the project characteristics relating to where 
vegetation management projects occurred in North Carolina from 2003 through 2008. 
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Table 26.  Overview Of WHERE Vegetation Management CE Projects Occurred In 
North Carolina From 2003 Through 2008. 
Eco-
Region 
Blue Ridge Piedmont Coast 
n=67 43 6 18 
Forest Nantahala Pisgah Uwharrie Croatan 
n=67 29 14 6 18 
District Cheoah Nantahala Tusquitee Appalachian Pisgah Grandfather Uwharrie Croatan 
n=67 5 9 15 3 4 7 6 18 
 
Nantahala National Forest 
 Created in 1920 as part of the Weeks Act (see Chapter Four), the Nantahala 
National Forest in western North Carolina is the largest federal forest (531,338 acres) in 
the state (See Chapter 1).  The Nantahala National Forest spread across the Southern 
Metasedimentary Mountains, Southern Crystalline Ridges and Mountains, High 
Mountains, and Broad Basins in the Blue Ridge Eco-region (Griffith et al. 2002).  Under 
the new HFI authorities, the Forest Service authorized more CE management projects in 
the Nantahala (43 percent) than any other forest in the state.   These included 100 
percent of the watershed restoration projects and 60 percent of all CE’s designed for the 
purpose of commercial logging (described below).      
 Until 2006, the Nantahala National Forest was divided into the Highlands, 
Tusquitee, Cheoah, and Wayah Ranger Districts.  After the consolidation, the new 
240,000 acre Nantahala District was formed when the Forest Service merged the 
Highlands Ranger District in Macon, Jackson, and Transylvania counties with the Wayah 
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Ranger District  adjacent to the Cherokee Indian Reservation in Macon, Swain, and 
Jackson counties.   Previously the largest Ranger District, the Tusquitee includes 158,579 
acre in Cherokee, Clay, and Graham counties, and includes the 5,499-feet tall Standing 
Indian Mountain. The Cheoah Ranger District has 120,000 acres in Graham and Swain 
Counties.  
 Although the newly consolidated Nantahala National Forest contains the largest 
acreage, the Tusquitee Ranger District issued the most projects, with more than half of 
all projects in the Nantahala and 22 percent statewide.  These proposed projects 
contained more rare species (endangered, threatened, sensitive, and forest concern) 
than any other district in the state.  Moreover, the Tusquitee issued more projects than 
the entire Pisgah or Uwharrie National Forests, and only three less than the Croatan 
National Forest.    
The Tusquitee district issued 35 percent (n=7) of all commercial logging projects 
identified in this study, and two-thirds (n=6) of all watershed restoration projects 
(discussed below).  Among these projects, the Timber Stand Improvement CE (discussed 
below) accounted for more than half.  Most strikingly, only 13 percent (n=2) of the 
projects on the Tusquitee district were authorized using the new HFI CE’s.  Although the 
rest were issued using the CE’s that were established prior to the HFI, they were 
authorized under different HFI rules, including the Appeals Rule (see Chapter Six) and 
extraordinary circumstances (see below).    
In addition, there were 108 species identified in projects issued in the Tusquitee 
District.   This accounts for over 26 percent of all the species identified in project files for 
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this study.  Additional discussion (below) explore potential explanations for this 
substantial percentage of species, including the Blue Ridge’s generally more biologically 
diverse ecosystems and the propensity for the Tusquitee district to authorize projects in 
sensitive areas. 
 The Nantahala Ranger District (formerly the Highlands and Wayah Ranger 
Districts) issued over 31 percent (n=9) of all projects in the national forest.  Combined 
with the Tusquitee, these two districts accounted for over 35 percent (n=24) of all 
projects identified in this study.  Although the projects issued by this district had a 
greater distribution of purposes compared to the Tusquitee, the Nantahala district 
relied on the “Timber Stand Improvement” CE (#6) a third of the time.   Interestingly, 
this district issued 40 percent of the HFI Hazardous Fuels Reduction CE’s (#10) designed 
as a wildfire prevention strategy.  The Blue Ridge forests, however, are not considered 
high-threat areas for the kind of catastrophic wildfires the HFI was originally established 
to address (discussed below and in Chapter Nine). 
 Unlike the other two districts in this national forest, the Nantahala Ranger 
District only had 13 populations of rare species occurring in the proposed projects.  Like 
the Pisgah and Grandfather districts, with one and four rare species occurrences 
identified respectively, the Nantahala District biological surveys identified far fewer rare 
species in the proposed projects than the statewide average (n=46).   
 The smallest district in the Nantahala National Forest, the Cheoah Ranger 
District, issued only five projects.  Except for one prescribed burn, the stated purposed 
for each project in the Cheoah district was for commercial logging projects.   No other 
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district issued a greater percentage of CE projects with the stated purpose of 
commercial logging.   This contributed to the rejection of independence models relating 
to the relationships between CE types and district (see discussion of statistical tests 
below). 
 Although the Cheoah is the smallest district and issued the fewest number of 
projects except for the Appalachian and Pisgah Ranger Districts, surveys in the Cheoah 
identified over 89 separate occurrences of rare species.  This accounts for twice the 
average, placing it second among all districts for the number of species found in 
projects.  Based on the number of species per project issued, the Cheoah ranked the 
highest with nearly 18 rare species occurring in each project.   See table **** 
Pisgah National Forest 
The North Carolina Blue Ridge eco-region also holds the 510,119 acre Pisgah 
National Forest.  Sold by the Vanderbilt family in 1916, the Pisgah was the first tract of 
land purchased under the Weeks Act (see Chapter Four). Today, the forest is divided 
into the Appalachian, Pisgah, and Grandfather Ranger Districts.  These districts 
accounted for 21 percent (n=14) of the projects issued in North Carolina under the new 
HFI authorities, including 75 percent of the weather-related salvage logging CE’s (#13).     
Among the three districts in the Pisgah National Forest, the Grandfather Ranger 
District is the largest, with approximately 187,000 acres southeast of the Blue Ridge 
Parkway, from north of Asheville to Blowing Rock, NC.  This tract of federal public land 
covers the Blue Ridge’s Southern Crystalline Ridges and Mountains, Eastern Blue Ridge 
Foothills, and Southern Sedimentary Ridges (Griffith et al. 2002).  
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The Grandfather district issued half the CE projects in the Pisgah National Forest, 
including the 250-acre Bald Mountain/Steels Creek project, which was one of the new 
HFI salvage logging CE’s (#13).  The Grandfather district also authorized projects 
targeting the Southern Pine Beetle on 304 acres, as well as relatively small wildlife-
openings (described below) averaging seven acres each.   
Four of the projects issued in the Pisgah National Forest occurred in the 157,000-
acre Pisgah Ranger District in Buncombe, McDowell, and Transylvania counties.   The 
Pisgah district is the Blue Ridge eco-region’s Southern Crystalline Ridges and Mountains, 
Broad Basis, and High Mountains (Griffith et al. 2002).  This district used CE’s relatively 
infrequently, including only two HFI CE’s for a four-acre nature-walk and a 51-acres of 
salvage logging following a Southern Pine Beetle outbreak (discussed below). 
Three projects were issued in the 150,000-acre Appalachian Ranger District in 
Mitchell, Avery, Yancey, Buncombe, Madison and Haywood counties.  This district 
includes the High Mountains, the Southern Crystalline Ridges and Mountains and the 
Southern Metasedimentary Mountains.  Most strikingly, two of the three projects in the 
Appalachian district were authorized under the new rules established by the HFI.   One 
of these projects (Dillingham Salvage) was the most controversial logging projects 
identified in this study (discussed in Chapter Seven).  The other noteworthy HFI project 
on the Appalachian district project was the Catpen Stewardship Goods for Service’s 
project (discussed in Chapter Seven).  Coincidentally, the Catpen project was authorized 
using the new commercial logging contracting system (discussed in Chapter Six and 
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Seven), although the project was substantially over budget after an archeological site 
was damaged during the logging.  
Croatan National Forest 
Established in 1936, the Croatan National Forest occupies 159,886 acres in the 
Carolina Flatwoods, Mid-Atlantic Flatwoods, and Mid-Atlantic Floodplains and Low 
Terraces of North Carolina’s Mid-Atlantic Coastal Plain (Griffith et. al 2002).  Given that 
the forest is smaller than most districts found in the national forests in the Blue Ridge 
Eco-region, the Croatan has only one ranger district by the same name.  In an area was 
once dominated by longleaf pine savanna, the forest has become a patchwork of pine-
plantations and second-generation longleaf stands (Frost 2000).  Previous logging and 
fire-suppression activities have replaced the native systems with tightly managed crops 
of loblolly pine, although scattered longleaf pine and pond pine forests remain (Frost 
2000).  Moreover, six threatened and endangered species, 61 sensitive, and 74 locally 
rare species occur on the Croatan.   
In fact, 75 percent of all pre-commercial thinning CE projects identified in North 
Carolina from 2003 through 2008 were conducted on the Croatan.  Pre-commercial 
thinning was the primary stated purpose for two-thirds of the projects in the Croatan, 
while insect and weather related salvage logging and commercial logging projects 
(authorized under the HFI CE’s) accounted for the balance.  Based on correspondence by 
the Forest Service, the agency changed one pre-commercial thinning project on the 
Croatan to a “Limited” commercial logging project authorized under the HFI CE (#12) at 
the last minute (Jones 2004:1, on file with author).    
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This emphasis on commercial forestry may also explain why the district had 
more than 17 percent of the rare species occurrence identified through Forest Service 
surveys.  While the Croatan issued more “Limited” HFI CE (#12) projects than any other 
national forest, and it also offered no projects for the state purposed of watershed 
restoration or wildlife openings.  The Croatan also authorized half (n=12) of all “Timber 
Stand Improvement” CE (discussed below) projects authorized in North Carolina, which 
is nearly 3.5 times more than the average found by other districts.   
The Forest Service management in the Croatan relies heavily on pre-commercial 
thinning in areas that have lost much of their original biotic and ecosystem 
characteristics.  The commercial forestry practices of thinning stands of young bedded 
loblolly pine plantations is conducted under the goal of promoting vigorous growth of 
more merchantable trees for future logging.  The Forest Service also asserts these 
activities benefit federally endangered Red Cockaded Woodpeckers (Hillman 2004:2, on 
file with author).    
Although this study does not address the claim that pre-commercial thinning 
practice helps “enhance the future habitat conditions for the RCW’s (Hillman 2004:2 on 
file with author), public comments raised questions about other species adversely 
affected by the thinning.   Regardless, by virtue of evidence from both sides of the 
argument, pre-commercial thinning, especially in rare species habitat, has significant 
effects (good and bad), which NEPA requires to be analyzed in an EA or EIS, not a CE (see 
Chapter Nine). 
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Uwharrie National Forest 
The 50,373-acre Uwharrie National Forest (Uwharrie) is located in the Carolina 
Slate Belt of the Piedmont ecoeregion (Griffith et al. 2002).  Although the Uwharrie is 
the smallest federal forest in state and proposed the fewest CE projects in the state 
(n=6), the Forest Service authorized CE’s for 14,549 acres—the most of all national 
forests identified in this study. 
There were more HFI Hazardous Fuels Reduction projects (CE 10) authorized on 
the Uwharrie (n=3) than any other forest identified in this study.   These three projects 
accounted for 13,326 of the total acreage, which, compared to other forests which did 
not use this HFI CE, explains why the Uwharrie treated the most acreage among all 
national forests in North Carolina.  The new CE (#10) exempts up to 4,500 acres of 
burning and 1,000 of logging from the standard National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) environmental assessment and Environmental Impact Statement process (36 
CFR 220((ii) (see Chapters Six and Seven).  Although there were 21 other burns issued by 
the Forest Service in North Carolina through the CE process, this study only addressed 
burns authorized under the HFI. 
The Hazardous Fuels Reduction CE (#10) also requires the Forest Service to 
design the proposals “through a collaborative framework” (USDA & USDI 2002).  The 
project files, however, provided no evidence of any deliberations identified as 
collaboration (see Chapter Seven).  Additionally, the Uwharrie offered the Pekin Wildlife 
Opening as part of a 3,898-acre logging project called the Pekin Ecosystem Management 
Project, which was the only project identified in this study that was challenged through 
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an administrative appeal (see Chapter Seven).   Finally, the last project on the Uwharrie 
was the Crown Touch and Release Project, which was a 1,160-acre pre-commercial 
thinning project.    The Crown Touch and Release project was nearly 3.5 times larger 
than the average pre-commercial thinning project, and it was the second largest pre-
commercial thinning identified in this study (following the Lime Project in the Croatan 
National Forest).    
The large acreage of the projects issued in the Uwharrie helps explain why more 
than more than an average of 12 rare species occurred per project.  In fact, even 
through the Uwharrie National Forest is smaller than ranger districts in other forests in 
the state, it had the third highest occurrences of rare species present of all similar 
administrative units (districts).  This may be explained by the ecological characteristics 
found at different spatial scales, with more biological diversity found in the Blue Ridge in 
a smaller grain-size than the Piedmont.  The Appalachian district, for example, only 
authorized three CE’s on 274 acres, yet each project had on average 13 species per 
project.    
WHAT PROJECTS OCCURRED 
 The next level of analysis explored WHAT types of CE projects were issued from 
2003 through 2008 in North Carolina.  Records research of these projects revealed that 
the “Timber-Stand Improvement” category (CE #6) was used over 35 percent of the 
time.  This dominance by a commercial forestry CE explains why commercial logging was 
the most common purpose stated by the agency, with over 29 percent of all projects.  
Finally, although there were only five projects identified as HFI prescribed burns in 
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North Carolina, these accounted for the largest portion of acreage treated (63 percent).  
Table 27 summarizes the project characteristics relating to what vegetation 
management projects occurred in North Carolina from 2003 through 2008. 
  
Table 27.  What Projects Were Issued In North Carolina National Forests Under The 
Healthy Forest Initiative. 
CE Type 
 
 
Special 
Use 
(#3) 
Road 
(#4) 
Regen 
(#5) 
Timber-Stand 
Improvement 
(#6) 
HFI 
Haz 
Fuels 
(#10) 
HFI 
Post-
Fire 
Rehab 
(#11) 
HFI 
Limited 
Logging 
(#12) 
HFI 
Weather
- Related 
Salvage 
Logging 
(#13) 
HFI 
Insect-
Related 
Salvage 
Logging 
(#14) 
N=67 2 5 14 28 5 0 5 5 3 
Purpose Pre-commercial Commercial Burn Restoration Wildlife 
Pine 
Beetle 
Other 
n=67 16 19 6 6 8 8 4 
Size Pre-commercial Commercial Burn Restoration Wildlife 
Pine 
Beetle 
Other 
n= 
25,408 
5,459 2,180 15,997 11 110 1,516 135 
 
 
CE Type 
 While the type of CE used varied among ten different categories, the pre-HFI 
“Timber-Stand Improvement” (TSI) category (#6) was most commonly used by the 
agency (35 percent), totaling more projects than all new HFI CE’s combined.  In addition, 
the TSI category accounted for 21 percent of all acreage treated in North Carolina from 
2003 through 2008.   Additionally, the pre-HFI CE for “Regeneration” management (#5) 
was used more than 22 percent of the time to authorized commercial forestry practices, 
including thinning, replanting, and burning.  Although these two categories were 
created before the new HFI CE’s, the Regeneration and TSI CE’s authorized in North 
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Carolina were affected by other provisions of the HFI (Appeals Rule, Substantive 
Comment, and extraordinary circumstances).  In short, the most common projects in 
North Carolina were authorized through the categories for regenerating and improving 
timber-stands, which were not specific hazardous fuels or post-fire related activities 
justified when the HFI was created in 2002 (see Chapter Six).   
Timber-Stand Improvements CE 
 The TSI category was created in 1992 for “routine” actions (57 Fed. Reg. 43180) 
defined as "activities that do not include the use of herbicides or do not require more 
than 1 mile of low standard road construction” (36 CFR 220.6(e) (6)).  The Code of 
Federal Regulations includes examples of “Girdling trees to create snags *and+ thinning 
or brush control to improve growth or to reduce fire hazard including the opening of an 
existing road to a dense timber stand” (36 CFR 220.6(e)(6)).   
This category was formed in 1992 when the agency combined two earlier CE’s 
established in 1985 (50 Fed. Reg. 26078).  One of these early CE’s was the Low-Impact 
Silvicultural CE for “activities that are limited in size and duration and that primarily use 
existing roads and facilities, such as firewood sales; salvage, thinning, and small harvest 
cuts; site preparation; and planting and seeding,” (FSH 1952.2 (4)).  The other was the 
Fish and Wildlife CE for “management activities, such as improving habitat, installing fish 
ladders, and stocking native or established species” (FSH 1952.2 (9)).   When the final 
language for CE 6 was published, the agency asserted that “*t+he intent of the agency is 
that only routine actions that have no extraordinary circumstances should be within 
categories for exclusion” (57 Fed. Reg. 43180 (Sept. 18, 1992).  The Forest Service also 
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defined routine actions as having “little potential for soil movement, loss of soil 
productivity, water and air degradation or impact on sensitive resource values and is 
consistent with Forest land and resource management plans”  (56 Fed. Reg. 19718 (April 
29, 1991).   
Records research revealed the TSI category was used for nearly 45 percent of all 
pre-commercial and commercial logging projects.  This emphasis on commercial forestry 
is noteworthy given that the uncertain legal status of using a CE for commercial logging 
(see below).  The TSI CE was adopted when another Forest Service exemption for 
logging was created called the Timber Harvest CE, which also evolved out of the Low-
impact Silvicultural CE and the Fish and Wildlife CE (57 Fed. Reg. 43180).  The Timber 
Harvest CE permitted the logging up to 250,000 board feet of “merchantable wood 
products” and salvage logging up to 1,000,000 board feet”  (57 Fed. Reg. 43180 (Sept. 
18, 1992).    
The Timber Harvest CE was later invalidated as the result of Heartwood v. Forest 
Service, 73 F. Supp. 2d 962 (S.D. Ill.1999), in which the federal district judge held that 
“the Forest Service failed to adequately address or provide support for its position that 
the timber harvests of these magnitude [sic] would not have cumulative effects on the 
environment… The Court cannot discover any meaningful analysis providing support for 
the Forest Service’s conclusion that the categorical exclusion of timber harvests of this 
magnitude would not have cumulative effects on the environment”  (Heartwood 1999: 
976-977).  Like the Timber Harvest CE, the reliance on categories for Timber-Stand 
324 
Improvement resulted in the dominance of commercial logging CE’s in North Carolina’s 
national forests. 
Given the controversial nature of CE’s in general (Moriarty 2004), including 
several court cases and a formal petition to the Forest Service challenging the legality of 
CE’s, as well as public opposition to CE’s in North Carolina (see Chapter Seven),  the 
category for exempting timber-stand improvements is one of the most criticized 
categories among all CE’s.    According to a federal petition filed by WildLaw (Vaughan 
2006:1), “The language of CE 6 is even more vague than that of the former Timber 
Harvest CE, which at least included an acreage cap.  Very similar projects to those 
previously carried out under the Timber Harvest CE are now being carried out under CE 
6… In the Southeast, in particular, CE 6 has been abused frequently.”  Furthermore, 
nearly 34 percent of all comments received by the Forest Service contained criticism of a 
TSI project, which accounts for more criticism lodged against the TSI category than any 
other CE combined.  
Moreover, 83 percent of all TSI projects were issued during the first three years 
of the six-year period investigated in this study.  This follows the general trend in the 
data showing the frequency of projects proposed dropped after 2005, following the 
Earth Island v Ruthenbeck ruling that required the Forest Service to grant the right of 
administrative appeals to interested citizens (discussed below).  In other words, 
although the agency could continue to use all CE’s as before Earth Island v Ruthenbeck, 
the drop in the frequency of CE’s corresponds directly with the federal court order 
requiring the Forest Service to provide an administrative appeal opportunity.  As 
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discussed below, the substantial level of public comments received by the agency—
combined with the opportunity to appeal— appears to have substantially influenced the 
frequency of CE’s proposed in North Carolina. 
Healthy Forest Initiative Categorical Exclusions 
 The CE’s established by the HFI were used only 27 percent of the time (n=18).  
The stated purpose for HFI CE’s related to commercial forestry 56 percent of the time, 
while prescribed burns accounted for 28 percent of the stated purposes for the projects.   
The remaining CE’s were used for routine non-forestry related management (Other), 
including right-of-ways and campground maintenance.  The “Post-Fire Rehabilitation” 
CE was not used in North Carolina, while other salvage logging, following weather and 
insect-related events, accounted for over 44 percent of all HFI projects.  This 
discrepancy between wildfire-related management and salvage logging for insects and 
weather-related events offers insight into the disparate influence of the HFI in different 
geographic regions under the Forest Service jurisdiction.    
Although the CE for Hazardous Fuels Reduction was used only five times in North 
Carolina, it accounted for more than 93 percent of all acres treated under the new HFI 
CE’s.  This Hazardous Fuel exemption was also the only HFI category that specifically 
mandated a collaborative decision-making process, although content analysis of the 
public comments for these projects found no evidence of such deliberation (See Chapter 
Seven).  Furthermore, the CE for Hazardous Fuels was only legal until November 25, 
2008, when it was invalidated in a federal court ruling and severed from the regulations 
(Sierra v. Bosworth, 04-2114) (see Chapter Six).    
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Project Purpose 
 There were approximately seven different stated purposes identified for 
proposed CE projects in North Carolina.  These range from practices directly related to 
commercial forestry (pre-commercial thinning and commercial logging), indirectly 
related to commercial forestry (prescribed burns, Southern Pine-Beetles), hunting 
(Wildlife Openings), and ecological forestry (Watershed Restoration).  While commercial 
logging was the most common purpose stated by the agency, the Forest Service treated 
more acreage with prescribed burns than all other categories combined.   
Although the Forest Service claimed that prescribed burns and Southern Pine 
Beetle prevention were justified on ecological grounds, these claims are not supported 
by ecological forestry science, which rejects burns to maintain monoculture stands of 
merchantable trees.   Additional, treatments for Southern Pine Beetle infestations do 
not address the prevalence of pine monocultures and drought-stressed trees (the root 
causes of the outbreaks).  Additionally, the claim that wildlife openings were ecologically 
justified is also problematic based on the evidence the project files.  The conservation 
science shows these openings only marginally support game management desirable for 
hunting while serving as vectors for invasive species and pests, including native SPB’s 
(McKinney 1999).  In fact, invasive species outbreaks introduce through logging 
constitutes a major threat endangered species, behind habitat loss and direct taking 
(White 2005).    
Given this evidence, the six watershed restoration projects provide the best 
evidence of ecological forestry among all CE’s used in North Carolina between 2003 
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through 2008.  Watershed restoration projects accounted for only 11 acres, or less than 
one percent of all forests treated. 
Commercial Forestry 
 The most common purpose identified for all CE projects issued in North Carolina 
in 2003 through 2008 related to commercial logging, which was in place 29 percent of 
the time.  This is consistent with the high frequency of CE 6 projects issued for “timber-
stand improvement” (discussed above), and, when combined with the pre-commercial 
thinning category, accounts for over 38 percent of all projects.  This dominance of 
commercial forestry management also explains the substantial participation by those 
with interests in ecological forestry who overwhelmingly opposed Forest Service 
projects, accounting for 80 percent of all critical comments received by the agency (see 
Primary Sources of Concern and Potential Effects section in Chapter 6). 
Prescribed Burns 
 The use of prescribed burns is often supported by the ecological literature when 
it is applied to native forests in fire-dependent ecosystems.  Although this study did not 
include non-HFI prescribed burns, the Forest Service did authorize five Hazardous Fuels 
Reduction projects (CE 10) in North Carolina.  Three were applied in the Uwharrie 
National Forest, and two were used in the Highlands District (now managed by the 
Nantahala District in the Nantahala National Forest).  Based on the available evidence, 
the Uwharrie projects were used for maintaining non-native pine monocultures, while 
the burns in the Highlands District were applied to areas that are not fire-dependant 
ecosystems.   
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Anecdotal evidence of an additional non-HFI prescribed burn in the Cheoah 
district included a 606-acre burn in the Cheoah Bald Inventoried Roadless Area and 
along the Appalachian and Bartram Trails.   As one commenter stated about the Cheoah 
project, “We believe there is little evidence that this area constitutes a fire hazard or 
shows any real need for controlled burns” (Thomas 2004:1, on file with author).  
Opposition to the Cheoah burn was not universal, however, as one commenter wrote to 
support the project, stating “I say go for it.  You folks surely know more about these 
things than we do in the general public” (Parham 2004:1).  Whether or not these burns 
were ecologically justified, the significance of 15,997 acres of burning raises questions 
regarding the use of CE’s for projects with substantial footprints (discussed in Chapter 
Nine). 
This study only explored HFI-prescribed burns and the Cheoah Bald due to the 
settlement made during negotiations for approved FOIA request (see Chapter Three).  
Additionally, while many projects addressed in this study include forms of burning in the 
project proposals, these were not the primary purposes identified by the agency. 
Southern Pine Beetles 
During the scope of this study, the Forest Service authorized eight projects 
covering 1,516 acres with the primary purpose of addressing outbreaks of Southern Pine 
Beetles (SPB).  Additionally, over eleven projects designed primarily for pre-commercial 
or commercial logging included treatments for Southern Pine Beetles.  According to the 
Forest Service, Southern Pine Beetles present the most serious economic threat to 
national forests in the Southeast (2010:1). As the agency states, in recent years, “SPB 
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outbreaks resulted in unprecedented forest losses, estimated to have exceeded $1.5 
billion in damage.  Over 70% of the pine forests in the South are still considered to be in 
medium or high SPB hazard categories” (2010:1). In 2002, for example the Forest 
Service treated over 200,000 acres in the Southern Region for SPB’s (USDA 2004).   
Ecological forest science, however, shows that SPB’s are native to the Southeast, 
and outbreaks may actually be linked to past commercial forestry practices, including 
fire suppression, monoculture plantation forestry, road construction, and seed spore 
dispersal (Heinselman 1981, 1983; Kilgore 1981; Abrams 1992, Spies & Turner 1999, 
Aber et al. 2000).  Dense even-aged pine plantations, for example, are more susceptible 
to infestations, and corridors provided by extensive logging roads may contribute 
substantially to the spread of pests and pathogens in many ecosystems (Aber et al. 
2000:6).  Additionally, the buffer between commercial pine plantations and native 
forests creates an “edge” effect, which may spread invasive species into forest interiors 
(Roland 1999).   
Thinning treatments done correctly can reduce the rate of spread of SPB 
infestations and can potentially preserve native pine communities, including Shortleaf, 
Pitch and Table Mountain Pine.  Thinning, however, only addresses the symptom of the 
problem of SPB outbreaks in the Southeast.  Instead of reducing SPB infestations, 
thinning and logging may intensify severe outbreaks by creating breeding habitat and 
food sources in “slash,” which is made up of left over logs, slash, and stumps (Massey & 
Parker. 1981) 
  A consensus among ecological forest scientists indicates that natural, 
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undisturbed ecosystems are more likely to be resistant to insect outbreaks and disease 
(Native forests have evolved with insects, which play important roles in the nutrient 
cycling, natural disturbance, food chains, productivity, and biotic diversity (Clancy 
1993:363).  In fact, insect outbreaks can have a beneficial ecological effect of creating 
large-diameter snags and critical foraging habitat for woodpeckers and nesting habitat 
for cavity-nesting birds and mammals (Veblen et al. 1991).  They also produce complex 
forest structure preferred by denning mammals (Koehler and Brittell 1990). 
Wildlife Openings 
 Part of the Forest Service’s management agenda includes the creation of “early 
successional habitat” in the national forests, defined cleared areas with the first 
‘succeeding’ generation of returning forests.  The agency believes these provide wildlife 
openings in the natural forest that benefits, among other things, game species and 
some native birds.  In North Carolina, eight projects were proposed for this purpose.  
With the exception of one project in the Piedmont’s Uwharrie National Forest, all were 
conducted in the Blue Ridge eco-region.  According to the North Carolina Wildlife 
Resources Commission, “Early-successional forest openings add habitat diversity and 
provide an important habitat component for a number of game and non-game wildlife 
species” (McHenry 2005:1).  In addition to potentially increasing structural diversity and 
mimicking natural disturbance, game management advocates believe early-successional 
clearings provides “walk-in” opportunities for hunting browsing deer and quail.  
  In contrast, ecological forestry advocates warn against wildlife openings because 
they may create “artificial openings *that+ have ecological problems” that outweigh 
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potential environmental benefits (Schafele 2005:1, on file with author).  These problems 
include edge-effects, introduction of invasive species, deteriorated natural conditions, 
and permanent loss of natural communities following road construction required to 
access the openings.  (Schafele 2005:1).   
 Interestingly, half of the wildlife openings identified in this study had 
documented occurrences of rare species (based on Forest Service biological surveys), 
including one population of federally listed endangered bats (Indiana Bat), as well as 13 
other protected “sensitive” species tracked by the agency.   In addition to the direct 
effect on identified endangered and sensitive species, there is some probability that 
these wildlife openings and early-successional habitat serve as vectors for Southern Pine 
Beetles and invasive species.  Although beyond the scope of this study, additional 
research is necessary to explain whether the declared ecological benefits of these 
projects outweigh the potential harm to biodiversity and ecosystem health.  This 
apparent conflict between agency directives for creating wildlife openings, while also 
protecting rare species and preventing SPB outbreaks, demonstrates some of the 
problematic incompatibilities within the agency’s multiple-use mandate (discussed in 
Chapter Nine). 
Watershed Restoration 
Among the projects proposed by the Forest Service during the scope of this 
study, watershed restoration work accounted for nearly nine percent (n=6) of 
management activity, equaling less than one percent of all acreage treated.  Each 
project was proposed in the Blue Ridge eco-region and averaged nearly two acres per 
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project.  All of these watershed restoration projects were proposed in response to 
adverse effects of illegal off-road vehicle use on public land. 
The use of Off-Road Vehicles (ORV) in national forests is one of the fastest 
growing forms of outdoor recreation.  The Forest Service has seen a tenfold increase in 
the use of ORV’s since 1972, growing from nearly five million to 51 million in 2004 
Today, ORV’s account for about 11 million annual visits to public lands.  (USDA Croatan 
National Forest Plan).   
This growth of ORV’s in U.S. National Forests has raised concern among the 
Forest Service nationally (Bosworth 2006) and in North Carolina (Croatan Management 
Plan) due to the propensity of ORV users to stray from legal sites into sensitive forest 
land.  In fact, the Forest Service believes “impacts from off-highway vehicles represent 
one of four key threats facing the nation’s forests and grasslands” (USDA 2005).  The 
agency has identified several ecological harms from ORV’s, including “impacts to cultural 
and historic sites, violation of sites sacred to American Indians, severe soil erosion, 
spread of invasive weeds, disturbance to wildlife, destruction of fragile soils and 
vegetation” ” (USDA 2004). 
All of the watershed restoration projects in North Carolina identified in this study 
targeted illegal ORV use and the subsequent “soil erosion and sedimentation into area 
creeks” and “local waterbodies” (Vann 2005:2, on file with author).  Illegal trails were 
also disturbing private property adjacent to the national forests.  To prevent these 
activities, the agency authorized several corrective measures, including “breaking 
compacted soils, filling gullies and shaping the terrain; installing dips, tanktraps and 
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other water diversion devises, and closing the trails with an earthen berm” (Vann 
2006:1 48).  Rehabilitation work included seeding the areas with a mixture of grass and 
legume seeds, lime, fertilizer, and mulching.     
Although ORV’s prove a serious challenge to agency rangers who try to block 
their access with road-closures, the agency found overwhelming support for this work.  
Of the 18 comments received by the Forest Service in response to these projects, only 
one was opposed.  Furthermore, these projects accounted for less than 3 percent of all 
opposition to Forest Service projects identified in the content analysis (see Chapter 
Seven).  In other words, these projects garnered the greatest proportion of support 
among all proposed actions by the agency.   While ORV associations are very public with 
their support of legal trails, the conspicuous absence of opposition to these road-
closures demonstrates the potential for this work given the substantial agreement 
between the public and the agency towards preventing illegal ORV use in the national 
forests. 
 
WHEN PROJECTS OCCURRED 
Based on the publication date of scoping notices mandated by NEPA (see 
Chapter Seven), the Forest Service proposed over 69% of the identified projects during 
2004 and 2005, and then the frequency of projects dropped substantially (see Table 27).  
The drop in CE’s proposed after 2005 is consistent with national figures provided by the 
GAO study (2007:12), which found “the number of projects approved using categorical 
exclusions increased from January 2003 through December 2004—primarily because of 
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increased use of the four new categorical exclusions—and then decreased from January 
through December 2005.”  To see a copy of the GAO graph, see Appendix F.  Like the 
GAO findings, this study found a similar trend in the drop in frequency of project 
occurrence in North Carolina.  This trend was also present three years beyond the time 
in addressed in the GAO study.   Table 28 summarizes the frequency of project 
occurrence from 2003 through 2008.  
 
Table 28.  Overview of Projects by Year. 
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However, given the relatively short period of time during which the four new categorical 
exclusions were in use, these officials said that it was not possible to speculate why the 
decrease had occurred” (GAO 2007:12).  This section addresses the decrease in the use 
of CE’s in order to more closely explore the factors contributing to the drop, and 
includes an analysis of projects proposed over six years, or double the period of time 
addressed in the GAO report.   
Modeling the Intensity of Project Occurrence 
One graphical way to assess whether events are occurring at a constant rate over 
time is to plot the cumulative number of events versus time.  If the rate is constant, then 
the scatter should approximate a straight line whose slope is the average occurrence 
rate—the total number of events divided by the length of the observation period.   
Figure 6 displays this plot for the project data with a scatter plot smoother 
superimposed.  The straight dashed line is the expected accumulation of events under a 
constant occurrence rate.  From the plot, it is clear that events initially occurred at a 
rate faster than the average rate until sometime in 2005 after which the rate decreased 
to less than the average rate.  In other words, during 2005, something happened to 
reduce the frequency of projects occurrence (proposed), as seen by the decreasing 
space between the arching line and straight line between 2006 and 2008.  The actual 
accumulation of events (grey dashed line) should be contrasted with the expected 
accumulation under a constant rate (red dashed line). 
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Figure 6.  Plot of the cumulative number of projects over time. 
 
 
 
 
Analyzing the number of events that occur in finite intervals over time 
If we divide the total elapsed time into a sequence of equal-length intervals we 
can use the total number of events occurring in these intervals to look for patterns over 
time by fitting various models for the intensity (occurrence rate) and determining which 
of these models best describes what was observed. Because the data consist of counts 
Poisson regression is an appropriate tool for this purpose. 
Fig. 2 displays the count pattern that is obtained when the total time period is 
divided into 18 intervals of equal length.  In this case, there appears to be an increasing 
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linear trend during the years 2003-2004, after which the number of counts decreases 
although perhaps not monotonically (see the separate rebounds in 2006 and 2007).  See 
Appendix E for a discussion of additional models considered, including various 
polynomial regressions as well as piecewise linear models. 
 
Figure 7.   Number of projects per interval when time is grouped into intervals of 
length 104 days yielding a total of 18 intervals. 
 
 
 
 
 These findings confirm that the Forest Service substantially reduced the 
frequency of CE projects proposed around the middle of 2005.  This corresponds directly 
with the July 2005 Earth Island Institutive v Pengilly ruling, which reinstated the public 
right to appeals an agency project.  As Chapter Nine explains, this inverse relationship 
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Service suggests that the agency does not consider the public an apathetic, easily 
manipulated body.  Instead, the increase of public participation appears to have the 
specific effect intended by Congress:  making agency employees more responsive to the 
interests of the public with the threat of administrative appeals and public scrutiny.  
 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN VARIABLES OF INTEREST: “WHERE WAS WHAT?”  
Before we address WHEN variables (discussed below), this section explores the 
relationships between the WHAT and WHERE project characteristics.  As the previous 
section provided a description of the policy and project characteristics regarding Healthy 
Forest Initiative projects in North Carolina, the next level of analysis explored the 
possible patterns and relationships between the selected policy and project-related 
variables of interest.   Specifically, this analysis explores where the Forest Service in 
North Carolina proposed the different projects (according to the CE type and primary 
purpose).  These response and explanatory (dependent and independent) variables 
investigated in this section offer a glimpse into the influences and processes involved in 
the implementation of the Bush Administration’s Healthy Forest Initiative in North 
Carolina.  
The contingency tables in this section explored the potential relationship 
between CE type and purpose response variables (What) with eco-region, national 
forest, and ranger district (Where).  Chi-square tests were used to examine the 
relationships for levels of significance, or evidence for rejecting independence, between 
the response and explanatory variables.   
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Additional analysis of the chi-square statistic is conducted using the standardized 
residuals to explore precisely which observations in the contingency tables deviated 
from expected frequencies and are, therefore, responsible for rejecting the 
independence model.  A null hypothesis holds that the explanatory and response 
variable found in the data are completely independent and are therefore 
indistinguishable from a random pattern.  If the chi-square test fails to uphold the 
independence model, standardized residuals are then used to determine which values 
are major contributors to rejecting the null hypothesis. 
 After creating a contingency table in Excel, they are run through the “R” 
software to produce a chi-square statistic.  In addition to the chi-square statistic 
outputs, R can produce the residual outputs.  If the chi-square statistic is significant, the 
residuals greater than 2.00 show the researcher which parts of the contingency table led 
to the significance.  Finally, once the residual observations are identified, explanations 
are presented based on evidence in the project files to explain the significance found in 
the table.  Tables 28 and 29 provide mosaic plots demonstrating the significant residuals 
analyzed in this section. 
Hazardous Fuels Reduction Burns (CE 10) in the Uwharrie National Forest 
 Based on the where response variables (described above), the authorization of 
CE 10 for prescribed burning in the Uwharrie consistently contributed to the rejection of 
the null hypothesis of independences at regional, forest, and district levels.   The 
number of prescribed burns authorized on the Uwharrie National Forest was more than 
three times the predicted levels.  Among the different patterns and relationships tested 
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in this section, the use of CE 10 for prescribed burnings in the Uwharrie National Forest 
contributed most to rejecting the independence model.  In short, the pattern of CE’s 
proposed in the national forests in North Carolina is clearly not random, and the 
Hazardous Fuels CE proposed for the Uwharrie explained this dependence more than 
any other relationship.   The mosaic plot from Table 29 shows the portion of burns on 
the Uwharrie National Forest (bottom-right) was significant. 
 
 
Regardless of the potential benefits and harms from these projects, they are by 
definition “significant” simply by virtue of the extent of acreage treated and 
Table 29.  Mosaic Plot of CE Purpose by District. 
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PURPOSE 
Commercial 
 
Precommercial Insect Wildlife Restore Burns Other 
App  
Cheoah 
Croatan 
Grandfather 
Nantahala 
Pisgah 
Tusquitee 
Uwharrie 
Major Contributor to 
Lack of Fit  
Not Contributor to 
Lack of Fit  
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concentrated in one distinct.  In 2007, the U.S. Ninth Circuit of Appeals held in Sierra v 
Bosworth that the HFI CE 10 was illegal precisely because the agency had not considered 
cumulative effects of these large burns when proposing the rule changes in 2003 (510 
F.3d 1016, 9th Cir. 2007).  The Ninth Circuit held, “The Forest Service’s conclusion to the 
contrary was arbitrary and capricious because the Forest Service: a) did not analyze or 
address the cumulative effect of all of the projects to be covered; b) based the Fuels CE 
on an acreage limit despite its finding that there is no correlation between acreage and 
significant impacts; and c) based its review of impacts of nearly 80% of the projects in 
the data call solely on the subjective ‘personal observation’ of its employees”  (510 F.3d 
101 ).   In November, 2008, the District Court formally enjoined the agency from using 
the HFI CE (Bosworth: 2008:1570).  
 Additionally, the court found the collaborative decision-making process 
(discussed in Chapter Six) showed the agency was following a case-by-case approach to 
implementing the projects, which is not legal for projects that theoretically fit in a 
predetermined category of actions (CE) that do not, individually or cumulatively, have 
significant effects.  According to the Ninth Circuit, this approach is contrary to the laws 
governing CE’s exempted from NEPA’s requirements precisely because there should be 
no site-specific significant effects to deliberate about. 
Pre-commercial Thinning in the Croatan National Forest 
 The next important finding relates to the disproportionate use of pre-
commercial thinning in the Croatan National Forest compared to other regions 
identified in this study (see Table 29).  In addition to the high ranking described in the 
342 
previous section, pre-commercial logging in the Croatan consistently contributed to the 
rejection of the null hypothesis of independence.  The use of pre-commercial thinning 
on the Croatan occurred nearly three times the predicted values when compared to the 
other forests and districts in the state.   
 The Blue Ridge region also contributed to the rejection of the independence 
model based on the lack of pre-commercial thinning.  With more than two times fewer 
occurrences than predicted, the forests in the Blue Ridge region had substantially less 
pre-commercial thinning when compared to the other regions in the state (see Table 
29).  One potential explanation for this low level of pre-commercial thinning in the Blue 
Ridge relates to the substantial history of commercial forestry on the Croatan compared 
to the Blue Ridge forests (Frost 2000).   
Weather-related Commercial Logging on the Appalachian District 
 While the Blue Ridge had uncommonly few pre-commercial thinning projects, 
another important finding relates to the high occurrence of weather-related commercial 
logging projects (CE 13) on the Appalachian Ranger District in the Pisgah National Forest.  
In this case, the use of the new HFI CE (#13) was authorized over three times more 
frequently than predicted by a model of independence.  The mosaic plot in Table30 
shows the portion of projects authorized under CE #13 for weather-related salvage 
commercial logging as significant (top right corner).   
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 The Dillingham Salvage project on the Appalachian is one of the CE 13 projects 
contributing to the rejection of the independence model.  In addition to being one of 
the most controversial commercial logging projects based on public participation (see 
Chapter Seven), the project also had four sensitive species representing extraordinary 
circumstances, which before the HFI would have prevented the agency from moving 
forward with the use of a CE for this project.   
Table 30.  Mosaic plot of CE Type by Where Projects were Proposed. 
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Insect-related Commercial Logging on the Grandfather District 
 Another important finding identified through the chi-square tests was the higher 
than predicted use of insect-related logging on the Grandfather Ranger District in the 
Pisgah National Forest.  Based on independence models, the Forest Service authorized 
more than twice the predicted number of projects targeting southern pine beetles.    
The mosaic plot in Table 29 shows the levels of significance (middle of the plot) for 
Southern Pine Beetle projects authorized by the Grandfather Ranger District. 
This finding is striking given the fact the Uwharrie and Croatan National Forests, 
not the Pisgah, have substantial pine forests compared to the Blue Ridge ecoregion.  
Despite this difference, the Grandfather issued as many projects targeting Southern Pine 
Beetles as the combined total from both other forests.   In fact, 37 percent of all insect-
related CE projects in North Carolina were issued by the Grandfather district.   
Additionally, the Pisgah National Forest issued more HFI CE’s (#14) for insect related 
“sanitation” harvests than predicted, which contributed to the rejection of the 
interdependence model.   
 The Grandfather Ranger District also proposed more than twice the number of 
wildlife opening projects than predicted by a model of independence (see Table 29).  
This was one of the major contributors to the significant chi-square statistic (98.9244, p-
value = 1.715e-06) (see Table 31).  Although it is not possible to provide a definitive 
answer, given the available data, the potential relationship between the occurrence of 
wildlife openings and Southern Pine Beetle outbreaks in the Pisgah National Forest is 
interesting.  Given the scientific consensus in the literature that artificial openings and 
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logging intensify pest outbreaks like Southern pine beetles, future research should 
explore the extent to which the disproportionately high level of wildlife openings on the 
Grandfather contributed to the substantial frequency of insect-related outbreaks 
occurring throughout the Pisgah National Forest.  
Commercial Logging and Regeneration (CE 5) on the Cheoah Ranger District 
 Another significant finding from the Blue Ridge projects documented by the chi-
square tests relates to the frequency of the regeneration CE (#5) and commercial 
logging on the Cheoah Ranger District (see Tables 29 and 30).  According the project 
files, the Cheoah issued more than twice the number of commercial logging projects 
under the regeneration CE than predicted by a model of independence.   
Interestingly, while the primary purpose for the project was commercial, many 
projects were designed for Southern Pine Beetle “prevention.” Unlike other insect-
projects where the wood products were not commercialized, these activities were 
classified as commercial because the agency was logging merchantable softwoods over 
eight-inches in diameter.  Regardless of whether the projects were effective in 
preventing or aggravating insect outbreaks, the commercial logging component of these 
projects is obvious.  Moreover, the significance of these outbreaks, concentrated in 
small pockets of the mountains, begs the question about the appropriateness of 
authorizing the projects under CE’s.  Whether or not commercial logging may address 
these problems, the results are significant either way, which under NEPA requires the 
agency to address through an environmental assessment and EIS (see Chapter Nine). 
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Watershed Restoration on the Tusquitee Ranger District 
 Finally, the last relationship contributing to the significant chi-square statistic in 
this section relates to the use of watershed restoration projects aimed at illegal-ORV 
driving in the Tusquitee.  As discussed previously, ORV’s are a major use authorized by 
the agency, and the difficulty in preventing illegal trails has been identified by the 
agency as one of the four threats to the forests by the Forest Service (Bosworth 2006).  
Although it is difficult to determine with the available data, given the high frequency of 
these water restoration projects used on the Nantahala National Forest (100 percent), 
the agency is either more proactive about ORV uses in Tusquitee district, or the other 
offices simply do not have the capacity or interest to address them through the CE 
process.   
The Uwharrie National Forest has extensive ORV use and allows them on every trail 
in the forest “except for a small portion of the Dickey Bell Trail located west of SR 6584 
which is suitable only for use by ATV’s or motorcycles” (Forest Service website).  If the 
Forest Service in the Uwharrie National Forest authorized watershed restoration 
projects targeting illegal ORV access, these projects were not conducted through the CE 
process. 
Likewise, the Croatan National Forest also has over 36 miles of roads designated for 
ORV use, including two trails running adjacent to the Pocosin and Pond Pine Wilderness 
Areas.  As the Forest Service explained in the Forest Scale Roads Analysis for the Forest 
Plans, “Unauthorized use is also occurring on over 70 miles of unclassified roads and 
trail corridors.  Many of these routes occur in the southern portion of the CNF, 
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coinciding with the highest occurrence of rare plant and animal species… Continued use 
of these unauthorized, user-created routes will further degrade sensitive habitats and 
expand OHV use into currently unused areas” (2003:9).   
Although the Croatan and Uwharrie National Forests have substantial legal and 
illegal ORV use, the Nantahala was the only part of the federal forest system in North 
Carolina that was implementing measures to address this threat.  Additionally, given the 
conspicuously low level of objections by the public toward these measures to address 
illegal ORV use (described in Chapter Seven), the increased use of these projects is 
justified on ecological and democratic grounds (see Chapter Nine). 
Summary Of Patterns: “What Forest Management Occurred Where?” 
 This section followed the description of the project characteristics (what, where, 
and when) in the data set with an analysis of the relationships between several variables 
of interest.   This section compared where the different CE’s occurred based on eco-
region, national forest, and district.  The CE’s were defined by Type and Stated Purpose 
as described in previous section, including nine available CE’s (# 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 
and 14) and seven available reasons given by the agency for the projects (pre-
commercial, commercial burns, restoration, wildlife, Southern Pine Beetles, and other).   
All of these relationships were statistically significant, or non-random, as explained in 
this section.  Table 31 summarizes the results of the chi-square tests from this section.   
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the policy and project characteristics discussed chapter 
documented several notable forest management trends occurring under the Healthy 
Forest Initiative in North Carolina from 2003 through 2008.   Consistent with other 
studying in the management literature, the current study showed that the most 
common stated purpose for a CE project proposed in a North Carolina national forest 
was for commercial logging (29 percent of the time).  To authorize this management, 
the Forest Service used a controversial CE for “timber stand improvement,” (TSI) which 
combined with pre-commercial thinning to account for over 38 percent of all projects.  
The Tusquitee Ranger District in the Nantahala National Forest authorized the 
most commercial forestry projects relative to other ranger districts, while the Croatan 
National Forest authorized the pre-commercial thinning more frequently than any 
other.   While the Uwharrie was the smallest national forest included in this study, the 
amount of acreage authorized for treatment (mostly using the HFI Hazardous Fuels CE 
#10) accounted for most substantial portion of management documented in this study.  
The Nantahala National Forest used the TSI CE most frequently, and, subsequently, the 
forests treated through this process included more federally listed and rare species than 
Table 31.  Chi-Squared Tests: CE Type And Purpose By Location. 
 Categorical Exclusion Type Stated Purpose 
Ecoregion 28.1502, p-value = 0.01359 41.7555, p-value = 3.661e-05 
Forest 61.7661, p-value = 1.057e-06 61.7661, p-value = 2e-05 
District 107.1683, p-value = 3.172e-06 98.9244, p-value = 1.715e-06 
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any other district.  Finally, two-thirds of all the projects authorized in the Appalachian 
Ranger District in the Pisgah National Forest relied on the new HFI CE’s for Salvage 
logging and “Limited” commercial logging.  These included the Dillingham Salvage 
Project and the Catpen Stewardship Project, two of the most controversial projects 
identified in this study. 
 The new HFI rules for extraordinary circumstances allowed the Forest Service to 
authorize 42 projects (63 percent) of projects with documented occurrences of federally 
listed Endangered, Threatened and Sensitive species.  The presence of archeological 
resources, Inventoried Roadless Areas, and other extraordinary circumstances pushed 
to total number of projects influenced by this HFI rule change to at least 66% of all 
projects authorized in North Carolina.   Other extraordinary circumstances (Native 
American cites, steel slopes, etc) were not included in this analysis, but would likely 
increase this percentage of projects authorized under the new HFI rule. 
As explained in Chapter Seven, this dominance of commercial forestry 
management resulted in a substantial level participation by commenters with interests 
in ecological forestry.  These participants overwhelmingly opposed Forest Service 
projects, and accounted for 80 percent of all critical comments received by the agency 
(see Primary Sources of Concern and Potential Effects section in Chapter Seven).   Given 
this type of participation, it is not unsurprising the Forest Service substantially reduced 
the frequency of projects issued in North Carolina after federal courts reinstated the 
right for citizens to administratively appeal agency decisions.   
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The following chapter provides a summary of the forest management and 
decision-making processes occurring under the Healthy Forest Initiative in North 
Carolina.   While the policy and project characteristics identified in this chapter explain 
whether ecological or commercial forestry best explains the forest management 
practices, the process and participant characteristics identified in Chapter Seven 
provides an understanding of the model of democratic theory that best describes the 
decision-making process occurring under the Healthy Forest Initiative.  Finally, Chapter 
Nine briefly describes the policy implications emerging from these findings to best 
answer practical and theoretical questions about ecology, democratic theory, and U.S. 
National Forest management. 
  
CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
What remains confusing and troubling to me is that the Forest Service 
seems to consider itself as our most important constituency. We are much 
more adept at being aware of and acting on the “best interests” of the 
Forest Service than we are the best interests of the public. This 
introversion hasn't served us well for the last 20 years and it won't in the 
future. We will never truly “serve people” until we have the courage to tell 
our own employees that we need to set our own precious views aside. 
  
James Furnish  
Departure memo  
 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Using records research, content analysis, and archival data, this dissertation 
documented and analyzed how the Healthy Forest Initiative influenced public 
participation and conservation for “Categorical Exclusion” projects in North Carolina’s 
national forests from 2003 through 2008.   The overall purpose of this dissertation was 
to determine which democratic theory best explained the decision-making process 
present under the Healthy Forest Initiative (HFI) in the Croatan, Nantahala, Pisgah, and 
Uwharrie National Forests in North Carolina, and what environmental outcomes 
resulted under the prevailing processes and individual U.S. Forest Service (Forest 
Service) decisions.  Evidence from Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight will be cited in this 
chapter to substantiate which democratic theory(s) best explains the decision-making 
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process under the HFI, what environmental outcomes were generated by those 
decisions, and what might be some of the policy implications of these findings. 
To evaluate the prevailing decision-making processes present in national forest 
management in North Carolina, characteristics of different democratic theories were 
identified in the literature (see Chapter Two).   This chapter begins with a design 
adapted from Steelman’s study (1996), in which she used two categories (elite and 
participatory) to evaluate the democratic structures present in the Monongahela 
National Forest planning process.  Building on this approach, the current study used 
characteristics in Table 1 to provide a framework for evaluating whether elite, 
pluralistic, deliberative, or agonistic democratic theories most adequately explained the 
processes for 67 HFI projects issued in North Carolina.  Finally, additional evidence from 
statistical modeling was used to identify patterns in the data to further explain the 
democratic processes and forest management present in the Healthy Forest Initiative. 
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Table 1.  Characteristics Of Elite, Pluralist, Deliberative, And Agonistic Democratic 
Theories * 
 ELITE PLURALISTIC DELIBERATIVE AGONISTIC 
ROLE OF THE 
PUBLIC 
Limited/Passive Represented 
by interest 
groups 
Represented by 
stakeholders 
Active Citizens 
LOCUS OF 
POWER 
Vested in Elite Vested in 
interest groups 
Stakeholder 
Collaboration 
Vested in 
Individuals 
VALUE OF 
DEMOCRACY 
Instrumental; as 
a means 
Instrumental Intrinsic Intrinsic 
VIEW OF 
FOREST 
SERVICE 
Idealistic. 
Trusting and 
competent 
Moderates the 
Political Arena 
Devolved Skeptical 
PRIMARY 
CONCERN 
Efficiency and 
stability 
Political 
Accountability 
Conflict 
resolution 
Growth of 
Individual 
LOCUS OF 
PARTICIPATION 
Voting, ratifying 
leadership 
Interest group 
negotiations 
Consensus 
driven Local 
deliberation 
Local 
participation, 
Dissent-based 
negotiation, 
argumentation 
VIEW OF THE 
PUBLIC 
Disinterested 
Skeptical, 
Malleable, 
Apathetic, 
Uneducated 
Disinterested 
Skeptical, 
Malleable, 
Apathetic 
 
Legitimate, 
Knowledgeable 
Legitimate, 
Knowledgeable, 
Diverse, Active 
*  Adapted from Steelman (1996) 
 
The process and participant characteristics were evaluated using categories 
outlined in the conceptual framework from Chapter Three and analyzed in Chapter 
Seven (Figure 2).  These characteristics were evaluated to determine whether elite, 
pluralistic, deliberative, or agonistic theories were confirmed.     
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Following the discussion on the HFI’s democratic traits, this chapter includes a 
discussion of forest management authorized under the Healthy Forest Initiative in North 
Carolina.  The environmental outcomes were evaluated using policy and project 
characteristics explained in Chapter Eight to identify the prevailing forest management 
approach.  Figure Two outlines the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter Three and 
analyzed in Chapter Eight. 
 
 
DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND THE HEALTHY FOREST INITIATIVE 
PROCESS CHARACTERISTICS  
 This first section discusses the process rules governing public participation under 
the Healthy Forest Initiative (see Chapter Six).   The three specific opportunities for 
Figure 2.  Conceptual Framework For Research Design: Decision-Making Process. 
Decision-making process   = f  (Process Characteristics  +  Participant Characteristics) 
Decision-Making Process  Process Characteristics Participant Characteristics 
Elite 
Aggregative Pluralistic 
Deliberative Democracy 
Agonistic 
 
Scoping Comments 
HFI Appeals Rule 
Collaboration 
 
Who participated 
What they said 
How they said it 
Figure 3.  Conceptual Framework for Research Design:  Forest Management. 
Forest Management = f  (Policy Characteristics + Project Characteristics) 
Forest Management Policy Characteristics Project Characteristics 
Commodity forestry 
Ecological forestry 
 
Extraordinary Circumstances 
Categorical Exclusions 
 
Where project occurred 
What occurred 
When project occurred 
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public involvement analyzed in this dissertation (not including lawsuits) were pre-
decisional scoping, administrative appeals, and collaborative decision-making.  These 
process characteristics are discussed briefly here before addressing the specific 
participation characteristics below.  Table 32 summarizes the findings based on the 
democratic model that most adequately described the process characteristics identified 
in this study. 
Table 32.  Model of Democratic Theory Supported by HFI Process Characteristics. 
 Elite Pluralistic Deliberative Agonistic 
Scoping Partial Support Support No Support Support 
Administrative Appeals Support No Support No Support Partial Support 
Collaboration Support No Support No Support No Support 
 
Scoping   
The scoping process is required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
to provide the public an opportunity to participate in determining whether significant 
issues are present in the proposed management area that would require the Forest 
Service to conduct an Environmental Assessment (EA) or an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) (FSH 36 CFR 220.6(c)).  The public is allowed to participate in scoping for 
all Forest Service actions, including those “categorically excluded” (CE) from NEPA’s EA 
process.  Even for projects the agency considers routine (CE), a citizen could raise issues 
relating to extraordinary circumstances (discussed below), which required, before the 
HFI policy changes, the Forest Service to conduct an EA or EIS.  This automatic trigger of 
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an EA by an extraordinary circumstance was eliminated by the Bush Administration as 
part of the first rule change under the HFI (see Chapter Five, Eight, and below).    
In addition to announcing the call for scoping in the Schedule of Proposed 
Actions (SOPA) published online (see Chapter Three), the Forest Service is required to 
mail letters to citizens who have expressed interest in Forest Service management in the 
past.  The agency is also required to publish a notice in one of the local newspapers.     
Although this level of public involvement represents the least substantial form of 
participation (Germain 2001:115), the Healthy Forest Initiative did not restrict the 
opportunity for public scoping.  In fact, there was evidence of 171 scoping level 
comments available in the projects files obtained for this study.  This level of 
participation was substantial given the relatively obscure nature of CE projects and the 
expedited process through which they are approved.   
The HFI did authorize, however, substantially more expedited management 
projects under the HFI through the CE process (discussed below), which limits the time 
and information available upon which the public is expected to comment.  In fact, in a 
2007 Oversight Hearing entitled “Management by Exclusion” by the House 
Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests and Public Lands, the Chair explained, “by 
categorically excluding forest plans and projects from NEPA, the Forest Service is 
excluding the ability of the public to be involved in the management of their publicly 
owned national forests“(Grijalva 2007:1).  
In addition, the HFI authorized the Forest Service to approve more projects in 
sensitive forest areas where extraordinary circumstances were present, which were 
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previously off-limits to active management without substantially more environmental 
review (EA’s).   Furthermore, the HFI required the public to submit “substantive” 
comments with site-specific, relevant information about concerns over project designs 
to earn standing (or the right to appeal the projects).  Given these new authorities, the 
Forest Service was authorized to propose projects in sensitive ecosystems, without 
complete documentation under an EA process, while requiring the public to submit 
substantive comments during the limited scoping process.    
In short, the scoping process is generally supported by more participatory 
models of democratic theory.  This is evident in the substantial level of public comments 
the Forest Service received through this process (n=171).   The value of the scoping 
process was limited, however, by the cumulative effect of the HFI categorical exclusion, 
substantive comment, and extraordinary circumstances rules.   
Appeals Rule 
In addition to “pre-decisional” scoping-level comment periods, for over a century 
the public has had “the right to object” (Coulombe 2004 ) to Forest Service decisions by 
submitting administrative appeals challenging plans for forest-wide and site-specific, 
project-level activity.  As Herbert Kaufman discovered in his seminal study of the Forest 
Service (1960:78), “It is accepted as one of the hardships of doing public business in a 
democratic government and is not ordinarily treated as a discredit, even if a field officer 
is eventually overruled.”  Under the HFI, however, the administrative appeals process 
was eliminated for CE projects by the “Appeals Rule” (see Chapters Six and Seven).    
358 
This HFI rule was active for less than three years before federal district and 
appeals courts severed it from the regulations (Earth Island v Ruthenbeck).   During the 
three years the HFI rule was valid, the agency proposed 49 projects in North Carolina 
(not subject to appeal).  After the Forest Service was enjoined from using the Appeals 
Rule, the agency authorized 18 projects over the next three years.  
After Earth Island v Ruthenbeck (2005), the public was again allowed to appeal 
decisions, although appellants could only gain standing to appeal if they followed 
another HFI rule requiring “substantive” comments during the scoping process.  Four 
years after it was established, the HFI substantive comment rule was invalidated in 
Wilderness Society v Rey II (2006) (See Chapter Five).  During this window, the Forest 
Service was able to waive six of the 18 projects from appeal challenges if the agency 
determined the comments were not “substantial.”   Of the final 12 projects open to 
appeal without substantive comment thresholds, only one project was appealed.   
Under the HFI, the public participation process (administrative appeals) was 
substantially reduced before the federal courts invalidated the restrictions.  Given the 
reduction in citizen participation rights under the HFI’s Appeals Rule and Substantive 
Comment processes, these processes of the HFI are best described by elite models of 
democratic theory that emphasize the need to restrict direct participation by the public.  
Furthermore, the lack of appeals filed after the courts reestablished these rules also 
supports more elite democratic views about the “view of the public” (discussed below), 
which considers the public apathetic and incapable of more sophisticated participation.  
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Collaboration 
The HFI also included new requirements for collaborative decision-making for 
the Hazardous Fuels Reduction CE’s and “Goods for Services” (GFS) contracts (see 
Chapter Five).  According to the literature and the Forest Service Handbook, 
collaborative management processes are supposed to include deliberative negotiation, 
face-to-face involvement of key stakeholders, and consensus-based decision-making to 
resolve conflict (see discussion in Chapter Two).  Of the eight projects authorized and 
implemented in North Carolina under rules requiring collaborative management, none 
exhibited any evidence of processes supporting deliberative models of democratic 
theory.   Instead, Chapter Seven documented evidence in the project files supporting 
elite democratic theory and traditional commercial forest management.   
One of the new HFI regulations with collaborative management requirements 
was the “Hazardous Fuels” CE #10, which was a procedure for expediting up to 1,000 
acres of logging and 4,500 acres of prescribed burning.  After being used by the Forest 
Service for four years, this CE was invalidated by the Forth Circuit Court of Appeals 
(Sierra v Bosworth 2007).   
This expedited CE process, with theoretically  no significant effect on the 
environment, was required by the HFI to be identified through a “collaborative 
framework” consistent with the agency’s guidelines outlined in the Collaborative 
Approach for Reducing Wildland Fire Risks to Communities and the Environment – Ten-
Year Comprehensive Strategy: Implementation Plan (USDA & USDI 2002).   Based on the 
evidence in the project files, none of the five HFI Hazardous Fuels Reduction projects 
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authorized in North Carolina had any evidence of collaborative decision-making of any 
kind. 
Additionally, three other categorical exclusion projects requiring collaboration 
were authorized under the new Healthy Forest Initiative “Goods for Services” 
commercial forestry contract system.  While creating new authorizes for the Forest 
Service to pay contractors with merchantable trees, the Forest Service was directed to 
establish a collaborative decision-making process to “involve States, counties, local 
communities, and interested stakeholders in a public process to provide input on 
implementation of stewardship contract projects” (FSH 61.12).   
The Forest Service Handbook directs the agency “to involve a diversity of local 
interests and engage key stakeholders in collaboration throughout the life of the 
project, from project design through implementation and monitoring” (FSH 61.12).   
Although the Forest Service did claim to use collaborative decision-making in one of the 
projects, there was no evidence supporting deliberative models of democratic theory 
for any of the three Goods for Services HFI projects in North Carolina. 
This lack of compliance with federal regulations can be partially blamed on the 
inherent tension between apparently incompatible management goals: expediting 
“insignificant” management projects while requiring time-intensive public deliberations 
for projects as big as 5,500 acres.  Regardless of the reason, this lack of formal 
collaboration confirms the presence of elite models of democratic theory in these 
projects due to the lack of public participation or the Forest Service’s disregard for the 
opinions documented in the comments submitted (See Chapter Seven).   
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PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS  
 The next section described the participant characteristics based on comments 
submitted to the Forest Service during the process characteristics (described above). 
The results from these two sections are used to define the HFI decision-making process 
according to alternate models of democratic theory.  
Role for the Public 
 The first participant characteristic addressed was “role for the public.”  Elite 
theorists envision citizen involvement as passive (except for voting), while other 
participatory theorists advocate a process fostering more active involvement from the 
public.  More participatory democratic models call for interest group representation 
(pluralistic), stakeholder negotiations (deliberative), or direct, “radical” involvement by 
active, independent citizens (agonistic).  “Participation theorists state that the public will 
take advantage of the opportunities to participate, while elite theorists claim that the 
public is apathetic and uninterested in exercising its participatory right” (Steelman 
1996:239). The analysis in this section determined which role the Forest Service 
prescribed for citizen participation.   
In developing an understanding of the HFI decision-making process, the 
distribution of projects, based on the “role of the public,” offers one of the more useful 
methods for evaluating where projects fit according to their respective democratic 
theory (see Chapter Two).   Figure 7 offers a visualization of the projects (based on the 
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corresponding democratic theory) over time, with jittered points to minimize overlap 
using a statistical package (Sing et al. 2007) from the CRAN site.   
Figure 8.   Dates of projects classified by model of democratic theory. 
 
 
 
 
 Evidence suggests that the presence of the elite model is supported in nearly half 
of the projects involving no public participation.  The records research shows, of 67 
projects proposed by the Forest Service between 2003 through 2008, the agency 
received no public comments in nearly 42 percent (n=28).   In some cases, this lack of 
participation can be explained by the expedited nature of the categorical exclusion 
process, which was limited to scoping-level participation except in the 18 projects that 
included an appeals process.  One project, for example, called the Tusquitee Hazard 
Tree Removal was apparently not scoped or announced to the public and included 
logging in areas along the original Cherokee Trail of Tears.  In short, the lack of public 
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participation suggests the process fostered a passive role for citizens and interest groups 
in a substantial portion of the proposed projects.   
 The elite democratic theory was also supported by five additional projects where 
the public comments were either only from government agencies or they were 
completely supportive of Forest Service proposal.  Comments from wildlife commissions 
or state forestry agencies are consistent with an elite democratic theory that suggests 
professional administrators from related government agencies, not the general public, 
should guide decisions.  Comments lacking any form of opposition from the general 
public are also consistent with elite democratic theory’s description of public trusts in 
agency decisions (discussed below).  Given this level of participation by the public in 
Healthy Forest Initiative projects proposed by the Forest Service between 2003 through 
2008, the evidence from these participant characteristics (Role of the Public) suggests 
that over 50 percent of the projects (n=34) support the presence of an elite model of 
democratic theory.   
 Evidence in the public comments supports the pluralistic model for 
approximately 32 percent (n=22) of the projects proposed in North Carolina under the 
Healthy Forest Initiative (see Table 32).  Fourteen Non-Governmental Organization 
(NGO) participated in this process, providing a third of all public comments (n=57) 
identified in Chapter Seven. There was also a substantial level of opposition by interest 
groups, which contributed to the significant chi-square statistic identified in Chapter 
Seven.  Although this participation supports the pluralist model, there was little 
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evidence that NGO’s had an influence on the outcomes of the projects 22 projects in 
which it participated (discussed below). 
Participation by unaffiliated individuals was most active in nearly 15 percent 
(n=10) of the Healthy Forest Initiative projects proposed by the Forest Service.  As 
documented in Chapter Seven, nearly 17% (n=29) of all the comments received by the 
agency (n=171) were submitted by unaffiliated individuals (with one individual 
commenting on three projects).  Furthermore, the substantial level of objections raised 
by individual citizens contributed significantly to the chi-square statistic (discussed in 
Chapter Seven.)  This level of direct involvement supports a participatory, agonistic 
theory of democracy given the focus on “radical” (Mouffe 1999) direct participation by 
citizens (see Chapter Two).  In short, this significant level of participation from 
individuals (often with ecological forestry interests) suggests theories about direct, 
dissent-based conservation (Peterson 2004) are supported by these 10 projects.   As the 
next section demonstrates, the level of conflict (by individuals and interest groups) also 
upholds another feature of agonistic models of democratic theory: conflict and 
confrontation.   
 Finally, there was no evidence of any collaborative decision-making, as defined 
by deliberative democratic theory or the Forest Service Handbook.  Although eight 
projects were authorized under policies that required or recommended collaborative 
management, Chapter Seven demonstrated that none of these projects conform to 
deliberative, collaborative models.  Instead, these projects followed the conventional 
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scoping-level participation, which is considered by theorists (Germain 2001) as the least 
substantial form of participation.   
While the Forest Service claimed it was fostering collaborative decision-making 
processes in the Fires Creek Stewardship Project, the project file contained no evidence 
of any pre-decisional meetings, consensus-based negotiations, or any other evidence of 
collaboration.  In short, there was no evidence of collaborative decision-making in North 
Carolina from 2003 through 2008 under Healthy Forest Initiative, despite the substantial 
emphasis placed on this approach by the Bush Administration (see Chapter Six).  
Based on the “role of the public” participation characteristics, the Healthy Forest 
Initiative explains the processes occurring in nearly 48 percent of the projects, while 
pluralist theory offers a description of nearly 32 percent (n=22) of the projects.  
Individual, direct participation (agonistic) was present in over 16 percent of the projects.  
Deliberative theory, and operational management (collaboration), was not present, 
based on the participant characteristics explored through this “role of the public” 
evaluation.  Table 33 provides a summary of the “role for the public” results for the 
project types based on elite, pluralistic, deliberative, or agonistic democratic models. 
 
Table 33.  Overview of the Number of Project Types for “Role of 
the Public” Based on Participation Characteristics. 
 Elite Pluralistic Deliberative Agonistic Plural/Ag 
Projects 50.75% 32.84% 0.00% 14.93% 1.49% 
n=67 34 22 0 10 1 
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Role of Conflict  
 In addition to the specific representation of the participant characteristics, 
another level of analysis involved developing an understanding of the role of conflict or 
contestation initiated by commenters.   In this case, the number of critical comments 
represented 57 percent of those received by the agency, while over 42 percent of the 
comments were either neutral or supportive.  These critical comments were present in 
34 projects, while the other 33 projects were either unopposed by the public or 
received no participation whatsoever.   On the other hand, given that there was no 
record of consensus-driven, collaborative decision-making, none of the project files 
contained evidence of participant characteristics supporting deliberative models of 
democratic theory. 
 As Table 34 demonstrates, the “Role of Conflict” under the HFI was best 
explained elite, pluralist, and agonistic democratic theories.  In addition to the direct 
role of individual participation (described above), agnostic theory also places substantial 
emphasis on conflict and the nature of confrontation.  While agonism acknowledges the 
intractability of conflict, pluralist theorists also believe public scrutiny in politically 
accountable forums is a necessary condition of modern democratic governance.   
Although the level of participation by unaffiliated individuals is rejected by 
pluralist and elite theorists, opposition from unaffiliated individuals was present in 11 of 
the projects, which supports more participatory, agonistic interpretations of democracy.  
Given that the majority of the individual comments were oppositional, and were not 
part of a deliberative decision-making process, these projects support agonistic 
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democracy’s “radical” form of direct participation.  Additionally, the presence of 
opposition from non-government organizations and interest groups upholds both the 
pluralist and agonistic models of democratic theory in approximately 22 of the projects.    
This level of conflict is noteworthy given the statements by proponents of the 
HFI who argued policy changes were required to address highly contentious federal land 
decision-making processes.  Instead, the conflict-resolution goals of the HFI themselves 
appeared to have triggered and intensified existing controversy over national forest 
decisions.   Furthermore, while many in the resource literature have advanced 
collaboration (Wondolleck & Yaffee 2000; Leach 2006) or “cooperative conservation” 
(Bush 2004) as an alternative to the conflict-driven contemporary approach, the 
evidence from North Carolina shows collaboration was not possible under the 
categorical exclusion process (see policy implications below).   
  
Table 34. Overview of the Number of Project Types for “Role of 
Conflict” Based on Participation Characteristic. 
 Elite Deliberative Pluralist/Agonistic Agonistic  
Projects 50.75% 00.0% 32.83% 16.41% 
n=67 34 0 22 11 
 
 
 
 
Locus of Decision-Making Power 
 The next characteristics addressed where the power of decision-making 
authority lay.  As Steelman explained, “Elite theorist’s state that decision-making power 
should rest with the bureaucratic or technical expert, while shared power in decision-
making denotes a participatory process” (1996:237).   Of the 67 projects identified 
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during records research, only four had evidence of public influence in modifying the final 
decision.  Project files for the 63 other projects contained no evidence of any 
modifications to the projects based on the public participation process.   
Four project files contained some evidence relating to a shared locus of decision-
making power.  In the Fire Creek Stewardship Project, the Forest Service dropped 15 
acres of logging from an Inventoried Roadless Area (Cheoah Bald Roadless) after 
individuals and interest groups objected.  Another project, the Pekin Wildlife Openings, 
appeared to be modified by public comments from individuals and groups, including an 
administrative appeal filed by the WildLaw law firm based in Asheville.  One Longleaf 
Restoration Project on the Croatan National Forest appeared to be partially modified 
after an individual raised concerns relating to the retention of native pond pine.  Finally, 
the pre-commercial thinning for Southern Pine Beetle Prevention was apparently 
modified after members of the NC Department of Environment and Natural Resources 
identified a population of Solidago verna (Spring-flowing goldenrod), a federal species of 
concern and a state threatened plant species.   
 Given that most projects were driven by commercial forestry management (see 
below), it is not surprising most of the opposition was based on criticism of the Forest 
Service’s proposed commercial logging and pre-commercial thinning.  The substantial 
lack of modifications of these commercial projects can be explained by the Forest 
Service’s traditional bias toward commercial forestry over ecological interests (Twight & 
Lyden 1989; Twight et al. 1990).  As Robbins explained in Lumberjacks and Legislators 
(1982) and American Forestry (1985), there has been a longstanding “highly congenial 
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relationship between the Forest Service and the commercial interests consuming 
national forest outputs.”  In Timber and the Forest Service, former Forest Service 
historian David Clary documented a strong timber production bias based on the 
agency’s historical goal of maximum commercial logging (1986: 199).   
The evidence based on “Locus of Decision-making Power” upholds the elite 
theory, given the Forest Service’s longstanding affinity with resource extraction interests 
to the exclusion of ecological forestry (Hirt 1994, Hays 2007).  Table 35 summarizes the 
data supporting the elite models with regard to the locus of decision-making power in 
the process.       
Table 35. Overview Of Locus Of Decision-Making Power In The Process For 67 
Healthy Forest Initiative Projects In North Carolina From 2003 Through 2008.  
 
Elite Pluralistic Deliberative Agonistic 
Decision-
Making Power 
94.03% 4.48% 00.0% 1.49% 
n=67 63 3 0 1 
 
View of the Forest Service   
 The trust placed in agencies by the public provides another criterion to describe 
the characteristics of the democratic process present under the Healthy Forest 
Initiative.  While elite theorists would predict little opposition or skepticism about the 
proposed management projects, more participatory models would hold a less trusting 
attitude toward the agency.   Unlike elite models, scholars with pluralist, deliberative, 
and agonistic models of democratic theory “believe the public should not be trusting of 
bureaucratic experts to protect their interests.  They are skeptical of the bureaucrat’s 
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ability to infer preferences” (Steelman 1996:235).  Studies of public attitudes show 
participants expect their contributions to have quantifiable effects on the final decisions 
(Knopp and Caldbeck 1990; Brown & Harris 1992), and that “dissatisfaction with the 
overall process” can trigger further confrontation when participants perceive the 
process was unfair, ineffective, or inefficient (Germain 2001:119) 
Based on the evidence obtained through content analysis in Chapter Seven, 
nearly 58 percent (n=99) of all comments contained objections, while over 42 percent 
(n=72) of the comments were supportive or neutral toward the Forest Service’s 67 
projects proposed from 2003 through 2008.  Of the 801 specific issues addressed in the 
comments, nearly 84 percent (n=669) were oppositional, while 16 percent (n=132) were 
supportive.  Additionally, concerns about the process combined to account for nearly 19 
percent of all specific issues identified, including concerns about information disclosure 
(6 percent), documentation (3 percent), forest plan compliance (3 percent), and 
expedited comment periods (one percent).   These findings demonstrate a healthy level 
of distrust and concern among commenters with the Forest Service, which supports 
more participatory models of democratic theory that emphasize public skepticism 
toward bureaucracies.    
The lack of participation by commercial forestry interests also contributed to the 
significant chi-square statistic identified in Chapter Seven.  As discussed, this trust in the 
agency by those with commercial forestry interests explains the relatively low level of 
formal participation by individuals with commercial forestry interests (less than 7 
percent), the lack of formal participation by commercial forestry NGO’s (1 percent of all 
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comments), and the absence of any documented process concerns identified by 
commercial forestry groups.   This is consistent with Steelman’s finding of low 
participation by commercial forestry interests who “did not participate in the public 
comment period.  They felt their interests would be safeguarded by the Forest Service” 
(1996:235).  This level of participation by commercial forestry interests further supports 
elite theorists who believe the public is trusting of the agency’s ability to make choices 
that benefit their interests.  
This opposition from the public to the Forest Service was concentrated in over 
50 percent (n=34) of the projects identified in the study, with objections from both 
unaffiliated individuals and interest groups as major contributors to the significant chi-
square statistic found in Chapter Seven.  Another 28 projects received no comments, 
four projects received public comments without any objections, and one oppositional 
project was filed by a government agency.  In other words, over 87 percent (n=34) of 
the projects with comments (n=39) were opposed by the public.   Table 36 summarizes 
the projects supporting democratic models by view of the Forest Service.  
 
Therefore, these findings are consistent with both elite and participatory models 
of democratic theory, based on evidence that a substantial portion of the objections and 
Table 36.  Overview of Projects By View of the Forest Service. 
 Elite Pluralistic Deliberative Agonistic Pluralist/Agonistic 
View of the Forest 
Service 
47.76% 34.32% 0% 16.41% 1.49% 
n=67 33 22 0 11 1 
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mistrust within public comments for over half of all projects.  The other half of the 
projects received no objections or skepticism whatsoever.  Given the large portion of 
critical comments filed by the public, these findings are consistent with the discussion of 
the “Role of the Public,” discussed previously showing similar results (See Table 32).  
Locus of Participation  
This section explores where participation originated, based on local (in-state) or 
non-local (out-of-state) participation.  Deliberative and direct participation theorists 
believe citizen involvement is most democratic when it originates at the local level.  Elite 
and pluralistic democratic theorists, on the other hand, argue democracy is best 
understood during voting or ratification to select leadership represented by elected 
legislators, appointed officials, or interest groups, regardless of location.  As Steelman 
explained, participatory theorists believe citizen input “is most effective, and therefore 
most likely, at the local level, for that is where the individual receives the most potential 
benefit from her involvement and where the costs of individual participation are 
lowest” (1996:241). 
The relationship between local and democratic citizen participation, however, is 
commonly debated in the literature (see Chapter Two).  While many scholars argue local 
participation in federal land management produces better decisions (Wondolleck & 
Yaffee 2000), others warn against an uncritical move toward devolution and 
deregulation that can be controlled by powerful commercial interests that commonly 
dominate agency decisions (Kaufman 1960; Twight & Lyden 1989; Coggins 1999; Abel & 
Stephan 2000; McCarthy 2005).  Abel and Stephan question whether “mechanisms for 
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participation that are nominally participatory may instead be more conducive to elite or 
pluralistic participation” (2000:618).  In short, while local participation does not 
automatically translate into more democratic control by independent citizens instead of 
powerful commercial interests, this analysis can be cautiously used to assess the form of 
participation. 
Commenters in this study had local residency 95 percent (n=162) of the time, 
while out-of-state comments came from fewer than five percent (n=8) of the 
participants.  Local comments were concentrated in 32 projects, with interest groups 
dominating 20 projects, and local individuals providing a substantial portion of 
participation 12 projects.  The remaining 35 projects received no participation (28 
projects), were dominated government employees, or were non-local commenters.  
There was no participation by stakeholders, local or otherwise, that would conform to 
deliberative democratic theory.   Table 37 summarizes the data for “Locus of 
Participation” described in this section. 
Table 37.  Overview of Participation Democratic Theory by Locus of Participation. 
 Elite Plural Deliberative Agonistic Pluralist/Agonist  
Locus of 
Participation 
52.24% 29.85% 0.00% 11.94% 5.97% 
 35 20 0 8 4 
 
This substantial level of local participation helps explain the number of 
comments from individuals and NGO’s, which combined to share over 50 percent of the 
total comments.  Sirianni and Friedland have argued this amount of direct participation 
is common at the local level (1995), and Abel and Stephan claim independent citizens 
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become involved in local issues due to the proximity of “direct impacts on their 
neighborhoods and families” (2000:617).   
View of the Public  
The final participant characteristic evaluated in this chapter is the “View of the 
public.”  While elite theorists describe the general public as uneducated, irrational, and 
a destabilizing force on governance, participatory models of democratic theory consider 
individuals as legitimate, knowledgeable, and informed contributors to agency decision-
making.  Like elite theorists, “who view the public as apathetic, irrational and easily 
manipulated participants,” (Steelman 1996:243), pluralists also consider direct 
participation by independent citizens as inefficient and unstable (Dahl and Lindblom 
1953, 1956, 1961).  More participatory models of democratic theory, however, 
“envision the public as a capable, discerning and knowledgeable participant (Steelman 
1996:243). 
Evidence from Chapter Seven demonstrated the lack of any public participation 
in over 28 Healthy Forest Initiative projects proposed by the Forest Service from 2003 
through 2008.  This confirms elite descriptions of the public as disinterested in these 
management decisions, and is consistent with traditional resource management 
approaches that are overrepresented by client interests (Stewart 1975; Twight & Lyden 
1989)  and unlikely to benefit the common interest (Steelman & DuMond 2009).  Within 
the remaining 39 projects with public comments, 41 percent equaled, or were less than, 
one page in length, while a majority, however, wrote more.  This explains why the most 
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comments contained greater levels of detail about specific project issues (70 percent) 
than those with little or no discussion (30 percent). 
Looking at the substance of participant’s comments, however, reveals a 
substantial level of local knowledge about species occurrences.  As Chapter Seven 
discussed, the public expressed concern with ecological forestry issues in over 46 
percent of the comments, and nearly half of all commenters identified with ecological 
forestry interests.  This is noteworthy, given that the public was more likely to 
participate in projects where endangered, threatened, and locally rare species were 
present.   
As figure 5 showed, the relative number of species found in each project were 
greater for projects that attracting more participation (participatory), while the projects 
without participation or with comments from predominantly government agencies 
(elite) showed fewer number of species.   The elite category showed a greater 
concentration of projects (dots) with fewer numbers of species present (x-axis) 
compared to the participatory project, which accounted for virtually every project with 
the largest concentrations of species except for one outlier.   In fact, when combined 
with acreage, the presence of species could successfully predict public participation 81 
percent of the time (see Chapter Seven).   
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Figure 5.   Distribution of log(#acres) by project type (the log is essentially the 
exponent of the acreage number. 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, the Forest Service does not release results from species surveys for 
Categorical Exclusion projects until after the decision has been announced in a Decision 
Memo (DM).  This indicates the public had access to other sources of local knowledge 
about these species beyond the information documented by the Forest Service.   This 
level of local knowledge confirms more participatory models of democratic theory, and 
rejects the claim made be elite scholars that the public is apathetic and disinterested in 
governance.  
Additionally, Chapter Eight documented a drop in frequency in project 
occurrence after the public was granted more substantial participation rights after the 
federal courts invalidated the HFI “Appeals Rule” (Earth Island v Ruthenbeck 2005).  The 
evidence found in this North Carolina case study (see Chapter Eight), as well as in a 
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national study (GAO 2007), supports more participatory models of democratic theory.  
Table 28 summarizes the changing rate of projects proposed over the six years analyzed 
in this study.   
Table 28.  Overview of Project Frequency by Year. 
 
 
 
Once participation rights were increased (administrative appeals), the Forest 
Service substantially reduced the frequency of proposed projects.  This can be explained 
by the agency’s fear that the public might potentially discover issues supporting an 
administrative appeal based unlawful management practices or on flawed project 
designs.  If the public was apathetic, irrational, and easily manipulated, it is unlikely that 
the Forest Service would have substantially reduced the frequency of projects proposed 
after administrative appeal rights were reinstated by the federal courts.   
This reaction by the agency demonstrates it did not consider the public as 
incapable, disinterested, or easily manipulated participants.  Therefore, the 
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participatory models of democratic theory that embrace involvement by independent, 
dissenting citizens (agonistic) is supported over other interpretations of democracy that 
consider the public as uneducated (elite and pluralistic) and  requiring conflict-
avoidance, consensus-based negotiations (deliberative democracy).  
 
SUMMARY HEALTHY FOREST INITIATIVE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
In conclusion, the HFI decision-making process is most supported by elite models 
of democratic theory, while there is also some evidence supporting pluralist and 
agonistic democratic theory.  For the majority of the projects, the Forest Service 
received no comments (Role of the Public), and when the public participated, the 
agency maintained control over the decisions (Locus of Decision-making Power).  The 
public was far less trusting in the agency (View of the Forest Service) than would be 
predicted under elite models, while more participatory models provide better 
explanations for the substantial level of objections delivered by the public.  Moreover, 
this opposition was primarily driven by local participants, which confirms the presence 
of more participatory models of democratic theory.  Finally, the knowledgeable and 
active level of participation by the public (View of the Public), demonstrates the public 
was not an apathetic, impressionable body of automatons, as would be predicted by 
elite democratic theory.  Instead, the public was most likely to participate when their 
interests (especially ecological) were at stake, and this participation substantially 
reduced the frequency of projects proposed by the agency.    
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Based on these findings, the HFI is best described as a decision-making process 
that conforms to elite models of democratic theory.     This study demonstrates that the 
elite model was most present in the majority of the projects identified, while pluralist 
and agonistic models are also present, albeit not as substantially as the elite model.  
Finally, the deliberative model of democracy theory is not supported by any of the 
projects identified in this study.  Table 38 summarizes the findings of the four categories 
used to describe the model of democratic theory present in the HFI in North Carolina 
from 2003 through 2008.   
 
Table 38.  Summary of the support for democratic models from projects authorized 
by the Healthy Forest Initiative in North Carolina from 2003 through 2008. 
 ELITE PLURALIST DELIBERATIVE AGONISTIC MIXED 
Role of the Public 32 23 0 11 1 
Role of Conflict 34 0 0 11 22 
Locus of Decision-
Making Power 
63 3 0 1 0 
View of Forest 
Service 
33 22 0 11 1 
Locus of Participation 35 20 0 8 4 
Total Score  
 n=335 
197 68 0 42 28 
 
The reaction by the public to the HFI, however, also shows support for some 
participatory theories (pluralist and agonist), while failing to uphold others (elite and 
deliberative democracy).  As described previously, Table 38 includes the “View of the 
Public,” providing evidence based on local knowledge and the inverse relationship 
between project frequency and participation, which undermines support for traditional 
elite theories of democracy that consider the public as ignorant, apathetic, and 
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impressionable.  Table 39 summarizes the decision-making process for projects 
authorized by the Healthy Forest Initiative in national forests in North Carolina from 
2003 through 2008. 
 
 
 
FOREST MANAGEMENT AND THE HEALTHY FOREST INITIATIVE  
In Chapter Eight, this dissertation documented and analyzed policy and project 
characteristics of the Healthy Forest Initiative to determine whether commercial or 
ecological models of forest management were confirmed by the data.  Although a few 
projects exhibited characteristics consistent with ecological forestry (watershed 
restoration), this next section describes how the major policy changes, as well as the 
Table 39.  Summary of democratic characteristic of Healthy Forest Initiative Projects in 
National Forests in North Carolina. 
 ELITE PLURALISTIC DELIBERATIVE AGONISTIC 
Role of the Public Support No Support No Support No Support 
Role of Conflict Support 
Partial 
Support 
No Support 
Partial 
Support 
Locus of 
Decision-Making 
Power 
Support 
Partial 
Support 
No Support 
Partial 
Support 
View of Forest 
Service 
Partial Support Support No Support Support 
Locus of 
Participation 
Partial Support Support No Support Support 
View Of The 
Public 
No Support Support No Support Support 
Total 
3 support; 
2 partial 
1 No Support 
3 support 
2 partial 
1 No Support 
6 No Support 
3 support 
2 partial 
1 No Support 
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vast majority of projects implemented under those polices, followed the traditional 
Forest Service support for commercial forestry.   
This is consistent with the substantial body of research in the policy and 
conservation literature documenting a longstanding “highly congenial relationship 
between the Forest Service and the commercial interests consuming national forest 
outputs” Robbins 1982).  As former Forest Service historian, David Clary, documented, 
there is a strong timber production bias based on the Forest Service’s historical goal of 
maximum commercial logging; "The wood chopper's voice will remain important, but 
someday it just might cease to be the dominant one in the Forest Service" (1986:199).  
Despite this prediction, the following section describes how, under the Bush 
Administration’s Healthy Forest Initiative, commercial forestry remained the dominant 
management model used for national forest management. 
 
POLICY CHARACTERIZES  
This section summarizes the overarching policy dimensions of the Healthy Forest 
Initiative by addressing two regulations promulgated by the Bush Administration.  These 
policies are evaluated based on the evidence in the policy and conservation literature 
described in Chapter Four and Five.  Table 40 summarizes the findings of the policy 
characteristics authorized under the Bush Administration’s Healthy Forest Initiative from 
2003 through 2008. 
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Table 40.  Model of Forest Management supported by the HFI Policy 
Characteristics. 
 
Commercial 
Forestry 
Ecological 
Forestry 
HFI Categorical Exclusion Support No Support 
Extraordinary Circumstances Support No Support 
 
Categorical Exclusions 
Statutory laws governing the Forest Service under the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1970 (NEPA) require three processes of review for site-specific, project-
level management.  The Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ), the federal body 
responsible for implementing NEPA, requires, 1) an EIS for all projects that may 
significantly affect the quality of the environment; 2) an EA that documents a “Finding of 
No Significant Impact” (FONSI) or a notice to prepare an EIS; and, 3) in limited 
circumstances, undocumented review where the action fits into a previously defined 
categorical exclusion (CE).   If the Forest Service determines that specific classes of 
management have no significant effect, individually or cumulatively, on the quality of 
the environment, regulations implementing NEPA allow the Forest Service to establish 
categories of management that are excluded from both the EIS and EA requirements (40 
C.F.R. §§ 1507.3(b)(2)(ii); 1508.4.)   
Under new provisions established by the Healthy Forest Initiative, the Forest 
Service authorized five new CE’s for Hazardous Fuels Reduction, Post-Fire Rehabilitation, 
“Limited” commercial logging, and weather and insect-related salvage logging.  These 
regulations represent a net increase in forest management authorized by the Forest 
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Service without substantial environmental analysis or documentation.  In addition, the 
specific management authorized under the new HFI CE’s is also inconsistent with 
ecological forestry as described in Chapter Four.  Table 5 summarizes the five new HFI 
categorical exclusion processes established by the Bush Administration in 2003. 
Table 5. Five New Categorical Exclusions Created by the Healthy Forest Initiative. 
CE 
# 
Name of HFI CE Management Characteristics Forest 
Management  
10 Hazardous 
Fuels Reduction   
4,500 acres of prescribed burns and 
1,000 acres of commercial logging;  
Commercial 
Forestry  
11 Post-Fire 
Rehabilitation 
4,200 acres of tree planting, fence 
replacement, habitat restoration, 
heritage site restoration, repair of roads 
and trails, and repair of damage to minor 
facilities such as campgrounds. 
Commercial 
Forestry  
12 “Limited” 
Commercial 
Logging 
70-acres of “small scale” commercial 
logging; Less than one-half mile of road 
construction  
Commercial 
Forestry 
13 Weather-
Related Salvage 
Logging 
250 acres of commercial logging in areas 
with recent weather-related 
disturbance; less than one-half mile of 
road construction  
Commercial 
Forestry 
14 Insect-Related 
“Sanitation” 
Salvage Logging 
250 acres of commercial logging for 
“sanitation harvests” in areas with 
recent or pending insect outbreaks; less 
than one-half mile of road construction 
Commercial 
Forestry 
 
Although prescribed burning on fire-adapted ecosystems is supported by 
ecological forestry, federal courts severed the hazardous fuels reduction CE from the 
regulations (Sierra Club v Bosworth 2007), holding the Bush Administration failed to 
address the cumulative impacts of individual 4,500 acre burns and 1,000 acre logging 
projects across the landscape.  Unlike commercial logging, prescribed burning is 
supported by ecological forestry, yet CE 10 authorized the agency to conduct large 
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burning projects without substantial environmental review required by the National 
Environmental Policy Act (1970).   Given the scale and potentially adverse 
environmental effects of the hazardous fuels reduction CE, this HFI rule is inconsistent 
with ecological forestry principles, and instead supports models of commercial forestry 
management.   
While the Post-Fire Rehabilitation CE (#11) was not used in North Carolina during 
2003 through 2008, the merits of such management following natural wildfire events 
are not supported in the ecological forestry literature.   On August 1, 2006, for example, 
nearly 600 leading scientists signed a letter opposing the Bush Administration’s post-fire 
activities, writing: “When we, as scientists, see policies being developed that run 
counter to the lessons of science, we feel compelled to speak up.  Proposed post-
disturbance legislation… crafted as a response to recent fires and other disturbances, is 
misguided because it distorts or ignores recent scientific advances.  Under the labels of 
‘recovery’ and ‘restoration’, these bills would speed up logging and replanting after 
natural disturbances… such activity would actually slow the natural recovery of forests 
and of streams and the creatures within them… no substantive evidence supports the 
idea that fire-adapted forests might be improved” (in Hanson et al. 2009).     
Additionally, as recently as February 2, 2010, scientists at the University of 
California at Davis released a report that claims to “debunk the myths” of post-fire 
management as designed by the Forest Service.  These scientists argue, “It may seem 
counterintuitive, but the scientific evidence is telling us that some of the very best and 
richest wildlife habitat in western U.S. forests occurs where fire kills most or all of the 
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trees. These areas are relatively rare on the landscape, and the many wildlife species 
that depend upon the habitat created by high-intensity fire are threatened by fire 
suppression and post-fire logging” (Hansen et al. 2009).  Given this criticism from 
ecological foresters, the Post-Fire Rehabilitation CE is most consistent with models of 
forest management that support planting merchantable stands of trees in naturally 
regenerating ecosystems for commercial purposes. 
Furthermore, three of the CE’s were specifically established for commercial 
forestry purposes.  The Limited Logging CE, for example, was created to allow the 
agency to expedite “small” 70-acre logging projects with up to one-half mile of roads for 
the “removal of individual trees for sawlogs, specialty products, or fuelwood, and 
commercial thinning of overstocked stands to achieve the desired stocking level to 
increase health and vigor” (FSH 1909.15 ch. 30).  By definition, this CE is most supported 
by commercial forestry management.  Weather related salvage logging (CE #13) is also 
designed for commercial, not ecological, forestry.  Salvage logging is rejected by 
ecological forestry given the lack of any redeeming environmental value (Lindenmayer & 
Noss 2006; Lindenmayer et al. 2010).  In fact, salvage logging actually intensifies forest 
health problems (Ingalsbee 1997).    
Insect-related logging is also not supported by ecological forest science.  The HFI 
“Sanitation Harvest” CE (#14) was designed to address insects like Southern Pine 
Beetles, which are native to the Southeast.  In fact, outbreaks are linked to past 
commercial forestry practices, including fire suppression, monoculture plantation 
forestry, road construction, and seed spore dispersal (Heinselman 1981, 1983; Kilgore 
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1981; Abrams 1992; Spies & Turner 1999, Aber et al. 2000).  Dense even-aged pine 
plantations, for example, are more susceptible to infestations, and corridors provided by 
extensive logging roads substantially contribute to the spread of pests and pathogens in 
many ecosystems (Aber et al. 2000:6).  Additionally, the buffers between commercial 
pine plantations and native forests create an “edge” effect that spreads species like 
Southern Pine Beetles into forest interiors (Roland 1993).  Instead of reducing SPB 
infestations, thinning and logging can intensify severe outbreaks by creating breeding 
habitat and food sources in “slash,” which is made up of left over logs, slash, and stumps 
(Massey &. Parker 1981). 
Consensus among ecological forestry scientists shows natural, undisturbed 
ecosystems are more likely to be resistant to insect outbreaks and disease (Aber et al. 
2000).   Native forests have evolved with insects that play important roles in the 
nutrient cycling, natural disturbance, food chains, productivity, and biotic diversity 
(Clancy 1993:363).  In fact, insect outbreaks can have a beneficial ecological effect of 
creating large-diameter snags and critical foraging habitat for woodpeckers and nesting 
habitat for cavity-nesting birds and mammals (Veblen et al. 1991).  They also produce 
complex forest structure preferred by denning mammals (Koehler and Brittell 1990). 
Given this large body of work in the literature, the “Sanitation Harvest” HFI CE for insect 
related salvage logging is not supported by ecological forestry.  In fact, Black et al. 
recently released a report demonstrating that logging to reduce insect outbreaks may 
intensity forest health problems.  “The best available science indicates that such 
treatments are not likely to reduce forest susceptibility to outbreaks or reduce the risk 
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of "res, especially the risk of "res to communities. Furthermore, such silvicultural 
treatments could have substantial short- and significant long-term ecological costs when 
carried out in national forest roadless areas” (Black et al. 2010:1). Instead, like the other 
HFI CE’s, this management approach is more consistent with principles of commercial 
forestry. 
Extraordinary Circumstance  
The first rule established by the Healthy Forest Initiative was the “Clarification of 
Extraordinary Circumstances” (67 Fed. Reg. 54,622, 54,622), which revised the Forest 
Service Handbook (1909.15 Chapter 30) by changing the previously existing automatic 
trigger an EA when extraordinary circumstances are present.  Instead, the HFI replaced 
the existing rule with discretionary language authorizing agency to consider whether 
“resource conditions” determine extraordinary circumstances were present (Huber 
2005).   “Previously, the presence of these ‘resource conditions’ were themselves 
defined as extraordinary circumstances, but the Forest Service changed the Handbook 
to make what was a mandatory duty into a discretionary act” (Vaughan 2006).     
Prior to the HFI, NEPA required the Forest Service to conduct an EA for all 
management except “routine actions that have no extraordinary circumstances” (57 
Fed. Reg. 43180 (September 18, 1992).  Extraordinary circumstances include a list of 
environmental and cultural issues that, if present in the proposed activity area, 
originally required the Forest Service to conduct a full EA for any national forest 
management.   Normally, for example, the Forest  Service could not use a CE if there are 
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steep slopes, endangered or threatened species, wilderness or wilderness study areas, 
and if the project occurs in an “Inventories Roadless Area”(1909.15 §30.3(2)).   
Under the “clarification of extraordinary circumstances” HFI policy change, the 
Forest Service was allowed to authorize CE projects with occurrences of federally listed 
Endangered and Threatened species.  Chapter Eight provided evidence based on 
available data that documents species occurrences in nearly 40 percent (n=26) of all CE 
vegetation management projects approved in North Carolina, while Forest Service 
Sensitive Species (another extraordinary circumstance category) were present in 63 
percent (n=42) of all projects.  Cumulatively, these species occurrences contributed to 
presence of extraordinary circumstances in 43 projects, while the presence of 
archeological resources, Inventoried Roadless Areas, and other issues increased the 
number of these projects with to nearly 66%.  Table 23 provides a summary of the 
extraordinary circumstances present in vegetation management in North Carolina’s 
national forests that would have previously required public documentation of potential 
environmental impacts in an EA.    
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Table 23.  Overview of Extraordinary Circumstances* Occurring in 67 
Categorical Exclusion Vegetation Management Projects in National Forests 
in North Carolina. 
Type of Extraordinary Circumstance Total 
Federally Listed Endangered & Threatened Species 36 
Forest Service Sensitive Species** 187 
Inventoried Roadless Areas 2 
Archeological Resources*** 17 
*Other Extraordinary Circumstances not analyzed for this study include steep 
slopes, flood plains, wetlands, municipal watersheds, Congressionally 
designated areas, Research Natural Areas; and American Indian cultural sites. 
** Sensitive Species were added to the list of Extraordinary Circumstances by 
the Forest Service in 2003 
*** Archeological surveys for projects were not included in the FOIA.  
Evidence of presence of archeological resources is based on Forest Service 
correspondence available in the project files. 
 
The extraordinary circumstances rule applied to the new HFI CE’s promulgated in 
the summer of 2003 as well as to existing CE’s established by the Forest Service that 
exempted vegetation management from NEPA analysis, including road rehabilitation, 
special uses, regeneration, and “timber-stand improvements.” By definition, the 
“clarification” of rules protecting federally listed and rare species, intact roadless 
forests, watersheds, and environmental resources is inconsistent with ecological models 
of forest management.  As such, the extraordinary circumstances rule established by the 
Bush Administration’s HFI in 2002 supports commercial forestry management.  
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PROJECT CHARACTERISTICS  
The next section discusses specific management characteristics for 67 projects 
approved and implemented through the categorical exclusion process in North Carolina 
from 2003 through 2008.  In addition to the broad policy considerations discussed 
above, this section provides a summary of evidence documented in Chapter Eight to 
determine whether specific projects authorized under the Healthy Forest Initiative 
confirmed commercial or ecological models of forest management. 
Watershed Restoration 
Among the ecologically justified management projects proposed by the Forest 
Service during the scope of this study, there were six watershed restoration approved in 
the Blue Ridge ecoregion for the purpose of reducing the adverse effects of illegal off-
road vehicles in the national forests.  These management activities accounted for nearly 
nine percent (n=6) of all management activity, and less than one percent of all acreage 
treated.    
This use of ORV’s in U.S. National Forests has raised concern among the Forest 
Service nationally (Bosworth 2006) and in North Carolina (Croatan Management Plan) 
due to the propensity of ORV users to stray from designated trails into illegal sensitive 
areas.  In fact, the Forest Service believes “impacts from off-highway vehicles represent 
one of four key threats facing the nation’s forests and grasslands” (USDA 2005).  The 
agency has identified several ecological problems arising from ORV’s, including “impacts 
to cultural and historic sites, violation of sites sacred to American Indians, severe soil 
erosion, spread of invasive weeds, disturbance to wildlife, destruction of fragile soils and 
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vegetation” ” (USDA 2004). The watershed restoration projects in North Carolina 
identified in this study targeted illegal ORV use and the subsequent “soil erosion and 
sedimentation into area creeks” and “local waterbodies” (Vann 2005:2, on file with 
author).   
While ORV’s pose a serious challenge to agency rangers who attempt to block 
illegal access, the agency received overwhelming support for this work.  Most strikingly, 
of 18 comments received by the Forest Service in response to these projects, only one 
was opposed (see Chapter Seven).  In other words, these projects garnered the greatest 
proportion of support among all proposed actions by the agency.  While ORV 
associations are often very public with their support of legal trails, the conspicuous 
absence of opposition to these road-closures demonstrates to future potential for this 
work.  In short, there is substantial agreement between the public and the agency 
towards preventing illegal ORV use in the national forests. 
Given these benefits of watershed restoration, and support for such activities in 
the conservation literature (Hays 2007), this management approved by the Forest 
Service supports models of ecological forestry.  As discussed below, the overwhelming 
support for this management, in addition to the ecological forestry benefits, 
demonstrates the potential positive policy implications for future Forest Service 
management (discussed below). 
Pre-commercial and Commercial Logging 
 The most common purpose identified for all CE projects issued in North Carolina 
in 2003 through 2008 related to commercial logging, which was evident 29 percent of 
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the time.  The most common CE type was for “timber-stand improvement” (CE #6), 
which is a commercial forestry management approach used for maintaining and logging 
merchantable crops of trees (discussed in Chapter Eight).  When combined with pre-
commercial thinning, the agency approved commercial forestry projects over 38 percent 
of the time.  This dominance of commercial forestry management also explains the 
substantial opposition by commenters with a primary interest in ecological forestry, 
which accounting for 80 percent of all critical comments received by the agency (see 
Chapter Seven).  By definition, the use of commercial logging and precommercial 
thinning confirms the substantial support for commercial forestry by the Forest Service, 
which is consistent with other findings (Twight 1989; Twight & Lyden 1990).  
Prescribed Burns 
 The use of prescribed burns is supported by the ecological literature when it is 
applied to native forests in fire-dependent ecosystems.   On the other hand, burning can 
be applied as a commercial forestry technique to reduce competition and threats to 
merchantable trees.  Although this study did not include non-HFI prescribed burns (see 
Chapter Three), the Forest Service did authorize five Hazardous Fuels Reduction projects 
(CE 10).  Three were approved in the Uwharrie National Forest and two in the Highlands 
District (now managed by the Nantahala District in the Nantahala National Forest).   
Based on the available evidence, the Uwharrie projects were used for 
maintaining non-native pine monocultures, while the burns in the Highlands District 
were applied to ecosystems that are not fire-adapted.  Furthermore, the significance of 
15,997 acres of burning raises policy questions about the use of CE’s for projects with 
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substantial acreage.   Anecdotal evidence of an additional non-HFI prescribed burn in 
the Cheoah Ranger District included a 606-acre burn in the non-fire dependent Cheoah 
Bald Inventoried Roadless Area (extraordinary circumstance) and along the Appalachian 
and Bartram Trails.   Although mountain balds are often maintained by controlled burns, 
the Cheoah project apparently targeted ecosystems that are not fire-adapted (Thomas 
2005, on file with author).  Regardless of the ecological merit of this project, however, 
few would argue it is “insignificant” as defined by NEPA (see discussion below).    
Consequently, CE 10 was invalidated in the Sierra v Bosworth (2007) ruling 
because the Forest Service failed to demonstrate the application of individual 4,500 acre 
burning and 1,000 acre logging projects would not have significant cumulative impacts.  
In fact, one of the projects on the Uwharrie National Forest called the “Fuel Reduction 
Wildlife Prescribed Burns” authorized 7,118 acres of burns and logging, in violation of 
the HFI’s 5,500-acre cap on hazardous fuels reduction projects.   
Southern Pine Beetles 
The Forest Service also authorized eight projects covering 1,516 acres with the 
primary purpose of addressing outbreaks of Southern Pine Beetles (SPB).  Additionally, 
eleven other projects included treatments for Southern Pine Beetles, but were designed 
primarily for pre-commercial or commercial logging purposes.  As discussed above, 
“sanitation” or salvage logging following tree-mortality from insect outbreaks is 
inconsistent with the principles of ecological forestry.   
While thinning treatments, done correctly, can reduce the rate of spread of SPB 
infestations and can potentially preserve native pine communities, including Shortleaf, 
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Pitch, and Table Mountain Pine, this approach only addresses the symptom of the 
problem.  Instead of reducing SPB infestations, thinning and logging can actually 
intensify the severity of outbreaks (Massey & Parker 1981).  Furthermore, given the 
substantial portion of precommercial and commercial logging described above, the 
agency may be intensifying problems related to insect outbreaks in parts of the national 
forest while acting to reduce them in others.  This conflict in management objectives is 
discussed in the policy implications section at the end of this chapter. 
Wildlife Openings 
 In addition to commercial forestry, the Forest Service’s management agenda 
includes the creation of “early successional habitat” in the national forests.  The agency 
claims cleared areas and the first ‘succeeding’ generations of recovering forests provide 
wildlife openings in the natural forest that benefits game species and some native birds.   
Chapter Eight documented and analyzed evidence of eight projects proposed for 
this purpose in North Carolina from 2003 through 2008.  With the exception of one 
project in the piedmont’s Uwharrie National Forest, all were conducted in the Blue 
Ridge ecoregion.  According to the North Carolina Wildlife Resources Commission, 
“Early-successional forest openings add habitat diversity and provide an important 
habitat component for a number of game and non-game wildlife species” (McHenry 
2005:1).  In contrast, ecological forestry advocates warn against wildlife openings 
because “artificial openings have ecological problems” that outweigh potential 
environmental benefits (Schafele 2005:1, on file with author).   
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 Most strikingly, there were documented occurrences of rare species (based on 
Forest Service biological surveys) in half of the wildlife openings identified in this study, 
including one population of federally listed endangered bats (Indiana Bat), as well as 13 
other protected “sensitive” species tracked by the agency.  In addition to the direct 
effect on identified endangered and sensitive species, it is also likely these wildlife 
openings and early-successional habitat serve as vectors for Southern Pine Beetles and 
invasive species.  This apparent conflict between agency directives for creating wildlife 
openings while also protecting rare species and preventing SPB outbreaks demonstrates 
some of the problematic incompatibilities within the agency’s multiple-use mandate.  In 
short, wildlife openings approved under the Healthy Forest Initiative in North Carolina 
from 2003 through 2008 support the commercial forestry management paradigm.  
 In conclusion, the vast majority of projects authorized by the Forest Service using 
Healthy Forest Initiative policies were consistent with commercial forestry descriptions 
of forest management (see Table 41).  Over a third of the projects were described by the 
Forest Service as commercial, while a substantial portion of other projects under other 
titles confirm the dominance of commercial forestry under the Healthy Forest Initiative.  
The notable exceptions were the six watershed restoration projects authorized in the 
Blue Ridge and Piedmont eco-regions.  Except for these projects, the forest 
management authorized by the Forest Service under the Healthy Forest Initiative from 
2003 through 2008 support commercial forestry models of public land management. 
 
396 
Table 41. Management Description Of CE Vegetation Projects Issued In North Carolina 
National Forests Under The Healthy Forest Initiative From 2003 Through 2008. 
Number 
(n=67) 
Primary Project Purpose Forest Management 
16 Pre-Commercial Thinning Commercial Forestry 
19 Commercial Logging Commercial Forestry 
6 Prescribed Burns Commercial Forestry 
6 Watershed Restoration Ecological Forestry 
8 Wildlife Openings Mixed 
8 Southern Pine Beetle  Commercial Forestry 
4 Other Mixed 
 
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
 This case study of decision-making and forest management processes under the 
Healthy Forest Initiative in North Carolina provides several implications for policies 
addressing U.S. National Forests.   Before presenting policy recommendations, it is 
important to reemphasize the limits of this study (see Chapter Three).  This dissertation 
focused on only four classes of Healthy Forest Initiative polices (appeals rule, categorical 
exclusions, extraordinary circumstances, and goods for services) in the Croatan, 
Nantahala, Pisgah, and Uwharrie National Forests in North Carolina.  These findings are 
therefore not immediately generalizable to other decision-making processes or national 
forests in other regions.  Although the North Carolina case was chosen for its important 
forest and management history (see Chapter Three), this selection also limits the 
general applicability to other forests given the state’s unique status.   
Despite these tradeoffs, several important policy findings have direct relevance 
to federal policies and other national forest regions.  The final section explores the 
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policy implications based on the findings documented in this dissertation.  As Table 42 
describes, these recommendations address the appropriate use of categorical 
exclusions, the difficultly in implementing collaborative management, watershed 
restoration, the “forest health vortex,” “bullet-proofing” environmental analysis, Critical 
Habitat loopholes, and the case for a “conservation democracy” theory of 
environmental decision-making.  
 
Table 42.  Overview of policy implications emerging from the case study of Healthy 
Forest Initiative projects in North Carolina. 
# Topic Recommendation Timeline 
1 
Appropriate Use Of 
Categorical Exclusions 
Restrict use of categorical exclusions to original 
management without extraordinary 
circumstances. 
Short 
term 
2 
Collaborative 
Management 
Implementation 
Avoid collaborative decision-making for 
controversial, expedited management projects. 
Short 
term 
3 
Watershed 
Restoration 
Increase implementation of non-controversial, 
ecologically justified management. 
Short 
term 
4 
“Bullet-Proofing” 
Environmental 
Analysis 
Expect strong public participation and 
opposition when projects are proposed in 
sensitive forest ecosystems. 
Mid 
term 
5 
Critical Habitat 
Loopholes 
Increase designation of critical habitat for 
endangered species, as required by the 
Endangered Species Act. 
Mid 
term 
6 
The “Forest Health 
Vortex” 
Avoid conflicting commercial logging and forest 
health management objectives. 
Mid 
term 
7 
“Conservation 
Democracy” 
To Increase ecological forestry, increase public 
participation. 
Long 
Term 
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1.  Appropriate Use of Categorical Exclusions  
 CE projects are not appropriate for controversial projects with significant 
environmental effects or potential public participation.  Categorical exclusions were 
originally created for “routine” actions with insignificant environmental effects.  Today, 
the management approach accounts for over 70 percent of all agency activity, including 
over half the acreage treated in the National Forests (GAO 2007).  Although it is possible 
the agency conducted insignificant forest management 70 percent of the time, the more 
likely explanation is that much of the management approved as CE’s approved should 
have been documented through the environmental assessment process as originally 
intended under the National Environmental Policy Act.   
 Regardless of whether the management is commercially or ecologically justified, 
the expectation of the Forest Service is that these actions will significantly modify the 
environment.  This is precisely the kind of management the agency should review 
through the environmental assessments process under NEPA.  Given the Bush 
Administration and commercial forestry interest’s call for urgency and alarm when 
introducing the Healthy Forest Initiative (see Chapter Six), the five CE’s exemplify 
inconsistencies with claims about the necessity of expedited management directives 
while simultaneously arguing the actions have no significant effects.   
 Additionally, given the use of CE’s to authorize projects that significantly modify 
the environment, documentation in an environmental assessment would not only 
comply with the original intent of NEPA, it would also provide the public with more 
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analysis and a more reasonable opportunity to participate.  In fact, the CEQ released 
guidance on the use of CE’s on February 18, 2010, specifically addressing how “An 
inappropriate reliance on categorical exclusions may thwart the purposes of NEPA, 
compromising the quality and transparency of agency decision-making as well as the 
opportunity for meaningful public participation and review” (Sutley 2010).  As this 
directive recommends, the restriction of the agency’s use of categorical exclusions to 
routine actions instead of significant forest management activities may have important 
immediate positive environmental and administrative policy implications for U.S. 
National Forests. 
 
2.  Collaborative Management Implementation 
The success of collaborative decision-making is unlikely as long as the agency 
relies on the approach for controversial and/or expedited management projects. The 
policy and conservation literature includes several papers that caution against the use of 
collaborative management for publicly held resources (Coggins 1999; McCloskey 2003; 
McCarthy 2005; Cheng & Mattor 2006).  These issues include the intractability of 
conflict (Mouffe 1999), the lack of interest or inability of the public to participate 
(Stankey), and the tendency for cooptation of collaborative meetings by powerful, 
commercial interests (Abel & Stephan 2000; McCarthy 2005).   (See Chapter Two) 
In this study, although the Forest Service was expected to support collaborative 
designs for eight CE projects in North Carolina, the citizen involvement for these 
projects was instead identical to conventional scoping processes (see Chapter Eight).  
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One reason for this lack of deliberative decision-making can be explained by the 
expedited process of categorical exclusions.  It is unlikely the agency will be able to 
develop meaningful collaboration for CE projects that are exempted from the 
environmental assessment process and approved in a substantially shorter period of 
time (30-days).   
Additionally, this exemption from documentation in an EA limits the amount of 
data citizens have to support informed collaboration.  Although the agency is required 
to document surveys in a project file with a discussion of potential extraordinary 
circumstances, these findings are not presented to the public until after the decision has 
been made by the agency.  In short, the CE process significantly lacks the level of 
environmental analysis that the public could be expected to use to meaningfully 
deliberate.  
Assuming the environmental effects of the CE projects are indeed insignificant 
(positive or negative), it is not surprising to find a lack of interest given the absence of 
management that would commonly inspire greater levels of public participation. Like 
other studies documenting a reluctance by the public to participate in collaboration for 
national forest management (Cheng & Mattor 2006; Knoop & Thomas 2006), the 
expedited and so-called “insignificant” nature of the CE management process is unlikely 
to be compatible with collaborative management. 
In this North Carolina case study, however, several projects requiring 
collaboration were indeed controversial, inspired substantial levels of scoping 
comments, and included documented extraordinary circumstances.  There was sizeable 
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participation, for example, in the Fires Creek Stewardship Project, a controversial 
project that included logging in the Tusquitee Bald Roadless Area.  The Forest Service, 
however, neglected to initiative formal collaboration for this or any other HFI CE project 
approved by the Forest Service from 2003 through 2008.    
These hurdles to collaboration for CE management projects can be avoided most 
easily by restricting the use of this decision-making approach to traditional EA or EIS 
processes that require sophisticated environmental analysis.  The CE process, on the 
other hand, does not lend itself to this type of management, and, by definition, it is 
intended for projects that do already fit into a predetermined category of actions (CE’s).    
In fact, the CE for Hazardous Fuels Reduction—the only HFI CE specifically 
requiring collaborative decision-making— was invalidated in federal court (Sierra v 
Bosworth) because, among other reasons, the Forest Service was not authorized to 
determine the “significance” of extraordinary circumstances on a case-by-case basis.  
Assuming that stakeholder deliberations would have provided some level of site-specific 
issues relating to the projects (as the process is designed to do), collaborative 
negotiations are therefore inappropriate and not allowed under NEPA (40 C.F.R. § 
1508.4).  As the plaintiffs in Sierra v Bosworth agued, “The Fuels CE is also invalid 
because it does not fully identify what actions it authorizes and, through its provision for 
a subsequent collaborative process and ‘extraordinary circumstances’ review, it 
establishes a ‘case-by-case’ categorical exclusion” (Huber et al. 2007).   
While the Forest Service was enjoined by federal courts against using the 
hazardous fuels reduction CE, the agency can still use the HFI “Stewardship” Goods for 
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Service contracting system established by the Bush Administration that also requires 
collaborative decision-making, albeit not with the force of law.  In fact, the Obama 
Administration’s 2011 budget for the Forest Service shifts emphasis from traditional 
timber sales to the GFS contracts (Reis 2010).  The success of this and other Forest 
Service “cooperative conservation” (Bush 2006) strategies is doubtful if, among other 
reasons, the agency authorizes the forest management under the CE process. 
 
3.  Watershed Restoration  
The use of Watershed Restoration provides a non-controversial, ecologically 
justified alternative the agency should use more frequently in the future.  Among the 
few ecologically supported CE activities approved by the Forest Service and documented 
in this dissertation (see Chapter Eight), the evidence suggests there is great potential in 
watershed restoration activities aimed at correcting and preventing damage from illegal 
off-road vehicle activities in the national forests.   As described above, watershed 
restoration was clearly the least controversial, and the most ecologically justified 
management authorized by the Forest Service in North Carolina.   
The Uwharrie National Forest , for example, has extensive ORV use on nearly every 
trail in the forest “except for a small portion of the Dickey Bell Trail located west of SR 
6584 which is suitable only for use by ATV’s or motorcycles” (Forest Service website).  
Likewise, the Croatan National Forest also has “unauthorized use is also occurring on 
over 70 miles of unclassified roads and trail corridors.  Many of these routes occur in the 
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southern portion of the CNF, coinciding with the highest occurrence of rare plant and 
animal species” (2003:9).   
Although the Croatan and Uwharrie National Forests have substantial illegal ORV 
use, the Nantahala was the only part of the federal forest system in North Carolina that 
implemented measures to address this threat through the CE process.  Additionally, 
given the conspicuously low level of objections by the public toward these projects, and 
the clear ecological support for authorizing them, watershed restoration of this nature 
shows the best potential for meeting goals for ecological forestry, as well as 
participatory models of democratic theory.  Expanding this approach from targeting 
illegal ORV use to other watershed restoration work like, for example, removing 
deteriorating logging roads, may offer similar benefits for the agency, the public, and 
the ecological systems of concern. 
 
4.  “Bullet-Proofing” Environmental Analysis  
The agency should expect to “bulletproof” environmental analysis if it continues 
to authorize controversial large commercial forestry projects in ecologically sensitive 
areas given the likelihood of increased public participation in these projects.  According 
to authors in the resource management literature (Bosworth 2002:36), one of the so-
called problems with public participation (especially administrative appeals) is that it 
forces the Forest Service to produce more carefully constructed, “bullet-proof” 
environmental analysis out of fear projects will be challenged by public based on 
imperfect agency documentation and review.  As the Forest Service Chief during the 
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Bush Administration argued, “some groups have successfully used appeals to obstruct 
timber sales, and Forest Service employees therefore treat almost every ground-
disturbing project as a potential target. 
 
They spend a tremendous amount of time trying 
to ‘bullet-proof’ project planning against appeals and litigation” (Bosworth 2002:37).   
On the other hand, Tiech et al. argue that “the additional time spent on 
document preparation (‘bulletproofing’) cuts several ways.   It may indeed prolong the 
process, but efforts to avert appeals can also prompt the agency to build a stronger 
scientific or economic justification for its decisions and be more sensitive to public 
objections to proposed projects” (2004:18).  Indeed, as Kaufman documented in his 
seminal study on Forest Service administration, The Forest Ranger (1960), this threat of 
administrative appeal was specifically established for this purpose of forcing compliance 
of field officers with agency directives.  
 Whether or not this bulletproofing effect is ecologically or procedurally 
beneficial, the evidence documented in Chapter Seven show the agency can predict 
increased public participation for large projects proposed in ecologically sensitive areas 
with rare species habitat.  Arguing about the agency’s extra time spent preparing 
environmental analysis misses the point that the Forest Service could avoid lengthy 
environmental review processes by discontinuing large controversial projects in 
ecologically imperiled native systems.  This pattern in the data, relating to the predictive 
power of large projects with rare species, is even more striking considering the public 
did not have direct access to the Forest Service surveys.   
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This local knowledge about forest conditions could be harnessed by the agency 
to improve ecologically justified management.  On the other hand, increased 
management in sensitive habitats will continue to force the agency to undergo 
controversial, costly procedures in the attempt to approve commercial forestry projects.  
Considering this tension between ecological and commercial forestry has been a part of 
the agency since the “classic conservation conflict” (Callicott 1999) dividing Pinchot and 
Muir (see Chapter Four), it is unclear whether the agency will drastically change course 
toward ecological forestry (Hays 2007).  Until it does, however, the Forest Service can 
expect controversial projects to get entangled in conflict-driven, dissent-based 
participation by citizens and non-governmental organizations with ecologically based 
interests.  The necessity for bulletproofing is, therefore, unlikely to go away any time 
soon.  
 Furthermore, the frequency of CE projects proposed by the agency in North 
Carolina’s national forests dropped significantly after the right of administrative appeal 
was reinstated by the Earth Island v Ruthenbeck (2005) ruling in federal court (See 
Chapter Eight).  In short, if the bulletproofing effect had consequences for forest 
management, they were generally ecologically beneficial based on the reduction of the 
frequency of CE projects proposed, and the likelihood those projects would have 
adverse effects on sensitive species. 
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5.  Critical Habitat Loophole 
The lack of designated Critical Habitat creates a loophole for the Forest Service 
to use the HFI extraordinary circumstances rule to approve management in habitat for 
federally listed threatened and endangered species.   When species are added to the 
Endangered Species Act’s federal endangered or threatened list, the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service is required, except in rare cases, to designate critical habitat for the 
species (7 U.S.C. § 136, 16 U.S.C. § 1531).   Once critical habitat has been established, 
federal agencies are not permitted to authorize or encourage any “adverse 
modification” to the habitat.  One recent study of the Fish and Wildlife Service’s data 
shows that species with critical habitat protected are twice as likely to recover as those 
without critical habitat.  Of the nearly 1900 endangered and threatened species listed in 
the United States,  the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service had failed to designate critical 
habitat  for over 83 percent of them (Parenteau 2005).   
Given the new extraordinary circumstances rule authorized by the Bush 
Administration, critical habitat could provide a layer of protection for 
endangered and threatened species.  In Chapter Eight, this case study 
demonstrated that endangered and threatened species’ critical habitat could 
have provided additional safeguards in nearly 40 percent (n=26) of all CE 
vegetation management projects approved in national forests in North Carolina. 
The ESA defines critical habitat as “the specific areas within the 
geographical area occupied by the species, at the time it is listed in accordance 
with the provisions of section 4 of this Act, on which are found those physical or 
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biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the species and (II) which 
may require special management considerations or protection; and (ii) specific 
areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species at the time it is 
listed in accordance with the provisions of section 4 of this Act, upon a 
determination by the Secretary that such areas are essential for the conservation 
of the species.”   Section Four requires “The Secretary, by regulation 
promulgated in accordance with subsection (b) and to the maximum extent 
prudent and determinable— A) shall, concurrently with making a determination 
under paragraph (1) that a species is an endangered species or a threatened 
species, designate any habitat of such species which is then considered to be 
critical habitat” (7 U.S.C. § 136, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.).   
In October 1999, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service announced a 
settlement with the Southern Appalachian Biodiversity Project (now WildSouth), 
in which it agreed to designate critical habitat for four species in North Carolina.  
This was the first time the agency designated habitat since 1988, despite listing 
25 species.  Under the Bush Administration, the agency designated less critical 
habitat than any other administration since the creation of the ESA (CBD et al. 
2010).  “The Bush administration is the only presidency not to have designated a 
single critical habitat except under court order (CBD et al. 2010) 
The HFI extraordinary circumstance provisions allowed the Forest Service 
to approve commercial forestry and other management in sensitive areas that 
may have been protected from adverse modification if the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
408 
Service had not failed to designate critical habitat.  Furthermore, the Forest 
Service’s use of categorical exclusions to expedite project implementation would 
have instead required an EA or EIS, which provide for substantially more 
environmental analysis and public review of the scientific merits of the 
management.  Until the critical habitat loophole is closed, agencies like the 
Forest Service can authorize projects with adverse modifications to habitats for 
species that are listed under the Endangered Species Act yet receive few 
protections other than being on a federal list. 
 
6.  Forest Healthy Vortex 
The Forest Service should address conflicting commercial forestry and forest 
health directives to avoid an unecological cycle for national forests management.  As 
identified in Chapter Eight, forest management projects authorized by the Forest Service 
in North Carolina included traditional commercial logging as well as projects aimed at 
addressing insect-outbreaks, hazardous fuels reduction, invasive species, and other 
‘forest health’ issues.  Ecological forestry science, however, has found that commercial 
logging, early-successional openings (clearcuts), and logging roads are the single 
greatest human causes of wildfires (Ingalsbee 1997) and the spread of invasive and pest 
species (Black et al. 2010).  These conflicting management directives contribute to a 
forest health vortex, or a cycle perpetuated when industrial logging and wildlife 
openings intensify the spread of Southern Pine Beetles and invasive pests, which 
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triggers a response by the agency for “Healthy Forest” management relying on logging 
and road-building.   
One of findings of the chi-square tests in Chapter Eight, for example, identified a 
substantial use of insect-related logging on the Grandfather Ranger District in the Pisgah 
National Forest, including more than twice the number of projects targeting Southern 
Pine Beetles in this district than would be predicted by a model of independence.  
Although the Uwharrie and Croatan National Forests have more native pine forests than 
the Blue Ridge ecoregion, the Grandfather Ranger District issued as many projects 
targeting southern pine beetles as the two other national forests combined.   In fact, 37 
percent of all insect-related CE projects in North Carolina originated in the Grandfather 
district, while the Pisgah National Forest authorized more HFI CE’s (#14) for insect 
related “sanitation” harvests than predicted. 
While the Forest Service worked to address the Southern Pine Beetles outbreak 
in one part of the forest, that work was undermined by conflicting management 
directives evident in the creation of wildlife openings, or “early successional habitat,” 
which serves as vectors for Southern Pine Beetles and invasive species.   The 
Grandfather Ranger District proposed more than twice the number of wildlife opening 
projects than predicted by a model of independence, which was one of the major 
contributors to the significant chi-square statistic (98.9244, p-value = 1.715e-06) 
discussed in Chapter Eight.  This potential relationship between the occurrence of 
wildlife openings and Southern Pine Beetle outbreaks in the Pisgah National Forest is 
evocative.   Given scientific consensus in the conservation literature that artificial 
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openings and logging intensify invasive and pest outbreaks (Aber et al. 2000), questions 
emerge about a correlation between the disproportionately high level of wildlife 
openings on the Grandfather and the substantial frequency of insect-related outbreaks 
occurring throughout the Pisgah National Forest.    
Furthermore, there were documented occurrences of rare species (based on 
Forest Service biological surveys) in half wildlife openings identified in this study.  On its 
face, creating wildlife openings with early successional clearcuts defeats the stated 
purpose if logging displaces rare wildlife already occurring in the project area.  
These apparent conflicts in agency directives between wildlife openings (not to 
mention commercial logging and road-building) while claiming to protect rare wildlife 
and prevent SPB outbreaks demonstrates a problem best described as a forest health 
vortex.   Incompatibilities within the agency’s multiple-use mandate continue to a 
vicious cycle of mismanagement aimed at addressing previous mismanagement.  Until 
the Forest Service accepts the ecological science relating to the impacts of commercial 
logging and road-building, it is unlikely it will successfully address forest health issues.  
“Commercial logging in national forests is the problem, not the solution” (George 2004). 
  
7.  Conservation Democracy  
Findings from this dissertation support a theory of Conservation Democracy to 
most adequately explain public participation and environmental decision-making 
processes occurring in national forests, as well as possible solutions to other current and 
future environmental controversies.  On August 22, 2008, the National Research Council 
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released findings from one of the most comprehensive studies of the effects of public 
participation showing that, when done correctly, public involvement usually leads to 
better environmental decision-making.  The NRC report, ironically announced on the 
sixth anniversary of the Bush Administration’s Healthy Forest Initiative, is confirmed by 
findings outlined in this dissertation relating to the potential value of improved public 
participation in supporting ecological outcomes (National Research Council 2008).   
In Chapter Seven, evidence was presented showing substantial support among 
most commenters for environmental interests, while Chapters Six and Eight 
underscored the role of the Healthy Forest Initiative in expediting commercial forestry, 
often in sensitive ecosystems with extraordinary circumstance.  While there was little 
evidence of public influence in modifying designs of specific projects (supporting an elite 
model for the HFI), the frequency of projects proposed by the Forest Service dropped 
substantially after public participation was increased by federal courts (supporting more 
participatory models of democracy).   
Although not the cause of this decrease in frequency of agency proposals, public 
processes established a “minimum condition” (Cox 2010) for the public to participate, 
even though citizens may choose to avoid the process, as seen in the appeals process 
documented in this study (see Chapter Seven).  This basic guarantee of “the right to 
object,” (Coulombe 2004), serves as a deterrent to agency planners who may otherwise 
propose controversial projects if the public cannot challenge decisions through formal 
administrative processes (Kaufman 1961).  This finding is consistent with the frequency 
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of projects issued in North Carolina (see Chapter Eight), as well as in the national study 
by the GAO (2007, see Appendix F).     
As explained in Chapter Five, the historical evidence shows environmental 
analysis and complex scientific questions were the primary reasons why the Forest 
Service was “paralyzed” (GAO 1989) and unable to increase the frequency of 
commercial forestry projects.  Furthermore, as Chief Bosworth admitted in his “process 
predicament” paper (2002:36), “some groups have successfully used appeals to obstruct 
timber sales, and Forest Service employees therefore treat almost every ground-
disturbing project as a potential target.”  Fig. 9 provides the chart from “The Process 
Predicament” (Bosworth 2002), which asserts an inverse relationship exists between 
public participation rights and the frequency of commercial forestry projects proposed 
by the agency. 
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Figure 9.   Forest Service data showing the rising number of appeals filed since 1995 
(top), while the volume of commercial logging fell (Bosworth 2002). 
 
 
 
 
This inverse relationship between citizen access and commercially-driven HFI 
management proposals underscores the potential for securing increased ecological 
protections by securing the “minimum conditions” (Cox 2010) for decision-making 
processes for national forests and other resources.  Moreover, on March 4, 2010, the 
GAO released a new report (GAO-10-337) confirming that public challenges to Forest 
Service projects most often target commercial forestry practices, while hazardous fuel 
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reduction projects go forward without challenge by administrative appeal (82 percent of 
the time), or lawsuits (98 percent of the time) (GAO 2010).  In short, the public uses the 
participation process to challenge commercial forestry, while ecological forestry and 
wildfire protection projects go forward mostly unchallenged.   
 Based on the evidence in Chapter Seven and Eight, pluralist and agonistic 
theories were confirmed in projects (based on the type of participation in the decision-
making process), with the majority of commenters objecting to agency commercial 
forestry proposals.  On the other hand, the evidence suggests elite democratic theory 
and traditional commercial forestry management were both ascendant under the Bush 
Administration.  The antidote to this trend is likely increased public access to agency 
decisions and scientific analysis to support ecological forestry management in U.S. 
federal public land.   
Additionally, while the participation process could be overwhelmed by input 
from commercial use interests, as described by Coggin’s (2001) in his article entitled 
“Californicators, Quislings, and Crazies,” this is not common in federal lands decision-
making processes (Hibbard & Madsen 2003).  Instead, the opposite seems to be the case 
in North Carolina (see Chapter Eight), as well as other studies (Steelman 1996; Tiech et 
al. 2004), which show the processes were largely unused by the “wise use” commercial 
forestry interests.   These processes are overwhelmingly used by citizens and non-
governmental groups with ecological forestry interests.   
Given the sizable level of direct participation by unaffiliated individuals, most of 
whom filed objections to agency decisions, the pluralistic theory fails to explain this type 
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of direct participation.  More participatory models offer better explanations for the 
substantial level of individual participation in nearly 17 percent of the projects issued in 
North Carolina.  Additionally, conflict-driven (Mouffe 1999) dissent-based participation 
(Peterson 2004) was evident in over 57 percent of the projects (see Table 11).    
Like “dissent-based conservation,” (Peterson MN et al. 2006:576) conservation 
democracy is the operationalization of participatory models of democratic theory that 
are most appropriate for conflict-ridden (agnostic) environmental management 
decisions.  Given the innate conflict in western liberal democracies between the liberty 
of minority interests and the will of popular sovereignty, commonly described as the 
democratic paradox, conservation democracy provides a framework for avoiding 
process traps that are currently undermining collaborative management established for 
contentious federal lands decisions. 
In addition to this attention to the democratic paradox, conservation democracy 
emphasizes the role of individual, unaffiliated citizens in decision-making processes 
supported by more participatory “radical” models of democratic theory (Mouffe 1999).  
This attention to direct citizen participation, combined with principles of dissent-based 
negotiations (see Chapter Two), provides the most ecologically promising approach 
toward federal forest management over contentious environmental decisions.  In short, 
the role of public processes, open to direct citizen participation, is likely to decrease the 
frequency that federal agencies will propose projects, either because of the bullet-
proofing effect (described above) or otherwise.    
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 Like the goal of conservation biology, “to provide principles and tools for 
preserving biological diversity” (Soule 1985), conservation democracy holds that 
increased and improved democratic processes for decision-making can provide for 
improved environmental outcomes (National Research Council 2008).  In setting the 
stage for a new application of social sciences to conservation problems, this approach 
challenges practitioners and theorists to develop more participatory models of 
democratic decision-making.  Like the core function of conservation biology, “providing 
reliable and useful scientific information on biological diversity and its conservation” 
(Meine, Soulé & Noss 2006:646, emphasis added), conservation democracy is tasked 
with the goal of finding reliable and useful ways to bring diverse populations into 
participatory processes to improve environmental decisions.   
 Beyond national forest planning, conservation democracy theorizes increased 
participation as a potential way to improve a variety of current and imminent 
environmental concerns operating at different spatial and temporal scales.  If the Forest 
Service, or the U.S. more broadly, reasonably expects to adapt to on-going and 
intensifying problems of climate change, for example, it would be wise to pay attention 
to participatory approaches to environmental decision-making.  Conservation 
democracy provides a more adequate understanding of environmental democratic 
processes that emphasize direct, dissent-based participation by individual citizens and 
non-governmental groups, especially from diverse populations, in confronting the most 
urgent ecological issues. 
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Given the dimensions of this task, as well as the vigorous empirical study 
required to advance it, this dissertation provided one example of an interdisciplinary 
approach to field-induced problem-solving to explore questions about the ecological 
consequences of different democratic theories.  Conservation democracy requires a 
grounding in policy and conservation literatures, a mission-driven orientation, and a 
recognition that potential solutions to environmental problems are interconnected with 
social structures and governance.   
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APPENDIX A: DIAGRAM OF APPEALS PROCESS 
 
Source: Abrams, J. “Policy Context for Appeals of Forest Service Decisions” ERI, NAU  
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APPENDIX B:  FOREST SERVICE PROJECT-LEVEL NEPA PROCESS 
 
 
 
Source: GAO 2006 
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APPENDIX C:  PROJECTS 
Project  Year Name Forest  Acres CE  
1 2003 Wildlife Brush Openings Lower Winespring Nantahala 50 6 
2 2003 Abner Southern Pine Beetle Salvage Nantahala 1 14 
3 2003 FY 04 Fuel Reduction Wildlife Prescribed Burns  Uwharrie 1708 10 
4 2004 Grass Forbs Habitat Creation Pisgah 10 6 
5 2004 Early Successional Habitat Creation Comp Pisgah 7 6 
6 2004 Site Preparation And Restoration Of SPB Infested Areas Nantahala 113 5 
7 2004 Office Oak Demo   Nantahala 4 12 
8 2004 Dukes Marina Forest Health Project Nantahala 22 6 
9 2004 Create And Maintain Grass Forbs Wildlife Habitat Nantahala 10 6 
10 2004 Site Preparation And Reforestation In SPB Infested Areas Nantahala 112 5 
11 2004 Ruffed Grouse Brood Habitat Improvement  Nantahala 10 6 
12 2004 Restoration Treatment For Sands Of SPB Killed Trees Nantahala 87 5 
13 2004 Lake Powhatan Improvements Pisgah 128 3 
14 2004 John Green Bend Wildlife Opening Nantahala 10 6 
15 2004 Mechanical Southern Pine Beetle Prevention Treatment Croatan 75 6 
16 2004 Mechanical Southern Pine Beetle Prevention Treatment Croatan 60 12 
17 2004 Buck Creek Botanical Habitat Restoration   Nantahala 374 6 
18 2004 Ogreeta Southern Pine Beetle Site Preparation Nantahala 16 5 
19 2004 Fires Creek Stewardship Project  Buckhorn Stewardship Project Nantahala 217 6 
20 2004 Fuel Reduction Burn   Nantahala 2271 6 
21 2004 Dillingham Salvage Pisgah 250 13 
22 2004 Southern Pine Beetle Slash Down  Release      Pisgah 136 5 
23 2004 FY05/06 Fuel Reduction Wildlife Prescribed Burns  Uwharrie 7118 10 
24 2004 Wolf Mountain Prescribed Burns  Nantahala 200 10 
25 2005 Tusquitee Hazard Tree Removal Nantahala 1 13 
26 2005 Compartment 36 Stand 29 Croptree Release Nantahala 40 6 
27 2005 Carteret Craven Electric Row Croatan 1 12 
28 2005 Compartments 96 And 97 Croptree Release Nantahala 182 6 
29 2005 Catpen Stewardship Pisgah 22 6 
30 2005 Longleaf Restoration Croatan 407 6 
31 2005  Big Mosquito RCW Habitat Improvement Project Croatan 777 6 
32 2005 Big Mosquito 2    Croatan 244 6 
33 2005 Bald Mountain Steels Creek Salvage Pisgah 250 13 
34 2005 Brice Creek Stewardship   Croatan 70 6 
35 2005 FY 05/06 Southern Pine Beetle Restoration Project   Nantahala 367 5 
36 2005 Green Mountain Wildlife Field Pisgah 3 6 
37 2005 Murray Branch Hazard Tree Removal Pisgah 2 13 
38 2005 FY 05 Watershed Improvements Nantahala 1 4 
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39 2005 Pre-Commercial Thinning For Southern Pine Beetle Prevention Croatan 131 6 
40 2005 Pre-Commercial Thinning For Long Term Soil Productivity Study Croatan 42 6 
41 2005 English White Pine  Pisgah 51 14 
42 2005 NC Arboretum Canopy Walk   Pisgah 4 12 
43 2005 Southern Pine Beetle Restoration   Pisgah 42 5 
44 2005 Evans Creek  Evan's Creek Soil And Water Nantahala 1 4 
45 2005 Fall Flight Project  Croatan 111 14 
46 2005 Short Pine Project  Croatan 416 6 
47 2005 Southern Pine Beetle Prevention Croatan 52 6 
48 2005 Pekin Wildlife Openings  Uwharrie 10 6 
49 2005 Buster Vinson Sugar Creek Prescribed  Nantahala 200 10 
50 2006 Lime Project   Croatan 1673 6 
51 2006 Cherry Springs Watershed Project Nantahala 1 4 
52 2006 Soil And Water 06 Nantahala 6 4 
53 2006 FY 06 Southern Pine Beetle Restoration  Pisgah 126 5 
54 2006 FY 07 Southern Pine Beetle Restoration Project   Nantahala 66 5 
55 2006 Hazardous Fuel Reduction And Wildlife Habitat Improvement Uwharrie 4500 10 
56 2006 Schenck White Pine Pisgah 3 3 
57 2006 FY 07 Watershed Improvement Project Nantahala 1 4 
58 2007 Bender Beetle    Croatan 156 6 
59 2007 Pine Progeny Test Pine Precommercial Thinning Nantahala 6 6 
60 2007 Big Creek Thinning Uwharrie 53 12 
61 2007 Row Pine  Croatan 284 6 
62 2007 Southern Pine Beetle Restoration Nantahala 33 5 
63 2007 Cottonmouth  Croatan 499 5 
64 2007 Crown Touch And Release  Uwharrie 1160 5 
65 2008 2008 Watershed Project  Copper Creek Project Nantahala 1 5 
66 2008 Drum Chopping Plantations Croatan 225 5 
67 2008 Twister Salvage Project Croatan 200 13 
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APPENDIX D:  CODING SHEET 
Style Vehicle Rep Affiliation Interest Identification Locus 
1Handwritten 1Letter 1Indv 1Individual 1Hunter/Angler Zip 
2Typed  2Verbal 2NGO 2TroutUnlimited 
2Environmental/Conservation/Preser
vation   
3Form Letter 3Other 3Gov 3NWTF 3Recreationalist    
4Other     4RuffedG 
4Consumptive 
User/Developers/Business   
      5WNCA 5Professional/Scientific/Historical   
      6SAFC 7State    
      7SABP 8Federal    
      8NCWRC 9(other)   
      9NCDCR     
      10DWQ     
      
11HotSprings 
Mountain Club     
      12App Trail Conf     
      13WildlawNC     
      14MtHighHikers     
      
15NCNaturalHerit
ageProgram     
      16SAMUC     
      17USFWS     
      18EBCherokee     
      19SClub chapter     
      20NCFS     
      21TNC     
      22NRCS     
      23NC DCM     
   
24ATR 
   
Length Detail Attitude Cause Effect 
0-150 words 
(.5) 1 No Detail 1Support 1Road Construction  1Ecological Forestry 
150-250  (1 pg) 2Support/Oppose 2Oppose 
2Precommercial 
Thinning 2Aesthetics  
250-500  (2 pgs) 3 1-2 topics 3Mixed 3Commercial Logging 3Recreation 
500+  (3+ pgs) 4 3-4 topics 4Neutral 4Burning 4Scientific  
  5 5+ topics   5Other 5Other 
      6None Mentioned  6None Mentioned  
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APPENDIX E:  STATISTICAL TESTS 
Notes from Chapter Six: Predictors of Public Participation 
By fitting a sequence of logistic regression models, the participation type is used 
as the binary response to determine which combination of variables is the best 
predictor of participation type.  These consider the physical size of the project, both raw 
and log-transformed, number of species in the project, both raw and log-transformed, 
and these two variables in combination. 
Table 1.   AIC values of fitted logistic regression models 
Predictors in model AIC 
#acres 84.54 
log(#acres) 79.01 
#species 91.03 
log(#species + 0.5) 86.14 
log(#acres) + #species 79.14 
log(#acres) + log(#species + 0.5) 76.82 
 
The best models use log-transformations of the predictors. A model that includes both 
log(#acres) and log(#species + 0.5) yields a small improvement over a model with only 
log(#acres). 
Table 2   Parameter estimates from the AIC-best two-predictor model 
Term Estimate Std. error z value Pr(>|z|) 
Intercept –1.9691 0.6216 –3.1677 0.0015 
log(#acres) 0.4389 0.1452 3.0232 0.0025 
log(#species + 0.5) 0.4765 0.2421 1.9682 0.0490 
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The coefficients of both regressors are statistically significant but the coefficient of 
log(#species + 0.5) is just barely so. 
Visualizing the One-Variable Models 
 With two variables in the final model, it is difficult to visualize the predicted 
model graphically. It is however easy to visualize the one-predictor models. To do this, 
an R function is used (plot.logi.hist) published in the Bulletin of the ESA (de la Cruz Rot, 
2005; http://www.esapubs.org/bulletin/backissues/086-1/bulletinjan2005.htm#et ).  
Figs. 3 and 4 were obtained using this function. They are graphical summaries of two of 
the single predictor models listed in Chapter Seven.   Fig. 3 is the logistic regression 
model containing log(#acres) and Fig. 5 is the logistic regression model containing 
log(#species + 0.5). The red curve is the estimated logistic curve for that model. At the 
top and bottom margins are dit plots and box plots of the distribution of the model 
regressor done separately by project type. The notch in each box plot estimates a 95% 
confidence interval for the displayed median. 
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Fig. 3   Fitted logistic regression model with log(#species + 0.5) as the regressor 
 
Fig. 4   Fitted logistic regression model with log(#acres) as the regressor 
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The two plots suggest that log(#acres) alone is a better indicator of participation type 
than is log(#species + 0.5) alone. The distribution of log(#acres) clearly shows better 
separation by project type.  
Confusion Matrices and ROC Curves 
 In order to understand how the two variables act in concert in the same model 
the predicted probabilities, 𝜋 , for various predictor combinations can be used to classify 
an observation’s participation type as either “elite” (Type = 0) or “participatory” (Type = 
1). To do this we choose a cut-off c such that when 𝜋 𝑖 > 𝑐 we classify observation i as 
Type = 1, otherwise we classify it as Type = 0. A so-called confusion matrix is then used 
to describe the accuracy of the classification rule (Table 1). The two diagonal entries of 
the confusion matrix give the number of observations that were correctly classified by 
the model. The two off-diagonal entries record the number of observations that were 
incorrectly classified. 
Table 1   The confusion matrix for a classification rule 
  Observed 
  Y = 0 Y = 1 
 
Predicted 
𝑌  = 0 True Negatives False Negatives 
𝑌  = 1 False Positives True Positives 
 
One reasonable choice for the cut-off is c = 0.5.  Table 2 shows the confusion 
matrices obtained using a cut-off of c = 0.5 for three different models. The column 
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categories of the matrix are the observed values of the response while the row 
categories are the model predictions (just as in Table 3). 
TABLE 2.  Confusion matrices using c = 0.5 as the cut-off for three logistic regression 
models with different predictors. Row categories are the predictions; columns are the 
observed values.  
Model 
predictors 
log(#acres) log(#species + 0.5) log(#acres) + log(#species + 
0.5) 
 
Confusion 
matrix 
   0  1 
0 21  8 
1 13 26 
   0  1 
0 23 13 
1 11 21 
   0  1 
0 25 10 
1  9 24 
As Table 2 reveals, there are trade-offs when choosing a classification model. 
Although the model that uses both predictors did produce the smallest number of false 
positives, it did not yield the smallest number of false negatives.  The model that 
contains only log(#acres) earns that distinction. 
Receiver Operation Characteristics  
Another strategy compared models using a range of possible values for c.  This is 
traditionally done with a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve.  Given the way 
entries in the confusion matrix respond to changes in c, it is not necessary to plot c 
directly.  Instead, this section plotted the true positive rate (TPR) against the false 
positive rate (FPR).  These two rates are obtained by dividing the number of true 
positives and false positives in the confusion matrix by the total observed number of 
positives and negatives, respectively.  TPR is also called sensitivity while FPR is referred 
to as 1 – specificity.  Fig. 6 displays the ROC curves for the three models whose 
confusion matrices are given in Table 5.  The ROCR package (Therneau et al. 2007) from 
the CRAN site was used for these calculations. 
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Fig. 5   ROC curves for the logistic regression models of Table 4 
 When c = 1 everything is classified as Type = 0 so the TPR and FPR are both 0. 
When c = 0 everything is classified as Type = 1 so both the TPR and FPR are 1. 
Consequently as c is reduced from 1 to 0 we move from the bottom left corner, (0, 0), to 
the top right corner, (1, 1), of the graph. If a model is any good, the TPR should grow 
faster than the FPR as c is decreased from 1.  If the discrimination is perfect, as c is 
decreased from 1 to 0 it immediately jumps vertically from (0, 0) to (0, 1) and then head 
straight across along the top margin to (1, 1).  In the typical scenario, assuming better 
than random discrimination, the ROC curve would be a continuous curve that connects 
(0, 0) to (1, 1) and also lies entirely above the line y = x.  
When comparing two models (e.g. models 1 and 2), the ideal scenario for the 
ROC curve of model 1 would be that it is entirely above the ROC curve for model 2.   In 
this case, model 1 is the better model.  In practice, things are seldom this clear-cut.  For 
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instance, in Fig. 3 the ranking of the three models is unclear because all of the ROC 
curves cross each other at some point. Still, the red curve, corresponding to the model 
with the single predictor log(#species + 0.5), is seen to lie almost entirely below the 
other curves. It does manage to exceed each of the others very briefly, but for most 
values of c the red curve lies below the ROC curves of the other two models and hence 
should be deemed the inferior model. On the other hand, the blue and grey ROC curves 
cross each other repeatedly. 
 One way to produce an unambiguous ranking of models based on ROC curves is 
to calculate the area under the ROC curve (AUC). An AUC of 0.5 indicates that the model 
has no discriminatory ability at all (essentially yielding a ROC curve that is the line y = x). 
Values of AUC close to 1 are to be preferred. Thus for any set of related models the one 
with the highest AUC should be deemed the best model. Table 5 displays the AUC values 
for the three models whose ROC curves are plotted in Fig. 5. The model with the largest 
AUC value is the one that uses both variables. 
Table 3   AUC values of fitted models 
Predictors in model AUC 
log(#acres) 0.80 
log(#species + 0.5) 0.73 
log(#acres) + log(#species + 0.5) 0.82 
 
AUC has a second more mechanistic interpretation because it can be shown to 
be equal to a statistic known as the concordance index. One approach took the raw data 
and repeatedly paired up each Type = 1 observation with each Type = 0 observation and 
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compared all possible ways (using each observation multiple times).  Next, the model is 
used to calculate 𝜋 , the probability of classifying the observation to be Type = 1, 
separately for each member of each 0-1 pair. If the model assigns a higher probability to 
the Type = 1 observation than it does to the Type = 0 observation in that pair, the model 
and the observation pair are in concordance. The fraction of times this occurs among all 
the possible pairs of zeros and ones is called the concordance index. Thus according to 
this interpretation, an AUC of 0.82 for the best model of Table 5 means that 82% of the 
possible 0-1 pairs that one could construct from the raw data would be ordered 
correctly by the model.  
 
Notes from Chapter Seven:  Frequency of Project Occurrence  
A number of formal tests are available to explore a constant accumulation rate.   
A shortcoming of all these tests is that they are designed to test for very specific 
departures from a constant rate.   For instance the Laplace test (Cox and Lewis, 1978, p. 
47) is a test for monotonicity. The test statistic compares the mean inter-arrival time, 𝑇 , 
against the midpoint of the observation period of length L.  If the mean is either much 
smaller or much larger than the midpoint, that is evidence for a decreasing or increasing 
trend over time. The test statistic is 
n
L
L
T
U
12
1
2

  
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which has an approximately standard normal distribution. If we take L to begin at the 
first event so that there are n = 66 inter-arrival times, U = –1.895 which just fails to be 
statistically significant (p = 0.058).  
The Laplace test is a test of monotonicity and is insensitive to other possibilities, 
for instance a bimodal pattern in which a high rate of event occurrence period is 
followed by a low rate of occurrence period. Because bimodality is the primary pattern 
of interest, tests of monotonicity are of limited value. An alternative tack is to fit models 
in which the rate of event occurrence follows a prescribed pattern and then assess how 
well these models fit the data. One groups the events into intervals and models the 
counts per interval over time, while a second approach examines how the waiting times 
between events have changed over time. 
Poisson models that were fit to the data include a linear model, quadratic 
model, segmented regression model, and a breakpoint regression model. The last two 
are piecewise linear models that differ in how the pieces relate to each other.  A 
segmented regression model is continuous in that the two linear pieces are forced to 
meet at a common point, while a breakpoint regression model can be discontinuous. 
Because the results could be sensitive to the manner in which the data are partitioned, 
the models were fit three times using different numbers of intervals for grouping the 
observations: 15, 20, and 25 intervals. Figs. 7-8 display the results.  
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Fig. 6 Number of projects per time interval when grouped into intervals of length 125 
days yielding a total of 15 intervals. The predicted means obtained from four 
different models are displayed. 
 
 
Fig. 7 Number of projects per time interval when grouped into intervals of length 94 
days yielding a total of 20 intervals. The predicted means obtained from four 
different models are displayed. 
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Fig. 8 Number of projects per time interval when grouped into intervals of length 75 
days yielding a total of 25 intervals. The predicted means obtained from four 
different models are displayed. 
 
 
As the number of intervals is increased, the counts naturally become sparser so 
much so that for n = 25 the pattern on the right hand side of the graph becomes rather 
noisy (Fig. 8).  Table 5 compares individual models using AIC and AICc. (AICc is preferred 
over AIC for model selection when the ratio of the number of observations to the 
number of parameters is low as it is here.) The table is partitioned into three sections 
because the model results obtained when using different numbers of intervals are not 
comparable. 
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Table 5 A comparison of Poisson regression models fit to counts in intervals 
 
 
The quadratic, segmented, and breakpoint regression models are competitive in 
all cases, while the linear model never provides evidence that project intensity has 
changed over time.  The pattern appears to be bimodal consisting of an increasing 
intensity followed by a decreasing one.  The location of the change point varies 
depending on the model and the number of intervals used in fitting the model. For the 
breakpoint regression models fit using 20 and 25 intervals, the change points occur on 
July 23, 2005 and July 3, 2005, respectively. For the quadratic model that was fit with 15 
time intervals the change point occurs on April 5, 2005. 
Analyzing the Waiting Times between Events 
 Events that occur at irregularly spaced intervals over time, such as the initiation 
dates of individual projects considered here, define a point process. Analyzing the total 
number of events that have occurred at any time (t) is called a counting process.  The 
time spans between individual events are referred to as waiting times.  If the waiting 
Model logLik #parms n AIC AICc 
linear –35.3255 2 15   74.6509   75.6509 
quadratic –29.7255 3 15   65.4511   67.6329 
segmented –28.5593 4 15   65.1186   69.1186 
breakpoint –26.4733 5 15   62.9467   69.6133 
linear –47.5231 2 20   99.0463   99.7522 
quadratic –41.3759 3 20   88.7517   90.2517 
segmented –39.3241 4 20   86.6482   89.3149 
breakpoint –36.8474 5 20   83.6948   87.9805 
linear –51.3423 2 25 106.6846 107.2301 
quadratic –45.5765 3 25   97.1531   98.2959 
segmented –43.4122 4 25   94.8243   96.8243 
breakpoint –41.8213 5 25   93.6426   96.8005 
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times are independent they define another kind of stochastic process called a renewal 
process. Waiting times are typically modeled using asymmetric probability distributions 
with positive support.  Examples include the exponential, Weibull, lognormal, and log-
logistic distributions. The area of statistics that deals with fitting models to duration 
data is known as survival analysis, also called event history analysis. 
 Probability distributions are characterized by a density function, f(t), and/or a 
distribution function, F(t). Formally, 𝐹 𝑡 = 𝑃 𝑇 ≤ 𝑡 =  𝑓 𝑢 𝑑𝑢
𝑡
0
. For a renewal 
process, F(t) is the probability that an event occurs in t units of time or less. Typically 
survival analysis requires using the survival function, S(t), defined as 𝑆 𝑡 = 1 − 𝐹 𝑡 . 
Thus S(t) is the probability that it takes greater than t units of time for an event to occur.  
Another quantity of interest is the intensity of the process, also called the hazard rate, 
h(t). Informally the hazard is the probabilistic rate at which events occur in any given 
instant of time.  More precisely, the hazard rate is the probability that an event occurs in 
the next small interval of time given that it has not occurred so far, divided by the length 
of that time interval. (Technically it is limit of this ratio as the length of the time interval 
goes to zero.)   
Loosely speaking the hazard rate is a conditional probability rate per unit time.  
In the language of survival analysis, asking whether projects arose at different rates in 
different years is equivalent to asking whether or not the hazard function is constant 
over time.  Because the project waiting times can be ordered by calendar date we can 
further investigate whether the change in the hazard rate is influenced by calendar date.  
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In the project data set a number of projects are listed as occurring on the same 
day. This means there is a waiting time of zero between those projects.  Zero is not a 
legal value for the probability distribution, so when projects occurred on the same day 
the ties were arbitrarily broken by evenly spacing out the starting times of those 
projects on those days.  
The survival package of R (Therneau and Lumley, 2008) can be used to fit models 
to time duration data.  It allows the exponential, Weibull, lognormal, or log-logistic 
distributions to be used as probability models.  Each of these distributions was fit to the 
between project waiting times and AIC was used to select the best one (Table 6).  
Table 6  A comparison of waiting time distributions 
Model logLik AIC 
Weibull –282.46 568.93 
lognormal –284.84 573.68 
log-logistic –285.77 575.55 
exponential –290.11 582.23 
 
The AIC-best model is a Weibull distribution. Its estimated hazard function is shown in 
Fig. 9.   In this case, the hazard is a decreasing function of time. 
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Fig. 10 Hazard function of a Weibull distribution fit to the between-project waiting times 
  
Because the Weibull hazard varies over time, it is possible to check if it also 
varies with respect to calendar time.   Five polynomial functions of calendar time—
constant, linear, quadratic, cubic, quartic—and two piecewise linear regression models, 
models constructed from two linear components that have different slopes.  The linear 
components can be connected to yield a continuous curve (segmented regression), or 
not, yielding a discontinuous curve (break point regression).  The transition point from 
one linear segment to the other is called a knot or change point.  Separate candidate 
models were fit using each of the event times as possible knot locations and the knot 
location that maximized the log-likelihood was used for the final model.  One additional 
change point model was considered: a piecewise constant (step) model, a model that is 
constant with respect to calendar time except that this constant changes to a new value 
when the date exceeds the value of the knot. The optimal knot location was chosen just 
as it was for the piecewise linear models. Table 7 summarizes the results.  Models were 
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fit using all four probability models, but because the Weibull always ranked best only 
the Weibull results are displayed.  
Table 7  A comparison of Weibull models with calendar date as a predictor 
Model logLik AIC 
constant –282.46 568.93 
piecewise constant (step) –278.95 563.90 
linear –280.43 566.86 
quadratic –277.27 562.54 
cubic –275.82 561.64 
quartic –275.60 563.21 
segmented –276.02 560.04 
breakpoint –274.94 561.87 
 
These models with a calendar date performed better than a model that ignores 
calendar date (constant).  The model that used a linear function of calendar date (linear) 
was the second worst model.  The remaining models are all very close in terms of AIC.  
The quartic model can be rejected for being overly complicated.  It’s AIC actually 
increased relative to the simpler cubic model suggesting that the additional term is not 
justified.   Although the cubic model ranked second best and yielded a lower AIC than 
the simpler quadratic model, the cubic term itself was not statistically significant (p = 
0.08). The cubic model just beats the breakpoint regression model. The segmented 
regression model ranks best in terms of AIC. 
A Weibull distribution is fully specified with two parameters referred to as the 
scale and the shape parameter.  R’s survreg function models the logarithm of the scale 
parameter as a linear function of regressors.  So in survreg a regression model with a 
single predictor x would be the following. 
log scale = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥 
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This results in the following parameterization of the Weibull survival function in R. 
 
𝑆 𝑡 = exp − scale −𝛼𝑡𝛼  = exp −exp 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥 
−𝛼𝑡𝛼   
 
Here 𝛼 is the shape parameter. The corresponding hazard function is 
 
ℎ 𝑡 = 𝛼 scale −𝛼𝑡𝛼−1 = 𝛼exp 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥 
−𝛼𝑡𝛼−1. 
 
The survreg function of R returns the reciprocal of the true shape parameter and labels 
it in the output as the scale parameter.   The estimated hazard functions for six of the 
models in Table 7 are shown in Fig. 11.  
 
Fig. 11 Hazard rate (intensity) is plotted as a function of calendar date for various 
Weibull models. The legend lists models in their AIC-best order: best (top) to 
worst (bottom) 
 
 Excluding the step and linear models, the intensity (hazard) of the renewal 
process is seen to increase up until a point, a point that varies between mid-2004 to 
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these models the projects initially increase in their frequency after which they occur less 
frequently.  
 The models differ dramatically in the estimated location of the change point 
(Table 8). The form of the model, continuous versus discontinuous, appears to influence 
this somewhat. The less constrained discontinuous models typically have later 
estimated change points (Feb 3, 2005 for the breakpoint model and September 19, 2005 
for the piecewise constant model). The segmented regression model places the change 
point at July 25, 2004 while the peaks of the cubic and quadratic models occur on 
January 9, 2005 and April 17, 2005 respectively. (This parallels the behavior of the 
segmented regression model for grouped data as seen in Figs. 6-8.)   Furthermore, the 
log-likelihoods of the segmented regression models that differ only in their knot 
locations were all very similar. Therefore, although the data clearly indicate that the 
monotonicity of the hazard did change at some point (switching from an increasing 
hazard to a decreasing hazard), the location of that change point varies from model to 
model (Table 8). 
Table 8.  Location of change points  
Model Change point 
constant none 
piecewise constant (step) September 19, 2005 
linear none 
quadratic April 17, 2005 
cubic January 9, 2005 
quartic not evaluated 
segmented July 25, 2004 
breakpoint February 3, 2005 
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APPENDIX F:  GAO 2007 GRAPH 
 
 
 
GAO graph of vegetation management projects approved by the Forest Service using an 
EA, EIS, and CE from 2003 through 2005. 
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APPENDIX G:  RECORDS REQUEST TO GAO 
 
2/24/2009 3:33 PM 
Chief Quality Officer 
U.S. Government Accountability Office 
Room 6K17Q 
441 G Street NW 
Washington, DC   20548  
FAX: (202) 512-4844 
EMAIL: RecordsRequest@gao.gov 
 
Dear Patricia Stokes and Karen Y Holliday, 
 
I am writing about the GAO's Natural Resources & Environment report (GAO-07-99) 
published October 2006, entitled “FOREST SERVICE: Use of Categorical Exclusions for 
Vegetation Management Projects, Calendar Years 2003 through 2005".  I am a doctoral 
student at UNC Chapel Hill, and my dissertation prospectus requires that I obtain data 
available in the GAO's October 2006 study, written by David Bixler, Matthew Reinhart, 
and others.  
 
I am seeking electronic copies of the spreadsheets created for this report relating to 
USFS Region Eight data for *North Carolina EIS, EA, and CE projects.  
 
Please let me know if there is anything else I need to do for this request.  
 
Thank you for your help. 
 
Best regards, 
 
Andrew George 
andrewg@unc.edu  
Doctoral Candidate/Lecturer 
Ecology 
UNC Chapel Hill 
Phone: 828 280 6956 
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APPENDIX H:  FOIA REQUEST 
Freedom of Information Act Request to US Forest Service 
 
July 1, 2009 
 
Marisue Hilliard 
National Forests in North Carolina 
160A Zillicoa Street 
Asheville, NC 28801 
 
Re: Freedom of Information Act Request 
 
Dear Forest Supervisor:  
 
Under the Freedom of Information Act, I am requesting copies of project files for USFS projects listed on 
the attached form.  I am a graduate student researching North Carolina’s national forest categorical 
exclusion projects from 2003-2008.   As a doctoral candidate at the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill’s Curriculum for the Environment and Ecology, I represent an educational institution and I would like 
to request a fee waiver for any copying and mailing costs in order to fulfill this request. 
We further request that any fees associated with this request be waived because disclosure of the records 
is "likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of government 
and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester." 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). This request 
satisfies all of the requirements for a fee waiver.  
I have no commercial interest in the records sought.  My interest lies in using the requested information 
to advance my own understanding, as well as that of other members of the public, into the activities of 
the USFS regarding its operations and purposes.  In sum, application of the statute to this request compels 
the conclusion that a fee waiver is appropriate.  
If there are any fees charged for searching or copying the records that are not waived, please let me know 
before you fill my request.  If you deny any part of this request, please cite each specific reason that you 
think justifies your refusal to release the information. Please notify me of appeal procedures available 
under the law.  
 
I would also like to thank your assistant forest planner and others NEPA field officers for their help and 
time spent educating me about this process.  If you have any questions processing this request, you may 
contact me at the following telephone number 828 *** ****. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Andrew George 
Curriculum for the Environment and Ecology 
209 Coates Building CB# 3275 
223 E. Franklin Street 
UNC Chapel Hill 
Chapel Hill NC, 27514 
 
CC: Lisa Harper, Forest FOIA coordinator 
CC: Heather Luczak, Assistant Forest Planner 
